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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
The three main aims of this research were: (l) to compare a
specific and time-limited form of psychotherapy, namely cognitive therapy,
with pharmacotherapy (drug of choice) in the treatment of depression,
(2) to test out the effect of combining cognitive therapy and pharmaco¬
therapy (drug of choice) and (3) to investigate the efficacy of these
modes of treatment relative to one another in two populations, outpatients
from a teaching hospital and from the community, i.e. a general practice.
Depressed patients were referred from two sources, a hospital out¬
patient clinic and a general practice clinic, and were screened using a
standard psychiatric interview, the Present State Examination, for
elicitation of symptoms and signs. On the basis of this interview,
Spitzer's research diagnostic criteria were checked. All of the patients
admitted to the study satisfied the criteria for primary major depressive
disorder. In addition, level of self-reported depression had to be
at least mild according to the British norms of the Beck Depression
Inventory (i.e. >14).
Eighty-eight patients were randomly assigned to pharmacotherapy
(drug of choice), individual treatment with cognitive therapy or a
combination of pharmacotherapy (drug of choice) and individual cognitive
therapy. For the cognitive therapy and combination treatment, the
protocol specified a maximum of 20 weeks, with both cognitive therapy
groups attending twice a week at the beginning and once a week thereafter.
The pharmacotherapy patients were prescribed therapeutic doses appropriate
to each drug. If no response occurred (i.e. at least a 50% reduction
in level of depression) after a maximum of twelve weeks of treatment,
patients were dropped from the trial whatever type of treatment they
received.
In the hospital sample all three treatment groups showed statistically
significant decreases in depressive symptoms. Combination treatment
resulted in greater improvement than did cognitive therapy alone and
pharmacotherapy alone on a number of mood and cognitive measures.
In the general practice population, combination treatment and
cognitive therapy alone resulted in statistically significant decreases
in depressive symptoms whereas pharmacotherapy, on the whole, failed to
reduce depressive symptoms. Both combination treatment and cognitive
therapy alone resulted in significantly greater decreases in depressive
symptoms than did pharmacotherapy on several measures of mood and a
cognitive measure.
When responders only were examined, pharmacotherapy, cognitive
therapy and combination treatment produced different patterns of response
over the treatment period in terms of self-reported depression and
hopelessness. Combination treatment in particular, but cognitive
therapy as well, resulted in a quicker and sharper effect than pharmaco¬
therapy, especially on hopelessness, a variable that is reported to
correlate highly with suicidal intent.
In terms of attrition, no one treatment was better than any other
in reducing the number of drop outs from therapy in each population.
It was concluded that cognitive therapy is at least as effective as
pharmacotherapy in the treatment of hospital outpatients and that it is
more effective than pharmacotherapy in depressed general practice patients.
Further, the combination of pharmacotherapy and individual cognitive therapy
may be particularly useful in the treatment of chronically depressed
hospital outpatients.
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A. GENERAL AIM OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis is directed towards examining the scope and
limitations of cognitive-behavioural therapy, a theoretically-
based, pragmatic and time-limited psychological approach to the
treatment of depression. The decision to investigate the efficacy
of this treatment, relative to traditional pharmacological methods,
was considerably influenced by the sequence of research studies which
have been undertaken by A.T. Beck and his associates at the University
of Pennsylvania and by other researchers who, over the last twenty
years, have investigated the role of thinking in the development of
human emotions and behaviours.
B. DEFINITION OF DEPRESSION
Depression is one of the oldest recognised disorders of psycho¬
logical life. The Biblical figure Oob suffered from severe depression
and feelings of self-reproach; in the first century Plutarch graphic¬
ally described behaviours characteristic of the disturbance; in 1621
Sir Robert Button devoted an entire treatise to 'The Anatomy of
Melancholy' (Zilboorg and Henry, 1949), and in the twentieth century
depression is said to have become so widespread that it has been
referred to as 'the common cold of mental illness' (Miller and Seligman,
1973, P.62). Some authors have been quick to attribute its prevalence
to technological, social and economic pressures; others have been more
reserved in their search for explanations. Whatever its ultimate
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cause, one thing is clear: the management of clinical depression
ranks as one of the most challenging tasks in modern psychiatry.
Depression is typically thought of as a mood or affective
disorder. Some opening remarks concerning affect-related terms may
be useful here. Nowlis (1963) regards affects as hierarchically
ordered phenomena; in order of increasing degree the sequence is
composed of emotions, moods and temperaments. Higher degrees of
affect last longer than lower ones. In combination, higher degree affects
afford the background activity with which environmental stimuli inter¬
act in the manifestation of affective responses. Emotional states
relate to situation-specific affects, whereas emotional traits refer
to a predisposition to experience certain emotional states with con¬
sistent and somewhat predictable latencies, intensities, and durations
(Spielberger, 1972); there is substantial overlap between the concepts
of mood and affective trait. According to some theorists, then,
depression may be conceptualised as an affective trait, predisposition,
or mood (Becker, 1977).
Although a large literature exists on state and trait anxiety
as a personality construct, relatively little has been written about
state and trait depression. Behaviourally oriented theorists have
shown a tendency to apply the concept of anxiety to all dysphoric states
and temperaments but, as will become clear, this situation has changed
considerably in recent years.
As Becker (1974, 1977) notes, moods are not entirely affective
occurrences; they are associated with thoughts and overt behaviours.
Cognitively oriented researchers regard moods as a class of responses
to an intervening evaluation of antecedent events. This evaluation
may well entail a cognitive bias (Beck, 1967; Lazarus, 1968). Such a
position underscores the importance of thinking style in the aetiology
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□f depression and forms the theoretical backbone of this thesis.
Some authors focus on the motivational characteristics of affects
(Broun and Farber, 1951; Tomkins, 1962); others concentrate on their
operant properties (Ferster, 1974; Lewinsohn, 1974). Some of these
different approaches and their implications for depression as a set
of clinical problems will be discussed shortly.
The label 'depression' may refer to a state of 'feeling low',
or a simple case of 'the blues', to a symptom, a syndrome, or a disease
(Mendels, 1968). As Greenacre (1953) says: 'Depression as a symptom
is as ubiquitous as life itself and, in a mild degree, appears 'naturally'
as a reaction to loss which need hardly be questioned'. When, then,
is depression a malady? She concludes, 'it is certainly the intensity,
the excessive duration, and the domination of the organism by the
affect, rather than its occurrence which is pathological' (P.9).
Although the difference between a mild bout of 'feeling low'
and depression is, in many ways, a matter of degree, within the field
of psychiatry depression is also regarded as a qualitative deviation
from the norm. Because there are no signs or symptoms that are
unique to depression, it is frequently associated with many other
psychopathological conditions and some physical illnesses (Blumenthal,
1971). Not surprisingly, the study and treatment of clinical depression
is plagued by the problem of low diagnostic reliability (Zubin, 1967;
Kendell, 1975).
Burns and Beck (1978) have summarised the descriptive aspects
of depression:
'Depression is a disorder of the entire psychobiologic system in¬
cluding the emotions, thoughts, behaviours and somatic functions.
The emotional component is characterised by a blue mood involving
feelings of sadness, anhedonia, guilt, irritability and despair.
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The somatic functions include hypochondriasis, insomnia, or
hypersomnia, weight gain or loss, constipation or diarrhoea,
fatigue and decreased libido. The behavioural changes are
characterized by passivity, lethargy, inactivity, social isolation,
withdrawal from work and avoidance of pleasurable activities. In
some patients there is an associated anxiety component that con¬
sists of fear, apprehension, and a sense of impending doom.
Frank panic attacks may be accompanied by somatic sensations
such as a jumpy stomach, tingling fingers, rapid breathing, and
lightheadedness.' (P. 109)
As noted, none of these symptoms invariably accompanies depression
and none is wholly specific to depression.
C. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
Although the study of depression is fraught with disagreement
and semantic, diagnostic and aetiological problems, the fact remains
that depression occupies a prominent place in the scientific in¬
vestigation of mental disturbance. Depression certainly seems to
account for a relatively large proportion of in-patient and out-patient
cases in psychiatric hospitals. For example, the 1978 admission
figures for the Royal Edinburgh Hospital show that, of the 2,401
admissions, 319 or 13.3 per cent were given a diagnosis of depression
according to the International Classification of Diseases Code (1965).
Moreover, the admission figures for 1978 obtained from the Scottish
Home and Health Department show that, of the 26,207 admissions to all
Scottish psychiatric hospitals, 13.3 per cent of the 14,305 women
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admitted and 6.9 per cent of the 11,902 men admitted had been classified
as suffering from a depression. Although twice as many women had
received a diagnosis of depression, the single most common diagnosis
given to males was alcoholism, or alcoholic psychosis (approximately 33
per cent). With regard to alcoholism, it has been suggested that
alcohol abuse may be an attempt by some individuals, particularly males, to
control depression and anxiety (Goss and Morasko, 1970). Thus, the
excessive use of alcohol may mask depression in some people.
Further evidence of the size of the problem which depression
presents to the field of mental health can be seen in Brown and Harris's
(1978) study of the prevalence of depression in Camberwell, a large,
predominently working-class Inner London borough. They found that
as many as 8 per cent of women surveyed at random had been psychiatrically
disturbed during the year preceding contact with a trained interviewer.
Although these community cases were, on the whole, less severely
disturbed than an identified group of psychiatric patients, those sampled
did seek medical attention at some point during their depressive episode.
Recently, Weissman and Myers (1978) investigated the prevalence
of affective disorders in a United States urban community using an
interview schedule based on Spitzer's Research Diagnostic 'Criteria
(1978). The main finding was that primary major depression was the most
common disorder in the community with a current prevalence rate of 4.3
per cent.
The range of findings for population studies varies
The figures have been calculated using
(manic-depressive psychosis, depressed
psychosis, circular type but currently
and 300.4 (neurotic depression).
four diagnostic categories: 296.1
type), 296.3 (manic-depressive
depressed), 298.0 (depressive type),
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considerably. Many of these variations may be explained by variations,
in methodology, especially in the diagnostic criteria used. It is
likely that this accounts for discrepancies in community survey data
and, as will become clear, admission rates between the United Kingdom
and America. In general, however, epidemiological studies have
estimated that from four to twenty-four per cent of the population
may experience episodes of depression severe enough to warrant
clinical intervention (Schwab et al., 1968). Depression self-report
symptom scales (e.g. Zung, Beck Depression Inventory) when applied
to community samples account for the relatively higher estimates
(kleissman et al. , 1978).
There is also evidence that, in populations of medically ill
patients, depression is frequently underdiagnosed and is inappropriately
treated even when recognised (Davidson et al. , 1973; Kotin et al. ,
1973; Lehmann, 1968; Raft, 1975). In a community survey, for example,
Craig et al. (1978) examined the relationship between current drug use
and symptoms of depression. Forty-two per cent of 771 men and sixty
par cent of 1,059 women reported having used one or more medications
in the 48 hours prior to an interview. The use of medications and
the number of medications used increased progressively with age among
both men and women. Respondents who used four or more drugs included
significantly more high scorers on a depression checklist than those
who used fewer medications. Moreover, the group of women who used
minor tranquilizers and sedatives included significantly more high
depression scorers than those who did not. In both men and women,
those scoring in the depressed range who were getting psychotropic
drugs tended to be taking minor tranquilizers or sedatives. The
authors concluded:
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'At the present time, if depression is recognized at-all, it
is most likely to be treated with non-specific remedies (minor
tranquilizers and sedatives) that, at best, offer merely
palliative symptomatic relief and, at worst, may intensify the
distress they are intended to treat.' (P.1039)
Similarly, diazepam and other antianxiety agents, not anti¬
depressants, were the drugs most commonly prescribed for depressed
individuals in a sample of middle class people seeking marital and
sexual counseling (Gullick and King, 1979); in a door to door survey
of symptoms present and drugs used (Uhlenhuth _et_al. , 1978); and in
family practice patients (Hesbacher et al., 1976). Thus, depression
might be one psychiatric syndrome for which diazepam and similar drugs
are most often inappropriately prescribed.
Inappropriate treatment (antianxiety agents) of depression is
a matter for concern because the disturbance may result in suicide.
There appear to be many other aspects of the morbidity, as well as
the mortality, of depression that warrant appropriate treatment.
For instance, Weissman and Klerman (1977) in an investigation of
chronic depression found the use of antianxiety medication (rather
than antidepressants) to be one of the three most important factors
correlated with chronicity of depression, the others being evidence
of neurotic personality patterns predating the acute episode,and not
having received maintenance treatment beyond the acute phase.
According to the National Institute of Mental Health, depression
accounts for seventy-five per cent of all psychiatric hospitalizations
in the United States and during any given year fifteen per cent of all
adults between the ages of 18 and 74 may experience significant de¬
pressive symptoms (Secunda, 1973, in Beck, 1978). Secunda also reports
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that twenty-five per cent of hospitalised depressed patients and
ten per cent of diagnosed depressed patients are psychotic by rigorous
criteria, i.e. diagnosed on the basis of socio-environmental criteria
and the presence of biological signs of depression rather than on the
basis of a thought disorder such as delusions, hallucinations, or
impaired reality testing (in Becker, 1977). It must be noted that
these diagnostic criteria are not generally accepted in the United
Kingdom where delusions and hallucinations are considered as the sine
qua non of a psychotic illness (Wing et al. , 1974; Foulds, 1976).
Certainly, the different emphasis on symptoms in the two countries
helps to explain the considerably lower admission figures found in
Scottish psychiatric hospitals.
As suggested earlier, for some people a depressive episode
ends fatally. Stengel (1970) has reported that the number of people
attempting suicide in a large metrapolitan city such as London with
a population of eight million is between 7500 and 12000 per year;
for England and Wales the figure is between 30000 and 40000 per
year. The estimated mean annual suicide rate per 100000 papulation
in England and Wales for the period 1965-1973 inclusive is reported
to be 10.75 for men and 7.4 for women (Myers and Neal, 1978). With
regard to suicide attempts, many are not successful and many are not
the result of depression. Nevertheless, it is generally recognised
that the most vulnerable people to death by suicide are those who
suffer from depression. For example, retrospective studies (Robins
et al. , 1959; Dorpot and Ripley, 1960; Flood and Seager, 1968;
Barraclough et al., 1974) have shown that in B0 to 90 per cent or more
of deaths from suicide, the victim had experienced psychiatric distur¬
bance at the time of death, most frequently depression, but often
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alcoholism.
Secunda (1973, in Becker, 1977) reported that in the United
States the suicide rate for the general population is 0.01 per cent,
while it is about fourteen per cent for individuals suffering from
bipolar affective disorder, i.e. a history of depression and mania.
The author also points out that approximately 23,000 people commit
suicide in the United States per year, this in spite of advances in
the chemotherapy of depression. Wiles .'(1977) collected evidence from
a variety of sources and concluded that almost all of the suicides in
America can be attributed to depressive illness, followed closely by
alcoholism, then schizophrenia, neurosis and personality disorder,
and drug addiction.
In his paper 'Suicide in Britain', Brown (1979) states that,
while doctors have an important potential role in preventing suicide
among depressed patients, this potential has yet to be realised and
that primary prevention may not have had much impact on suicidal
behaviour. For instance, he cites the study by Barraclough et al.
(1974) in which 93 of 100 consecutive suicides had visited a doctor
within one year of death, and 48 within one week of death. Of
these 24 had sought help from a psychiatrist. In another study
Murphy (1975, also in Brown) found that of 49 suicides who had presented
to a doctor within six months of dying, 35 had threatened or tried to
commit suicide, but only 39% of the doctors were aware of this history.
Similarly, Myers and Neal (1978) reported that very few of the
psychiatric patients in their investigation were receiving adequate
physical treatment for depression at the time of death, yet 63 per
cent had consulted a physician within a month beforehand. Thus,
it seems there is room for improvement with respect to the prevention
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of suicide. As Broun (1979) recommends, .it may be that more effective
education of physicians, including psychiatrists, in the diagnosis
and application of physical treatments of depression is required in
order to achieve this goal. Houever, a potentially useful alternative
to drug treatment for the depressed, suicide-prone individual might
be the kind of psychological treatment being investigated in this
thiesis, namely cognitive-behavioural therapy.
What is the likelihood that an individual uill develop a
depressive illness in his lifetime? Secunda (1973, in Becker, 1977)
estimated that the lifetime probability of developing a severe de¬
pressive episode is from four to ten per cent, though a higher figure
(18 per cent) is reported by Wsissman et al. (1978). Consistent uith
hospital admission figures, the prevalence rate for uomen is usually
reported as being tuice that of menv(Weissman and Klerman, 1977). y
Apart from the anguish uhich depression causes for the individual and
his family, particularly in vieu of the recurrent nature of the ill¬
ness, the treatment of depressive disorders places considerable strain
on the resources of any health service.
Given the relatively high prevalence, morbidity, and mortality
of depression, it is clear that depression must be regarded as a major
health problem. Physicians find it hard to diagnose depression,
especially at the primary care level. Even if it is recognised in
the community, it is likely to be treated uith non-specific remedies
uhich may simply perpetuate an already debilitating illness. Tech¬
niques for the prevention of suicidal behaviour Cuhich is on the
increase in Britain and the United States (Broun, 1979)) are in need
of improvement in both the primary care and psychiatric clinic.
Finally, the probability of an individual developing a depressive
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disorder during his lifetime, particularly women, is quite high.
D. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT
What kind of interventions are needed to deal with these
problems? As will be discussed in the next chapter, the appropriate
use of physical methods of treatment (EOT, tricyclics, MAOIs and
lithium) has provided a partial answer to this question. For example,
there is strong evidence that physical treatments, in particular EOT
and tricyclic drugs, work very well for some depressed patients.
However, various investigations and reviews (e.g. MRC Trial, 1965;
Quitkin et al. , 1976; Morris and Beck, 1974) indicate that a significant
percentage of patients do not recover at all, and for those who do
respond, recovery may be slow and incomplete with frequent relapses.
In light of the deficiencies in the therapeutic response of
depressed patients, it would appear to be worthwhile to investigate
alternative methods of treatment for depression, in particular those
psychological techniques which have received the most persuasive
empirical support. Recently, cognitive and behavioural psychologists
and psychiatrists have shown an interest in affective disorders which
has led to the development of a set of psychological techniques for
the treatment of depressions (Mahoney, 1974; Seligman, 1975;
Lewinsohn, 1974; Ferster, 1974; Rehm, 1977; Beck, 1967, 1973,
1976, 1978, 1979). Several factors would appear to account for
this heightened interest:
(1) the less than satisfactory results obtained by physical methods
of treatment as outlined above
(2) evidence for the efficacy of behavioural, or performance-
based therapies for the treatment of problems such as phobias,
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test anxiety, stuttering, bedwetting, etc.
(3) the growing awareness that a pluralistic approach is perhaps
the most reasonable stance to take with respect to the
aetiology of depression (Akiskal and McKinney, 1975)
(4) the increasing amount of empirical support for the role
of cognition within the freamework of social learning
theory (Bandura, 1977) to explain human behaviour in general,
and specifically,
(5) the growing awareness that thinking style may play an important
role in the development and maintenance of emotional disorders.
E. FORMAT OF THE REVIEW
The following chapters will take up these points in more detail.
Before that, a review of physical treatments of depression is presented,
highlighting deficiencies which, in spite of the not inconsiderable
success of this therapeutic approach, undermine the adequacy of a purely
biological model of depressive illness. Chapter two will also consider
the evidence for the use of drugs in combination with psychotherapy.
The third chapter will consider the impact which the various psycho¬
social theories, particularly behavioural approaches, have made on the
study of depression, as well as their therapeutic implications. Chapter
four, the final review section, will examine the theory and supporting
evidence which underlies the research reported in this thesis, that is,
the cognitive approach to the treatment of clinical depression.
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CHAPTER TWO
DRUGS, ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY AND THE USE OF DRUGS
IN COMBINATION WITH PSYCHOTHERAPY IN THE TREATMENT OF
DEPRESSION
A. PHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENTS
The affective disorders vary in severity from mild but nevertheless
distressing self-limiting alterations in mood, many of which never come
to medical attention, right through to the most severe and disabling psychotic
states. For clinical depression, urgent measures are indicated for
psychotic symptoms, depressive stupor and suicidal intent. The depressive
syndrome also leads to considerable morbidity with impairment of domestic,
social and occupational aspects of life. However, with regard to treatment,
the tricyclic compounds and monoamine oxidase inhibitors introduced over
twenty years ago have been reported to provide symptom relief in a significant
proportion of depressed patients (Davis et al. , 1968; Smith et al., 1969;
Morris and Beck, 1974; Rogers and Clay, 1975; WHO, 1975). Other drugs
reported to have antidepressant effects include the tetracyclic compounds,
lithium, iprindole, some phenothiazines and diazepam (Rush, 1975).
This section of the review presents a selective overview of research
findings on the efficacy of pharmacological treatment in depression,
focusing primarily on outcome studies in which tricyclics, monoamine oxidase
inhibitors and the relatively new tetracyclic compounds are used. As a
cornerstone for the chapter, the author has relied heavily on several key
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reviews (e.g. MRC Trial, 1965; Morris and Beck, 1974; Paykel and Coppen,
1979) because they represent the most comprehensive and critical summary
to date on the current status of antidepressant medication. In addition,
a search through Psychological Abstracts was made in order to survey drug
studies conducted between January 1, 1973 and March 31, 1979. It was
found that many articles reported investigations on new drugs, particularly
tricyclic derivatives, many of which are not marketed in the United Kingdom,
findings on groups containing very few subjects, i.e. less than fifteen
in each cell, and studies in which experimental drugs not in widespread use
clinically (e.g. neurotransmitter precursor substances such as L-tryptophan)
were tested and shown to produce equivalent effects on depressive symptoms
relative to tricyclic control groups. These investigations are not
included in the review. Also excluded were studies of inpatient populations
in which it was clear that schizophrenics with 'secondary depressive symptoms'
had been included in the sample (e.g. Raskin etal. , 1975).
Original articles which report findings on relatively large populations
in which the more effective antidepressants are used are selectively
summarised. Moreover, the survey includes primarily those investigations
that meet the following criteria: (a) the use of a control group, (b) random
assignment of patients to treatment groups, (c) double-blind research design,
(d) relatively large sample sizes, i.e. greater than 30 subjects. Thus,
an attempt is made to overcome weaknesses of previous studies (as discussed
in Beck, 1967, 1973) by defining specific inclusion criteria for the studies
reviewed. As Morris and Beck (1974) point out, 'a summary of studies that
meet these methodological criteria is more likely to permit a valid con¬
clusion' (P. 667).
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A survey of the recent literature revealed articles reporting studies
of two or more drugs at the same time. The list of treatments reflect
the separate comparisons in these investigations. Also, throughout the
review the term 'treatment group' is used to indicate that the reference
is to only one section of a reported study.
The subjects in the most recent survey (January, 1973 to March, 1979)
had manifest clinical depression, ranged in age from twenty-one to sixty-
five years and spent an average of 5.2 weeks in drug treatment. While
only those investigations that met the methodological criteria outlined
above are included, there was wide variation among the studies with regard
to such critical variables as (l) patient characteristics, (2) length of time
between treatment and evaluation, (3) method of assessment of improvement,
(4) type of control condition, (5) schedule of pharmacotherapy administration,
(6) physiological variations within and among patients and (7) statistical
analyses. Some of the confounding effects of these variables will be taken
up later.
1. Tricyclics
The tricyclic antidepressants include imipramine hydrochloride
(Tofranil, Presamine), desipramine hydrochloride (Norpramin, Pertofrane),
amitriptyline hydrochloride (Elavil, Tryptizol), nortriptyline hydrochloride
(Aventyl), protriptyline hydrochloride (Vivactil) and doxepin hydrochloride
(Sinequan). The author also found numerous reports in the recent
literature which described studies on the efficacy of a new tricyclic
called Amoxapine and these are also included in the review. Studies
have investigated the efficacy of one or more of these drugs compared
with a placebo, or the differential effects of two tricyclics and/or
one of the relatively new tetracyclic compounds.
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2. Tricyclics versus placebo
Morris and Beck (1974) provide an extensive review of published
research which included 146 double blind studies on drugs actively
promoted in the United States as antidepressants during 1972. The
data indicate that, in total, tricyclics were more effective than
placebo in 61 of 93 treatment groups which included inpatient, out¬
patient and mixed in and outpatient samples.
Rogers and Clay (1975) did a statistical review of controlled
trials of imipramine and placebo in the treatment of depressive illness
by extracting the basic data and analysing these by Fisher's two-tailed
test. They tabulated the results of thirty studies and divided these
into three diagnostic groups - endogenous, mixed endogenous/neurotic,
and neurotically depressed patients. They found that in the endogenous
depressed category five out of fourteen studies showed imipramine to
be more effective than placebo, the drug being particularly effective
for patients in an acute phase of the illness. Thirteen studies
included mixed endogenous/neurotic patient samples and of these three
showed imipramine to be superior to placebo, while two out of three
investigations indicated the superiority of imipramine over placebo
in the neurotically depressed group. In total, imipramine was more
effective than placebo in ten out of thirty studies reviewed but only
one of these demonstrated the efficacy of imipramine in a sample of
chronically depressed patients (Leyberg et al., 1959).
As the list of studies in Table 2l\i indicates, the author found
six comparisons of tricyclics with placebo in four investigations between
1973 and 1979. There were no studies on inpatient and mixed inpatient
and outpatient samples. The four separate studies on outpatients
reported significant results in favour of tricyclic drugs in all six
comparisons.
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Table 2^ Controlled studies comparing tricyclics with placebo (1973 to 1979)
(6 tricyclic comparisons in 4 studies)

































p = < .05
both drugs superior
to placebo
p = < .05
both drugs superior
to placebo
p = < .05
imipramine superior
to placebo
p = < .05
Thus, the euidence presented in this reuiew indicates that, although
equiuocal results haue been reported, tricyclics are more effectiue than
placebo in the treatment of depression and the most definitiue results
are obtained in the treatment of non-chronic populations.
3. Imipramine and amitriptyline uersus other tricyclics
Morris and Beck (1974) also reuiewed studies that compared the effects
of imipramine and another tricyclic drug. The data, condensed in table
2A2 , indicates that by 1972 there were a total of thirty treatment group
comparisons reported in twenty-nine studies. Four comparisons showed
superiority of imipramine ouer other tricyclics, six treatment groups
indicated that imipramine was less effectiue than other tricyclics, while
twenty comparisons showed no significant difference between imipramine and
■- other tricyclics.
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Table 2A2 Number of drug group comparisons showing imipramine superior
to, inferior to, or equivalent to other tricyclics
(30 treatment group comparisons in 29 studies)
Comparison drugs: desipramine, amitriptyline, nortriptyline,
protriptyline, doxepin, perphenazine
Imipramine
Superior Inferior Equivalent effect
4 6 20
(superior and inferior indicate significant difference at p = < .05 )
Similarly, Morris and Beck (1974) reviewed studies which compared
the effects of amitriptyline and other tricyclic drugs (table 2A3). These
indicate that in thirty-eight treatment groups in thirty-three studies,
nine comparisons showed superiority of amitriptyline over other drugs,
six treatment groups showed amitriptyline to be less effective than other
tricyclics and twenty three groups reported no significant difference
between amitriptyline and other tricyclics.
Table 2A3 Number of drug group comparisons showing amitriptyline superior
to, inferior to, or equivalent to other tricyclics
(38 treatment group comparisons in 33 studies)
Comparison drugs: imipramine, nortriptyline, protriptyline,
doxepin, perphenazine
Amitriptyline
Superior Inferior Equivalent effect
9 6 23
(superior and inferior indicate significant difference at p = < .05)
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The author found four studies between 1973 and 1979 that reported on
the efficacy of imipramine compared with other tricyclics and four investi¬
gations which compared amitriptyline with alternative tricyclics. As
the data in table 2A4 indicate, imipramine was found to be superior to the
little used tricyclic dimathracine when administered to a small sample of
depressed inpatients (Abuzzahab, 1973). Two studies reported no significant
differences between imipramine and other tricyclics (amoxapine, amitriptyline)
in larger outpatient samples, though in both instances there was significant
symptomatic improvement. Similarly, Smith (1975) reported an equivalent
effect on symptoms for imipramine and amoxapine.
Table 2A4 Controlled studies comparing imipramine and amitriptyline with
other tricyclics (1973 to 1979)
(B tricyclic comparisons)









p = < .05
Rickels,
1974
Amitriptyline vs depressed outpatients




p = < .05
Olgiati et al.,
1974
amitriptyline vs depressed outpatients
pizotyline (N = 73)
equivalent effect

















Barnes, 1977 amitriptyline vs depressed outpatients




p = < .05
Yamhuire et al.,
1977
amitriptyline vs depressed outpatients




imipramine vs depressed outpatients
amitriptyline (N = 57)
equivalent effect
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There were four investigations that compared the effects of
amitriptyline with alternative tricyclics. Rickels et al. (1974)
reported results on a large sample of 93 psychiatric and 75 nonpsychiatric
outpatients who received either amitriptyline or clomipramine in a six week
trial. The main finding was that both agents produced a high level of
clinical improvement. According to several endpoint measures, amitriptylins
was found to be superior to clomipramine, though there were differential
effects on symptoms in the different outpatient samples.
While Morris and Beck (1974) did not report on any studies comparing
amitriptyline with desipramine, the author located one study that examined
the efficacy of these drugs. Barnes (1977) found desipramine to be more
effective than amitriptyline (p = < .05) with regard to symptomatic improve¬
ment and faster onset of therapeutic action.
Finally, two studies compared the effects of amitriptyline with two
of the recently investigated tricyclic compounds (Olgiati et al., 1974;
Yamhure et al. , 1977). In both' instances no significant differences
were found between amitriptyline and the experimental drugs (amoxapine,
pizotyline).
In summary, the review indicates that when the effects of the conventional
and most popular tricyclic antidepressants (imipramine and amitriptyline)
are compared with one another and/or tricyclic derivatives, the majority of
treatment comparisons (fourty-eiqht out of seventy-six) show no significant
differences between the drugs.
4. Other comparisons and tricyclic compounds
Morris and Beck (1974) reviewed five studies in which tricyclic
derivatives were compared with each other. None of the studies reported
significant differences between these chemical agents. Recently, Poldinger
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et al. (1978) reported an investigation on the comparative efficacy
of nomifenisine and nortriptyline in a sample of depressed outpatients.
Although both groups improved significantly from baseline measures,
no significant difference was found betuieen the two drugs.
The efficacy of the antidepressant iprindole, a drug closely related
to doxepine, was found to be superior to placebo in three studies reviewed
by Morris and Beck (1974). Iprindole has also been compared recently
with imipramine in a study which involved one hundred depressed/anxious,
general practice outpatients (Rickels et al., 1973). Again no significant
difference was found irl the effects of the two drugs, although both groups
gained a high level of symptomatic improvement.
5. Monoamine oxidase inhibitors
The monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOl) constitute a second major class
of antidepressants. Phenelzine sulfate (Nardil) and tranylcypromine sulfate
(Parnate) are the two primary drugs in this category.
In 1965, an important clinical trial compared ECT, imipramine, phenelzine
and placebo in the treatment of depression. Phenelzine was found to be
only as effective as placebo in men and gave even less favourable results
than placebo in females (MRC Trial, 1965). Morris and Beck (1974) examined
eighteen studies involving tranylcypromine or phenelzine compared with
imipramine and with placebo. They concluded that MAO inhibitors generally
failed to show the same degree of superiority over placebo as tricyclics.
Tyrer (1976) reviewed twelve controlled trials comparing phenelzine
and placebo and found that a more favourable outcome in six of the studies
seemed to be associated with a larger dose than normal (45 mg/day) and
continuation of treatment for six weeks.
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Patients considered suitable for treatment with NAO inhibitors have
been described as having 'atypical', 'reactive', or 'neurotic' depressive
illness (Sargent, 1961) whereas tricyclics are said to be the drugs of
choice for patients with 'typical' endogenous depressive symptomatology.
Whether 'atypical depression' constitutes a valid diagnostic entity is still
a matter of rigorous debate (Kendell, 1976). MAOl's have also been shown
to be of benefit in anxiety states and phobic anxiety, especially agoraphobias
and social phobias (Kelly, 1973, in Barnes et al., 1977).
Though earlier comparative studies, including the flRC Trial, could be
criticised for inadequate dosage and duration of MAOI treatment, it would
seem that in the treatment of severe depression tricyclic antidepressants
/
are to be preferred.
6. The tetracyclics
flaprotiline
A number of investigators have compared the effects of maprotiline
in depressed patients with the effects of imipramine or amitriptyline.
The drug first came to medical attention in 1972 following the appearancw
of reports on its pharmacological and clinical characteristics. The
medication is extensively reviewed by Pinder et al. (1977).
Pinto et al. (1972) reviewed thirteen double-blind trials in
which maprotiline was administered in a dosage of 150 mg daily and
compared with conventional antidepressants in a similar dosage.
Taken together, these investigations involved 850 patients. After
approximately 28 days of treatment the evaluations showed no significant
differences between the efficacy of the treatments on depressive symptoms
as measured by the Hamilton rating scale for depression. There was
marked improvement in over 70 per cent of patients in all of the drug
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conditions.
The effects of maprotiline have been investigated in a feu
placebo controlled studies. For example, maprotiline or placebo
was administered to a matched group of nineteen patients. Equivalent
effects were demonstrated between the treatment groups after one, two
and four weeks of treatment. The results of this particular study
are difficult to interpret because the treatment groups were ill-
matched. Two thirds of the placebo group were hospital inpatients
as compared with one third of the maprotiline group which also contained
a large proportion of patients with a history of previous or recurrent
depressive episodes (Dukes, 1975a, in Windham, 1979). Other studies
(WcCallum and Weares, 1975) have reported results comparing maprotiline,
amitriptyline and placebo which are equally difficult to interpret.
Some researchers have found maprotiline to have a more rapid
onset of action. For instance, Pinto et al., (op cit. ) found maprotiline
to be superior to imipramine in retarded depressed patients after one
week's treatment, and also to amitriptyline after two weeks' administration
in agitated depressed patients, but these differences were not maintained
after four weeks' treatment.
Thus, the findings of investigations in which standard antidepressants
were used as controls and studies which involved placebo controls are
puzzling and difficult to interpret. The consensus of opinion appears
to be that maprotiline may only be as effective as standard drug treat¬
ments for depression. Further studies are required to clarify the
important findings reported to date.
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Mianserin
The pharmacological properties of mianserin have been extensively
investigated since the early 1970*s while reports of its clinical
efficacy have appeared since 1973.
As with maprotiline, controlled clinical trials have compared
the drug with amitriptyline and imipramine. The reports indicate little
difference between the drugs in terms of antidepressant effect. Some
of the studies noted fewer complaints of side effects from the patients
receiving mianserin (Coppen and Ghose, 1976; Coppen et al., 1976;
lilheatley, 1976; Ghose et al. , 1976, in Windham, 1979).
Windham (1979) mentions an important trial conducted by Wurphy
et al. (1976) in general practice because it is one of the few that
involved comparison with placebo. A double-blind comparison of the
effects of mianserin, imipramine and placebo was made. Imipramine
and mianserin showed a similar degree of improvement and were significantly
superior to placebo. The drugs were reportedly effective against the
same range of symptoms and the "benefit-over placebo became evident
after two to three weeks of treatment.
Thus, mianserin also seems to be an effective drug in the treat¬
ment of depression, though it would not appear to offer greater
therapeutic advantage than the standard antidepressants.
7. Lithium carbonate
Lithium carbonate is an alkali metal which is thought to modify the
distribution of electrolytes at a subcellular level (e.g. Prien et al., 1974)
thereby maintaining cell electrolyte balance. Lithium has been used primaril'
in the management of manic-depressive illness in the manic phase, the
prophylaxis of recurrent mania, and bipolar illness (Morris and Beck, 1974;
Paykel and Rowan, 1979).
With regard to the prophylaxis of depression, a number of investigators
have found lithium superior to placebo in the treatment of bipolar patients
(e.g. Baastrup et al. , 1970; Prien et al. , 1973; Fieve et al. , 1976).
There are a feu studies which indicate that lithium is more effective
than placebo in unipolar patients (e.g. Coppen et al. , 1971; Fieve et al.,
1976). In their brief review, Paykel and Rowan (1979) note that there
are no negative studies concerning the efficacy of lithium relative to
placebo in the maintenance treatment of these disorders; that in bipolar
depressed patients lithium was superior to imipramine; and that imipramine
was 'probably' more effective than lithium in unipolar depressed patients.
Recently Worral et al. (1979) reported two randomised double-blind
controlled trials on sixty-three depressed female inpatients subject to
recurrent affective disorder, i.e. bipolar and unipolar psychoses. The
results indicated that at the end of three weeks lithium produced greater
improvement than imipramine; lithium in combination with tryptophan was
more effective than tryptophan alone - the latter drug having no discernible
antidepressant effect in this group of patients. The authors point out that
the antidepressant activity of lithium was not apparent until the second and
third week of the trial.
Hard evidence is scarce that lithium is an effective antidepressant
in people who have developed a depressive disorder. Mendels (1976) has
observed that an antidepressant response appears more frequently in bipolars
than unipolar depressives, though in one study (Watanabe et al. , 1975, in
Paykel and Rowan, 1979) no difference' was found between unipolars and bipolars
in response to lithium which appeared to be as effective as imipramine.
Overall, there seems to be a superior maintenance effect for lithium
in bipolar patients and evidence is accumulating that this preventative
26.
effect may apply to unipolar depressives. More controlled trials should
be conducted to establish further the prophylactic and possible antidepressant
effects of lithium.
B. ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY
The 1930's witnessed the introduction of several controversial physical
therapies in the field of psychiatry (e.g. insulin shock, sleep therapy, lobotorny
and electroconvulsive therapy^ Of these, only ECT retains its place in the
treatment of depression. ECT has been criticised on the grounds that it
provides little or no therapeutic gain, that inherent dangers significantly
detract from whatever benefits it might have, and still others contend that ECT
should not be used because little is known about its mode of action. Freeman
(1979) has pointed out that much of the criticism has been ill informed and
that a considerable amount of research has examined the efficacy of ECT. This
section presents a brief review of the current clinical status of ECT.
hiechsler et al. (1965) summarised research published between 1958 and
1963 which compared the effectiveness of ECT with antidepressant drug regimens.
American, British and Canadian journals were the principal sources for the 153
investigations involving nearly six thousand patients. Many of the studies
were uncontrolled and used extremely heterogenous patient samples. Neverthe¬
less, the authors suggest that the 72 per cent mean improvement rate for ECT
over tricyclics (65 per cent), MAOIs (50 percent) and placebo (23 per cent) gives
a moderately accurate profile.
Crowe and 3ohnstone (1979) note that this picture probably exaggerates
the efficacy of the antidepressant treatments, including ECT, because of the
fact that a high proportion of these investigations were uncontrolled. Also,
they Demonstrated higher improvement rates than studies which include a control
group.
27.
Crow and Oohnstone (1979) report a very important comparison by
UJechsler et al. (1965) between investigations that deal primarily with
depressions of recent onset and those which include mainly chronic
depressions. Here again, the heterogeneity of the data is apparent
as the studies involved some schizophrenics and geriatric patients.
Table 2B^ extracted from their review, shows that the superiority of both
drugs and ECT over placebo is much less in the category of chronic depression,
Table 2B-[ Mean % improvement
Depressions of recent onset Chronic depressions
Total drugs 61.7 31.9
Placebo 23.7 20.7
ECT 86.1 36.7
(Crow and Oohnstone, 1979, p. 109)
Two large multicentre controlled trials were published in the mid-1960s,
In the United States, Greenblatt et al. (1964) reported a trial on depressed
patients admitted to three state hospitals in Boston. ECT was found to be
significantly more effective than all the other treatments after eight
weeks (see table 2B2).
Table 2B2 A comparison of ECT with drug treatment (from Greenblatt et al.,
in Freeman, 1979)
Type of treatment Results (marked improvement) %





The Medical Research Council trial (1965) uias undertaken at several
centres in England. This second investigation was better designed than
the previous study in that more accurate entry and outcome criteria were
specified. ECT was the most effective treatment at the end of four
weeks. The percentage of patients with total remission or slight symptoms
were ECT 71 per cent, imipramine 52 per cent, phenelzine 30 per cent, and
placebo 39 per cent (Freeman, 1979). These differences were essentially
maintained for ECT and imipramine at six months' follow-up. Rapid onset of
action and greater efficacy in the first two months was reported for ECT.
In general, the available outcome literature indicates favourable
outcomes in association with ECT relative to pharmacological methods,
particularly in severely depressed patients (Turek and Hanlon, 1977;
Crow and Oohnstone, 1979; Freeman, 1979). Some concerns regarding
possible problems with ECT will be discussed at the end of the chapter.
Before commenting further on the efficacy of physical treatments, it
would be useful to consider the relationship between pharmacotherapy and
psychotherapy. Both approaches to treatment are widely used in current
clinical practice and frequently combined in a pragmatic fashion. However,
little empirical evidence exists to guide the clinician in choosing between
or in combining the two forms of therapy in any systematic fashion.
The next section of the chapter has two purposes: (l) to give a brief
historical account of the thinking which preceded the systematic investigation
of the effectiveness of drugs and psychotherapy in the treatment of de¬
pression, and (2) to describe the current evidence about the efficacy
of this form of treatment in relieving the acute symptoms and problems
associated with depressive disorders.
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C. THE USE OF PHARMACOTHERAPY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PSYCHOTHERAPY
IN THE TREATMENT OF DEPRESSION
1. Historical overview
The research on drugs and psychotherapy of the early and mid 1960's
did not address the issue of the efficacy of psychotherapy compared to
drugs, but mainly focused on how and when, if at all, drugs should be
brought into the psychotherapeutic treatment of depressed patients
(Weissman, 1978). A fairly extensive literature developed which con¬
tained astute clinical observations about the impact of introducing
drugs into the psychotherapeutic relationship (Bellack and Rosenberg,
1966; Ostow, 1962; Sarwer-Foner, 1970). These clinical accounts
paid little attention to diagnosis, type or quality of drugs or
psychotherapy, length of treatment or the differentiation of
possible outcomes under the different therapies. With few
exceptions (Lorr et al., 1963) the literature seldom referred to
controlled studies to test out the efficacy of combining drugs with
psychotherapy.
At a time when the predominant opinion was negative for the com¬
bined use of drugs and psychotherapy, two psychoanalysts, Ostow (1952)
and Sarwer-Foner (i960) argued for the addition of pharmacotherapy
to psychological intervention. For example, Ostow recommended the
selective use of drugs under certain conditions to help a patient who
was too upset to participate in psychoanalysis or to protect a patient
who might harm him or herself, or during periods when the attending
physician was away. There were also several attempts at the time to
examine systematically the hypothesised effects of drugs on psychodynamic
process, such as the content of dreams, or the expression of anger
(Bellack and Rosenberg, 1966; Klerman and Gershon, 1970; Sarwer-Foner,
1970).
Weissman (1978) notes that 'with increased experience and acceptance
of pharmacotherapy for psychiatric disorders, concern about the effects
of drugs on psychotherapy reversed to include questions about the effects
of psychological factors on drug treatment. There were efforts to
clarify the nature of these psychological effects. Questions were raised
about the impact of such non-specific factors as the setting in which
the drug treatment was administered, the physician's attitudes, or the
patient's expectations (Fisher, 1970; Stone et al. , 1975)' (P.1314).
This research trend, according to Ueissman, had two main impacts:
the placebo response in pharmacotherapy was found to be less than expected
and there was clarification of the specific psychotherapies (e.g. Ellis,
1962; Beck, 1973) as distinct from the psychotherapeutic management of
patients, or the psychological consequences of receiving treatment (for
a detailed review of these see Weissman , 1978).
The late 1960's witnessed the gradual accumulation of evidence
that drug therapies are effective in the treatment of acute depressive
episodes and numerous attempts to delineate the nature of psychotherapies.
It was inevitable that more sophisticated hypotheses about the interactions
of drugs and psychotherapy would be developed. Thus, in addition to the
deleterious effects of combining drugs with psychotherapy put forward
originally, the effects were now hypothesised as feasible in either direction,
pharmacotherapy on psychotherapy or vice versa. The interactions between
treatments were regarded as being potentially positive as well as negative.
Klerman (1975) identified at least four types of potential effects
of combined therapies. They are described below.
Meqative effect of drugs on psychotherapy
Drugs obstruct psychotherapy by concentrating on symptoms rather
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than aetiology, by amplifying reliance on the doctor and fostering
dependency, by reducing the chances of gaining insight, hence recovery,
by reinforcing the tendency for the doctor to use an easy way out and
to be authoritarian, or by diminishing the patient's motivation to
contribute actively to therapy.
Positive effect of drugs on psychotherapy
Drugs maximise the effects of psychotherapy by making the patient
more accessible and by reducing anxiety, by increasing sleep and memory,
or by restoring contact with the environment, thereby improving the
capacity to form or maintain relationships. Drugs reduce distractibility
and improve verbal skills.
Negative effects of psychotherapy on drugs
Increased anxiety produced by psychotherapeutic experiences counter¬
acts the symptomatic recovery attributable to drugs.
Positive effect of psychotherapy on drugs
Psychotherapy solidifies the patient/doctor relationship and
facilitates patient attendance and compliance with drug administration.
Klerman (1975) also pointed out that before prescribing drugs and
psychotherapy, research should produce four types of evidence:
1. evidence for the efficacy of each treatment alone and then in
comparison,
2. understanding of the mechanisms of action of the treatments,
3. verified concepts that bridge the two treatments and provide
a foundation for the combined regimens,
4. evidence of the efficacy of the combination.
According to Ueissman (1978), 'in the late 1960's much of this
evidence was lacking. There were many controlled studies that demonstrated
the efficacy of drugs in acute depressive disorders, partially verified
hypotheses about their mode of action, and no research evidence for the
efficacy of psychotherapy in depression (Klein and Davis, 1969). Com¬
bined treatments (drugs and psychotherapy) for the affective disorders
were widely used and empirical research about their value was lacking'
(P.1315). However, over the last ten years there have been exciting
developments in the study of the psychology of depression and evidence
as regards the efficacy of psychological interventions with and without
drugs has begun to accumulate.
Having outlined the dominant state of thinking during the 1960's
that precipitated the empirical investigation of drugs and psychotherapy,
attention can now be shifted towards an evaluation of the available
evidence concerning the efficacy of psychological approaches alone and in
combination with drugs. An increasing number of experimental studies
have appeared in the literature quite recently which indicate a role for
psychological approaches without drugs in treating depressed patients,
particularly behavioural and cognitive-behavioural techniques (Burgess,
1969; Rush etal. , 1975; Rush et al., 1977). These and other psychological
treatments demand a detailed review in their own right and will therefore
be taken up in subsequent chapters. The next part of this chapter will
focus specifically on the current state of evidence about the effectiveness
of the combined use of drugs and psychotherapy in the treatment of depression.
Only those studies incorporating some control comparison will be considered.
2. Evidence for the efficacy of drugs combined with psychotherapy in
maintenance trials
In light of the empirical requirements for prescribing combined
therapies set out by Klerman, kleissman (1978) has noted that the most
logical way to progress might have been first to test out the effectiveness
of drugs and psychotherapy in the acute treatment of depressive disorders.
However, the first controlled clinical drug studies including psychotherapy
were started in maintenance drug trials by researchers who were interested
primarily in the psychopharmacological treatment of affective disorders.
Although evidence had accumulated for the efficacy of antidepressants
on symptom reduction in acute depression (see sections A and B of this
chapter), there still remained the critical question of how to prevent
relapse and/or improve social adjustment. By the late 1960's it was
uncertain as to how long depressed patients should be maintained on
drugs and if psychological techniques should be incorporated into drug
therapy (liJeissman, 197B; Klerman et al. , 1974). Despite the lack of
completed controlled trials of psychotherapy that included a homogenous
sample of depressed patients (Lieberman, 1975), there was considerable
clinical testimony at the time about the value of psychotherapy as the
exclusive treatment of depression. Also, it had been a technique widely
used in clinical practice, the rationale being that psychotherapy ameliorated
problems related to impaired social and interpersonal circumstances. For
these reasons, the National Institute of Mental Health supported three
independent maintenance trials using drugs and psychotherapy.
In a study conducted in Baltimore, Covi et al. (1974) assigned neurotic
depressive outpatients to receive imipramine, diazepam or placebo and to
group psychotherapy conducted within a psychodynamic framework, but other¬
wise unspecified (90 minutes per week for 16 weeks), or to brief support
(20 minutes each week). Taking final measures (i.e. 16 weeks or termination
if earlier) on self-ratings of mood and symptoms, there was a main effect of
drugs, i.e. imipramine being superior, but not of psychotherapy.
The Philadelphia project (Friedman, 1975) assigned depressed out¬
patients to amitriptyline or to placebo and also to marital conjoint therapy
(12 weekly one hour sessions) or to brief support (half-hour sessions every
two weeks). This study was originally considered a maintenance trial
since patients were followed through to recovery. However, in retrospect,
it has obvious implications for acute treatment because patients were acutely
ill during the initial weeks of the study. Taking only final assessment
results which gain a one per cent significance level, there is evidence
for a pharmacotherapy effect on both symptom ratings and on marital
functioning, but only for the latter was there a desirable change related
to the psychotherapy.
Klerman et al. (1974), U/eissrnan et al. (1974), Paykel et al. (1975)
conducted a study in two clinics (The Boston-New Haven Collaborative Project)
of the specific and interactive efficacy of maintenance antidepressants
and psychotherapeutic treatment on the depressive symptoms and social
adjustment of outpatient female primary depressives. One hundred and fifty
patients who responded favourably to a preliminary four to six week trial
on antidepressant medication were assigned to a high or low psychotherapy
contact condition. Responders then received an additional two months on
drug maintenance.
After the initial one month of acute treatment and two months of
maintenance drug treatment, patients within each of the two psychotherapy
groups were randomly allocated to drug, placebo, or no tablet groups.
The high contact group always included a minimum of one weekly individual
supportive session which dealt with current adjustment issues. Drugs
reduced depressive symptoms most effectively and as effectively with or
without psychotherapy, but drugs alone had little impact on social
adjustment. In contrast, psychotherapy improved general social adjustment
including work, communication, friction, anxious rumination, but had limited
effect on the depression per se. Relapse rates were rather lower for
drugs alone or in combination with psychotherapy (12 per cent) than with
psychotherapy alone (16 per cent); 36 per cent relapsed in the low contact,
no-tablet minimal treatment group. Of the initial cohort of 150 patients
who completed at least two months of the maintenance phase, 11 dropped out
and 33 relapsed before finishing the programme. Sociodemographic character¬
istics did not differentiate relapsers from completers.
Social adjustment measures were analysed for two periods: at the end
of the four month drug maintenance phase and four months thereafter.
Group adjusted differences were insigificant at four months, but considerably
in favour of the high contact therapy groups (44 per cent improvement) over
the low contact groups (28 per cent improvement) on completion of the eight
month period. 'Submissive dependence' and 'family attachment' were the
only factors yielding no differences. Drugs had no advantage over no
drugs on social adjustment ratings nor did they interact with psychotherapy.
Becker (1977) underscores an observation noted by the investigators
in that the potential effectiveness of the psychotherapy may be underestimated
because of the initial two month drug phase. Many patients attributed their
improvement mainly to medication and were less motivated to deal with social
adjustment issues once they had obtained symptomatic relief. Becker also
points out that 'most patients came from working class families and there¬
fore may have lacked incentive for self-exploratory or actualizing procedures'
(P. 134). Higher education and social class, a tendency to describe
reality in psychological constructs, and high motivation for therapy
are among the sociodemographic factors typically associated with positive
psychotherapy results. However, Klerman et al. suggest other possible
biases that may have prejudiced ratings in favour of psychotherapy.
Interviewers were not blind to the psychotherapy condition and no
independent ratings by relatives or objective self-reports were gathered.
Given these biases, it is disconcerting to note that the size of the
difference in social adjustment was not very large. After eight months'
treatment the adjusted means differed by a mere 0.17 units on a five point
scale. Moreover, inspection of the precipitating factors in those patients
who relapsed (Paykel and Tanner, 1976) shows that neither the amitriptyline
nor the psychotherapy protected against relapse associated with life events.
Nevertheless, in this investigation, as in the Philadelphia project,
measurable changes were demonstrated on those functions which were the
prime focus of the psychological techniques, though this seemed to have no
beneficial effect on the symptoms of depression. Furthermore, the
findings underscore the desirability of including social effectiveness
criteria as well as symptom relief and relapse rates among outcome criteria.
The data from these studies (Covi et al. , 1974; Friedman, 1975;
New Haven/Boston Project) indicate a striking similarity in outcome.
The three investigations demonstrated an effect for tricyclics in preventing
relapse and diminishing symptoms and either little or no effect on social
or interpersonal performance.
As regards the effect of maintenance drugs, all three studies show
that in comparison to placebo or psychotherapy, tricyclics were more
effective in preventing reoccurrence of symptoms and relapse. Symptom
reduction appeared to facilitate some improvement in social performance
but antidepressants generally did not help patients cope better with
'problems in living*.
37.
The findings far the maintenance psychotherapies were also remarkably
alike in that all of the investigations demonstrated an effect for psycho¬
therapy in areas related to interpersonal relationships and 'problems
in living', an effect that was negligible in relieving the acute symptoms
of depression.
These investigations permit an evaluation of the results with respect
to the various interactions of drugs and psychotherapy postulated by
Klerman. This comment is best summarised by a quotation from UJeissman's
review:
'The New Haven-Boston study results, which found a psychotherapy effect
only in patients who remained symptom-free, best supported the hypothesis
that drugs have a positive effect on psychotherapy in that the symptom
relief, produced more readily by drugs, rendered the patient more
accessible to psychotherapy. There was no evidence in any of the
studies for a negative interaction between drugs and psychotherapy.
Therefore there was no evidence for the hypothesis that drugs have a
negative effect on patients who had experienced symptom relief.
Drugs did not make patients less interested in psychotherapy (this
contrasts sharply with Becker's notion that social class may have con¬
tributed to an unwillingness to self explore after remission of
symptoms) and did not lead to early termination or poor response to
psychotherapy, nor was there any evidence for a negative effect of
psychotherapy on drug response. Patients receiving psychotherapy were
not symptomatically disrupted' (author's insertion, P.1318).
In summary, the studies of maintenance trials of combined treatments
show that for depressed patients an argument can be made for combining
drugs and psychotherapy techniques.
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The results of these trials cannot be generalised to acutely
depressed populations. Also,it may be said that the effects of both
types of therapy appear to be independent, operating on different out¬
comes, and there are no reported negative interactions.
3. Evidence for the efficacy of drugs combined with psychotherapy
in the acute treatment of depression
Favourable clinical accounts of the combined use of antidepressants
and psychotherapy for acutely depressed patients have been reported in the
literature (Lesse, 1960, 1966). These suggest that the availability
of combined approaches has changed the management of depressive patients,
resulting in less hospitalisation and less use of electroconvulsive
treatment. However, there are three controlled trials to date which
investigated the efficacy of drugs and psychotherapy in acutely depressed
patients.
Daneman (1961) reported a double-blind comparison of imipramine plus
psychotherapy versus a placebo plus psychotherapy in the treatment of
private practice patients suffering from recurrent depressions (159
neurotic, 32 psychotic depressive reactions and four with depressions in
organic brain syndromes). Psychotherapy consisted of 45 minute sessions
of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy, once or twice a week over a
period of between 30 and 90 days. Evaluations were made by the author
(the only therapist) on a series of rating scales. Global judgements of
improvement were the main source of data.
After one month, 79 percent of the imipramine psychotherapy subjects
were said to be in 'full remission* compared to 7 per cent of the placebo-
psychotherapy subjects. At two months, the comparable figures were 87
per cent for the drug and psychotherapy group compared to 10 per cent for
the placebo plus psychotherapy group. The differences between the groups
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were statistically significant, indicating the superiority of the
combination of active drug plus psychoanalytic psychotherapy over the
combination of pill placbo plus psychoanalytic psychotherapy. On the
surface it would appear that combining drugs and psychotherapy proved
relatively effective.
However, there are several problems with this study. First, other
forms of therapy were given to the patients in an uncontrolled manner (e.g.
phenothiazines, family consultation). It is thus impossible to attribute
the observed effects to the treatment under scrutiny. Second, at two
months' evaluation attrition was as high as 49 per cent. Third, the use
of one therapist limits the generality of the findings to other populations.
The use of couples therapy groups in conjunction with lithium has
been compared with lithium plus supportive counselling in the long—-term
management of married bipolar patients (Davenport et al. , 1977). This
can be regarded as an investigation into the differential effects of treat¬
ment on acute symptoms as well, since the patients received weekly
conjoint therapy sessions during an initial period of hospitalisation.
Sixty-five patients were assigned arbitrarily to conjoint group therapy
plus lithium or lithium plus individual supportive counselling. At
approximately 21 /i years' follow-up, those in the combination group
had more benign post hospital course than those given minimal support
beyond lithium maintenance, i.e. the couples group had fewer rehospitalisations
and marital failures than the lithium plus support group.
This study is important for two reasons. First, it represents the
only comparative trial that involves diagnosed bipolar patients. Second
the results tend to suggest that conjoint group therapy may have an impact
on asymptomatic phenomena in manic-depressive patients.
In the most important study of its kind, UJeissman et al. (1979)
randomly assigned nonpsychotic, nonbipolar, acute primary major de¬
pressed outpatients to one of four treatment conditions: short-term
interpersonal psychotherapy alone, pharmacotherapy, interpersonal psycho¬
therapy plus pharmacotherapy and nonscheduled treatment. Inter¬
personal psychotherapy consisted of 'at least one weekly 50 minute
session with the treating psychiatrist' (P.556), which focused on the
social context of depression. Pharmacotherapy consisted of amitriptyline
100 to 200 mg dosage increased to 125 mg within a week, 'stabilised over
the next 3 weeks and maintained for the next 12 weeks' (P.556). Combined
therapy consisted of both treatments described previously. Nonscheduled
treatment or 'psychotherapy on demand' consisted of allocating patients to
a psychiatrist they could contact whenever they felt in need of care. No
active treatment was scheduled, but the person could communicate by telephone
and 'if his or her needs were of sufficient intensity, a 50 minute session
(a maximum of one a month) was scheduled' (P.556).
Of the 96 patients randomised into treatment, 81 were used in the
analysis. Symptomatic failure was the main outcome criterion in the
report, i.e. a Raskin depression score of 9 or more as rated by a
clinical evaluator after eight weeks of therapy. The results show that
the combination group had the lowest rate of failure whereas the highest
failure rate was obtained in the nonscheduled treatment group. Patients
in the active treatment groups demonstrated a significantly lower rate of
failure than those in the 'psychotherapy on demand' group (p = < .001).
The investigators note that while there were fewer relapses in the combined
therapy group than in either psychotherapy or drugs alone, the difference
was not highly significant (p = < .10). No significant differences in
failure rates were found between the psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy
groups. Symptomatic failure occurred as early as the first week in
the nonscheduled treatment group whereas there were no failures in the
drugs and psychotherapy group before the twelfth week. No patients
in the combined group had to be withdrawn at the prescribed eight week
assessment period. Similarly, there were no symptomatic failures
before week eight in either the drug or psychotherapy groups.
The investigators also point out that a small proportion of patients
in the 'psychotherapy on demand' group were not symptomatic failures and
reported satisfaction with this treatment. As the investigators note,
'it would be important to predict who are the substantial minority of
patients who responded to this infrequent non-scheduled treatment' (P.558).
In order to clarify the amount of tolerance and efficacy of the
various treatments, Herceg-Baron et al. (1979) in a follow-up report
provide a detailed analysis of the attrition patterns in the treatment
groups. 67 per cent of the patients in the combined treatment completed
the full 16 weeks, compared with 48 per cent in psychotherapy alone,
33 per cent in pharmacotherapy alone, and 30 per cent in the non-scheduled
group. Patients in the combined group were more likely to accept treat¬
ment initially than patients in the other treatment groups (p = < .05),
more likely to complete treatment (p = < .01), and less likely to relapse.
Patients treated with drugs and psychotherapy were less ill upon early
termination than those receiving either drugs or psychotherapy alone or
the non-scheduled treatment. This is a particularly interesting result
inasmuch as those who dropped out of treatment for other than nonsymptomatic
reasons did not receive further treatment. Furthermore, the investigators
note that if patients dropped out of another treatment because of persistent
symptomatology, they frequently asked for a combination treatment. For
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example, 38 per cent of patients who initially refused psychotherapy
subsequently accepted a combination of drugs and psychotherapy.
The research evidence for the efficacy of drugs and psychotherapy for
acute treatment of depression in comparison to drugs or psychotherapy alone
is meagre. Although Weissman et al. (1979), for example, conclude that
the combination treatment was more effective than either treatment
alone and delayed relapse, the difference in outcome did not achieve a
satisfactory level of statistical significance. It should be noted,
however, that any comprehensive evaluation of therapy and the relative
value of different techniques should include criteria such as length of
treatment and its acceptability to the patient, among others (Kazdin and
Wilson, 1978). The findings on attrition patterns in the treatment
groups in the Weissman et al. (1979) study suggest that combination treat¬
ment may be more acceptable to patients than either pharmacotherapy or
psychotherapy alone. Moreover, once admitted to a course of treatment,
patients may be more likely to complete a combined therapy regimen.
Thus, the combination of psychotherapy (group, individual and marital)
in conjunction with drugs would appear to be an effective treatment for
some depressive patients. Luborsky (1975) has suggested that the
advantage for combined treatment represents a possible additive effect
of the two treatments. This remains an empirical question. However,
no matter what theoretical approach is used to explain the apparent efficacy
of a combined approach, these studies suggest that psychological techniques
are highly relevant to the pharmacotherapy of depression. Further research
is necessary to establish firmly the efficacy of combined treatment and
to answer questions about which type of psychotherapy to use with which drugs,
for which depressive patients.
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D. SPONTANEOUS REMISSION
Up to this point the chapter has focused on the efficacy of
pharmacological treatments, EOT and pharmacotherapy in combination with
psychotherapy in the management of depressive disorders. However,
after nearly 25 years and much heated debate, it is disconcerting to find
that there is substantial disagreement over the rate of improvement in
neurotic illnesses in the absence of active treatment. This is a crucial
issue because 'spontaneous remission' is thought to confound the success
rates that are claimed for many forms of psychiatric treatment, especially
psychotherapy (Eysenck, 1952; 1967; Bergin, 1971; Rachman, 1973; Bergin
and Lambert, 1978). It is thus important to ask whether rates of success
reported for active treatments profit by the effects of extraneous events
or homeostatic mechanisms and, as Bergen and Lambert (1978) point out,
whether there are reliable 'baseline' figures that represent improvement
in neurotic patients who go without treatment.
While little is known about the actual process of 'spontaneous
remission', several prominent researchers, notably Eysenck (1952, 1967)
and Rachman (1973), have attempted to provide a baseline figure with which
to compare the results of psychiatric intervention.
These authors obtained estimates based on a review of studies which
examined the duration of neurotic illnesses not treated by psychotherapy.
They argued that if a period of two years is accepted as a baseline measure
(which is reasonable since psychotherapy does not usually last longer than
two years and may involve less time), two thirds (66^) of neurotics show
recovery or marked improvement without the benefit of psychotherapy, after
a lapse of two years from the time that their disorder is identified, or
they are hospitalised (Rachman, 1973).
Recognition that many neurotic disorders can be expected to
remit spontaneously complicates the problem of determining to what extent
recovery from an illness can be attributed to the specific effects of
treatment. Moreover, there is some evidence that rates of spontaneous
remission vary according to different diagnostic categories. Depression,
in particular, is said to have one of the highest rates of spontaneous
remission. For instance, Greer and Cowley (1966) carried out a four to
six year follow-up study of 160 neurotic patients who were consecutive
admissions to the Flawdsley Hospital. In an extensive investigation of
different diagnostic groupings, they found that depressed patients had the
shortest duration of symptoms (over 50 per cent were asymptomatic in less
than six months) whereas patients diagnosed as obsessive reactions were
found to have the longest duration of symptoms (five years or longer).
Although Greer and Cowley emphasised premorbid personality as an important
prognostic indicator, they concluded that the type of neurotic illness
is also an important factor relating to outcome.
Bergin and Lambert (1978) tried, as Rachman (1973) did, to order
rates of spontaneous remission according to type of neurotic illness and
concluded that such an ordering cannot be accomplished by reference to the
current research literature. According to these authors,'it appears
that anxiety and depressive neuroses have the highest spontaneous remission
rates, followed by hysterical, phobic, obsessive compulsive and hypo¬
chondriacal disorders; but no study has attempted to describe recovery
rates by diagnostic classification while holding constant other important
variables such as degree of disturbance, type of onset, and past history
of disturbance'(Bergin and Lambert, 197B, pp 147-148). They suggested
that a complete revision of the classification of neurotic disorders is
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required before any confidence can be placed in the ordering of remission
rates.
Several authors (Bergin, 1971; Lambert, 1976; Bergin and Lambert,
1978) have contested the work of Eysenck and Rachman and established
another baseline rate for spontaneous remission on the basis of reviews
of studies of minimal treatment and no treatment outcomes. The median
remission rate for untreated subjects, according to Bergin and Lambert
(1978) is 43 per cent (range 18 - 67 per cent). In their view, 'a
two thirds estimate is not only unrepresentative but is actually a most
unrealistic figure for describing the spontaneous remission rate or even
rates for minimal treatment outcomes' (Bergin and Lambert, 197B, p. 147).
The question of spontaneous improvement has stimulated considerable
research and discussion. Whether the figure of 66% or 43/6 is accepted
as the baseline estimate of spontaneous remission, it should be noted
that there are average figures which, in fact, obscure considerable variation.
In any event, the important issue at stake in this chapter is whether the
improvement rates discussed in relation to the various treatments exceed
those reported for spontaneous remission. It is clear that some studies
on the efficacy of ECT (e.g. MRC Trial 71/6) and to a somewhat lesser extent
drug therapy (e.g. MRC Trial 52^6 for imipramine) fulfill this requirement.
It is worth noting, in summary, that some neurotic disorders are
particularly responsive to unspecified extratherapeutic events, or
non-specific treatment factors such as reassurance, attention and
suggestion. They are thus sensitive to placebo and may show a high rate
of spontaneous improvement. Patients in general practice who present
with minor emotional disorders, frequently a mixture of mild anxiety and
depressive symptoms, may be especially responsive to change. Uheatley
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(1972), far example, has noted a placebo response rate of 50 per cent
in various drug studies in general practice compared with active drug
response rates of about 75 per cent.
Thus, it may be said that in order for specific treatments of
depression to be regarded as effective, treatment response rates must be
interpreted with caution, taking into account various estimates of
spontaneous remission.
E. COMMENT
On the basis of this review, the following comments and conclusions
can be made about the effectiveness of the physical methods of treatment
of depression.
Clinical comparisons of tricyclics and placebo demonstrate the
efficacy of pharmacotherapy. Inspection of the data from a recent
survey of the literature and that compiled by Morris and Beck (1974)
indicates that sixty-six out of ninety-nine (66 per cent) treatment
comparisons in eighty-nine investigations show tricyclic antidepressants
to be superior to placebo. Amitriptyline and imipramine were reported
to be consistently more effective than placebo. A relatively small number
of studies which compared the tricyclic derivatives, nortriptyline,
protriptyline, doxepin and amoxapine with placebo reported significant
effects in favour of the drugs.
When the effects of the conventional tricyclics (imipramine and
amitriptyline) are compared with one another and/or tricyclic derivatives
the majority of investigations report equivalent effects among the drugs
in reducing depressive symptoms. Forty-eight out of seventy-six (63 per
cent) treatment comparisons in seventy studies showed no significant
differences between tricyclic antidepressants. Similarly, direct
comparisons of tricyclic derivatives with each other demonstrate an
equivalent effect on symptoms. MAO inhibitors do not demonstrate the
same degree of effectiveness as tricyclic medication. Morris et al.
(ibid) report an overall success rate of 33 per cent for MAO inhibitors
over placebo, though they point out that this figure is based on trials
which included drugs that had not been approved by the Federal Drug
Administration as of 1972. Even so, phenelzine has been found to be only
as effective as placebo in men and less effective than placebo in women
(MRC Trial, 1965). While early studies have been criticised for inadequate
dosage and duration of MAO inhibitor treatment (Tyrer, 1976) and some
researchers have suggested that it may be particularly effective in 'atypical'
depressions (Sargent, 1961), the findings clearly indicate that tricyclic
drugs are to be preferred in the treatment of severe depressions.
The introduction of the tetracyclic substances, namely Maprotiline
(Ludiomil) and Mianserin (Bolvidon), in the treatment of depressive
illness is a potentially valuable addition to the everwidening range of
pharmacological therapies. These may be particularly useful in patients
with a low tolerance for unwanted anticholinergic effects. Several
studies report that tetracyclics also appear to show a more rapid onset
of action than tricyclics. Nevertheless, the bulk of evidence indicates
that tetracyclic drugs offer little therapeutic advantage relative to
tricyclic medication. Further research is necessary to confirm the findings
that they are effective antidepressants.
Lithium carbonate is effective primarily in the treatment of bipolar
illness. The value of the drug as an acute anti-manic agent and as
prophylaxis in the longer term treatment of manic-depressive illness is
well-accepted. The more controversial role of lithium lies in its
use as an acute treatment of depressive episodes, although recent
controlled studies in the United States support the use of lithium
as an acute antidepressant (Goodwin et al. , 1972; Nayes et al.,
1974; Baron et al., 1975; Mendels, 1976). European authorities have
considered the drug of little value in the management of acute depressive
episodes (Schou, 1971, in Worral et al. , 1979). Further research must be
conducted in order to establish firmly its efficacy as an antidepressant.
There is evidence that electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is an
effective treatment in severe depressive disorders. Reasonably well-
designed and controlled investigations suggest that ECT may be more than
the most effective pharmacological methods and reduces symptoms more
rapidly. There is a current body of opinion that in general ECT may cause
brain damage (Friedberg, 1977) and in particular lasting memory deficits
(Squire and Chase, 1975). Also, it has been suggested that the procedure
causes cognitive deficits which have escaped detection with the currently
available psychological tests (Crow and Bohnstone, 1979). Nevertheless,
the data show that ECT must be regarded as one of the more effective
front-line physical methods of treatment for severely depressed inpatients.
Though it is undisputed that available somatic methods of treatment
work and for the short-term treatment of depression may appear to be cost
efficient, there are some disquieting facts and deficiencies in the
therapeutic response of depressed patients. Most investigations report
that physical methods of treatment have an average failure rate of
approximately 20 per cent (Blackburn, 1977). For example, in the MRC
Trial (op. cit.) where ECT, imipramine, phenelzine and placebo were
compared, if the mean response to treatment is calculated, it is clear
that 80 per cent of the patients had been discharged by the end of the
24th week. Interestingly, 45 per cent of patients on placebo
improved after four weeks. Different investigations of the effects
of ECT report similar percentages of failures: Angst (1961) 20 per
cent; Carney et al. (1965) 17 per cent; Stromgren (1973) 24 per cent.
Inspection of the literature on tricyclics reveals a somewhat higher
failure rate. Beck (1973), for example, estimates that between 35 and
40 per cent of patients who receive a first course of tricyclics do not
improve during treatment. The data is consistent with the common clinical
observation that a fair proportion of patients so treated fail to demonstrate
a satisfactory or sustained clinical response.
This problem is highlighted by Quitkin et al. (1976) in their review
of five follow-up studies which show that, in follow-ups of six months to
two years after the acute symptoms of depression had been treated by ECT
or tricyclics, relapse rates varied from 12 to 32 per cent on drugs and
28 to 85 per cent on placebo or no pill. On the face of it, it appears
that for those patients who do improve, recovery may be slow or" incomplete
and there are frequent relapses (Blackburn, op cit). Furthermore, several
studies have shown that drug treatment produces symptom relief but fails
to improve social adjustment (Park and Imboden, 1970; Tanner et al., 1975).
The type of review presented in this chapter permits the formulation
of conclusions with respect to the efficacy of the physical methods of
treatment of depression and is helpful in describing research trends.
However, advances in experimental designs, epidemiological techniques
and the specification of reliable diagnostic criteria may encourage
future researchers to concentrate on the specific interrelationships that
are obscured by an overall summary of research trends.
Various selection factors, i.e. type of depressive disorders,
availability and type of psychiatric services may greatly interact
with treatment effects. For example, a sizeable proportion of the findings
reported here are based on samples of depressed inpatients. As in¬
patients represent a relatively small and highly selective sample of
depressively ill people who tend to present with serious, psychotic,
suicidal, therapy resistent and chronic depressions (Helmchen, 1979),
it is doubtful that treatment response rates obtained on such a restricted
sample can be applied with confidence to depressed outpatients. At the
very least, the generalisation possibilities of research results gained from
depressively ill people in the hospital are limited to an unknown degree.
It is therefore necessary to conduct more investigations of the effects
of therapy on outpatients because (l) by far most depressed patients are
treated in outpatient settings (Akiskal et al., 1978); (2) those patients
who are hardly ever seen in a hospital are also treated as outpatients
with depressions, and (3) outpatient treatment is carried out under very
different conditions from hospital treatment (Porter, 1970).
The acute-chronic illness dimension may be an important factor
related to observed treatment effects. Klerman and Cole (1965)
reported that 46 per cent of acutely ill inpatients supposedly improved
on placebo. Similar improvement was found in ionly 16 per cent of chronic
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inpatient and outpatient samples. In their statistical review of con¬
trolled trials of imipramine, Rogers and Clay (1975) compiled data which
show that 34 per cent of acutely ill patients improved on placebo while
only 20 per cent of chronic patients responded to the inert substance.
Moreover, only one out of six investigations involving chronic populations
reported significant results in favour of the drug.
There appears to be some evidence that other patient characteristics
(e.g. age, sex) may significantly interact with effects of treatment. For
example, severely depressed older women were significantly more effectively
treated with amitriptyline than with imipramine, particularly with regard
to symptoms of depressed mood, sleep disturbance, and agitation (Hordern
et al., 1963; Hordern et al. , 1965). The authors suggest a strong
specific interaction between the patient's age, sex and administered treat¬
ment.
Brown and Harris (1978) hypothesise that socio-environmental factors
sensitise an individual to developing depressive symptoms and it is possible
that these too contribute greatly to observed treatment effects, particularly
for those individuals treated as outpatients. Recently, it has been argued
that the well-documented sex difference in depression may be due to a sex
difference in susceptibility, in precipitating factors, or in both. For
instance, Radloff and Rae (1979) found that women were exposed more often
to more of the factors that relate to depression, though the factors related
to depression similarly for men and women. Since the sex difference was
still evident after patients were matched on the factors, it is possible
that there is a sex difference in susceptibility. Thus both learned factors
and biological sex differences might contribute to susceptibility to depression,
hence to treatment effects. A related area is the literature on the role
life events, especially those viewed as stressful, may play in the genesis
and maintenance of depressive disorders (Paykel, 1974).
Several investigators have called attention to potentially significant
differences in the chemical and action characteristics of drugs, e.g. time
of onset of effect (Snow and Rickels, 1964; Sandfer et al., 1965) and
individual biochemical and physiological factors, e.g. individual differences
in drug uptake by the brain (Haydu et al. , 1962). However, it is only
recently that researchers have attempted to couple these areas systematically
with investigations of clinical drug efficacy by measuring 'blood levels'
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of a drug as apposed to dosage. Systematic attention to these data
as well as those previously mentioned may dispel much of the contradiction
present in the drug literature.
The results of the drug and psychotherapy studies, in general,
support the efficacy of tricyclic medication in reducing depressive
symptoms. Conventional psychotherapies (Daneman, 1961; Covi et al,,
1974; Friedman, 1975; Klerman et al., 1974; Weissman et al., 1974)
appeared on the whole to have no discernible impact on depressive
symptoms, though marital therapy (Friedman, 1975) and individual psycho¬
therapy (Weissman et al. , 1974) seemed to improve aspects of social
adjustment.
The combination of tricyclic drugs and interpersonal psychotherapy
in the treatment of acutely depressed outpatients appears to have had a
greater impact in reducing depressive symptoms compared to tricyclics alone
and interpersonal psychotherapy alone (Weissman et al., 1979).
These data suggest that combining drugs with psychotherapy may widen
the spectrum of phenomena affected and that there may be an additive effect
when these two forms of therapy are combined systematically. To date,
there is no evidence for any negative drug and psychotherapy interactions
(for an excellent review of combinative approaches see Hollon and Beck,
1978).
To conclude, there is a need to provide individualised treatment
regimens for depressed patients. A chemical agent that appears to produce
an antidepressant effect in one person may not produce the same effect in
another depressed individual. A given patient may respond differently to
the same drug at different times. This is likely to be the case for
psychotherapies as well when used alone or in conjunction with drugs.
More research is needed not only with the physical treatments mentioned,
but also with the effects of specific psychotherapies combined with
physical treatments in relation to specific types of depression.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed studies concerned with the efficacy
of pharmacotherapy, electroconvulsive therapy, and the combined use
of pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy in the treatment of depression.
While there is strong evidence that physical treatments work, biochemical
theories derived from the study of the pharmacological action of drugs
have not produced the long-awaited discovery of a distinct relationship
between depression and a specific biochemical event (Hollon and Beck,
1979; Blackburn, 1977). This has contributed to an increased interest
in the psychological causation of depression (for reviews see Akiskal and
McKinney, 1975; Blaney, 1977) and undermined the degree of confidence
that can be placed in a purely'biological model of depressive disorders.
The next chapter examines the most prominent psychological theories
and techniques which are shaping our understanding of the development and
maintenance of clinical depression.
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CHAPTER THREE
PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACHES TO DEPRESSION
A. INTRODUCTION
Utilisation of any set of techniques such as drug therapy,
psychotherapy, a combination of these, or behaviour therapy to re¬
duce emotional disturbance or alter personality assumes some model
of the nature of man. The model includes assumptions about
motivational factors, the processes that contribute to and influence
attitudes and behaviour, the extent to which events shape a person's
life, and the degree to which the influence of such events can be
changed ''Craighead et al. , 1976). A theoretical framework also
determines the manner in which behaviour is conceptualised, the
causes to which behaviour is attributed, and the systems of inter¬
vention deemed appropriate to alter behaviour and relieve concomitant
emotional strain.
Numerous aetiological models of depression have been put
forward. Chapter two reviewed outcome studies on the use of drug
therapy in the treatment of depression. The demonstrated efficacy
of antidepressant drugs together with increased understanding about
their mode of action has stimulated much research into the develop¬
ment of biochemical theories of depression. These include the
association of clinical depression with a functional deficiency of
biogenic amines at central postsynaptic receptor sites (Schildkraut,
1965; Coppen, 1967; Tissot, 1975), cell electrolytes imbalance
(Shaw, 1979; Van Praag, 1978) and abnormalities of neuroendocrine
function (Van Praag, 1978). Others have proposed that depression
may result from genetic deficits (Leonhard et al., 1962; Angst,
1966; Perris, 1966, 1968), internal psychological processes
(Abraham, 1911; Freud, 1914; Rado, 1928; Fenichel, 1945;
Dacobsen, 1946; Bibring, 1953), maladaptive interactions between
the organism and the environment (Ferster, 1965, 1966, 1973;
Lazarus, 1968, 1979; Seligman, 1976; Leuinsohn, 1976; Beck, 1973,
1976) and social deprivation (Broun and Harris, 1978).
Despite this diversity in causal theories, the phenomenology
of depression has been described in remarkably consistent terms since
the time of Hippocrates (Zilboorg and Henry, 1949). As cited
earlier, depression has been traditionally regarded as a mood dis¬
order but the clinical picture also includes marked changes in
cognitive, behavioural, motivational and vegetative functions (Burns
and Beck, 1978). In a bold attempt to collate the data from these
diverse sources, hence to establish conceptual inroads among the
different aetiological theories, Akiskal and NcKinney (1975) proposed
a multi-component model of depression. They maintain that any
number of different events allied with areas of specific vulnerability
psychological, social, physiological and biochemical - can combine to
produce a common psychobiological process that may be identified as
a depressive illness. According to these researchers, no matter what
psychosocial stresses contribute to the onset of depression, once the
biological integrity of the organism is disrupted, the process becomes
autonomous and virtually impregnable to psychological interventions.
At this stage, the most immediate problem confronting the clinician is
to decide which of the somatic therapies to use in order to stop the
illness process.
In view of the efficacy of antidepressant medication, and until
recently, the conspicuous lack of demonstrated benefit from psycho¬
social interventions on depressive symptoms (Covi et al., 1974;
Friedman, 1975), it is hardly surprising that the management of
clinical depression had remained the province of the physical
"treatments. Indeed, when Akiskal and McKinney proposed their
model, the available literature amply supported their pessimistic
evaluation of the effectiveness of psychological approaches.
Enthusiasm generated by case studies using behavioural methods (e.g.
Burgess, 1969; Rush et al., 1975) had been justifiably dampened by
a persistent lack of controlled investigations. Hollon and Beck
(1979) note 'that as late as 1970 there existed no published study in
which any type of psychotherapy had been shown to be more effective
than either alternative treatments or no treatment conditions in any
controlled comparisons with a homogeneously defined sample of depressives'
(P. 154)
This unsatisfactory state of affairs has changed considerably with
the burgeoning interest in the psychological causation of depression
(Blansy, 1977). The past decade has witnessed a healthy growth in
empirical studies that are beginning to provide support for several
cognitive and behavioural models of depression (Beck, 1967, 1973, 1976;
Lewinsohn, 1974; Seligman, 1976; Rehm, 1977). In addition, findings
from several comparative outcome studies indicate that some psychological
therapies have a place in the treatment of some outpatients who present
with mild to moderately severe depression. Particularly intriguing
is the potential role for behavioural or cognitive-behavioural inter¬
ventions and the findings of one of the studies fRush et al., 1977)
suggest that such an approach might be more effective than treatment
with one of the most potent tricyclic antidepressants (imipramine
hydrochloride ).
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Chapter two also covered the literature on the use of tricyclic
antidepressants in conjunction with traditional forms of psycho¬
therapy in treating depressed patients. It was argued that the
combination of pharmacological and psychological treatments offers
a potentially unique advantage in the treatment of some depressions.
Although it is too early to specify for which types of depression this
approach might be indicated, controlled outcome studies suggest that
the combination treatment is generally more effective than the exclusive
use of either treatment alone, especially when multiple outcome criteria
are considered (Klerman et al., op cit.; Weissman et al., op. cit;
Herceg-Baron et al., 1979). This advances the likelihood that biologica
and psychosocially oriented clinicians will work more closely in
planning treatment programmes for depressed patients.
But to what extent is depression a psychosocial phenomenon?
In what ways have psychosocial models of depression been translated into
specific, remedial interventions? How do such approaches compare
with existing methods of treatment?
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the complete
range of psychosocial theories and therapies of depression. For this
thesis it is important to discuss the models which have had a major
impact on the conceptualisation of depression and the therapeutic
procedures derived from each model.
As mentioned previously, it is recognised that biochemical
models may play a central role in explaining the wide variation of
depressive symptomatology. However, an enormous literature, stimulated
by studies of the mode of action of the various somatic treatments,
prohibits inclusion of biological models in this review (see Paykel and
Coppen, 1979).
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The chapter is therefore broken down into three main sections:
psychoanalytic, behavioural and sociological theories. The review
describes these major theories of depression and considers evidence
in support of each model, comparing the approaches with one another.
As the central argument of the thesis rests-upon experimental
support for a cognitive model of depression, a detailed description
of- Beck's theory and evidence bearing on the relationship between
cognitive factors and depression is reserved for the final chapter
of the literature review.
B. PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES
1. Overview
The early analytic writers viewed depression as a psychological
disorder caused by the inadequate resolution of intrapsychic con¬
flicts experienced during the psychosexual stages of childhood.
Initially, they stressed the concepts of orality, narcissism, and
ambivalence, but later, the focus shifted and increasing emphasis
was placed on the roles of the ego and social relations.
Systematic understanding of the dynamics of depression began
with Abraham's observation that the loss of a loved object is common
to both mourning and melancholia, or clinical depression (Abraham,
1911, 1916). He thought depression was a consequence of regression
to the oral level of libidinal development, with the typical oral
characteristics of intolerance and envy, increased egocentricity and
ambivalence. Aggression prevents the depressed patient from receiving
or expressing love which leads to feelings of deprivation. Abraham
compares clinical depression to a form of dying. He also discusses
depression in terms of an obsessional neurosis (Abraham, 1924).
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The depressed patient, like the obsessional neurotic, expends
much libidinal energy in an effort to repress latent hostility.
When confronted with the loss of an object, he projects the hostility
outwards and concludes that he is hated by those around him. Out¬
ward-directed hostility is further generated by his acute sense of
impoverishment which, in turn, produces guilt, anxiety, and self-
reproach .
Freud (1917), in his celebrated paper 'Mourning and Melancholia',
likened clinical depression to normal grief. Both may happen as a
reaction to the loss of a loved object but in depression the response
to the loss, seen as separation, frustration, and disappointment,
remains in the realms of the unconscious. Thus, in normal grief,
facing reality leads to an adaptive, redistribution of libidinal
energy towards other objects. On the other hand, in clinical
depressions the conflict of ambivalence is internalised. As Blackburn
(1972) notes 'the intense self accusations are expressions of hate
towards the ambivalent internalised object (as opposed to Abraham's
view of hostility directed against the self). Freud explained this
as the narcissistic identification of the ego with the object through
introjection, a regression to the oral stage of libidinal development'
(author's insert, P.56). '
Rado (1928) also described depression in intrapsychic terms
but advanced the theory of identification a step beyond the Abraham-
Freud formulation. The original model had as its cornerstone the
incorporation of the lost or frustrating object in both the ego and
superego (ego-ideal). Rado suggested that depression may be caused
by the rebellion of the ego against a cruel superego. Rather than
an attack from the superego, depression comes from the ego's struggle
to regain the superego's approval through self-castigation, just
as the child in his early efforts tried to win the love of his
parents by self-punishment. He explained that the child had split
his parents into 'good' and 'bad', assigning the bad, aggressive
parts to his age and the good, loving parts to his superego.
Depression is an attempt to destroy these bad parts of the ego,
which, when purged, can unite with the superego in reciprocal love
(Ashworth, 1976).
In Rado's view, depression is an intense yearning for love.
Love is essential for the maintenance of self-esteem. Since the
ego of the depressed person is grossly deficient in critical
evaluation of his own achievement, he relies upon the approval of
others to satisfy his overwhelming need for love. This description
represents a significant departure from early psychoanalytic writings.
According to Ashworth (ibid), 'it indicated a shift in emphasis from
id to ego. In a later paper (Rado, 1951), he abandoned the
concepts of introjection and narcissism and regarded the self torment
of melancholia as purely an ego phenomenon wherein the ego is trying
to regain the lost loved object, and therefore his self-esteem, by
submitting his rage as abandonment to . . . fear and thus retro-
flexing the rage inward.' (P.8)
Fenichel (1945) agreed with Abraham and Freud about the importance
of hostility in depression but was quite explicit about what he termed
'the struggle for the maintenance of self-esteem' (P.139). He stated
that 'normal' sadness as well as the melancholic forms of depression
have in common a decrease in self-esteem. The clinical differences
are viewed as stages in the course of the struggle to regain the lost
self-esteem by various adaptive mechanisms. Fenichel argued that
depressed people respond to frustration with anger which they deny.
The self-reproach of the depressive patient consists of the dis¬
charge on the ego of the aggression unconsciously felt for the lost
object.
Bibring (1953) was the first to conceptualise depression
strictly in terms of ego psychology, focussing on object loss and its
consequences on the ego. His neoanalytic theory, a major conceptual
break with the Abraham-Freud model, views depression as an ego state,
an affect completely divorced from the oscillations of the aggressive
drive. Bibring postulated that depression need not result from con¬
flict or an attempt at synthesis between the ego and superego. Rathe
depression may occur when the ego is cognizant of its goal and
simultaneously aware of its helplessness to attain it. Self-esteem
collapses because the ego feels unable to live up to its aspirations
and depression is an emotional expression of the ego's impotency.
Depression, in other words, develops when an individual cannot match
his ego ideals - the desire to be worthy and loved, the striving to be
secure, powerful and competitive, the aim to be good, kind, and com¬
passionate. Although hostility may be generated by object loss,
or obstacles that block the path to cherished goals, it is a secondary
phenomenon in Bibring's model. Early childhood traumatic experiences
as well as frustration of attainment of aspirations predispose
individuals to depression.
Dacobsen (1953) takes up Bibring's point about loss of self-
esteem in depression. She introduced the concept of self and object
representations which develop during infancy into realistic and stable
images in the ego, and also serve as the foundation for the ego ideals
This brief overview of psychoanalytic theory may give an idea
of the main contributions to the field of depressive illness (for
detailed reviews see Greenacre, 1953; Becker, 1974). The
phenomenon of low self-esteem in depression was a key factor in
all these models: it was seen as a consequence of anger turned
against the self, or a manoeuvre to appease a cruel superego, or
the awareness that cherished goals are unobtainable. The emphasis
shifted away from internal psychological processes - intrapsychic
divisions, narcissism, orality, ambivalence - towards external events
such as early familial experiences and the need for social approval.
The neo-analytic school, in other words, rejected the view that
depression results from an aggressive drive generated within the
unconscious. Instead, it is seen in terms of a conscious cognitive
factor (loss of self-esteem).
Although many of the early psychoanalytic conjectures are
untested and untestable, they have been of considerable heuristic
value and suggest hypothetical constructs for scientific study.
Loss-separation and hostility are two such constructs that have been
investigated.
2. Loss and separation
Since the concept of loss and separation serves as the corner¬
stone of psychoanalytic thought, it is here discussed separately.
In his well-known paper 'Anaclitic Depression', Spitz (1946)
described a syndrome occurring in hospitalised infants who had been
denied maternal contact. He observed that many of these infants
failed to thrive, that their mortality was high , and that they were
withdrawn and unresponsive and appeared to be depressed. Aetiologically,
race, sex, age, developmental and intellectual level seemed irrelevant,
the one significant precipitating factor being that the infants
were forcibly separated from their mothers during the second six
months of life.
Bowlby (i960) confirmed Spitz's findings in his own studies
on the mother-child relationship. He postulated that anaclitic
depression was a consequence of the separation of the infant from
its mother. Moreover, he argued that the depression was a real
state of grief in the child. Bowlby went on to describe an
initial stage of 'protest' comprised of agitated behaviour, soon
followed by withdrawal and retardation (depression). In addition
to emphasising the parallels between anaclitic depression in the
child and normal grief in the adult, Bo.wlby also advanced the hypo¬
thesis that the loss of a loved object in childhood makes an
individual vulnerable to pathological grief reactions in later life.
Although there is considerable disagreement about whether the
o
syndrome described by Spitz and B^'wlby is analogous to the clinical
state of depression in the adult (O'Connor, 1956; Whoolton , 1959)
their findings have stimulated research into the effects of early
environment in depression. This is exemplified by animal studies
of the loss-separation model (Harlow, 1955, 1971; Senay, 1966;
Karfman, 1967; McKinney, 1969, 1971; Kaufman et al. , 1967) and
studies which show a positive relationship between childhood
bereavement and depression (Brown, 1961; Munro, 1965; Beck et al. ,
1963; Denneby, 1966; Forrest et al. , 1965).
Other evidence that early loss can make people vulnerable
to later loss is reported by Levi et al. (1966) in which a particular
cluster of both early and recent loss was noted in suicide attempters,
relative to a control group of non-suicidal psychiatric patients.
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However, Sethi (1964) failed to replicate this result in depressed
patients. Buohnell (1970) compared depressed and non-depressed
inpatients and found that severely depressed patients reported
significantly more early death of mother than moderately severe
depressives, though the incidence of parental death before age 20
did not differ between the two groups.
Granville-Grossman (1968) in their review of the relevant
literature on depression, point out that the term 'parental deprivation'
has been used indiscriminately to mean childhood bereavement, as well
as separation from parents for other reasons, and maladaptive relation¬
ships with parents. Moreover, the term usually refers to maternal
deprivation, even though some writers (e.g. Batchelor and Napier, 1953)
have discussed the significance of the loss of a father figure. This
confusion of terms may account for some inconsistencies in the loss-
separation literature. Many investigations have failed to show a
clear relationship between childhood bereavement and depression
(Perris, 1966; Oltman et al., 1951; Gregory, 1939, 1962; Pitts,
et al., 1965). If early loss is related to depression, there should
be a higher incidence of early loss in depressed patients relative to
the general population or other psychiatric groups, but again
Granville-Grossman (1968c) concluded that the evidence for this
hypothesis is far from compelling.
In summary, the loss-separation model derived from psychoanalytic
theories offers a means of testing an aetiological theory (object loss)
and also has the potential for delineating what other variables in the
social field influence the development and maintenance of depression.
While empirical support for the association between early bereavement
and depression has been equivocal, the model has had a profound impact
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on theory and practice. It has contributed significantly to
the development of behavioural theories and the study of life events
and social factors in depression. These areas will be taken up in
more detail later in the chapter.
3. Hostility
The classical psychoanalytic writers (Abraham, 1911; Freud,
1917) viewed depression as a consequence of the inward turning of
the aggressive instinct that, for various reasons, is not directed
towards the appropriate object. The individual experiences retro-
fleeted anger in response to the real or symbolic loss of an
ambivalently loved object. The theory is described in metapsychological
terms and does not lend itself readily to empirical investigation.
Nevertheless, as the mainstream of early analytic thought on
depression views retroflected anger as crucial, attention is here
directed to selected studies on hostility.
The anger-turned-inward model of depression has not received
much empirical support. For example, if depression is supposed to
be a product of converted internalised anger, then levels of overt
anger and overt depression might be expected to be inversely correlated,
whereas increases in the overt expression of anger should covary with
clinical improvement. In one clinical study (Friedman, 1970), measures
of overt hostility and 'covert' hostility (e.g. guilt) were positively
correlated with one another and negatively correlated with improve¬
ment. Thus, the exact opposite of the predicted relationship
held true. Klerman et al. (1970) also found that reduction of
hostility towards external objects did not correlate with clinical
improvement.
While many studies have failed to demonstrate a causal
relationship between the direction-of-hostility theory and depression
(Akiskal and McKinney, 1975; Hollan and Beck, 1979), there is strong
support for the role of aggression in the phenomenology of depressive
illness. For instance, in order to measure extrapunitiveness
(anger against others) and intrapunitiveness (anger against self)
Foulds (Foulds et al., I960; Foulds, 1965) devised the 'Hostility
and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (HDHQ)'. Using this
instrument, investigators (Mayo, 1967; Philips, 1971; Blackburn,
1975) have consistently shown that general hostility (extrapunitiveness
and intrapunitiveness) is higher than average during depression and
diminishes to a normal level after recovery, the greater change
being in intrapunitiveness with only a slight change in extrapunitive¬
ness .
Clinical investigations have frequently underscored the
importance of punitiveness, especially intrapunitiveness, as a key
factor in syndrome depression. Grinker et al. (1961) conducted a
factor analysis of the phenomenology of depression and noted that
five components described the feelings and worries of depressed
patients. One of these (factor III) appeared to describe attributes
of guilt over wrong-doing by the patient. Feiqhner et al. (1972)
and Spitzer (197B) include 'feelings of self-reproach' among their
research diagnostic criteria for depression. Recently, Blackburn
(1979) used several depression scales and a self-rated hostility
measure (HDHQ) to investigate the relationship between hostility and
depressed mood. Nineteen patients were investigated in a follow-
up design. She found significant intercorrelations among the mood
measures which decreased over time, as did two of the four hostility
measures ('intrapunitiveness and direction-of-hostility 1 ).
The traditional notion that depressed patients show less
overt anger than nondepressed people has also been challenged.
Although depressed patients may display little anger in the presence
of high status figures such as professional helpers (Ueissman and
Paykel, 1974), hostility is quite often intense and overtly expressed
towards significant others (UJeissman et al. , 1971). That depressives
may selectively control overt expressions of hostility is consistent
with the concept of ambivalence which, according to the classical
analytic school, plays a central role in the aetiology of depression.
On the other hand, several researchers have argued that there may
be a subgroup of depressed patients, i.e. 'hostile depressives1,
characterised by a simultaneous presence of depressive symptoms
and overtly expressed anger (Overall et al., 1968; Lazarus, 1968;
Paykel, 1971).
Masochistic behaviour, commonly regarded as a consequence
of retroflected hostility, has been explained within the context
of learning theory. For example, Forrest and Hokanson (1975)
demonstrated a reduction in physiological arousal following preference
for self-injurious behaviour ('masochism') in a dyadic interactional
experiment. Depressed and nondepressed college students were given
a choice of responding to another subject's response by (l) deliver¬
ing a shock to the subject, (2) administering a less severe shock
to themselves, or (3) giving a friendly signal to the subject. The
depressed patients preferred the self-shock system and evidenced
reduced physiological arousal, labelled by the experimenters as an
indice of perceived relative personal safety. However, Forrest and
Hokanson were able to modify the preference for self-injurious
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behaviour and physiological arousal reduction in both the depressed
and non-depressed groups. Response contingencies were subsequently
arranged so that the initially non-selected responses, i.e. expressed
hostility using countershock for depressed subjects and self-shock
('Masochism1) for the non-depressed subjects, became differentially
rewarded, thus eliciting a friendly signal from the other subject.
The new contingencies were in operation over ninety trials. De¬
pressed and nondepressed subjects shifted behavioural choice and
physiological arousal reduction to the differentially rewarded
response.
The investigators postulated that masochistic behaviour,
rather than being a function of the anger-turned-inward model,"may
be maintained by differential reinforcement, with low levels of
self-injurious behaviour serving to pre-empt harsher, punitive
responses from others. The selection of an alternate response
(self-injurious behaviour) in favour of an aggressive strategy
(shock delivery) was interpreted within Band ura's social-learning
model. Other studies (Hokenson etal. , 1963, 1968) have shown
that women tend to adopt similar strategies when interacting with
men, as do students interacting with lecturers.
According to these findings and those of Weissman and Paykel
(op. cit), the expression of hostility may be regulated by perceived
environmental contingencies and the social context in which the
individual behaves.
If depression results from converted internalised anger,
t
then predominantly hostile themes should be evident in the dreams
and fantasies of depressed individuals. However, investigations
of manifest dream content have shown an excess of themes of loss
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and failure instead of aggression in both ill and remitted patients
(Beck and Horvich, 1959; Beck and Ward, 1961; Hauri, 1976).
Beck (1963) also examined the content of free association fantasies
of depressed patients during psychoanalysis and found a tendency
for patients to report themes of failure and low self-esteem
rather than hostility. He concluded that the findings could be
interpreted as demonstrating a belief in personal incompetence
rather than retroflected hostility. As will become clear, this
position is more in line with neoanalytic concepts and a cognitive
theory of depression.
The Abraham-Freud formulation also predicts that some
depressed individuals may 'punish* themselves indirectly by re¬
jecting opportunities to experience pleasure, withdrawing from
family and friends, and by 'resisting' progress in therapy. This
apparent motivational process has been referred to by clinicians as
an unconscious wish to fail. While it is true that depressives
demonstrate performance deficits on certain tasks (Miller, 1975),
such deficits need not be attributed exclusively to motivational
of physiological inhibitions. The findings of success-failure
experiments suggest that reduced performance may be a consequence
of lack of confidence, indecisiveness, and negative predictions
about performance (Beck etal., 1962). Two investigations (Klein
and Seligman, 1976; Loeb et al., 1971) have demonstrated that
following feedback about success, depressed subjects experienced
an increase in mood and performed better on subsequent tasks.
Again, these data raise further challenges to the internalised anger
model and could be more parsimoniously interpreted as consistent
with a cognitive theory of depression. This model predicts that
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depression is caused by 'negative expectations' rather than an
unconscious desire to fail.
The retroflected anger theory, in summary, offers a creative
and intuitively appealing explanation of the development of
clinical depression. It has generated hypothetical constructs
for elucidating aetiological factors and has been helpful in
delineating the phenomenology of depressive illness, in particular
the role of hostile affect and behaviours. However, there is not
much empirical support for the theory. Findings on the association
between overt hostility and depression and the inverse relationships
between overt hostility and improvement, the regulation of self-
injurious and aggressive behaviours in response to recognised
social status differences and outcome expectancies, the excess of
themes of loss and failure in dreams and fantasies, and the positive
response to feedback about effective performance are inconsistent
with the anger-turned-inward hypothesis. Instead, the data appear
to be more readily accommodated within a cognitive-motivational
model, whereby depressed people believe themselves to be failures and
doomed to lifelong deprivation.
4. Controlled treatment studies
Psychoanalytic thought is undoubtedly one of the leading
influences in the psychological treatment of depression. Explorative
psychotherapy, grounded in both clinical and neoanalytic writings
has been described extensively in the clinical literature (e.g. UJolberg, 1954).
Orthodox psychoanalytic therapy is a prolonged and intense process.
The principle components of therapy include free association,
catharsis, and interpretation. Change and reconstruction of
personality is supposed to come through the release of repression,
the discharge of painful effects 'e.g. anxiety and hostility) and
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the resolution of transference neurosis. Neoanalytically oriented
psychotherapists usually attempt a briefer treatment through a
flexible application of a variety of techniques (for excellent
reviews see Wolberg, 1954; Bergin and Strupp, 1972).
The ultimate goal of most forms of traditional psychotherapy
is to provide a therapeutic situation in which the patient can
achieve insight into the neurotic nature of his relationships and
symptoms, the initially unconscious fantasies that lie behind these,
and their origin in his childhood experiences (Nemiah, 1961). In
recent years psychotherapists have focussed more on the 'here and
now' and the amelioration of impaired social and interpersonal
circumstances (Whitehead, 1979).
The first controlled studies of the effectiveness of traditional
psychotherapeutic approaches were conducted by psychopharmacologists
interested in the combined use of tricyclic antidepressants and
psychotherapy. The previous chapter reviewed this literature.
Three separate studies have demonstrated that traditional psycho¬
therapeutic interventions are less effective than drug therapy alone
or that combined psychological/drug therapy interventions are no
more effective than drug treatment alone in terms of reducing syndrome
depression or preventing relapse (Covi et al., 1974; Friedman, 1975;
Klerman et al.. 1974). There is one investigation showing that
traditional psychoanalytical oriented psychotherapy is more effective
than placebo plus psychotherapy (Daneman, 1961). One study exists
which provides tentative support for the superiority of combined drug
therapy/psychotherapy intervention over drug therapy and psychotherapy
alone in reducing symptoms (Weissman et al., 1979). Finally, it
appears that marital therapy plus lithium may be more efficacious
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than lithium alone in preventing marital failure in bipolar patients
(Davenport et al. , 1977).
Overallj traditional psychosocial approaches to the treatment
of depression have fared poorly relative to pharmacological
treatments (for excellent reviews see Whitehead, 1979; Weissman,
1978; Hollon and Beck, 1979) in reducing depressive symptoms.
BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES
1. Overview
This section covers the major behavioural models of depression,
most of which are SkinneEian or operant derivatives. Ferster (1947),
Lewinsohn (1974, 1975, 1976), Seligman (1976) and Rehm (1977) have
been the major contributors, though others have put forward classical
or affect-mediated (Hollon et al. , 1979) theories which focus on
the role of conditioned anxiety and avoidance behaviour in the develop
ment of depression (Wolpe et al. , 1966; Wolpe, 1971). As there
appears to have been little systematic testing of the latter, only
operant approaches and supporting evidence will be considered here.
Environmentally-oriented behavioural models implicitly reject
the mediatiohal variables suggested by psychoanalytic theorists
(retroflected anger, loss of self-esteem). Rather, they construe
depression in terms of reduced contingencies of reinforcement (Ferster
1965; Lazarus, 1968), inappropriate contingencies of reinforcement
(Ullman and Krasner, 1969) or a combination of these (Lewinsohn and
Lisbet, 1972).
Ferster (1965, 1966, 1973) was among the first to evaluate
depressive behaviours within an operant framework, albeit more ex¬
clusively from a theoretical standpoint than a pragmatic, empirical
stance. He defined the fundamental characteristic of depression
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as a reduction in frequency of behaviours that are positively re¬
inforced and, basing his theory on analogue research from the animal
laboratory, specified three components that might contribute alone,
or in combination, to the development of depression. First, the
frequency of positively reinforced behaviour will decrease if the
schedule of reinforcement becomes too thin, i.e. if the individual
is rewarded infrequently. Lewinsohn et al. (1969) have referred
to this as a 'prolonged extinction schedule'. Second, the presence
of maladaptive anxiety (e.g. instilled by high rates of punishment)
can depress the rate of adaptive behaviour. Third, unexpected changes
in the environment can lower the frequency of adaptive behaviour,
particularly if cueing stimuli for ongoing behaviours are suddenly
depleted, e.g. through loss, separation, death, or even organic
deficits following illness. Ferster argues that depressives might
have difficulty coping with low rates of reinforcement because of
a lack of social skills, a stance taken by other behavioural researchers
(Patterson et al., 1969; Moss et al., 1972; Lewinsohn, 1974). These
investigators have expanded this research by focussing on low rates of
response contingent reinforcement and aversive control (punishment,
avoidance, escape) as aetiological factors in depression.
Klerman (in Becker, 1977) has criticised Ferster's claim that
depression is essentially a weakness or absence of adaptive behaviour.
Why is there a break in the impact of premorbid and intramorbid
positive reinforcers? Why do such things as sex, food and work
that were previously rewarding appear to lose their powers? Klerman
suggests that the loss of reinforcer effectiveness may be due to
internal, biological events rather than environmental changes.
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Costello agrees with Klerman's hypothesis that apparent loss of
reinforcer potency has been neglected. He, too, suggests a
biochemical or neurophysiological change process as an explanation
of diminished reinforcer effectiveness, particularly in depressed
patients with endogenous symptoms. For those depressions
characterised more by cognitive and mood disturbances the impact of
rewards may be reduced by a disruption of a chain of behaviour at
either an overt or covert level.
Drawing upon research from animal conditioning experiments,
Costello says that loss of a significant person or context that
served as a cue or prompt for significant rewards reduces the
desirability of the rewards, which in turn seriously disrupts
complex behavioural responses. He argues, 'that we are dealing
with a chain of behaviours is suggested by the absence in many
instances of any obvious link between the specific loss and his general
loss of interest* (P.244, in Becker, 1977 (P.85)).
This is a highly speculative position and there is as yet little
empirical support for the theory (Seligman et al., 1976). It is,
however, of considerable heuristic value because of its testability
and represents a direct attempt by behaviourists to deal with the
problem of apparent loss of reward effectiveness.
Although Lazarus (1968, 1974) agrees with Ferster that depression
results from excessive activity requirements per reward, he emphasises
that depressed individuals undertake tasks they fail to complete,
thereby depriving themselves of positive reinforcement. Furthermore,
depressed behaviour is either deliberately, or inadvertently, rewarded
by other people (e.g. attention or sympathy), thereby maintaining
even more self-defeating behaviour. Various researchers have under-
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scored the importance of reinforcement of depressed behaviour from
social support systems (Bonime , 1966; Lewinsohn etal. , 1968;
Liberman et al. , 1971; Stuart, 1967).
Treatment strategies based upon these theories focus upon
the person's environment as a means of changing depressive behaviour.
The therapist actively intervenes to arrange contingencies that will
reward adaptive behaviours and extinguish or punish depressive
behaviours. These methods attempt to change the way a person's
family or associates respond to his behaviour, thus increasing the
likelihood that he will engage in non-depressive behaviours (UJelcrum
et al. , 1976). There are two controlled studies using this approach;
both employ single case designs with reversals.
Reisinger (1972) treated a young female inpatient diagnosed
as 'anxiety-depression' within a token economy programme. Crying
behaviour was selected as the target to be reduced in frequency.
The woman was given a token each time she smiled (adaptive response)
and was fined a token each time she cried; a modified ABAB design
demonstrated that the tokens exerted control over these behaviours.
Several weeks later social reinforcement for smiling was paired with
tokens. Tokens were gradually faded from the programme until social
reinforcement was the only reward. The programme seems to have
been successful as the resident was discharged shortly thereafter
and had not been rehospitalised at follow-up 14 months later.
The main difficulty with this study is the implicit assumption
that depression is equivalent to crying behaviour; other aspects
of symptomatology were not considered (e.g. mood). Also, the general-
isability of the results to other patients is severely restricted by
the highly circumscribed nature of the depressed behaviour.
Hersen et al. (1973) demonstrated that a token economy
programme reduced observable depression uiith three neurotically
depressed inpatients, all of whom also received drug therapy.
The programme focussed on behaviours in several areas: work
performance, grooming, occupational therapy and responsibility.
Talking, smiling and motor behaviour were assessed,on a time sampling
basis, by the nursing staff using a behaviour rating scale. ABA
reversal designs were employed. During the baseline conditions
obtaining tokens was contingent upon performance of the target
behaviour but the tokens had no value (privileges were non-contingent)
both the behavioural ratings and amount of earned tokens were low.
During the treatment phase, privileges were contingent upon tokens,
and there was a marked increase in the number of tokens earned and
a related increase in the behavioural ratings. Houjever, both the
behavioural ratings (smiling etc.) and number of earned tokens de¬
creased remarkably when the baseline conditions were reinstated.
Thus, all of the patients improved during the active treatment, re¬
verting to pre-treatment levels during the reversal phase.
The strength of this study is that patients responded to treat¬
ment in a very short time (several days) compared with the four months
in the Reisinger study. Its basic drawback is that like the previous
study, no measure of affective state was taken. Furthermore, the
fact that the behaviour changes were under such rigorous stimulus
control reduces the potential of generalisation of the learned
responses to other settings.
Lewinsohn (1968, 1974, 1975, 1976), Seligman (1976) and Rehm
(1977) have preferred to maintain closer links between hypotheses
and data than the earlier behavioural researchers. The contributions
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of these learning theorists to the understanding of depression will
be considered separately.
2. Lewinsohn's theory
According to Lewinsohn's viewpoint, depression is caused by
a low rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement, which
translates as positive reinforcement that is only forthcoming if the
critical behaviours are emitted by the person (Lewinsohn, 1974).
This low rate exists if (l) few events are rewarding, (2) few
rewarding events are available in the environment and/or (3) the
person lacks the necessary social skills to make those responses
that would be rewarded. Thus, Lewinsohn's model is one that claims
that it is not reduced reinforcement per se but an appropriate rate
of response-contingent positive reinforcement that is crucial to the
development and maintenance of depression.
Supporting evidence for the theory has been largely correlational
(e.g. Bunner, 1975; Lewinsohn and Libet, 1972; Lewinsohn and Graf,
1973; Lewinsohn and Macphillamy, 1974; fflacphillamy and Lewinsohn, 1974;
Sheslow and Erikson, 1975; for reviews see Blaney, 1977). Essentially,
these studies report negative correlations between reported levels of
pleasant events and mood but do not establish any causal link between
events and affect. For example, Lewinsohn and Libet (1972) and
Lewinsohn and Graf (1973) found a correspondence across time within
person's between participation in pleasant activities and depression.
Considering the usual definitions of depression, this result is hardly
more than tautology. These researchers, arguing that aetiology would
be suggested if a decrease in activities preceded decreases in self-
reported mood level, computed time-lagged correlations to evaluate the
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extent to which there was a powerful relationship between behavioural
changes on one day and a congruent mood change on following days.
Neither study reported data compatible with the predictions of the
theory, i.e. they failed to show that changes in activity preceded
changes in mood.
Lewinsohn argues that lack of social skills is a causal factor
in depression, the point being that reduced social skills decreases
the amount of reinforcement available to the individual. This
contention is held to be supported by investigations which demonstrate
that depressed patients elicit less reinforcement from others and
seem to show deficits in social skills (Lewinsohn and Shaffer, 1971;
Lewinsohn et al., 1970; Libet and Lewinsohn, 1973; Libet etal. ,
1973). Since these correlational studies were conducted using
depressed populations, it is likely that the observed deficits in
social skills behaviour are merely aspects, rather than causes, of
depression. These data also fail to address the issue of whether
social skills deficits remain after remission of symptoms. Further¬
more, one study has shown that depressed individuals may be as socially
skillful as nondepressed people when placed in an 'analogue interaction
situation* (Schrader et al. , 1978). These investigators suggested
that, rather than having a depleted repertoire of social skills,
depressives may respond to certain kinds of situations by inhibiting
acquired skills. Such a view is compatible with findings cited
earlier that depressives appear to selectively modulate assertive
behaviours in response to perceived social status deficits (Weissman
and Paykel, 1974; Weissman et al. . 1971).
Blaney (1977) has provided an excellent review of the relevant
literature. In his view, 'since so much of the effort surrounding
Lewinsohn's theory has been essentially correlational, perhaps the
theory should be treated as a characterisation of the depressed
person's interaction with his environment rather than as a hypothesis
concerning the causal antecedents of the depressive episode'(P.210).
Despite these challenges, Lewinsohn's model has had a major
impact on behavioural theory and practice. The guiding principle
behind Lewinsohn's therapy is to restore an adequate schedule of
positive reinforcement by altering the level, quality and range of
the patient's activities and interactions. This is done through
the judicious application of graded tasks, contingent reinforcement
and activity schedules (Bonham, 1979).
Thus, Hammen and Glass (1975) attempted to reverse depression
in a nonclinical population using some of the techniques recommended
by Lewinsohn (also see Rush and Beck, 1979, for a description of
Lewinsohn's method). On the basis of scores on questionnaires in
the mild to moderate range of depression, college students were
randomly allocated to one of four conditions: the experimental
group was instructed to increase their activities from an individualised
Pleasant Events Schedule; another group was told to eat more protein
than carbohydrate foods - this was used as an expectancy control
group; also included were self-monitor (recording daily activities)
and waiting list control groups. Subjects were not told that they
were having 'treatment'. Although the experimental and self-monitor
groups both maintained a similar level of pleasant activities,
subjects in the 'treatment' group showed less reduction of depression
than subjects who simply recorded their activity. Moreover, subjects
who increased their activities reported fewer highly pleasant activities
(self-rated). Thus, the circumstances under which pleasant activities
are increased appear to affect the impact of increased activity on
mood.
The results indicate that depressed people seem to be able
to participate in more pleasant activities but this does not
necessarily improve their mood. Lewinsohn argued that the investigation
failed to establish whether the prescribed activities were potentially
reinforcing for the subjects. The brief treatment period (two weeks)
and the fact that the subjects did not realise they were receiving
treatment might also account for the findings (Whitehead, 1979).
Operating on the idea that depression is a 'reaction to re¬
inforcement loss', Shipley and Fazio (1973) selected student volunteers
who complained of depression lasting at least three weeks (screened
using Zung Self-Report Depression Questionnaire). They provided
functional problem-solving advice in an individual approach directed
towards appropriate modes of social interaction. Homework assign¬
ments were given. Twenty-two treatment subjects and twenty-eight
controls, i.e. an interest support group without homework assignments,
were seen for three one-hour sessions over three weeks by one therapist.
The results showed significantly greater improvement in the behavioural
group compared to the control groups.
There are two problems here, also evident in the study conducted
by Hammen and Glass (1975). First, there is an implicit assumption
that a depressed population has been accurately identified. Self-
report methods of defining and identifying depressed subjects embodies
many critical problems. These problems relate to issues concerning
the use of rating scales as diagnostic measures, in general, as well
as to specific difficulties inherent in self-rating scales (e.g.
Zung, SDS, BDI, etc.), as opposed to observer rating scales and
research diagnostic interview schedules (Depue and Monroe, 1978).
Secondly, the severity of symptomatology in the populations studied
places powerful constraints on the generalizability of the results
to patients with greater levels of mood disturbance. With regard to
Shipley and Fazio's work, Whitehead (1979) says, 'comparing the
initial scores on the Zung SDS with those quoted for patients by
Bigger et al. (1978), these student subjects scored in the range
of nil to mild depression' (P.500)
The objective of improving social skills has been approached
using a group modality. Therapy focusses on the acquisition of
communication skills through graded task exercises and the discussion
of specific interpersonal problems (Lewinsohn, 1970). The relation¬
ship between loss of reinforcement and depression is explained in some
detail to provide a rationale for therapy. Although no controlled
trials exist, in an investigation to be discussed in the next chapter,
Shaw (1977) employed a similar procedure. He found that in college
students seeking help for depression, the social skills group performed
no better than subjects in a non-directive therapy control group.
In summary, Lewinsohn has developed a major line of behavioural
research focussing on the importance of low rates of response contingent
positive reinforcement as a key factor in depression. While the model
is built on an empirical base, much of the evidence held to be in support
of the theory is equivocal; some studies (e.g. Hammen and Glass, 1975)
raise challenges to Lewinsohn's theory. Nevertheless,it is notable
that treatments which focus on behavioural targets have been effective
in alleviating some forms of depression.
3. Learned helplessness theory
Seligman (1972, 1973, 1975), Miller and Seligman (1973), Seligman
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et al. (1976) have proposed a theory of depression in which the con¬
cept of loss of reinforcement is a tertiary rather than a central
component. His model acknowledges the extent to which mediational
variables, i.e. cognitive set, may interact with specific environmental
events in the development of reactive depression. The basic tenet
of the original model asserts that lack of contingency between
behaviour and reinforcement results in a set, or perception, of learned
helplessness.
In earlier work, Seligman and his colleagues observed that
after dogs had been exposed to several trials of inescapable electric
shock by being restrained in a harness, they seemed unable to learn
to escape shock when the escape response was permitted (Seligman and
Maier, 1967; Seligman and Groves, 1970). Moreover, they noted that
the dogs were able to learn the appropriate response only after they
had been physically hauled into the shock-free part of the shuttlebox
over many consecutive trials. Seligman suggested that the animal's
escape responses had been extinguished in the inescapable shock trials
and described this phenomenon as learned helplessness.
Learned helplessness, then, describes a behavioural state
characterised by the non-emission of adaptive behaviours because the
organism recognises no relationship between its own responses and relief
from aversive events.
Seligman has argued that learned helplessness is a model for
'reactive depression'. Behavioural similarities between animals
subjected to inescapable shock and depressed patients, in Seligman's
I
view, include reduced levels of activity and aggression, sexuality,
sociability and retardation; and both remit spontaneously. He cites
parallels between the aetiology of learned helplessness and the aetiology
ascribed by psychodynamic authors to depression such as Bibring
(1953). Loss of appetite, and weight and brain depletion of a biogenic
amine (norepinephrine), which acts as a neural transmitter, are also
regarded as correlates between learned helplessness and depression
(Becker, 1977). Seligman further suggests that depressed patients
and laboratory animals benefit from antidepressant medications which
increase the amount of centrally available norepinephrine. With
regard to behavioural treatment, the animals have to be forced out of
their helpless state by being dragged into a shock-free zone.
The cornerstone of Seligman's model is that depressed people
believe that they lack control over environmental events. This
cognitive set may result from a learning history which has not afforded
an opportunity for positive control over the environment. For example,
a history of failure in coping adequately with stressful situations,
or recurrent punishment, may produce a negative set of expectations
about one's ability to cope with future stressors. When confronted
with stressful events such as reinforcement loss, people vulnerable
to depression may give up easily in their attempts to problem solve,
even though appropriate coping methods are available. Another example
of a defective history would be if the person was rewarded regularly
for behaviour but on a noncontingent basis. Under these conditions,
the person might not learn the critical behaviours that are needed
to elicit reinforcement from the environment (Wilcoxin et al., 1976),
thereby generating a belief that the amount of incoming reinforcement
has-nothing to do with his behaviour. According to Seligman, this
might account for 'success depressions' in which people attain a goal
for which they have worked hard and feel that they are rewarded not
for current behaviour but for who they are or what they have achieved
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previously.
A number of human studies have been conducted both to induce
states of learned helplessness and to demonstrate its existence in
depressed subjects. Heroto (1974, 1975) showed that helplessness
could be induced using aversive noise levels. It has also been shown
that non-contingent positive reinforcement undermines competitive
responding in students presented with discrimination problems (Kurlander
et al. , 1974).
Miller and Seligman (1973) investigated the effects of levels
of depression and perceived externality of control on expectancy
changes in skill versus chance performance tasks. Depressed college
students were selected on the basis of scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory (the mean scores of the highly depressed group were mild
compared to clinical samples) and Rotter's Internal Versus External
Expectancy Scales. In this study, expectancy change did not correlate
with internal-external scores. Depressed and non depressed subjects
did not differ on the chance task. However, the skill task, in which
the reinforcement received was response-contingent, produced highly
significant changes, i.e. depressed subjects perceived that they
had less control over the amount of reinforcement they received than
did non-depressed subjects working on the same task.
Although Seligman has not proposed any specific treatment
strategies, he has referred to the approach used by Uladsworth and
Barker (1977) as having a large element of 'control'. Their method,
considered as an Antidepressive Program (ADP), seeks first to provoke,
then to reinforce the expression of anger. They selected fifty six
male inpatient depressives diagnosed as neurotic and psychotic, and
used the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale before treatment and there-
after at one and three weeks. Psychiatric patients received anti¬
psychotic drugs in addition to the other treatments. The experimental
treatment consisted of making the patient perform repetitive, meaningless
tasks until such time as he expressed anger and refused to do any more;
at this point he was entered into group therapy. This was compared
with an approach that used meaningful tasks, admittance into group
therapy and pharmacotherapy (imipramine^. The results showed no
differences in response in the psychiatric patients, but for the neurotics
significant improvement was found in the experimental group.
It should be noted that this programme is linked to psychodynamic
formulations in terms of the hypothesised role of anger in the treatment
approach and might therefore be regarded as evidence in support of
traditional psychotherapy. Methodologically, it might be argued that
the results are an artefact of differences in patient admission since
the experimental group received treatment before the control group.
Also, the use of only a single depression measure makes it difficult
to evaluate the magnitude of change in clinical terms. However, the
result is at least arguable within the Seligman model insofar as
patients in the experimental group were 'forced* in the initial phase
to emit a response that was apparently incompatible with passivity
(helplessness).
Several investigations (Gotchel et al. , 1975; Klein etal. ,
1976; Roth and Kubal, 1975) have pointed to the role of increased
anxiety and/or hostility in the helplessness paradigm. Drawing upon
this evidence Blaney (1977) contends that the helplessness model may
not be specific to depression. In addition, Rush and Beck (1979)
note that 'the usual helplessness-inducing manipulations may also de¬
crease self-esteem. This makes interpretation of many studies said
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to support the helplessness model difficult, since self-esteem and
helplessness may be confounded' (P. 307).
Extension of the learned helplessness model to clinical
depressive disorders has brought strenuous criticism (for a complete
review see Depue and Monroe, 1978). First, Seligman claims that the
model is analogous to 'reactive depression*. Apart from the semantic
confusion which arises from using the terms endogenous-reactive (neurotic)
and psychotic-neurotic interchangeably, many investigations have shown
a tremendous degree of heterogeneity inherent in the reactive group
of patients (Kendell, 1976). According to Depue and Monroe 'it has
become impossible to speak meaningfully of reactive depression as a
unified entity or type or to speak of this group confidently within
the framework of a single aetiologic factor' (P.7). Seligman's con¬
tention that learned helplessness is comparable to 'reactive depression'
virtually discounts the confusion in this area and implies a distinct
position on aetiological factors, i.e. depressive reactions are in¬
duced by environmental events.
Several of the symptom parallels between learned helplessness
and clinical depression put forward by Seligman may be inaccurate.
As in' the case of reactive depressions, it is no longer possible to
provide a simple definition for the so-called major depressions (e.g.
unipolar and bipolar) because the clinical manifestations within each
are so variable (Spitzer, 1975; Akiskal and McKinney, 1975). In
viewing passivity, psychomotor retardation, and stupor as parallels
between hisnmodel and reactive depression, Seligman appears not to
have considered the relevant literature on symptomatology and depressive
subtypes. These symptoms ara not necessarily characteristic of de¬
pressive disorders in general, let alone reactive depression. Depue
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and Monroe note that these features are more compatible with some
forms of endogenous depression, bipolar 1 particularly, as measured
by 24 basic behavioural ratings.
Finally, Seligman's empirical support rests heavily on human
analogue studies of depression. While analogue studies can be
helpful in delineating specific processes in depression, the use of
self-report scales as diagnostic (selection) instruments (e.g. BDI),
and the relatively low levels of mood disturbance in the populations
studied makes it difficult to generalise the results to clinical samples.
Having recognised that the learned helplessness model is in
need of revision with respect to these problems, the model appears
to be worthy of continued investigation. It has a reasonably broad
empirical base, good research generating potential, and may well have
important implications for greater understanding of 'normal',
situational and/or minor depressive disorders.
Recently, flbramson et al. (1978) have proposed a reformulation
of the learned helplessness model which is said to overcome many of
the shortcomings inherent in Seligman's original theory. Arguing on
strictly academic grounds, these authors point out that the original
model, when applied to humans, has two major drawbacks. These may
be summarised in a quote from the paper.
'(a) it does not distinguish between cases in which outcomes are
uncontrollable for all people and cases in which they are uncontrollable
only for some people (universal versus personal helplessness), and
(b) it does not explain when helplessness is general and when specific,
or when chronic and when acute' (P.49).
The revised model is based on a revision of attribution theory
(Winer, 1978) and attempts to address these critical issues. It can
88.
be summarised as follows:
(1) Depression is comprised of four kinds of deficits:
motivational, cognitive, self-esteem and affective.
(2) Depression occurs when a person believes that he is
unlikely to achieve a desired goal and expects that he lacks
the coping responses necessary to increase the likelihood
of reaching the goal (helplessness).
(3) If the person believes that he is helpless to respond to
a broad range of situations or problems, then he is likely to
experience deficits in a wider range of situations (generality).
The narrower the range of situations in which the person believes
himself to be helpless, the more situation-dependent the depression
will be (specificity).
(4) Chronicity will depend on whether the state of helplessness
is recurrent or long-lived. The more stable the state of
helplessness is, the longer the duration of symptoms.
(5) Loss of self esteem will depend on whether the person blames
himself (externality) for his helpless state.
(6) Severity of depression depends on the extent to which the
person expects that he cannot control events. The more certain
he is that he cannot exert positive control over his environment,
the more severe the deficits.
In a word, the reformulated learned helplessness model says that
once people perceive noncontingency between their responses and reinforce¬
ment, they then attribute their helplessness to a cause.
Of the formulations discussed thus far, the revised learned
helplessness model of depression is the most recent and consequently
has received the least amount of research attention. Although there
is no direct empirical support as yet, the authors argue that the
reformulated hypothesis is consistent with the experimental evidence
on learned helplessness in humans and findings from human analogue
studies on attributions (see Abramson et al. , 1978).
Abramson et al. have proposed a broad-based, but as yet un¬
tested, treatment strategy on the basis of the reformulated model.
Some of the behavioural treatments discussed in the previous section
may be useful such as graded tasks - providing realistic goals and
standards of success as well as social and problem-solving skills
training, whereby the individual learns a wider range of coping res¬
ponses. They also suggest 'environmental manipulation by social
agencies to remove aversive outcomes or provide desired outcomes, e.g.
rehousing, job placement, financial assistance' (P.69). Another
strategy involves the use of verbal-persuasive techniques in changing
(l) the expectation from uncontrollability to one of controllability
over circumstances, and (2) unrealistic attributions of failure.
In contrast to behavioural models which view therapeutic
procedures in terms of establishing appropriate schedules of reinforce¬
ment, learned helplessness therapy focusses on changing two mediational
or cognitive elements, (l) the belief that one cannot exert positive
control over reinforcement, and (2) the belief that one is personally
responsible for a wide range of aversive outcomes.
4. Self-Reinforcement Theory
Rehm (1977) has proposed a self-reinforcement theory of depression
based on deficits in self-control. It incorporates features from the
behavioural and mediational models of the disorder. Like the learned
helplessness model, it acknowledges the centrality of thinking processes
in the aetiology and treatment of depression. On the other hand,
self-reinforcement theory is in agreement with behavioural models
in stating that response-contingent positive reinforcement is crucial
in the maintenance of adaptive behaviours. The two models differ
in that the behavioural stance holds that depression is caused by
environmentally supplied reinforcers, whereas the self-reinforcement
theory emphasises the rewards and punishments that the person delivers
to himself.
The self-control theory states that depression is a consequence
of defective self-reward mechanisms. The model takes its lead from
proposals by Bandura (1971) and Kamfer (1970, 1971) that self-reinforce¬
ment consists of three components: self-monitoring, self-evaluation
and self-reinforcement.
Self-monitoring refers to observing one's own behaviour and
the events which precede and follow it. The term 'behaviour' is used
in its broadest sense to include not only motor responses but internal
events such as mood, proprioception and cognitive activity (e.g.
selective attention, discrimination). Self-evaluation is the process
of making judgements about one's performance, and estimates about the
causes of positive or negative performance, relative to internalised
standards. Self-reinforcement refers to the self-administration of
appropriate schedules of positive reinforcement which may be regarded
as a way of supplementing environmentally dispensed schedules of re¬
inforcement.
According to the self-control theory (Rehm, 1977), depression
is seen as a series of deficits in self-monitoring, self-evaluation
and self-reinforcement. This tripartite self-control system may be
defective at any of six substations in the behavioural chain. These
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are (l) selective attention to negative events, (2) selective attention
to immediate instead of delayed consequences of behaviour, (3) imprecise
attributions of causality, e.g. attributing successful performance to
chance as opposed to one's skills, (4) excessively high performance
standards, (5) low rates of self-reward and (6) high rates of self-
punishment.
People u/ho are vulnerable to depression are said to have a
learning history mainly characterised by low rates of self-administered
reward and high rates of self-punishment. Bandura (1971) suggests
several ways a person may develop faulty self-reinforcement systems
with respect to certain behaviours. An individual might fail to self-
reinforce if (a) he does not regard a problem as challenging his
abilities, (b) he undervalues the importance of a task and (c) he has
unrealistic expectations concerning his ability to solve the problem
at hand. Bandura (1977) and Thoreson and Mahoney (1974) have reviewed
a sizeable literature on the means by which performance standards are
learned.
Excessively high performance standards may be one reason why
an individual may self-reinforce infrequently, thereby leav ing him
vulnerable to depression. Since it is very unlikely that an individual
with such standards could generate behaviours that would match his
expectancies, the resulting failure to live up to his aspirations
produces a negative self-evaluation of performance. Rehm hypothesises
that 'super-criteria' for self-reward can generate feelings of worth-
lessness, low motivation and depressed affect.
With regard to the presumed mechanisms that maintain established
patterns of self-reinforcement and self-punishment, Wilcoxin et al. ^1976)
state:
'self-reinforcement is maintained by periodic social reinforcement.
The performance of punishable behaviour is hypothesised to generate
anxiety or guilt. Self-punishment terminates these distressing
thoughts and forestalls possible social condemnation. In addition,
self-punishment may elicit social approval from others who are
pleased with a person's efforts to control his own behaviour' (P.220).
The self-control model has empirical support. For instance,
there is evidence that depressed populations demonstrate an attentional
bias to negative events (Loeb et al., 1964; Loeb et al. , 1971; Wein-
traub et al., 1974; Hammen et al., 1976). It has been shown that
depressed subjects underestimate the amount of positive reinforcement
they receive (UJener and Rehm, 1975,). However, this literature is
also compatible within a cognitive analysis (Beck, 1976). In a test
of a hypothesis derived from Lewinsohn's theory, Rehm and Plakosh (1975)
reported correlational data supporting the view that depression is
related to a preference for immediate rather than delayed reward.
Two unpublished studies mentioned in reviews by Hollo'.n and Beck (1979)
and Rush and Beck (1979) suggest that depressed individuals dispense
self-punishment more often than non-depressed subjects, whereas depressed
subjects deliver less reward (Roth'et al. , 1974; Rehm, 1977). Rehm
also cites evidence which indicates that attributions of causality vary
as a function of observed covariance between events fKelly, 1971) and
studies which suggest that accurate attributions of responsibility
mediate changes in cognitive and behavioural responses, e.g. the
learned helplessness work of Klein and Seligman (1976).
Rehm (1977) has devised a therapy package which consists of
different behaviour therapy techniques that focus on each of the separate
self-control deficits. Essentially, self-control therapy involves
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training depressed individuals to attend selectively to and record
positive events. Self-monitoring diaries are used as a basis for
discussion during therapy sessions in which the therapist attempts
to modify the individual's distortions of their own behaviour. This
skills training package also includes teaching people how to monitor
long-term as well as short-term consequences of behaviour, the direct
modification of self-attributional deficits, assisting individuals to
evaluate their performance realistically by making criteria for success
-S
less stringent, and the use of appropriate self-reinforcement techniques.
A behavioural programme for depression based on the self-control
model has been developed and tested in a controlled treatment trial.
Fuchs and Rehm (1977) treated volunteer depressed subjects who were
screened using the Minnesota Multiphase Personality Inventory (MMPI)
in weekly group sessions over a six-week period. The self-control
programmes consisted of didactic presentations of self-control concepts
and homework assignments focusing on appropriate self-evaluation and
self-reinforcement (N = 8). This approach was compared with a non¬
specific treatment (N = 10) which involved discussion of problems,
social interaction, and self-disclosure but no behavioural assignments
were given. Compared to a waiting list control (N = 10), both treatment
groups showed improvement on self-reported mood (BDI) and the self-
control programme demonstrated significantly greater improvement than
the nonspecific group at the end of treatment. A six-week follow-up
assessmemt indicated a continuing but nonsignificant trend for the
superiority of the self-control treatment over non-specific therapy.
The findings suggest that treatment based on a self-control
model is more effective than nonspecific and waiting list controls.
However, these depressed subjects cannot be regarded as a clinical
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sample - those with a history of psychiatric hospitalisation or
suicidal ideas or attempts were excluded from the study. Depressed
volunteers may respond differently to treatment than an identified
psychiatric population.
In terms of the theory, the self-control model is open to
many of the criticisms that have been directed towards the behavioural
and learned helplessness models, e.g. heavy reliance on correlational
and human analogue findings as principal sources of evidence. However,
like these models, Rehm's theory is phrased in operational terms, has
an empirical base, and as such, remains one of several psychological
theories of depression that can be scientifically tested.
While the self control model has been associated with operant
behavioural theories, its distinct emphasis on the role of covert
processes in the aetiology and treatment of depression fe.g. selective
attention, attributional style) places it firmly in the camp of mediational,
or cognitive, paradigms. As will be seen, Rehm's concept of self control
deficits bears a striking resemblance to Beck's cognitive theory and
therapy of depression (Beck, 1976).
From a mediational viewpoint, the major drawback of the environ¬
mentally oriented behavioural theories of depression ^Ferster, 1973;
Lazarus, 196B, 1974; Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975, 1976) is that they present
an impoverished outlook of a highly complex psychobiological process.
In assuming that depression is primarily a behavioural disorder, they
appear to discount the wide variety of clinical problems encountered
in the psychiatric clinic. Moreover, environmental models neglect the
role of thinking and individual differences in information processing
and their relationship to mood, processes that appear to have major
implications for theory and practice (Hallon and Beck, 1979).
This section reviewed the main contributions of behavioural
approaches to the field of depression. While the behavioural tradition
flatly rejects the intrapsychic model favoured by many psychodynamic
theorists, they have retained links with the analytically derived but
testable concept of loss. From a behavioural perspective, depression
is seen as a consequence of maladaptive interactions with the environ¬
ment which relate to several aetiological hypotheses. These include
f loss of reinforcement, (2) loss of reinforcer effectiveness, (3) in¬
appropriate schedules of reinforcement together with a lack, or loss, of
social skills, (4) perceived lack of control over reinforcement, and
(5) self-control deficits.
Historically, the emphasis has shifted from the influence of
external events, i.e. environmentally dispensed reinforcement, on overt
behaviour towards the role of covert processes ''e.g. selective attention)
in the development and maintenance of depression. It is worth noting
that the mediational theories, in particular learned helplessness,
have aetiological features similar to those put forward by neoanalytic
writers such as Bibring.
Treatment approaches based on behavioural models appear promising
in view of the demonstrated efficacy of these methods on subclinical
depressed subjects. However, these findings must be confirmed in
replication studies and it remains to be seen whether behavioural strategies
will be effective in the treatment of more serious depressive disorders.
Table 3Ct summarises the psychoanalytic models which have been
reviewed. Table 3C2 outlines the behavioural theories offered to
date and Table 3C3 shows the behavioural models which incorporate
important cognitive elements. As seen, the distinction between
traditional behavioural and mediational behavioural models is becoming
less defined.
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Anger directed against the self
following real or symbolic loss
Rebellion of the ego against a
cruel superego, e.g. struggle to





Unconscious aggression felt for
lost object is discharged onto
the ego, 'struggle to maintain
self-esteem'.
Collapse of self-esteem, person •
cannot live up to his ego ideals
and becomes aware of his helpless¬
ness to attain them.
Poor development of early self,
and object representations lead
to blurring of boundaries between
the ego and ego ideals, hence mal¬
adaptive self-appraisal mechanisms.
Bowlby (i960) Separation from mother at early
age, loss of loved object in child¬
hood increases vulnerability.
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Table 3C2 Behavioural Models of Depression
Authors Theory
Ferster (1965, 1973, 1974) 1. Loss of principal reinforcer
leads to reduced positive re¬
in forcement for adaptive be¬
haviour .
2. Social skills deficit leads
to impaired ability to recover
from reduced positive reinforce¬
ment.
Lazarus ^1968, 1974) 1. Loss of reinforcer, acting as a
discriminative cue, leads to
broken chains of behaviour.
2. Deprivation of reinforcement by
failing to complete tasks.
3. Social system supplies re¬
inforcement for depressive
behaviour.
Leuinsohn (1968, 1974, 1975,
1976)
1. Lou rate of response - contingent
positive reinforcement.
2. Feu events are reinforcing.
3. Feu reinforcing events are
available in the environment.
4. Social skills deficit
(less frequent and skillful
and more non-contingent re¬
inforcement from others)
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Seligman (1972, 1973, 1975)
Theory
Loss of reinforcer effectiveness
leads to overall disruption of
chains of behaviour.
Perception of the lack of contingency
between behaviour and reinforcement
leads to a state of 'learned help¬
lessness' f a belief that one lacks
control over environmental events)
Abramson, Seligman, Teasdale
<'1978 )
Bandura (1971) and Kanfer
(1970, 1971)
Rehm (1977)
1. Belief that one lacks control
(helplessness)
2. The person then attributes his/
her helplessness to a cause.
3. Internalised, global, stable
attributions lead to generalised
and prolonged helplessness
Reduction in self-reinforcing thoughts
and activities
1. Selective attention to negative
events.
2. Selective attention to immediate
instead of delayed consequences
of behaviour.
3. Inaccurate attributions of
causality.
4. Excessively stringent performance
standards.
5. Low rates of self reward.
6. High rates of self-punishment.
7. These are essentially deficits in
self-monitoring, self-evaluation
and self-reinforcement.
d. brown's sociological approach
While the psychodynamic and behavioural approaches differ in
several important ways, they are alike in terms of their emphasis on
the individual as a means of investigating aetiological factors in
depression. This clinical or intensive approach to aetiology finds
its origins in the history of medicine (Zilboorg and Henry, 1949).
Detailed knowledge of the person and his disorder allows the investigator
to make sense of the meaning of the person's symptoms, predict the
course of the disorder and, if possible, plan remedial action to correct
the problem. This is the main advantage of the clinical approach. The
trouble is that such detail makes it difficult to progress beyond the
individual case (Brown and Harris, 1979).
Another way of conducting aetiological research in psychiatry
is the epidemiological survey in which all cases of psychiatric dis¬
order in a population sample are ascertained. Selective information
is obtained both in cases and in normals. This has the strength of
representative sampling to avoid the potential bias in examining treated
cases, i.e. that it may only be treatment seeking behaviour that is
being investigated (Paykel and Rowan, 1979). Against this, the
epidemiological survey maintains comparability at the expense of ignoring
much of the complexity and clinical richness of the individual case.
Brown and Harris (1978), in their controversial book 'The
Social Origins of Depression', argue for the compatibility of the clinical
and epidemiological approaches in aetiological research. In their view,
a sociological model can make two important contributions to the field
of depression. First, it can investigate whether factors in the social
environment, e.g. enforced housing, can increase the probability of
developing a psychiatric disorder. Secondly it can assess how the
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individual perceives and reacts emotionally to these conditions and
other life events.
Since the work of Broun and his colleagues is closely related
to research on life events and depression, studies on this topic are
considered here in a separate section.
1. Life events
Investigations have established the relationship of life
events to general illness 'Holmes and Masuda, 1974; Rahe, 1974;
Wyler et al. , 1971) and psychiatric disturbance in community samples
(Myers et al. , 1974; Broun, 1973, 1975, 1978). A number of studies
have also compared events reported prior to onset by depressed
patients uith those reported by control groups.
Paykel et al. (1974) looked at life events in 185 depressed
inpatients and a similar number of matched controls from the
general population. Life events changes during the six months
prior to onset of symptoms uere measured by intervieu uith patients
some ueeks after symptomatic improvement. The depressed patients
had three times as many life events changes as control subjects.
When events uere divided into 'desirable' and 'undesirable'
categories, depressives uere found to report significantly more
undesirable events but did not differ from the controls on desirable
events.- Paykel also devised a measure of exits (departure of
someone from the immediate social field of the respondent) and
entrances 'introduction of an individual). Depressives had a
significantly higher number of exit events compared uith controls,
though there uas no excess for entrances.
Comparing depressed uomen uith a sample of uomen from the
general population, Broun et al. (1973) found that the rate for all
events was raised only in the three weeks preceding onset of depression,
but for events rated as very threatening 'on a combination observer
and personal response measure) it was elevated over the full 48 weeks
studied. In a smaller study, Thomson and Hendrie (1972) found that
depressives scored higher on weighted stress measures than hospital
personnel. Consistent with psychoanalytic theories, Cadent et al.
(1972) found that depressed patients reported twice as many recent
losses as their relatives, though the difference did not attain
a satisfactory level of significance.
Using depressed patients as their own control, Paykel (1974) com¬
pared life events at symptomatic onset with short-term follow up.
Thirty patients from a randomly selected sample of seventy were found
to have been symptom free for at least six months. These thirty subjects
had approximately half the percentages of exits and undesirable events
of the initial sample. While events rates fell, they were still higher
than general population levels.
There is evidence linking life events to other specific psychiatric
disorders. For instance, Brown and Birley (1968) reported a significantly
higher level of events in the three weeks prior to onset or relapse of
schizophrenia than in the general population. High incidences of life
events have been reported in schizophrenics relapsing on drug treatment
in maintenance trials (Liff et al. , 1972). Jacobs et al. ^1976)
found that first admission schizophrenics experienced more undesirable
events in the year before symptom onset. These investigations suggest
that schizophrenics may be particularly vulnerable to emotional inter¬
changes with the environment (Brown et al. , 1972).
Paykel (1974) cites a study by Jacobs in which fifty schizophrenics
and fifty depressives were compared on life events. Significantly fewer
undesirable events, exits, and total life changes were noted in the
schizophrenics compared to the depressives.
Beck and UJorthin ^1972) have also investigated life events in
schizophrenic and depressive samples. They found that depressives
reported more events and events of higher mean rated threat than
schizophrenics.
Paykel (1974) investigated suicide attempters, compared with matched
mixed depressives, and controls from the general population. Suicide
attempters reported four times as many life changes as the controls
and 50^ more than the depressed patients. Attempters had significantly
more undesirable events than the depressives and the general population.
Threatening-type events differentiated the attempters from the depressives,
but interpersonal function was a common occurrence before suicide attempts
and onset of depression. In the month before suicide attempts, events
were especially high (Paykel, 1979r in Paykel and Rowan, 1979).
Other studies have pointed to the role of life events in samples of
neurotic patients attending general practitioners ''Cooper, 1973)
and mixed psychiatric and medical/surgical patients (Schess etal.,
1977; Morrison et al. , 1968).
Impressive as these retrospective studies may seem, they have a
common methodological flaw. Having experienced illness may influence
people to view their past experiences differently, whereby they identify
more changes in life events than actually occurred (Parsons, 1975).
Prospective studies, such as those of Holmes and Macuda ^1974) and
Rahe (1974) reduce the problem of retrospective bias and provide a
better indication of predictability of illness.
In summary, these studies give strong support to the hypothesis
that life events precede a wide array of psychiatric problems. Depressed
patients are more likely than controls to report more life events
that are undesirable and involve loss of people from their social
environment during the six months prior to onset of illness than are
controls. There is evidence that schizophrenia bears some relation
to life events, but perhaps less than depression.
2. The theory
In keeping with their philosophy of combining the clinical and
epidemiological methods to research, Broun and Harris (1975, 1978)
have proposed a provocative sociological theory of the origin of
depression. They argue that it is the interaction of life events
(provoking agents) uith predisposing circumstances in the social environ¬
ment (vulnerability factors) that generates depressive illness.
They compared 114 depressed females and an epidemiological community
sample of 458 uomen. Information uas obtained by intervieu and it
uas found that 8 per cent of the community sample had onset of psychiatric
symptoms, primarily depression, uithin the previous year. These uere
designated as 'onset cases'. Severe life events and serious long-
term problems uere highly correlated uith depression in both groups.
Houever, the investigators uere also concerned uith predisposing factors,
i.e. social factors uhich increased the likelihood of symptomatic onset
after the occurrence of a life event. These vulnerability factors
included: three or more young children present in the home, lack of
a confidant uith uhom the person could share apprehensions, lack of
employment, full or part-time, and loss of a mother by separation or
death before age 11. These variables seemed to account for the
similarly strong relationship shoun by louer social class.
The data for predisposing factors emerged mainly from the community
population instead of the patients. Brown and Harris suggested that
other treatment seeking factors prompted vulnerable individuals not
to explore available sources of medical care. It was argued that
caring for young children in the home makes it less likely that
women will consult a general practitioner. Also, it may be that the
different meanings that patients and less disturbed women attach to
the onset of symptoms affects whether an individual will seek treatment.
While these are plausible explanations, Paykel et al. (1979) point out
that mild rather than clinical depression could account for the high
prevalence of depression in the community sample.
Pursuing the line of deprivation researchers, Brown et al. '1977),
looked at specific kinds of losses in childhood in relation to different
types of depression. They found that neurotic depression was related
to general losses, whereas loss by death was associated with psychotic
depression. It was suggested that the more severe the loss, the
greater the negative psychological impact (loss of self-esteem, increased
sense of helplessness).
There is evidence for the relationship between lack of social
supports and minor psychiatric disturbance. Miller and Ingham ^1976)
and Miller et al. (1976) found that lack of a confidant and friends
appeared to both regulate the effects of life events and to be directly
related to symptoms, suggesting an independent effect for vulnerability
factors.
With regard to provoking agents, Brown and his colleagues hypothesise
that both the time intervening between a given life event and its severity
in terms of perceived threats are related to the onset of psychiatric
illness (Brown et al. , 1973). Moreover, various events happening to
the same person, less obvious than bereavement or divorce, may interact
and lead to symptomatic onset. Miller and Ingham (1979) reported
evidence of a small 'summation' effect for both major and minor stresses
plotted against severity of depression, though a better predictor of
symptom severity might be a dissipation model of life events (events
stress dissipates gradually over time) as suggested by Surtees and
Ingham ^1980). Surtees and Ingham regarded their findings as
compatible with the work of Brown and Harris: 'experiencing multiple
discrete severe events results in a (small) increased risk of an onset
of depression but . . . experiencing minor events, even in combination
with severe events results in no additional risk' 'P.29).
Shapiro (1979) has criticised Brown and Harris's work on the grounds
that they were ' subjective' in their methodological approach with
respect to patient selection, measurement of life events, choice of
analyses, and interpretation of the data. They replied with a point-
by-point defence of the methodology and argued that Shapiro's purist
emphasis on experimental rigor , while understandable, is not easily
accommodated within a multi-disciplinary approach to psychosocial
research (Brown and Harris, 1979). Others have said that Brown's
findings do not support the differentiation of risk variables into
vulnerability factors and provoking agents 'Tennant and Bebbington,
1978). However, the same authors reanalysed Brown's data and concluded
that there appeared to be an effect for vulnerability factors in their
own right.
While Brown's work is open to criticisms that can be made of many
retrospective studies, it appears to be of seminal importance in the
field of psychiatric aetiological research. An enormous amount of
very detailed work has been done in order to establish that severe
events in the life of a patient, particularly early loss, are among
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the main causes of depression. As seen in this review, there is some
evidence that this may be so. However, the most important aspect of
Brown's research is its focus on identifying those people in the general
population who are most likely to develop a clinical depression. Does
exposure to vulnerability factors put an individual at greater risk
to onset of depression? Clearly there is not enough information
available yet to address this question adequately.
Ideally, a prospective study is called for, though this is much
easier said than done. A compromise solution might be to attempt
to replicate Brown's work with a view to establishing similar prevalence
rates using more rigorous diagnostic criteria, as suggested by Paykel
and Rowan ''1979).
Brown and Harris stress that their model has implications for
treatment. In their view:
'The results of this study suggest that the understanding of
untreated depression can be of great help in the understanding
of those that have reached the treatment setting, and thus that
even severely disturbed inpatients might benefit if physical
treatments were supplemented by what might be called social therapy
designed to raise their sense of self-esteem and increase the
alternative sources of value available to them in the long term . . .
These findings provide backing for many reforms in our current
social organisation, increases in the number of nursery school
places and the number of part-time employment opportunities for
women being some obvious candidates. They point, too, to the
large areas of loneliness and isolation which exist amid our
so-called affluence and to the important role they play in
determining family health. To combat these and to build a sense
106.
of mastery and self-esteem, which will render every member of the
community more resilient to the buffets of experience, requires
more than comforting talk in a surgery.' ^P.292-293)
For those interested in the psychological treatment of depression
a fascinating question must be: vulnerability factors notwithstanding,
does the impact of life events upon the person depend upon his coping
abilities and/or personality? While there is no direct experimental
evidence linking personality, life change events and depression,
clinicians and researchers in the area believe that it does ''Wolff,
1961; Rahe, 1974; Hinkle, 1974). It has been suggested that people
who remain free from illness possess 'psychological characteristics'
which help them to cope with the impact of life events, even the more
severe stressors. Among such attributes are an ability to shift
relationships with abandon, self-protective concern over own well-
being, an avoidance of responsibility 'Hinkle, 1974 in Parsons, 1975).
This is, however, little more than speculation and there is an urgent
need for further work in this area.
Recent evidence on the efficacy of behavioural interventions
on mild forms of depression (e.g.Shipley and Fazio, 1973; Fuchs and
Rehm, 1977) raises the possibility that psychological techniques may
serve to modify the impact of life changes upon the individual. Since
the appraisal of threat appears to be as important as the actual
aversive event itself, those approaches which aim to modify cognitive
processes would seem to offer the most promise in relieving 'event-
associated depressions'.
E. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has been concerned with the major psychosocial theories
of depression, the treatments derived from them and supporting evidence.
Psychoanalytic theories have been highly influential in the study
of the aetiology and treatment of depression. Because psychoanalytic
concepts are phrased in metapsychological terms, it has been difficult
to subject identifiable hypotheses to experimental validation. Never¬
theless, analytic theories have been of heuristic value, suggesting
hypothetical constructs such as deprivation and hostility for scientific
research. Treatments for depression based on analytic approaches have
fared poorly compared to pharmacological interventions.
Environmental theories of depression have an empirical base but
appear to convey more about how depressed people interact with their
environment than they do about the causal factors involved in the
onset of depression. Behavioural models which incorporate a cognitive
component offer a more sophisticated approach which attempts to delineate
the role of thinking processes in relation to mood and motivational
factors. Therapies derived from behavioural theories are more effective
than 'expectancy' and waiting list control conditions in the treatment
of some mild forms of depression. There is, however, no evidence
that behavioural techniques work better than pharmacological treatments
of depression.
Life events, possibly interacting with social factors, appear to
be of outstanding importance in the study of the aetiology of depressive
illness. Research is urgently required to delineate the role of coping
abilities and/or personality in relation to life events and the impact
they have on the individual.
This review indicates that a plethora of potential predisposing
factors exists, including biological substrates in neurochemical,
physiological and pharmacological functions, previous event and re¬
inforcement histories enabling the development of coping skills, factors
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of help-seeking affecting those who eventually get treatment, and
personality variables leading to vulnerability to stress in general
and specific events. Such considerations suggest a highly multifactorial
aetiology.
Of the mediational psychological models put forward to date,
Brown and Harris favour Beck's cognitive theory of depression, the
subject of the next and final chapter of the literature review.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COGNITIVE THEORY AND THERAPY OF DEPRESSION
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter reviewed the major psychosocial approaches
that have been put forward to explain and treat depression. It was
argued that a markedly multifactorial aetiology is required to explain
the various components of the depressive syndrome which may prove to be
mutually interactive over time. As suggested by Akiskal and McKinney
(1975) it may be possible to enter the system from any of several
directions to trigger a full-blown clinical depression (e.g. physiological,
psychological, social).
Behavioural theories have contributed significantly to increasing
our understanding of depression, particularly with respect to how
depressed people interact with their environment. The therapies
derived from them have helped to pave the way for the operationalisation
of psychotherapy, including procedural manuals (e.g. Beck, 1976; Rehm,
1977; Beck et al., 1978, and Beck et al. . 1979),that describe the
specific techniques and their sequence during the course of treatment
(Ueissman, 1979). Moreover, recent studies on the efficacy of behavioural
treatments of depression (e.g. Shipley and Fazio, 1973; Fuchs and Rehm,
1977) suggest that intervention at the psychological level is one way to
alleviate depression, though it may be that combined treatment approaches
(i.e. drugs and psychological therapy) aimed at entering the system at
several levels-will prove to be more effective than either approach on
its own (e.g. Ueissman etal. , 1979).
One of the clearest trends in contemporary psychology appears
to be the merging popularity of cognitive perspectives (liJeimer and
Palermo, 1973; Dember, 1974). The impact of theory and research on
central mediating processes and cognitive-symbolic mechanisms can be
readily identified in many subsepcialties (Mahoney, 1977). Oudging from
the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, behavioural approaches
to depression have followed suit (Seligman, 1976; Abramson et al. ,
1978; Rehm, 1977). The attention paid to cognitive factors in
traditional behaviour therapy has also increased remarkably over the
last ten years, while several recent developments have strengthened the
trend towards a cognitive-mediational model of the modification of
behaviour (Bandura, 1974, 1977; Wilson, 1978). For instance, there
are already several books devoted to the area (e.g. Beck, 1976; flahoney,
1974; fleichenbaum, 1977 and Foreyt and Rathjen, 1978), and two journals
(Cognitive Therapy and Research and Biofeedback and Self-Regulation)
serving to disseminate a growing literature.
Before discussing Beck's theory of depression, it would be helpful
to consider briefly the historical development of the cognitive learning
approach to behaviour change. Afterwards, the chapter is devoted to a
detailed description of cognitive theory and supporting evidence and
a comparison of this approach with alternative theories of depression.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
flaloney and Arnoff (1978) have provided an interesting historical
account of what has been referred to as 'the cognitive-learning trend'.
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They point out that 'such strange bedfellows as cognitive psychology
and behaviour modification' (P.689) have been persuaded to cohabitate
as a result of several major changes in the thinking of behaviouristic
psychologists, clinical scientists from various disciplines and
behaviour therapists in particular.
In the mid 1960's behaviourists became very interested in the
phenomenon of self-control which was mirrored in the development of
weight control programmes (Ferster etal. , 1962; Stuart, 1967) and
laboratory investigations of self-regulatory processes 'Kanfer, 1970;
Bandura, 1969, 1971). This in itself appears to have been a truly
revolutionary occurrence in the field of behavioural research. Accord¬
ing to Flahoney and Arnoff (1978):
'Prior to this, the prevalent and explicit assumption of behaviourists
was one of environmental determinism (i.e. that the forces shaping
a person's life lie primarily in the external environment). In
fact the long-standing debate between behaviourists and humanists
was basically focused on 'internalism' versus 'externalism' ^Watson,
1973) . . . behaviouristic research on self-control also ushered
in the acceptance of reciprocal determinism that emphasised complex
and continuous causal interaction between the organism and its
environment (Bandura, 1969, 1971; Thoreson and Mahoney, 1974).
The human organism was no longer viewed as a passive product of
environmental influence, but as an active participant in his or her
own complex development' ''P. 690).
Another major shift in behaviouristic circles involved the adoption
of the idea that human thoughts could be functionally analysed and
altered by merely extrapolating the principles of behaviour change
fHomme, 1965). In a position paper, Homme argued that 'coverants,
the operants of the mind' were basically observable events, provided
that one acknowledges that they can be monitored by the person experiencing
them. It was argued that mentalistic dualism, a stance so bitterly
criticised by behaviourists, was certain to linger as long as strict
environmentalists neglected the role of 'private events' in human per¬
formance. Homme went on to present a behavioural technology (coverant
control) that involved specific tasks built around the cueing and re¬
inforcement of salient thoughts.
These changes prompted a movement whereby behaviourists began to
apply the principles of conditioning to covert processes such as covert
sensitization, .i.e. an aversion method based on visual images 'Coutela,
1966, 1967). As Mahoney and Arnoff ^1978) note, 'Covert conditioning
constituted a significant development in the trend toward a cognitive-
behavioural interface. For the first time in decades behaviourists
were openly and actively scrutinising their subjects' self-reported
thoughts, feelings and images. Not only were these formerly banished
phenomena now welcomed as targets of clinical concern but they were also
employed as a means towards inducing other behaviour change. Not
surprisingly, when behaviourism made this tardy move into the black box,
it brought with it the accoutrements of its stimulus-response tradition.
The processes and procedures of laboratory conditioning were soon imposed
on human thought processes and mediation came to be viewed as a chain of
covert stimuli and responses'. In his classic text 'Cognition and
Behaviour Modification', Mahoney '1974) argued convincingly against the
conditioning model of cognition and proposed a revival (as far as be¬
haviourists were concerned) of the mediational approach to human learning
and performance.
Mahoney's erudite defence of the cognitive-learning model had been
anticipated by rumblings in the behaviour therapy camp as far back as
the late 1960's. On the heels of the covert conditioning movement
came Bandura's ^1969) book 'Principles of Behaviour Modification'
in which he proposed an explicit shift to cognitive and information-
processing models of behaviour change. In this and a more recent work,
'Social Learning Theory', Bandura (1977) stresses the role of behavioural
procedures in effective psychological therapies, but argues that the
underlying processes of behaviour change involve cognitive-symbolic
mechanisms. His contentions are supported by a sizeable literature
ranging from awareness ^Notterman etal. , 1952; Dulany, 1962, 1968;
Spielberger and De Nike, 1966) to vicarious learning in animals (e.g.
Morgan, 1896; Crawford and Spence, 1939; Church, 1957; Corson, 1967)
and in humans (O'Connor, 1969; Berger and Oohansson, 1968; Bandura,
1971; Bandura and Rosenthal, 1966). Later, other behaviour therapists
became convinced of the need to include cognition in a comprehensive
model of behaviour change (e.g. Lazarus, 1971; Eates, 1971; Goldfried,
1971; Kanfer, 1971; Mischel, 1973).
While behavioural quarters were experiencing these growing pains,
social psychologists such as Kelly (1955) and Rotter (1954) and clinicians
such as Ellis (1962) and Beck (1963) made their presence felt in the
cognitive-learning arena. Their research and theories, particularly
their emphasis on cognition and the role of belief systems in emotional
disorders, have prompted many workers in the area to regard them as the
founding fathers of the popular cognitive-learning trend 'Mahoney and
Arnoff, 1978).
Albert Ellis has been one of the most persuasive writers in the
field. He noted that several Greek and Roman philosophers, including
Epictetus, as well as Buddhist thinkers perceived the close connection
among reason, emotion and behaviour and offered advice for changing
behaviour by modifying thinking patterns '1962). His form of psychological
counselling. Rational-Emotive Therapy ''RET) has claimed a considerable
professional following and enjoys much of the popularity of the more
commercial 'thought management' schemes put forward by writers such as
Coue (1922), Carnegie(1948) and Peale ''lPeO). In contrast to 'positive
thinking' approaches, Rational Emotive Therapy ''RET) has gained a degree
of scientific credibility as a procedure for the treatment of various
neurotic conditions. For example, comparative outcome studies have
compared RET with some form of behaviour therapy in the treatment of
anxiety, particularly systematic desensitization and behaviour rehearsal,
though several have compared RET with client-centred therapy ''e.g. Di
Loreto, 1971; Woes and Heinman, 1972; Fleichenbaum et al. . 1971;
fleichenbaum, 1972; Kanter, 1975; Wein et al. , 1975; Teigerman, 1975;
Molesky and Tosi, 1976).
Thus, having confronted empirical challenges ''see flahoney, 1974)
the original conditioning model of self control gave way to more
mediational theories and behaviour therapists started to investigate
the potential for social and cognitive psychology in the clinical field.
The conventional, rigid structure of behaviour therapy began to be re¬
placed by more flexible approaches to behaviour change. 'Broad-
spectrum' behaviour modifiers began to talk about and test coping skills
therapies that focused on training people how to solve problems more
efficiently 'D'Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971; Spevack and Shure, 1974;
Mahoney, 1977; Neichenbaum, 1974, 1977). As seen in chapter three,
animal experiments on learned helplessness merged into a cognitive theory
of depression (Seligman, 1975). Indeed, the reformulated version of
the learned helplessness model 'Abramson et al. , 1978) finds its roots
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in attribution theory which has been of considerable influence in clinical
conceptualisations (e.g. Bern 1970; Rotter et al. , 1972; Lefcourt,
1976). Not surprisingly, the turbulent journey from a conditioning to
a cognitive-learning base has resulted in a blurring of the boundaries
between behaviour therapy and other conceptual approaches (Rainy, 1975).
As suggested, the 'cognitive revolution' has not been without its
detractors (e.g. Greenspoon and Lamol, 1978; Ledwidge, 1978, 1979)
and has stimulated numerous debates and arguments (Bandura, 1976;
Catania, 1975; Stuart, 1972; Rachlin, 1974). For instance, Ledwidge
(1978) has argued that cognitive behaviour modification is 'a step in
the wrong direction' on the grounds that the approach represents a re¬
turn to 'mentalism' and that cognitive and behaviour therapists use
completely different techniques to bring about desired changes in
behaviour.— In a recent paper, 'Cognitive Behaviour Modification: Mis¬
conceptions and Premature Evacuation', Mahoney and Kazdin (1979) have
challenged Ledwidge's assumptions about metaphysical dualism and the
validity of classifying therapists according to the techniques they
employ. As they note 'if any clear distinction can be drawn, the major
difference between cognitive and less cognitive behaviour modifiers does
not lie in their therapeutic procedures so much as in their rationale
and selection of a given procedure in an individual case. The more
cognitively oriented therapist is inclined to employ a behavioural
procedure appropriate to the 'cognitive restructuring' presumed to
be required' (P.1045). Moreover, as will become clear, cognitive
theorists (and therapists) are firmly committed to the tenets and
practices of modern behavioural research, i.e. careful specification of
treatment components, use of multiple outcome measures including be¬
havioural assessment, etc.
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Despite some criticisms, the merger of cognitive psychology
and behaviour modification has been greeted with enthusiasm and intense
research. However, the term 'cognitive-behaviour therapy' encompasses
an admixture of diverse and often underdeveloped principles and
procedures (Wilson, 1978). Recognising the many differences among
proponents of this approach, Mahoney and Arnoff (1978) have nonetheless
extracted the following similarities:
1. 'that humans develop adaptive and maladaptive behaviour and
affective patterns via cognitive processes (e.g. selective attention,
symbolic encoding, etc.)
2. these cognitive processes are functionally activated by
procedures which are generally isomorphic with those of the human
learning laboratory, and
3. the resultant task of the therapist is that of a diagnostician-
educator who assesses maladaptive cognitive processes and subsequently
arranges learning experiences which will alter cognitions and, in
turn, the behaviour-affect patterns with which they correlate'
(P. 692).
These authors emphasise that the cognitive-learning perspective has
spawned the development of three major forms of cognitive therapies:
problem-solving therapies (e.g. D'Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971; flahoney,
1977), coping skills therapies (e.g. Kazdin, 1974; Goldfried, 1971;
Suinn and Richardson, 1971) and the rational psychotherapies which include
Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1962, 1970, 1973), Self-Instructional
Training (Meichenbaum, 1973, 1977) and Cognitive Therapy (Beck, 1976,
Beck et al.. 1978, Beck et al. . 1979).
In summary, the role of cognition in psychopathology has been dis-
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cussed by many clinical scientists, but none more so than A.T. Beck
and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania. Since the primary
focus of this thesis is Cognitive Theory and Therapy of Depression,
the discussion is now restricted to that topic.
C. COGNITIVE THEORY
The cognitive theory of depression upholds the view that it is
psychological factors which are central to the understanding of de¬
pression and these are the targets at which therapy should be directed.
The main proponent of this view is A.T. Beck who, like Ellis, was early
struck by the pervasiveness of irrational thoughts and fantasies in
neurotic disorders, particularly depression (Beck, 1963). His subsequent
clinical research led him to postulate patterns of irrational cognitions
that are common to various clinical syndromes (Beck, 1976). Processes
such as selective attention, magnification and arbitrary (illogical)
inference are believed to produce cognitive structures that vary in
their general themes. Thus, for each of the neurotic disorders, Beck
suggests different ideational contents (Beck, 1976).
The cognitive model posits three specific concepts to explain the
origins of depression: (l) the negative cognitive triad, (2) schemas,
and (3) systematic logical errors, or defective information processes.
1. The negative cognitive triad
The cognitive triad is a thinking pattern that leads the
depressed individual to regard himself, his experiences, and his
future in an unrealistically negative fashion.
The first ingredient of the triad centres around the person's
negative view of himself. According to Beck et al. (1979), 'He
sees himself as defective, inadequate, diseased, or deprived. He
tends to attribute his unpleasant experiences to a psychological,
moral, or physical defect in himself. In his view, the patient
believes that because of his presumed defects he is undesirable
and worthless. He tends to underestimate or criticise himself
because of them. Finally, he believes he lacks the attributes
he considers essential to attain happiness and contentment' 'P.11).
The second ingredient consists of the depressed person's tendency
to construe his ongoing experiences in a distorted manner. The
world is perceived as a place making exhorbitant demands on him,
or presenting unsolvable problems which prevent him from obtaining
cherished goals. He systematically misinterprets situations in
a negative manner even though more reasonable explanations are
available. The depressed patient regularly views his interactions
with the world as indicative of defeat or deprivation.
The third aspect of the cognitive triad consists of a negative
view of the future ''hopelessness). Beck et al. '1979) explain:
'as the depressed person makes long range projections, he anticipates
that his current difficulties or suffering will continue indefinitely.
He expects unremitting hardship, frustration and deprivation. When
he considers undertaking a specific task in the immediate future,
he expects to fail.' (P.ll)
The activation of the negative cognitive patterns is said
to explain the other signs and symptoms of the depressive syndrome.
Rush and Beck ?1979) provide some specific illustrations:
'if the patient incorrectly thinks he is being rejected, he will
react with the same affect that occurs with actual rejection.
If he is pessimistic about the future and anticipates negative
outcomes, he will feel low in energy, apathetic, and be reluctant
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to initiate various tasks. Suicidal wishes result from a
desire to escape what appears to be an unbearable situation or an
insoluble problem. Seeing himself as inept, he overestimates
the difficulty of normal tasks in life. He is indecisive because
he believes any decision he might make will be wrong' (P.311-312)
The depressed person's tendency to rely excessively on other
people is also explicable within a cognitive framework. The
patient depends on help and reassurance from those around him
because they appear to be far more competent and efficient than
he believes himself to be.
Finally, even the classical vegetative symptoms such as
'psychomotor retardation', reduced positive motivation, and inertia
can be seen as a direct consequence of hopelessness, or a pervasive
sense of futility (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1979).
2. Schemas (rigid beliefs)
The second principal component of cognitive theory consists
of the concept of schemas. This concept is used to address the
question: What kind of mechanisms account for the negative, self
defeating thoughts of the depressed patient?
Schemas consist of organised superordinate structures of
attitudes, or beliefs (basic assumptions) which influence the way
a stimulus is seen, filtered, processed and responded to. Beck
et al.'^1979) explain: 'any situation is composed of a plethora
of stimuli. An individual selectively attends to specific
stimuli, combines them in a pattern, and conceptualizes the
situation. Although different persons may conceptualize the same
situation in different ways, a particular person tends to be consistent
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in his responses to similar types of events. Relatively
stable cognitive patterns form the basis for the regularity
of interpretations of a particular set of situations. The
term 'schema' designates these stable cognitive patterns' (P.12)
Beck's concept of schemas is similar to that put forward by
academic psychologists such as Bartlett (1932), Neisser (1976)
and Miller, Galanter and Pribram (i960). According to Neisser:
'A schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle
which is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience,
and somehow specific to what is being perceived. The schema
accepts information as it becomes available at sensory sur¬
faces and is changed by that information; it directs movements
and exploratory activities that make more information available,
by which it is further modified.' (1976, P.54)
Neisser suggests that schemas function as information-accepting
systems, much like a format in a computer-programming language.
Formats specify that information must be of a certain sort if it
is to be comprehensible. Other information will be ignored or
will lead to meaningless results.
A schema also functions as a plan, of the type described by
Miller, Galanter and Pribram. Neisser says:
'Perceptual schemata are plans for finding out about objects
and events, for obtaining more information to fill in the format.
One of their important functions in seeing is to direct ex¬
ploratory movements of the head and eyes. But the schema
determines what is perceived even where no overt movements
occur (listening is a good example), because information can be
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picked up only if there is a developing format ready to accept
it. Information that does not fit such a format goes unused.
Perception is inherently selective.' (ibid, P.55).
Blumenthal (1977) has commented that the identification
of one's self, or the attainment of a self concept begins early
in life and is surely one of the most basic schemas that an individ¬
ual ever forms. Self preservation is meaningless unless the self
is first delineated. According to Blumenthal,
'Should the developed self concept be radically changed or lost
at any point in life, as sometimes happens, we witness the most
extreme changes in human personality, including severe mental
pathologies' (P.147-148).
Lewin (1935) proposed that the self concept may be a complex
schema consisting of many integrated subsystems. These subsystems
are subconcepts that are associated with different spheres of one's
life but are nevertheless affected by the condition of the whole
self system. Examples of such subconcepts are an individual's
physical appearance, social role, and intellectual ability.
In Lewin's terms, Beckian schemas might be regarded as
aspects of the self concept (character attributes) or a set of
general rules that guide how a person reacts to specific sit¬
uations. Such formulas determine how the person organises per¬
ceptions into cognitions (i.e. verbal or pictorial ideation), sets
goals, how he evaluates and modifies his behaviour, and how he
understands or copes with events in his life.
The most obvious types of rules are standards and regulations.
(Beck (1976) says that the individual employs 'a kind of mental
rule book to guide his actions and evaluate himself and others'
(P.42). The rule book becomes a yardstick against which he
compares the 'rightness, or wrongness' of his own behaviour and
that of others. Performance is also evaluated as successful or
unsuccessful according to these rules. As Beck (ibid') notes,
'By drawing on these standards and principles, he instructs him¬
self (or others) how to behave in a given situation. After¬
wards, he can evaluate the feedback from his actions, make the
necessary corrections and either praise or criticize himself for
his performance' (P.42). Furthermore, these rules are said
to assist the individual in the analyses of complex interpersonal
situations. For example, when an individual is talking to some¬
one, the listener will not only attempt to decode the message,
but will extract a highly idiosyncratic meaning from the information
given. The manner in which the listener will respond is determined
by his personal assessment of the situation, e.g. 'was the speaker
being rude, or humorous?' 'Should I retaliate or continue the
conversation in an affable manner?'
The organisation of different experiences is determined by
the kind of schema in operation at the time. Specific
occurrences, such as stressful life events, can trigger schemas
which have lain dormant for long periods of time. The kind of
rule that is activated in a given situation determines how the
individual responds. Beck et al. (1979) attempt to clarify this
point:
'in psychopathological states such as depression, patients' con¬
ceptualizations of specific situations are distorted to fit the
prepotent dysfunctional schemas. The orderly matching of an
appropriate schema to a particular stimulus is upset by the
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intrusion of these overly active idiosyncratic schemas. As
these idiosyncratic schemas become more active, they are evoked
by a wider range of stimuli which are less logically related
to them. The patient loses much of his voluntary control
over his thinking processes and is unable to invoke more appropriate
schemas' (P.13).
Beck (1976) specifies some of the schemas, or basic assumptions,
that might make an individual vulnerable to excessive depression
or sadness. Some examples are listed below.
1. 'in order to be happy, I have to be successful in whatever
I undertake'
2. 'To be happy, I must be accepted (liked, admired) by all
people at all times'
3. 'if I make a mistake it means I'm inept'
4. 'fly value as a person depends on what others think of me'
(P.255)
Beck points out that such schemas can be related to what
Karen Horney (1950) has referred to as the 'tyranny of the
shoulds'. For example, he notes that once a person has the
schema 'in order to be happy, I need to be loved by everybody',
he is likely to supplement this with another belief 'i should
make everybody love me'. Beck contends that the 'shoulds' and
'should nots' have a slave-driving quality and have much in common
with Freud's idea of the superego. Other examples listed by Beck
are:
1. 'i should be able to endure any hardship with equanimity'
2. 'i should know, understand, and foresee everything'
3. 'i should be the perfect lover, friend, parent, teacher,
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student, spouse'
4. 'i should assert myself, I should never hurt anybody else'.
(From Beck, 1976, P.257)
Working independently of Beck, Ellis (1962) labelled such
rules as 'irrational ideas'. However, Beck differs from Ellis
in his assertion that schemas 'are generally not irrational, but
are too absolute, broad and extreme; too highly personalized;
and are used too arbitrarily to help the patient handle the
exigencies of his life' (Beck, 1976, P.246). Thus, as far as
Beck is concerned, maladaptive schemas differ from adaptive ones
in terms of their inappropriateness, rigidity, and excessiveness
(for a review of maladaptive schemas, see Kovacs and Beck, 1978).
As mentioned previously, the depressed patient gradually
loses control over his cognitions, and it becomes increasingly
difficult for him to use a more adaptive set of attitudinal guide¬
lines to regulate his behaviour. The less severe the symptomatology,
the easier it is for the depressed patient to regard his self-
defeating thoughts with some degree of objectivity. However, once
the depression becomes intense, the patient's thinking becomes in¬
creasingly dominated by negative cognitions, even though there may
be no logical link between real-life events and his negative con¬
structions about them. The role played by schemas in the de¬
pressive spiral is described as follows:
'As the prepotent idiosyncratic schemas lead to distortions
of reality and consequently to systematic errors in the
depressed person's thinking, he is less able to entertain the
notion that his negative interpretations are erroneous. In
the more severe states of depression, the patient's thinking
may become completely dominated by the idiosyncratic schema:
he is completely preoccupied with perseverative, repetitive negative
thoughts and may find it enormously difficult to concentrate on
external stimuli (for example, reading or answering questions) or
engage in voluntary mental activities (computations, problem-solving,
recall). In such instances, we infer that the idiosyncratic
cognitive organization has become autonomous. The depressive
cognitive organization may become so independent of external
stimulation that', the individual is unresponsive to changes in his
immediate environment' (Beck et al. , 1979 , P.13)
Beck explains the relation between thought and affect in terms
of a feedback effect, such that cognitions stimulate congruent affects
and vice versa. Once the negative cognitive triad has been triggered
(by the superordinate schemas), Beck has identified a number of logical
errors in the depressed patient's thinking. These comprise the third
major component in the cognitive theory of depression.
3. Systematic logical errors
According to Beck (1967), faulty information processing accounts
for a series of logical errors in the thinking of the depressed
patient which strengthen and maintain the belief in the validity
of his negative ideas, despite the availability of contradictory
evidence. These cognitive distortions can be divided broadly into
two main categories: response and stimulus sets (bias).
Systematic errors in response set include:
1. Arbitrary inference: the process of drawing a conclusion
in the absence of evidence to support the conclusion or when the
evidence is contrary to the conclusion, e.g. the depressed person,
kept waiting by the therapist, thinks: 'he has deliberately left
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in order to avoid seeing me', or a frown on the face of a
passer-by may trigger the thought 'he finds me disgusting'.
2. Overqeneralisation: Drawing a general conclusion on the
basis of a single incident, e.g. 'i can't do anything right',
when only a minor isolated failure has been experienced.
3. Magnification and minimisation: errors in evaluating the
significance or magnitude of an event that are so gross as to
constitute a distortion, what Ellis has termed 'catastrophizing',
e.g. some everyday difficulty will end up a disaster. This
inexact labelling evokes an emotional response congruent with
the descriptive labelling, not with the actual event.
4. Personalisation: a tendency to relate external events
to oneself when there is no basis for doing so. This aspect
of depressive thinking is related to other distortions,
especially arbitrary inference. In psychotic states, the
depressed patient may believe that he is the cause of all
catastrophies in the world.
5. Dichotomous reasoning: the process whereby the depressed
patient places all' experiences in one or two opposite categories,
e.g. good or bad, flawless or defective, immaculate or filthy.
Usually the patient chooses the extreme negative to describe
himself.
These logical errors in response set interact with another
faulty cognitive process which Beck calls selective abstraction.
Selective abstraction is a stimulus set which consists of
focusing on a detail taken out of context, ignoring the more
salient features of the situation and concentrating on the whole
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experience on the basis of this element, e.g. 'my friend ignored
me, so he doesn't like me anymore', disregarding the fact that he
may have been busy at the time.
Beck etal. (1979) point out that the attributes of the
typical depressive thinking are analagous to those described
by Piaget (1932/1960) in his descriptions of the thinking of
children. They have provided some examples of the differences
between what might be termed 'primitive thinking' and 'mature',
or adaptive thinking, some of which are listed below:
1. IMondimensional and global:
'I am fearful.'
2. Absolutistic and moral¬
istic: 'I am a despicable
coward
. '
3. Invariant: 'I always have
been and always will be a
coward . '
Multidimensional: I am mod¬
erately fearful, quite gen¬
erous, and fairly intelligent.'
Relativistic and non-judge¬
mental: 'i am more fearful
than most people I know. '
Variable: 'my fears vary from
time to time and from sit¬
uation to situation. '
(from Beck et al.. 1979, P.15)
These examples suggest that depressed people may interpret
their experiences in relatively primitive ways and tend to make
wide-sweeping gudgements about events that impinge on their lives.
As Beck et al. (1979) note, 'the meanings that flood their con¬
sciousness are likely to be extreme, negative, categorical, absolute
and judgemental' (P.14).
In terms of what is seen in the psychiatric clinic, the
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logical errors are most apparent in what Beck calls the depressed
person's automatic thoughts, as they appear automatically and very
quickly. Patients have to be taught how to monitor these thoughts
(e.g. 'I'm weak', 'l'm a failure'), otherwise they may not even
report them. As suggested earlier, these negative thoughts become
more salient in severe depressive states. Automatic thoughts
tend to be specific and discrete,autonomous, plausible, repetitive,
and idiosyncratic within individuals and within disorders. They
are essentially what other authors have referred to as internal
dialogue (Meichenbaum, 1977) and self-talk (Ellis, 1962).
In summary, the cognitive model of depression puts forward
three major ingredients to explain the basis of clinical depression:
the negative cognitive triad, schemas, and systematic logical errors.
Beck, therefore, considers thought processes to be the central
factor in depression, all other signs and symptoms of depression
being secondary to the maladaptive thought processes of the
depression-prone individual. Figure 4^ shows a diagram of the key
components in Beck's model.
Fig. 4^
TRIAD
EVENT > SCHEMA ■> ERRORS ■^DEPRESSION
(AUTOMATIC
THOUGHTS)
4. Predisposing factors and precipitation to depression
The cognitive model offers an explanation as to how people
become vulnerable to developing depression. Essentially, early
experiences provide the foundation for the development of the
negative concepts of the self, the world, and the future. The
depression prone person may become sensitised by stressful life
events such as the loss of a parent or repeated rejection by
peers. Other unfavourable experiences of a less outstanding
nature may similarly produce vulnerability to depression. Accord¬
ing to Beck (1976) 'these traumatic experiences predispose the
person to overreact to analogous conditions later in life. He has
a tendency to make extreme judgements when such situations occur.
A loss is viewed as irrevocable; indifference, as total rejection.'
(P.107-108)
1 For example, the break-up of a marriage may trigger the con¬
cept of irretrievable loss associated with the death of a parent
in childhood. Sometimes the precipitating event is a physical
illness or abnormality that activates the notion that the person
is doomed to a life of unremitting agony. However, Beck emphasises
that 'unpleasant - even extremely adverse - life situations do not
necessarily produce a depression unless the person is particularly
sensitive to the specific type of situation because of the nature
of his cognitive organization' (Beck etal. , 1979, P.16).
Other people who are at risk to developing depression set
rigid, perfectionistic standards for themselves during childhood
so that their expectations are dashed when they have to face
inevitable disappointments in later life. Aberrant thinking is
triggered in situations that impinge on specific vulnerabilities,
such as acceptance-rejection, success-failure, health-sickness,
or gain-loss (Beck, 1976). For example, a patient who believes
that in order to be happy he must be accepted by all people at
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all times will assess his own worth entirely by how often and to
what extent he is accepted by others.
Beck suggests that these basic assumptions are derived during
childhood from attitudes and opinions of peers or parents. At
one time these beliefs may have been articulated and reflect basic
family rules. For example, a parent might say to a child, 'Be
nice all the time or Angus won't like you'. Conceivably, the
child may repeat this aloud at first and later, at a subvocal
level, to himself. After a while the child develops the underlying
attitudes 'my worth depends on what others think of me'. Moreover,
many of these attitudes are culturally reinforced (Beck et al.,
1978).
While specific stresses (e.g. loss of job, disruption of a
relationship) in conjunction with depressogenic schemes can precipitate
adult depression, Beck contends that prolonged, non-specific stressors
can also lead to a depressive episode. For instance, gradual
withdrawal of affection by a partner or a persistent discrepancy
between goals and achievements may also undermine the individual's
psychological resources. Again Beck (1976) provides a clear
illustration: 'The individual . . . may be continually dissatisfied
with his or her performance as a parent, housewife, income producer,
student or creative artist. Moreover, the repeated recognition of
a gap between what a person expects and what he receives from
an important interpersonal relationship, from his career, or from
other activities, may topple him into a depression. In brief,
the sense of loss may be the result of unrealistically high goals
and grandiose expectations' (P.10B).
Thus, depressed patients acquire their schemas as a result
of early learning experiences. The 'negative cognitive triad'
may be grounded in experiences with disparaging parents or teachers
or in a history of loss or repeated frustrations, with depressive
affect being triggered by events that evoke negative cognitions.
Such events tend to have cue properties similar to the early
conditions that generated negative attitudes, though prolonged
non-specific stress can also precipitate depression.
D. EVIDENCE FOR BECK'S MODEL
To evaluate Beck's model adequately, three points need to be
demonstrated. First, the presumably causal elements (negative
thoughts) must be shown to co-vary with the phenomenon under observation
(depressed mood). In other words, that depressed patients think in
a particularly negative manner relative to other populations. Second,
it is necessary to demonstrate that changes in cognitive content and
processes cause subsequent shifts in the other components of the
depressive syndrome (affect, behaviour, motivation, and physiology).
Third, it would lend weight to Beck's theory if it was demonstrated
that the treatment derived from his theory was as effective or more
effective than other methods of treatment of depression. This is
not a strong test of Beck's theory, however, as the therapy he recommends
contains many nonspecific factors such as attention and the manipulation
of expectancies which are common to other types of therapy. Even so,
it would be difficult to explain why treatments with a less cognitive
approach were more effective. As this thesis is concerned with the
effectiveness of Beck's therapy, special attention will be paid to this
type of evidence.
The main sources of evidence for Beck's model of depression are
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correlational, experimental, and treatment studies. These are
reviewed separately.
1. Correlational studies
There is a large literature showing that depressive states
have cognitive correlates (Beck, 1967, 1974). For example it
has been demonstrated that negative perceptions of the self, the
world, and the future are intercorrelated and that there is a
relation over time between these negative cognitions and self-
rated depressed mood (Weintraub et al. , 1974). Minkaff et al.
(1973) reported a high positive relationship between depression
and hopelessness (General Expectancy Scale) and an even higher
relationship between intent to commit suicide and hopelessness,
though this relationship also held in a schizophrenic group.
Katz et al. (1969 in Hollon and Beck, 1979) found that ratings
of sadness were highly correlated with self-ratings of pessimism
(r _ .56) ancl °f negative self-concept (r _ .79) in a clinically
depressed sample. Using self-esteem ratings to assess the self-
evaluative aspect of depressive cognitions, Hammen and Krantz
(1976) found that depressed women were significantly more self-
critical than non-depressed women.
In a more recent article, Krantz and Hammen (1979) reported
on a measure of cognitive distortion which reliably distinguished
relatively depressed and non-depressed groups, including mild and
clinical levels of depression. The instrument is said to assess
the 'biased manner of evaluating situations that emphasize negative,
self-critical, or pessimistic interpretations that are not warranted
by the events themselves' (P.617). They found a consistent positive
relationship between depressive symptoms as measured by the Beck
Depression Inventory and cognitive distortion scores across samples
of college students, out-patients in therapy for depression and
non-depressed psychiatric inpatients.
There is evidence for the relationship between depression
and a negative evaluation of experience. For instance, several
studies have shown that depressed and nondepressed populations
differ on measures of dream content, with depressed subjects
reporting more themes of loss and failure (Beck and Hurvick, 1959;
Beck and Ward, 1961; Houri, 1976). That depressed individuals
show a special readiness to attend to negative aspects of situations
is supported by studies of memory in depression (Lishman, 1972;
Lloyd and Lishman, 1975). These indicate that one correlate of
severe depression is a tendency to recall negatively-toned material
more easily and readily than material of a more positive nature.
In addition, Lewinsohn et al. (1973) demonstrated that depressed
individuals are more sensitive to an aversive stimulus (mild electric
shock) as measured by GSlR than are psychiatric controls and normals.
Nelson (1977) reported moderate positive correlations between
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory and adherence to certain
'irrational* beliefs postulated by Ellis (1962) to account for mal¬
adaptive behaviours in general. Specifically, the analyses showed
that depression was most significantly correlated (P < .001) with
high self-expectations (r = 46) , frustration reactivity (r = 51),
overconcern about the likelihood of future misfortunes (r = 54),
helplessness (r = 45)and the total Irrational Beliefs Score.
Another measure of cognitive content, the Automatic Thoughts
Questionnaire (ATQ), is described by Hollon and Beck (1979).
Items were derived by asking people to describe specific thoughts
associated with depressive experiences and were cross-validated
on a separate sample of psychometrically selected depressed college
students. The findings indicated that the thirty negative thoughts
on the ATQ were subscribed to significantly more often by depressed
than by non-depressed individuals. Weissman and Beck (1977 in
Rush and Beck, 1979) used the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS)
to measure specific beliefs relevant to depression. They found
a significant correlation between the severity of depression and
the degree to which the person endorsed these hypothesised de-
pressogenic schemas.
There is empirical support for the hypothesis that depressed
individuals process information in a different manner than non-
depressed subjects. Studies have shown that depressed subjects
underestimate the percentage of correct feedback they actually
receive about their performance on a laboratory task relative to
non depressed controls (Demonbreum and Craighead, 1977; Wener and
Rehm, 1975). Nelson and Craighead (1977) also found that at a
high rate of reinforcement (70%> positive, 30% negative feedback)
depressed subjects significantly underrated the amount of positive
reinforcement as compared to non-depressed subjects. At a high
rate of punishment (70"% negative feedback), again depressed subjects
differed from normals significantly. This time depressed subjects
estimated correctly but normals underestimated the amount of
punishment. The results suggest that nonresponsiveness to reward
in depressed subjects may be a function of distorted cognitive
activity. Further evidence for this hypothesis comes from a recent
study by Lobitz and Post (1979) who examined the various components
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of self-reinforcement in clinically depressed and non-depressed
psychiatric patients. While depressed patients demonstrated a
lower level of self-reward than non-depressed controls, the results
suggested that these low levels of reward may be predicted from
the individual's low levels of self-evaluation and self-expectation,
i.e. negative cognitions.
Empirical support for the relationship between cognition,
mood, and performance comes from the learned helplessness literature.
Early work had demonstrated that failure experiences lowered self-
esteem in both depressed and non-depressed subjects, though only
non-depressed people manifested any positive change in self-esteem
as a function of success (Loeb etal. , 1964). Moreover, failure
experiences were found to have a more adverse effect on a depressed
person's expectations of future success than on those of non-
depressed people (Loeb etal., 1967). Building on these findings,
Miller and Seligman (1973, 1975) and Klein and Seligman (1976)
demonstrated that a depressed person's negative expectations about
achieving success are not global in nature but are limited to
situations in which skill, not chance, is involved. Specifically,
relative to a non-depressed group , depressed individuals were
found not to change their expectations about subsequent performance
on skill tasks on the basis of feedback regarding previous trials.
These investigations have also shown that increases in
expectations following successful performance on laboratory tasks
correlate highly with subsequent increases in performance levels.
Conversely, exposure to uncontrollable failure appears to be
associated with reduced performance (Hiroto and Seligman, 1975;
Miller and Seligman, 1975; Klein and Seligman, 1976).
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In this context, depressed individuals appear to do less
well on a variety of psychological tasks than non-depressed sub¬
jects (for review, see Miller, 1975). However, it is likely
that some of these deficits can be attributed to either cognitive
(e.g. negative expectations) or motivational (disinterest in
outcome) elements (Hollon and Beck, 1979).
The depressed person's apparent insensitivity to outcome
(failure to shift expectancy) has been reported with respect to
a carefully diagnosed unipolar inpatient population; this phenomenon
was not observed in either the depressed schizophrenic or matched
schizophrenic control conditions (Abramson et al., 1978). Con¬
sidering that one investigation has failed to replicate this result
with depressed alcoholics (o'Leary et al., 1978), it may be that
the failure to alter expectations following feedback about success
is specific to depression and not a characteristic of general
psychiatric illness.
According to the reformulated learned helplessness model
(Abramson et al., 1978) 'attributional style' may help to explain
why depressed individuals appear to process information differently.
Several investigations indicate that depressed subjects are prone
to attribute negative outcomes, such as failure to internal factors,
e.g. personal incompetence (Klein et al., 1976; Kuiper, 1978;
Risley, 1978).
These studies all made important contributions in translating
Beck's theory into operational terms and then demonstrating a
relation between cognition, mood, and performance. However,
some aspects of Beck's model have been questioned. For instance,
Beck (1976) says that depressed subjects distort their perception
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and recall of ambiguous or neutrally-toned environmental feed¬
back. Craighead and Demonbreum (1979) failed to obtain differential
perception and recall of neutral feedback among psychometrically
identified depressed-anxious, non-depressed-anxious, and non-
depressed-non-anxious female college students. Even so, it is
doubtful that the selection instruments (BDI and a General Trait
Anxiousness Test) were sensitive enough to disciminate accurately
such mildly disturbed and heterogeneous groups. As the authors
point out, had depressed subjects without anxiety been included
in the trial, it is possible that they would have distorted and
produced the predicted results which were found in previous studies
(Nelson and Craighead, 1977; Demonbreum and Craighead, 1977).
Hammen (1978) has questioned whether all depressives show
regular cognitive distortions. Her data suggested the possibility
that some depressives have a tendency to distort despite low levels
of life stress. In their self-references, such persons may be
using the stable self-schema or a negative self concept as Beck
proposed. On the other hand, depressives who perceive high life
stress show a lesser tendency for cognitive distortion.
Those depressives who are depressed independently of life-
stress events may be using negative schema to distort environmental
information. Consequently, they may invoke a negative self-schema
as a means of giving a systematic negative bias to information about
themselves. Negative self-references result. Other depressives,
perhaps those who have only recently undergone life-stress, may
not use such schema.
Drawing on clinical evidence that depressed individuals describe
themselves inconsistently, Davis (1979) has questioned whether a
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negative self-schema is a regular symptom of depression. He
compared depressed general hospital outpatients with nondepressed
normals on semantic and self-reference encoding tasks. As
expected, the groups differed significantly on self-reference re¬
call with depressives showing significantly weaker recall on this
exercise. However, duration of depressive episode significantly
predicted the strength of self-reference recall. Davis concluded
that a negative self-schema does not develop until a person has
been depressed over a period of time. In a later study which
involved tests of free recall with subclinical depressed subjects
and normal controls, Davis (1979) provided tentative support for
the idea that short-term depressives lack stable cognitive schemas
for interpreting personal information. As he acknowledges, the
study is not without its flaws (e.g. the use of analogue depressives
and 80^ of the variance unaccounted for) but it raises interesting
questions about the specificity of schemas in relation to different
types of depression, an issue not addressed by the cognitive model.
Overall, the results of these studies are compatible with
Beck's cognitive theory of depression, though some findings are
clearly relevant to other mediational approaches as well (e.g.
Seligman, 1976; Rehm, 1977). They indicate that negative thought
content and the manner in which information is processed covary
with depressed mood and performance but say nothing about the specific
causal relationships between these variables; depressed mood could
cause depressive cognitions or depressive cognitions could cause
depressed mood. However, experiments which show that depressed
mood can be induced by manipulating a person's thoughts or attention




A number of investigations are available where changes in
mood have been induced by changes in thoughts. V/elten (1968)
had three groups of subjects read aloud and focus on sixty
self-referrent statements designed to be depressing, elating,
or neutral and two other groups received treatments to control
for experimental demand intended to produce simulated elation
and simulated depression. Two measures of pre-treatment mood
level were obtained from each subject at the beginning of his
individual treatment. After treatment seven behavioural
measures were taken as criteria for elation and depression.
Four of his seven dependent measures discriminated significantly
among the treatment groups (writing speed, decision time word
association, and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist ( MAACL).
The comparative performances of subjects in the three control
groups showed that the obtained mood changes could not be
attributable to artefactual effects. Moreover, post-experimental
questionnaire data strongly supported the finding that elation
and depression treatments had induced elated and depressed mood.
Similarly, Coleman (1975) assigned female college students
to one of five treatment or control groups on the basis of scores
typical of elation or depression (MAACL,), the Ueissman-Ricks
elation-depression scale (1966) and also on the basis of
suggestibility (Howard Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility).
The subjects were assigned to one of the five experimental
conditions in such a way as to ensure homogeneity of suggestibility
and elation-depression across treatment cells. The induction
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of positive versus negative cognitions produced significant
differences in elation-depression on several dependent variables
(MAACL, writing speed, measures of expectation of success,
word association, and behavioural measures). Characteristically
elated and depressed subjects were able to adopt polarised mood
states. The author argued that the data were in line with
previous findings that self-esteem is a determinant of elation-
depression, and more specifically, that negative self-evaluations
are determinants of depression.
These two studies demonstrate a major flaw common to many
investigations on the psychological causation of depression
(Blaney, 1977), namely that they were conducted on- student
populations. As mentioned previously, it is doubtful that the
mood swings of 'college sophomores' are at all equivalent to
those seen in the psychiatric clinic.
Crowley (1976) tried to replicate Velten's findings in a
group of depressed inpatients (N = ID) and in a group of university
students (N = 20). An attempt was made to control for suggest¬
ibility. Using only elation-inducing statements she found
significant changes in the depressed group on several dependent
measures (2 visual analogue scales to assess mood and anxiety
on the MAACL). This effect, however, was not obtained in the
normal group. Suggestibility appeared not to account for
the effect as the correlations between suggestibility and other
subject and control variables were nonsignificant.
Teasdale and Bancroft (1977) used a single subject design
to investigate the specific alterations which occurred during
30 second periods of thinking either pleasant or unpleasant
thoughts. They found that this had a systematic effect in modifying
the patient's rating of perceived mood and that corrugator EMG was
significantly increased by 30 second periods of unpleasant compared to
pleasant thinking. It appeared that thought processes on their own
can produce changes in at least one physiological concomitant of de¬
pression. However, Bonham (1979) has pointed out that the manner in
which the negative thoughts were elicited was not controlled, therefore
changes in mood may not have been directly related to the thoughts.
It is equally possible that mood changes were used as cues to elicit
pleasant or unpleasant thoughts.
Thought stopping has been used to reduce the corrugator activity
induced by unpleasant thoughts (Teasdale and Rezin, 1978). This appeared
to be ineffective as the investigators found that the cognitive changes
induced by thought stopping were not matched by the physiological changes.
It was suggested that more powerful negative thoughts over longer time
intervals might have produced the predicted result.
Blackburn and Bonham (1980) attempted to gain tighter control
over the quality and intensity of cognitive content by using the personal
thoughts (pleasant and unpleasant) of five depressed patients in a single
case design experiment. The main aim was to measure the effect of
training in a cognitive strategy ('distancing') which is considered to
be a central element in Beck's form of therapy. The pre-test session
involved eliciting thoughts related to the patient's experience, rating
them on a scale for degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness, and train¬
ing in the distancing technique, i.e. to regard the thoughts as psychological
events which could be subjected to validation, and not as reality itself.
For example, if the patient had thoughts that he was a failure, he was to
try to 'take perspective', and question the validity of these ideas.
Following this period, cue instructions were given either to 'think
the pleasant thoughts', 'distance yourself from unpleasant thoughts',
or to 'involve yourself in unpleasant thoughts', i.e. create a vivid
mental picture and/or think about them as they normally did.
Mood ratings (by visual analogue) for the three thought conditions
were significantly different in the five subjects. The pleasant thought
evoked the least depression while the 'distanced' unpleasant thought
sessions always evoked lower overall mood ratings than the 'involved'
unpleasant thought sessions. Interestingly the distancing sessions
evoked depressed mood ratings that were lower than the pre-training
baseline rating for that thought. The thought conditions were also
positively and significantly correlated with corrugator EMG and heart
rate across subjects, with distancing being differentiated to some extent
by these physiological measures.
The results provide further evidence that thinking negative
thoughts can lead to negative affect and, more specifically, that the
intensity of mood associated with a thought seems to depend on the way
the person copes with the thought and not exclusively on the content of
the thought itself. Numerous studies support the hypothesised relation¬
ship between dysphoric mood and negative thoughts (e.g. Strictland et
al. , 1975; Hale and Strickland, 1976; Natale, 1977; Moore et al., 1973
Masters et al., 1979; Rogers and Craighead, 1977). These, in turn, are
backed up by a large literature which demonstrates that cognition plays
a key role in the labelling and control of general arousal (e.g. Schacter
and Singer, 1962; Schacter, 1969; Valins and Ray, 1967; McGuigan
and Schornover, 1973; Rimm and Litvak, 1969; Bandura, 1969).
To recapitulate, there is a growing body of data which indicates
that affective states can be influenced by cognitive manipulations by
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inducing the subject to attend to unpleasant thoughts (see Blaney,
1977). While more research is required to confirm the finding of
Blackburn and Bonham (1980), it appears that training in a cognitive
strategy that is specific to Beck's therapy can help the individual
to modify his affective state once it has been induced.
3. Treatment Studies
The final class of evidence for the cognitive model of depression
derives from clinical studies which have compared Beck's Cognitive
Therapy to other forms of treatment. Since a description of the
procedure appears in the next chapter, only a brief outline of
cognitive therapy is presented here.
The ultimate goal of cognitive therapy is the development of
rational, adaptive thought patterns. Cognitive therapy progresses
through the following stages:
1. depressed individuals become aware of their thoughts
2. they learn to identify inaccurate or distorted thoughts
3. these imprecise cognitions are replaced by accurate, more
objective thoughts
4. an essential aspect of cognitive therapy involves consistent
■ therapist feedback and reinforcement throughout the treatment
process.
The specific procedures used to attain these therapeutic ob¬
jectives are both behavioural and cognitive in nature (Wilson, 197B;
Beck etal. , 1979). For this reason Beck's approach has also been
referred to as a 'cognitive-behavioural intervention'.
Although there have been several case studies reported (e.g.
Rush et al., 1975) only the controlled studies will be considered
in this review.
Several investigations have looked at the relative efficacy
of behavioural and cognitive procedures alone and in combination
(Gioe, 1975; Shaw, 1977; Taylor and Marshall, 1977).
Shaw (1977) compared group treatments in a population of
students who had approached their university counselling centre
for help with depression (N = 32). They had to score a minimum
of 18 on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and to have experienced
depression for at least three weeks. They were then randomly allocated
to one of four groups: cognitive therapy; 'behaviour modification',
using Lewinsohn's (1970) social skills approach; an attention/
assessment, 'non-directive' control condition and a waiting list
group. Treatments consisted of two two-hour sessions per week for
four weeks. Assessments were conducted using the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) and the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRS-D)
which was completed by blind assessors working from a specially
edited video-taped interview between the therapist and patient.
The results indicated that the cognitive group was most effective
in reducing depression as measured by self-report (BDI, P = < 0.001)
and clinical rating (HRS-D, P = < 0.02). At one month follow-up
the cognitive and social skills groups were compared again but the
continuing trend was no longer significant.
Another group therapy trial has been reported by Gioe (1975,
in UJeissman, 1979; Rush and Beck, 1979; Beck et al. . 1979). Gioe
used 10 depressed student volunteers in each of four conditions:
cognitive therapy plus 'positive group experience', cognitive therapy
alone, positive group experience alone, and a waiting list control
group. The combination treatment package is said to have been
superior in alleviating depressive symptoms as measured by the BDI.
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Taylor and Marshall (1977) attempted to evaluate the various
components of treatment by comparing a cognitive, a behavioural, and
a mixed approach which they called 'cognitive-behavioural' treatment.
Subjects (N = 28) were recruited by advertisement on the university
campus. A minimum score of 13 on the BDI and self-reported depression
of not less than two weeks was required for admission. Treatment
consisted of six individual 40-minute sessions over a four week
period. A waiting list control group was also included. The
results indicated that the three treatment groups improved significantly
more than waiting list controls on all measures (BDI, a visual analogue
scale, self-acceptance and self-esteem assessed by repertory grids
and the Dempsey D-30 Scale). There were no differences between
the cognitive therapy alone and the behavioural intervention alone
on any measure. However, the combined group was more effective
than either component alone. Thus, the cognitive and behavioural
components appeared to be additive in their effects in this small
sample of mildly depressed subjects.
These three studies (Shaw, 1977; Gioe, 1975; Taylor and
Marshall, 1977) used depressed student populations and must there¬
fore be viewed as preliminary because of important research issues
such as the sample size and the severity of symptomatology. Never¬
theless, they have been useful in that they employ tightly controlled
research designs and provide tentative support for the effectiveness
of a specific form of treatment, as do other investigations aimed
towards evaluating behavioural interventions (e.g. Fuchs and Rehm,
1977).
While the generalisability of these findings to clinically depressed
populations is limited, there is some justification for the growing
\
146.
confidence in the applicability of cognitive therapy to depressed
psychiatric outpatients.
Rush et al. (1977) have conducted the most persuasive investigation
to date with respect to the effectiveness of cognitive therapy. Forty-
one male and female depressed out-patients, all nonpsychotic (Feighner's
Diagnostic Criteria), were randomly allocated to either pharmacotherapy
(imipramine) or cognitive therapy. As a group the patients had
been intermittently or chronically depressed with a mean period of
8.8 years since the onset of their first depressive episode and 15%
were suicidal. Dosage levels for imipramine ranged from 150 to 250 mg
per day. Treatment lasted for an average of 12 weeks with a maximum
of 20 one-hour individual cognitive therapy sessions and 12 weekly
drug therapy visits. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) was
completed by all the patients. In addition, all patients were
rated on the Hamilton scale for depression (HRS-D) and on the
Hamilton scale for anxiety. Ratings were made independently of
therapists by experienced clinicians but they were not blind to the
treatment modality.
Both treatment groups showed statistically significant decreases
in depressive symptomatology (P = < 0.001). However, cognitive
therapy resulted in significantly greater improvement than did
pharmacotherapy (P = < 0.01) on both the self-rating scale (BDI) and
clinical ratings (HRS-D, HRS-A Raskin Scale). Drop out rates were
also significantly higher in the pharmacotherapy group. Fifteen
out of nineteen cognitive therapy completers demonstrated a clinical
remission; five out of the 14 drug completers showed a similar
reduction in symptomatology. The response rate to both pharmacotherapy
and cognitive therapy surpassed the reported ranges for placebo response
in depressed outpatients (Morris and Beck, 1974).
Attrition in the pharmacotherapy group was significantly greater
than with cognitive therapy (P = < 0.05): 36 per cent of the patients
allocated to the drug group dropped out as compared with 5.7 per cent
of the cognitive group. None of the pharmacotherapy drop outs
demonstrated any significant clinical improvement and six out of
eight eventually reentered therapy. Both groups maintained the
treatment improvements at six months follow-up but patients assigned
to cognitive therapy showed significantly less depressive symptomatology
at three and six months of follow up. UJhen only completers were
considered, the cognitive therapy group were still significantly less
depressed at three months (P ^ < 0.05) though this trend was no longer
highly significant (P = < 0.10) at six months follow-up.
This is an impressive study for several reasons. First the
authors used operationalised diagnostic criteria to select patients
for the trial. Second, Ueissman (1979) has pointed out that the
patients receiving drugs were not drug failures since their level
of response was what might be expected in a drug trial. The fact
that cognitive therapy was compared with an active treatment known
to generate a high response rate makes the outcome even more remarkable
(Hollon and Beck, 1978). Third, the results suggest that for the
first time one psychotherapeutic approach may be a more effective
short-term intervention in unipolar depression than tricyclic
pharmacotherapy.
The most obvious methodological problem is that the two treatment
groups differed in the amount of therapist contact. However, the
absence of a psychotherapy effect in the Covi et al. (1974) and
Friedman (1975) studies (see chapter 2) suggests that this may not
be a critical factor. Becker and Schucket (1978) have argued that
the drug levels may not have been optimal for individual patients
but they were clearly in line with current practice (Rush et al. ,
1978). With regard to follow up, chemotherapy was stopped after
three months and this might account for the greater numbers of that
group having to reenter treatment (Whitehead, 1979). Although the
use of blind clinical judges would have been much better, both the
clinicians' ratings and self-report measures of depressive symptoms
supported the superiority of cognitive therapy. Moreover, it is
doubtful that blindness can reliably be maintained in treatment
studies comparing drugs with a psychotherapy technique.
Other studies have looked at cognitive therapies in the treat¬
ment of psychiatric patients. Rush and Watkins (in press, 1979)
«
assessed outcome in group versus individual cognitive therapy, and
the effects of antidepressant medication on attendance and outcome.
Forty-four patients were diagnosed as clinically depressed (Feighner's
Criteria) and satisfied a description of neurotic depression (DSMII),
though a significant number had vegetative symptoms. They had to
score a minimum of 20 on the Beck Depression Inventory and at least
14 on the Hamilton scale. Subjects were assigned to one of three
conditions: group cognitive therapy, individual cognitive therapy
alone, or individual cognitive therapy with antidepressant medication.
The protocol specified a maximum of 20 group or individual cognitive
therapy sessions over a 10-12 week period, with individual sessions
lasting 50 minutes and group sessions 75-90 minutes in duration.
Each group contained 4-6 patients and two therapists. Of 44 subjects
28 were given group cognitive therapy, 9 individual cognitive therapy,
and 7 were treated with the combination package. Rather than prescribing
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a specific drug for the group, an agent most appropriate for each
patient was administered.
Post treatment analysis showed that all three groups improved
significantly on self-report and clinical ratings. No significant
difference was found between individual cognitive therapy alone and
individual therapy in combination with medication. However, individual
treatment with or_ without medication was significantly more effective
than group cognitive therapy as measured by BDI scores. This finding
was not upheld by the clinical ratings and at two months follow-up
the differences between groups on the self-report measures were no
longer significant. The group cognitive treatment cell had more
drop-outs (5) than individual cognitive therapy (l); there were no
drop-outs in the combination group.
The authors compared their results with a clinical report on
a cognitive therapy group (Shaw and Hollon, 1978) in which only 5 out
of 10 depressed outpatients obtained complete remission by the end
of treatment. These data are very preliminary but suggest that
group cognitive therapy is less effective than cognitive therapy
which is given on an individual basis. This is a bit surprising
in that the group therapy in Rush and Uatkin's study had a higher
number of average sessions per subject than either individual cognitive
therapy alone or in combination with drugs. Replication of this
study using larger samples is necessary before any firm conclusions
can be drawn.
Beck et al. (1979) have looked at individual cognitive therapy
compared with combined individual cognitive therapy and amitriptyline.
The admission requirements for this small study were similar to those
in the Rush et al. (1977) trial except that the sample included
schizoaffective patients. Patients were assigned randomly to the
treatment groups. Seven out of 33 patients were discontinued from
the study, leaving 14 patients in the cognitive therapy alone and
12 in the combined therapy group. Both treatment groups demonstrated
highly significant and substantial clinical improvement on self-report
(BDI) and clinical ratings (HRS-D) but no between-group differences
were found at the end of treatment. Treatment gains were partially
sustained at six months follow-up.
As in the previous study (Rush and Watkins, in press), the re¬
sults appear to indicate that the use of tricyclic medication does
not enhance the effectiveness of cognitive therapy administered on
an individual basis. However, both studies involved very small
samples which, in itself, might account for the lack of differences
between the cognitive therapy alone and combined groups. The
inclusion of schizoaffective patients in the Beck et al. study also
complicates matters. Although patients were allocated randomly to
the different treatment conditions, there is the possibility that the
two groups differed in terms of diagnosis - a higher proportion of
schizoaffective patients in the combined group might account for the
relatively inhibited response rate. This is not made clear in their
report. What is made clear, however, is that when the schizoaffective
patients were excluded from the comparison, the cognitive therapy alone
group in this study responded 'approximately as well' as those patients
who received cognitive therapy in the Rush et al. (1977) study. On
the other hand, it appears that no comparison was made between the
combined cognitive therapy and amitriptyline group (minus the schizo¬
affective patients) and the cognitive therapy group in the Rush et
al. trial. Had this been done, it is possible that the combination
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package would have done better.
Despite these difficulties, Beck et al. have provided further
evidencd in support of the applicability of cognitive procedures
to clinical populations.
Other studies have demonstrated the efficacy of cognitive
approaches in the treatment of depressed patients (e.g. Morris,
1975; Schmickley, 1976; Maclean and Hakstian, 1978; Dunn, 1979).
Dunn (1979) used a cognitive approach to modify the maladaptive
thought patterns of 'depression-prone' psychiatric outpatients.
The selection criteria included: a history of treatment of depression,
current self-reported depression though not suicidal or psychotic,
and they must have been stabilised on low to moderate doses of tri¬
cyclic drugs (under 125 mg/day). A sample of 24 patients were
randomly assigned to either cognitive modification or a medication-
support group (of these 20 completed therapy). Patients were seen
individually by one of two trained therapists twice weekly for eight
weeks. The dependent measures were the Beck Depression Inventory,
a frequency count on adaptive nondepressive verbalisations, and a
global rating of severity of depression (independent and blind).
Post-treatment and 6 month follow up data indicated that the
patients receiving cognitive modification therapy (l) had significantly
lower BDI scores (P = < 0.01), (2) were rated by judges as less
depressed (P = < 0.05) and (3) verbalised more adaptive, nondepressive
statements (P = < 0.01).
A number of criticisms can be made of this study. The population
under scrutiny is undoubtedly a very heterogenous group as no effort
was made to select patients according to operationalised diagnostic
criteria - many types of psychiatric patients are 'prone' to report
feelings of depression, especially anxious patients. The control
sample was barely adequate since the patients received the same
treatment in this condition as they did when they wer e being
stabilised on tricyclic medication, i.e. drug therapy plus supportive
psychotherapy. Moreover, while the length of treatment was con¬
trolled, the amount of therapist contact was not. Another worrying
aspect of this study is that the drug-support group did not show
any improvement during treatment and at follow-up. Assuming that
the drug regimen was managed in line with current practice, these
patients would be expected to improve significantly in an eight week
period. It may be that this group differed from the cognitive
modification group in terms of important clinical variables such as
duration of illness and response to previous treatments.
Some favourable remarks can be made about this study. First,
cognitive therapy is said to be particularly suited to those
individuals who suffer from recurrent depressions (Beck et al. , 1978).
To the extent that these patients were chronic depressives (no
descriptive data was reported), the results suggest that the combinatio
of cognitive modification and tricyclic drugs is more effective than
supportive psychotherapy plus tricyclic drugs. Furthermore, in terms
of the format postulated by Klerman (1975), it appears that individual
cognitive modification may exert a positive effect upon pharmacotherapy
whereas supportive psychotherapy appears not to exert this effect.
Second, considering the size of the sample (10 in each group) the
significance values in Dunn's study are more likely to reflect large,
rather than small effects for the treatment. Third, in contrast
to many studies which have relied entirely on self-report ratings,
Dunn obtained differences between the groups using a behavioural
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measure, i.e. frequency of non-depressed verbalisations obtained
during a videotaped mental status interview.
In this context, Whitehead (1979) has noted that self ratings
may be especially sensitive to change with psychotherapies. Cognitive
approaches might be effective in training patients in new cognitive
styles {-reproduced in self-ratings) but may not necessarily produce
a general amelioration of depression. While Dunn's behavioural
measure is not immune to experimental demand, the results show that
cognitive modification has a measurable effect not only on self-rated
depression but on how patients describe themselves, particularly their
affective state (more positive self evaluations, more accurate reporting
of affect).
Of the studies reviewed, the last four (Rush etal. , 1977; Rush
and Watkins, in press; Beck et al. , 1979; Dunn, 1979) provide
stronger support for the use of cognitive (or cognitive-behavioural)
procedures in the treatment of depression. All four investigations
were conducted using psychiatric patients and three studies (Rush
et al. , 1977; Rush and Watkins; and Beck et al. , 1979) employed
operationalised diagnostic criteria in the selection of depressed
subjects. However, increased confidence in the generalisability of
the results to psychiatric populations is obtained at the expense of
experimental rigour. In contrast to the studies which involved
mildly depressed subjects (Shaw, 1977; Gioe, 1975; Taylor and Marshall,
1977), these investigations did not control for such factors as
attention-placebo, the different components in the 'cognitive-be¬
havioural package', and spontaneous remission.
Taken together, these treatment studies comprise the third
source of evidence for a cognitive theory of depression. While
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the review presented here is by no means exhaustive (see Weissman,
1978, 1979; Whitehead, 1979; Rush and Beck, 1979; Hollon and Beck,
1979; Hollon and Beck, 1978), it does indicate that cognitive therapy
has a place in the treatment of some kinds of clinical depression.
Having said that, there is still a long way to go in terms of longer
follow-ups, predictive patient and therapy factors, and more importantly,
replication of the findings by researchers who are less biased towards
the therapeutic techniques under investigation. In the few existing
studies of direct comparisons between different psychological approaches
(e.g. Shaw, 1977), there appears to be a tendency for the treatment
that is the preferred modality of the research group to be shown as
more effective by that group (Weissman, 1979).
E. COMPARISON OF COGNITIVE THEORY AND THERAPY WITH OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACHES TO DEPRESSION
Beck's model of depression differs from the environmentally-oriented
behavioural formulations in two important respects. First, the cognitive
model focuses on covert behaviours such as beliefs, attitudes and self-
statements rather than overt behaviours. Second, maladaptive thoughts
are considered the cause of depression: low mood, reduced motivation,
e-
and other depressive symptoms are ragarded as secondary manifestations
resulting from maladaptive thoughts. In the sense that cognitive theory
views depression essentially as a disorder stemming from dysfunctional
mediational processes, it is very similar to the Self-Control and Learned
Helplessness theories of depression.
The self-control theory addresses many of the same processes discussed
in cognitive theory (e.g. selective attention to negative aspects of
performance). In comparing the self-control and cognitive models, Rehm
argues that 'the self control model deals with the same phenomena in a
way that specifies the distortion processes in operational terms and
places them in a theoretical context with other factors in depression . . .
the self-control model postulates specific relationships among covert
processes and the overt symptomatology seen in depression' (Rehm, 1977,
P.800). While there is a distinct emphasis on the role of self-dispensed
reinforcement in Rehm's model that is not apparent in Beck's theory, it
seems that the self-control theory adds little to existing cognitive
formulations. Rehm's theory appears to be a translation of cognitive
theory into behavioural terminology (Hollon and Beck, 1979). This in
itsialf constitutes an important contribution to the area and may stimulate
research into the cognitive and behavioural determinants of depression.
Beck, like earlier theorists (Freud, 1917; Bibring, 1953), regards
low self-esteem as a hallmark feature of depression and offers the concepts
of schemas and the negative triad to explain it. A major deficiency in
the original learned helplessness model of depression was that it did
not explain the depressive's low opinion of himself. However, the
reformulated model (Abramson et al., 1978) postulates that depressed
individuals who believe their helplessness to be personal (they, alone,
are helpless) show lower self-esteem than individuals who believe their
helplessness to be universal, i.e. that there is nothing that they or
anyone else can do about their helplessness.
In the same context, Beck's concept of schemas has been used to explain
why depressed persons are especially inclined to blame themselves for
unpleasant outcomes even when their responsibility for the outcome is
not at all clear. While the old learned helplessness model did not
address this issue, Abramson et al. deal with self-blame-in their revised
attributional analysis of learned helplessness. In brief, depressives
often make internal, global, and stable attributions for failure and may
make external, specific and less stable attributions for their success.
Thus, in attempting to explain low self-esteem and self-blame, the
revised learned helplessness model finds common ground with Beck's
cognitive model in terms of its comprehensiveness as an aetiological
theory. Despite these improvements, the revised learned helplessness
theory does not offer any construct to explain why certain people are
prone to making depressogenic attributions. In contrast, Beck uses
the notion of superordinate schemas (beliefs) to explain why some people
are prone to depression while others are not. A big stumbling block in
Beck's proposals, however, is that there is very little evidence re¬
garding what specific beliefs are important in depression (Blaney, 1977).
The main caveat in Beck's theory must be that it does not specify
what role what cognitions have in what stage of the development or
maintenance of what kinds of depressive conditions (Blaney, 1977).
Although Beck has not presented a model of the required specificity, his
work comprises enough material that could be expected to contribute to
such a theory. There already are some promising studies under way aimed
at addressing these critical issues (Rush, personal communication).
With regard to treatment, Burns and Beck (1978) have discussed the
general characteristics of cognitive-behavioural therapy which set it
apart from other kinds of psychological interventions.
Cognitive therapy differs from traditional kinds of psychotherapy
both in the manner in which the therapist and patient interact and in the
types of problems that are discussed in the interview. In contrast with
the'nondirective therapies' (e.g. psychoanalysis or client-centered therapy)
the cognitive therapist helps to structure the therapy session and
participates actively in discussions with the patient. Beck emphasises
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the therapeutic benefits of helping the depressed patient to structure
his'thinking and behaviour in a systematic, predictable manner.
Another characteristic of cognitive therapy is that the content of
the sessions is focused on the here-and-now and less attention is given
to developmental and early childhood experiences. As Burns and Beck
note,
'this is not to say that we feel that the past is not important
or that discussions of how past experiences may have contributed
to distorted thinking are excluded. However, the major thrust is
clarifying the patient's thinking and feelings during the therapy
sessions and between therapy sessions' (P.115).
In contrast to the Rational-Emotive approach where the therapist takes
a unidirectional posture (e.g. the patient is told about his 'irrational
ideas'), the cognitive therapist and the patient work together as a
collaborative team. The therapist instructs the patient in a variety
of self-help tasks that are performed daily as homework assignments to
be done between therapy sessions. The therapist underscores the importance
of regular completion of homework assignments which is regarded as a
critical element in the treatment process. These are designed to help
the patient to recognise and restructure his maladaptive thoughts and
behaviours.
Burns and Beck (1978) compare the cognitive approach to behaviour
therapy:
'Whereas the focus of classical behaviour therapy is modification
of the patient's overt behaviour through reinforcement techniques,
the primary goal of cognitive therapy involves a transformation of
distorted thinking patterns. Thus, the data of greatest importance
to the therapist involve the patient's inner experiences, including
his feelings, thoughts, daydreams, and attitudes. The therapist
demonstrates that the patient's behaviour is a consequence of his
mental state. Behaviour-modification techniques are then used to
demonstrate to the patient the irrationality of his beliefs. When
the patient assumes more adaptive behaviour patterns, he usually
begins to change his attitudes and feelings about himself' (P.115).
Thus, in cognitive therapy behavioural tasks are viewed as experiments
which demonstrate to the patient that his rigid, negative self-concept
and perceptions of the environment are erroneous. The patient and therapist
collaborate in scheduling these experiments which are carried out between
sessions. The patient makes detailed observations (and records) about
the outcome of each experiment. As he begins to change his behaviour,
he evaluates himself and his experiences more realistically.
A second type of homework assignment which differentiates cognitive
therapy from other approaches involves the monitoring of specific, mal¬
adaptive cognitions. The patient is taught how to record the 'automatic
thoughts' that flow through his mind in response to a number of disturbing
events. Gradually, the patient recognises that these cognitions are
closely connected with his emotions. According to Burns and Beck (1978),
'he then applies a number of tests to determine whether these attitudes
are reasonable, logical, and valid. As he learns to analyze these
erroneous cognitions, he is taught to restructure his thoughts in a more
realistic, reasonable manner' (P.16).
The general strategy behind cognitive-behaviour therapy is to detect
thepatient's incorrect thinking and to teach him to assess the degree
of his belief in this thinking. The patient and therapist work together
in organising specific tests or 'logical demonstrations' that reveal the
discrepancies between the patient's 'automatic thoughts' and reality
itself. Once the fallacies and traps in the patient's thinking are
uncovered, more accurate appraisals and interpretations of his experiences
can be substituted together with more appropriate behavioural responses.
The next chapter contains examples of specific techniques that the cognitive
therapist uses to counteract the incorrect thinking of the depressed
patient.
F. THE PLACE FOR COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY
Even if certain kinds of depression can be treated successfully
with psychological interventions, why bother to use cognitive-behaviour
therapy at all? Why not give antidepressant drugs to all patients?
After all, numerous investigations demonstrate that pharmacotherapy is
at least partially effective in 70 to 80 per cent of depressed outpatients
and is relatively quick in action (Morris and Beck, 1974). In contrast
only a few studies show that behavioural or cognitive methods are effective
in moderate to severe depressions. In fact, only one investigation
suggests that cognitive therapy works better than tricyclic drugs in
depressed outpatients (Rush et al., 1977) and there are no published
studies which have compared social skills therapy or classical behavioural
approaches with drug therapy in the same population. On top of this,
compared to drug therapy, even the most time-limited behavioural method
involves considerable time and effort on the part of the therapist and
patient. Bearing in mind that tricyclic pharmacotherapy has been found
to be more effective than group therapy f Covi et al., 1974), marital therapy
(Friedman, 1975) and interpersonal psychotherapy fKlerman et al., 1974) in
alleviating acute depression, the most logical position for the cognitive
behaviour therapist to take is one of realistic humility and openness to
empirical investigation.
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According to Rush and Beck (-1979), 'this lack of supporting clinical
research data suggests that it is wise to refrain from promising results
with 'any depression' and from contending that behavioural or cognitive
treatments are the answer for all depressed outpatients when introducing
these treatment methods into a medical setting. Rather, a close
collaboration between the descriptive diagnostician, the biologically
oriented psychiatrist, and the behaviourally oriented therapist is
essential' (P.299).
On the other hand, a balanced view of the situation indicates that
there are reasons for treating some kinds of depressed patients with
cognitive or behavioural methods (Rush and Beck, 1978). First, these
methods may help to prevent relapse in a way that is not available
with pharmacotherapy. The purpose of these strategies is to help the
patient learn new ways of evaluating himself and the environment and/or
specific behavioural skills. Rush and Beck stress that if maladaptive
thinking styles remain unchanged, they might make the person vulnerable
to future relapse. They cite evidence that drug-treated, remitted
v
patients show cognitive distortions characteristic of the acutely depressed
patient (H£uri, 1976). In their six month follow-up analysis, Rush at
al. (1977) found that more patients in the drug therapy group had to re¬
enter treatment compared to the cognitive therapy group (P = < 0.05).
Certain types of psychological therapies may be better than others in
preventing relapse but there is no evidence about this as yet.
Another reason for using cognitive or behavioural methods is that
they may reduce the drop out rate from outpatient treatment. On the
basis of drop-out data from the Rush et al. study, Rush and Beck project
a 5 - 7 per cent drop out rate for cognitive therapy compared to the
familiar 25 - 35 per cent rate for pharmacotherapy.
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A third reason for investigating specific psychological treatment
strategies is that many patients who might be drug responsive either
refuse to take the medication because of personal objections or develop
side effects which lead them to stop taking the drug (Beck et al. , 1978).
Moreover some depressives- do not respond to antidepressant medication.
While some non-responders may require more intense forms of treatment
(e.g. ECT, hospitalisation), others might respond well to cognitive or
behavioural approaches.
Fourth, cognitive or behavioural interventions may enhance the
effectiveness of pharmacotherapy through some interactive process
(Klerman, 1975). If these procedures were specifically modified to
accommodate drug regimens, they might improve compliance and reduce
premature termination from biological treatment.
Preliminary empirical support for a positive interaction between
cognitive modification and tricyclic medication comes from Dunn's (1979)
study of 'depression-prone* patients, though as discussed earlier, this
clinical trial is plagued with methodological difficulties. With regard
to compliance, Weissman et al. (1979) found that one kind of role-
oriented psychotherapy, namely interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT),
in conjunction with tricyclic drugs was more acceptable to patients than
either IPT or pharmacotherapy alone. In addition, patients in the
combination treatment were significantly more likely to complete treatment
(P = <D.0l). It would be interesting to see if a more structured behavioural
treatment could improve upon their compliance rates.
Finally, the use of cognitive or behavioural techniques may pay
particularly high dividends in terms of training programmes for mental
health professionals. As Rush and Beck note 'Often the psychiatrist
or medical trainee is familiar with descriptive diagnostic methods, rating
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scales for depression, and biological treatments. However, greater
familiarity with day to day behaviour and the recurrent cognitive
distortions of the depressed patient allows the trainee to develop a
new understanding of this class of disorders and to gauge better the
impact of his/her behaviour on tie patient. For example, he/she learns
to elicit the patient's negative expectations about treatment and to answer
themrealistically, thereby increasing compliance with biological or
psychological treatments. These educational experiences constitute an
important rationale with which the behaviour therapist can enter the
medical setting* (P.301).
Thus, there are reasons for guarded optimism concerning the use of
specific psychotherapies in the treatment of depression. However,
cognitive and less cognitive behaviour therapists wishing to treat
depressed outpatients would do well to avoid engaging in what Beck refers
to as 'nondimensional/global thinking' with respect to their preferred
modalities (e.g. 'cognitive-behaviour therapy is the best way to treat
all depressed patients'). In light of the limited clinical research
data, it is best to adopt a 'multidimensional schema' such as 'Cognitive
behaviour therapy works for some people who present with some kinds of
depression'. It is the task of future research to confirm the present
findings and delineate the specificity of these procedures across different
patients and disorders.
G. SUMMARY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT OUTCOME STUDIES
Thus far, this review has covered the physical treatments of depression,
the major psychosocial theories that have been put forward to explain it,
supporting evidence for these, and in particular, the evidence for the
effectiveness of the psychological therapies derived from each theory.
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This final section examines the data from the perspective of the psychological
treatments as a group and reviews their efficacy alone, in comparison
with, and in combination with drugs for the treatment of depression.
Table 4Gt summarises all of the studies contained in the literature
review.
There are two studies (7, 8) testing the efficacy of psychological
treatment using subjects as their own controls. Both studies support
the efficacy of intensive differential reinforcement schemes (token
economies) in the regulation of depressive behaviours.
There are ten studies (2, 3, 5,6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15) which have
looked at the efficacy of psychological treatment in comparison with a
specific low-contact,nonspecific,or no active treatment control group.
Group Therapy, Marital Therapy, Interpersonal Psychotherapy, Behaviour
Therapy, and Cognitive Therapy are represented. Six studies employed
nonclinical populations (9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15). Only five out of ten
studies had more than ten patients in each cell. With the exception
of one study (9), all of the studies support the efficacy of psychological
treatments alone as compared with a control group.
There are five studies (2, 3, 5, 6, 16) which have evaluated psycho¬
logical treatments relative to tricyclic pharmacotherapy. Contingency
management and other forms of behaviour therapy have not been compared
with drugs. All of the other psychological therapies are represented
and all five investigations have acceptable sample sizes which include
only depressed patients. One study (16) found a specific psychological
therapy (cognitive therapy) to be more effective than a tricyclic drug
(imipramine) in reducing symptoms and attrition in the treatment of
acutely depressed outpatients. One investigation (6) found a slightly
greater effect for drugs and psychotherapy (interpersonal Psychotherapy)
in acute symptom reduction and three investigations (2, 3, 5) found
tricyclics better than psychotherapy (group, marital, interpersonal)
in decreasing relapse rate or symptoms, but psychological treatment
somewhat better than tricyclics in the improvement of social adjustment.
The effect of psychological treatment in study 5 was evident in patients
who stayed in therapy for eight months without symptomatic failure.
The findings on the comparisons of psychological treatments with
tricyclic pharmacotherapy indicate the superiority of tricyclics in
the treatment of acutely depressed patients. The most persuasive
outcome study showing an effect of psychological treatment is that of
Rush et al. (1977) but there is an urgent need to replicate their findings
before any firm conclusion can be made as regards the efficacy of individual
cognitive therapy.
There are eight studies (l, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 18, 19) from which
information on the combined use of psychotherapy plus tricyclic drugs
can be drawn. Six of the studies include depressed patients, one study
involved depressed and schizoaffective patients (18), and one investigation
(19) tested 'depression-prone' patients. The samples in all of these
studies are fairly large. Again, contingency management and behavioural
treatments are not included in combination studies but all other psycho¬
logical treatments are represented. Six out of the eight studies show
the superiority of combined treatment over a control group or either
treatment alone. On investigation (18) showed an equivalent effect
for combination therapy relative to a psychotherapy alone condition.
One study (ll) shows psychological treatment as superior to combination
treatment.
Two other combination studies are available. One study (4) examined
the efficacy of psychotherapy (couples group) plus lithium and lithium
alone in the long-term management of a moderately large sample of bipolar
depressed patients. The combined therapy was more effective than
pharmacotherapy alone. One investigation (17) compared individual
psychotherapy (cognitive) plus drug of choice with two different psycho¬
therapy conditions (individual and group cognitive). Although all of
the subjects were depressed patients, there were less than ten patients
in the individual psychotherapy groups. An equivalent effect was found
for combined treatment and individual psychotherapy alone but both were
superior to group therapy.
Taken together, the results on the comparisons of combination
treatments with a control group or either treatment alone suggest that
combined treatment may be the most effective way to alleviate depression.
Various reviewers have covered the efficacy of psychological therapie
in the treatment of depression (Weissman, 1978, 1979; Whitehead, 1979;
Rush and Beck, 1979; Hollon and Beck, 1978, 1979). These and the
review presented in this thesis indicate that there are large gaps in
the data. The major limitations in the literature are: (l) heterogenei
in the populations under scrutiny and lack of operationalised diagnostic
criteria and standardised clinical assessment of signs and symptoms;
(2) relative scarcity of information on bipolar, severely depressed,
psychotic and/or hospitalised patients; (3) the lack of psychotherapy
control groups in treatment trials of depressed patients (attention-by-
assessment, low contact, and nonscheduled 'psychotherapy on demand');
(4) lack of control of spontaneous remission rates (e.g. by waiting list
control); (5) the lack of specific outcome criteria (e.g. return to
work as a stipulated score on a clinical measure) which would suggest
'real' clinical improvement as opposed to statistically significant
improvement; (6) in the case of the nonspecific psychotherapies (Marital
Group, Psychoanalytic, Psychotherapy) the absence of procedural manuals
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that describe the techniques and their sequence during the course of
treatment; (7) the absence of longer follow-ups (only four out of the
nineteen studies reviewed had follow-ups of six months or more); and
(a) the lack of comparisons among the psychotherapies, e.g. cognitive,
behavioural and interpersonal psychotherapies. In addition, the testing
of these forms of therapy in homogenous groups of patients with other
psychiatric disorders is required. This might help to delineate the
specificity of these treatments for depression. For example, cognitive
therapy might prove useful in the treatment of anxious patients.
H. CONCLUSION
The correlational studies cited in support of Beck's theory appear
to demonstrate that depressed subjects (l) differ from nondepressed
individuals in terms of cognitive content, and (2) differ from nondepressed
people in terms of cognitive processing in such important areas as recall
of information, perception of reinforcement and degree of control,
expectation of success and/or reinforcement and attributions for success
and failure. Problems in these areas might be expected to interfere
with comparatively more normal processes of reinforcement. As Hollon
and Beck (1979) point out, it does not seem that depressed individuals
are either totally impervious to rewards or absolutely unmotivated to
achieve success but it does appear that factors in negative cognitive
set interfere with these goal-oriented processes.
Likewise, there is support for the hypothesis that (l) thinking
negative cognitions can generate negative mood and (2) that negative thinking
may interfere with the performance of skilled behaviour. Moreover, a
specific cognitive strategy related to Beck's therapy appears to reduce
the impact of negative thinking on mood.
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It appears that psychological treatments may be effective in allev¬
iating some kinds of depression; that interpersonal, behavioural and
cognitive therapies have a measureable effect; and that the most
promising form of psychological treatment is Beck's Cognitive Therapy.
It is too early to make any firm conclusions with respect to the
efficacy of combined psychotherapy and drug therapy. However, the bulk
of the evidence suggests that a multi-modal approach is the best way
to treat acutely depressed outpatients. Thus far, the most effective
form of psychological treatment (cognitive therapy) and the most
effective form of pharmacotherapy (tricyclics) have not been tested
adequately in a clinical trial.
The key components in each treatment, the long-term benefits of the
treatments (if any), and the specificity of the different therapies




A. RATIONALE AND GENERAL AIMS
The rationale for cognitive-behavioural treatment of depression
is derived from Beck's cognitive model: if the basis of the depression
is an overactive set of negative thoughts, then the correction and
weakening of these concepts may be expected to alleviate depressive
symptoms.
The empirical basis for the application of cognitive theory to
the treatment of depression has been detailed in the literature
review. Correlational studies show that the preponderance of
negative thinking is reflected in the dreams, self-concepts, and attitudes
about the future of depressed patients. Studies involving the experi¬
mental manipulation of relevant cognitive phenomena indicate a predict¬
able effect on other manifestations of depression such as affect,
motivation and performance. Moreover, a cognitive strategy (distancing)
based on Beck's cognitive formulation appears to reduce the impact of
negative thinking on mood.
Controlled studies of cognitive-behaviour therapy with depressed
students and psychiatric outpatients show that it can be more effective
than behaviour therapy (social skills), attention by assessment and
tricyclic pharmacotherapy. However, one problem with this research
is that only one study (Rush et al., 1977) employed operationalised
diagnostic criteria in the selection of clinically depressed outpatients.
Another difficulty is that it was conducted by the proponents of the
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therapeutic techniques under scrutiny, as were subsequent studies
directed at examining the efficacy of combined cognitive therapy and
chemotherapy (Rush and Watkins, in press; Beck et al., 1979). The
need for a replicative study comparing cognitive therapy with pharmaco¬
therapy which involves a research team that is relatively independent
of the development of cognitive psychotherapy is apparent.
Combined cognitive therapy and drug treatment has been examined
just recently in two controlled trials (Rush and Watkins, in press;
Beck et al., 1979) but in each instance the samples were small and,
in the Beck et al. study, a very mixed group of patients (depressed
and schizoaffective) had received treatment. Though these studies
used operationalised diagnostic criteria for selecting depressed
subjects, the possible additive effects of the combined treatments
were difficult to ascertain because neither study used a drug only
control group. Clearly, there is a need to examine the efficacy of
combined cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy in comparison to cognitive
therapy alone and pharmacotherapy alone. This would provide a better
test for mode of interaction of two treatments which have been shown
to be effective in depression (Weissman et al., 1979).
B. SPECIFIC AIMS
The primary objective of the present study is to investigate the
scope and limitations of cognitive therapy alone and in combination
with pharmacotherapy in the treatment of depressed ambulatory patients.
The specific aims of the investigation are:
1. to assess the therapeutic efficacy of cognitive
therapy on its own in the treatment of depressed outpatients,
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2. to investigate the effectiveness of cognitive
therapy in conjunction with pharmacotherapy as a treatment
for depression,
3. to compare the relative effectiveness of cognitive
therapy, pharmacotherapy, and combined cognitive therapy/
pharmacotherapy in a broad range of depressed patients
in terms of the reduction of acute symptomatology, pattern
of response, the minimisation of dropping out of treatment
and prevention of subsequent relapse,
4. to evaluate which symptoms respond best to the different
types of treatment and which are refractory to treatment,
5. to compare the relative efficacy of the three treatment
modalities within and across different clinical settings,
namely a general practice and a psychiatric outpatient
service.
6. to elicit predictive patient and therapy factors
C. DESIGN
To meet the aims outlined above combined cognitive therapy and
pharmacotherapy has to be compared with cognitive therapy alone and
pharmacotherapy alone in a factorial group design. Many researchers
have discussed the methodological advantages of using factorial designs
for the evaluation of treatments in controlled trials (e.g. Kerlinger,
1976; Weissman, 1978 ; Bergin & Lambert, 1978). A 2 x 3 factorial design
was decided upon to allow for the investigation of (l) treatment effects,
(2) location (or population) effects, and (3) possible interaction effects
between the different patient populations and the treatments under
observation. In addition, it was intended that the study meet the
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requirements of an adequately controlled trial as summarised by
Hamilton (1979). These include:
1. Selection of patients according to operationally defined
diagnostic criteria,
2. There should be a list of clinical and demographic features
in the description of the patients
3. Patients should be separated in treatment groups by an
appropriate method of randomisation
4. Careful definition and administration of each treatment
is essential
5. The treatments should be defined in terms of the amount
given and the length of time required
6. Thorough assessment of the patient's clinical state, i.e.
severity of illness, before the start of treatment is necessary
7. Patients should be assessed after a specified period or at
regular intervals throughout treatment
8. Finally, there should be follow-up evaluations if this is
possible.
No non-specific control group was employed in the design. Given
the wealth of adequate placebo-controlled double-blind studies involving
antidepressants (e.g. Morris and Beck, 1974), it did not appear scientific¬
ally necessary nor ethically justifiable to allocate depressed (and
frequently suicidal) patients to a treatment modality (e.g. placebo
drug or non-specific psychotherapy control) known to be less effective
than antidepressant chemotherapy. The explicit strategy was to consider
the basic chemotherapy (plus brief supportive contacts with the prescribing
doctor) to be the most appropriate 'control' condition for comparative
purposes. Similar arguments in favour of a 'best alternative treatment'
177.
rather than a placebo control are presented by O'Leary and B°rkovic
(1978) and Hollon (1979) (personal communication).
The major problem with such a strategy is that all active
therapies may prove to appear 'equal' at the end of the trial. To
put it another way, it may be that no significant differences emerge
between the three treatments. Such a finding could occur either
because of a genuine comparability in the efficacies of the various
therapies, or, because of inadequate implementation of the research
design (e.g. unreliable measurement, low statistical power, etc.).
Of the controlled trials reviewed, two studies involving homogeneous
samples of depressed patients have found significant differences between
cognitive-behaviour therapy and other control groups using sample
sizes comparable to that anticipated in the present investigation (Rush
et al. . 1977; Rush and Ulatkins, in press). Furthermore, the self-report
and clinician-rated measures of depression were similar to those used in
this study, as outlined below.
It was hoped to obtain at least 30 subjects in each treatment
group to make up a balanced design large enough to make group comparisons
possible.
D. SELECTION OF PATIENTS
1. Source of referral
Depressed patients were referred from two sources: the clinical
population at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital outpatient department, and
an ordinary general practice clinic located in Leith, a predominantly
working class district in Edinburgh. The Leith practice covers a
population of approximately 6,633, of whom 5,700 are below age 65
and mostly from social classes IV and V. Only ambulatory depressed
178.
patients were considered for the trial. There were two reasons
for this: first, empirical support for the efficacy of cognitive
therapy rests solely on studies which involved mild to moderately
depressed populations. Consistent with current clinical practice,
these patients might well be regarded as neurotically depressed
patients, though it must be emphasised that the term 'neurotic
depression' lacks diagnostic specificity and does not, therefore,
constitute a distinct diagnostic entity (Akiskal et al. , 1978;
Kendell, 1975; Paykel, 1971). Given the aims of the research,
the existing experimental evidence on outpatient samples, as well
as the wish to maintain some degree of comparability across the
different findings, it was decided to restrict the investigation to
the evaluation of outcome in ambulatory patients only. . The second,
and more pragmatic reason for choosing to work with an outpatient
population was that most depressed patients are treated in outpatient
clinics (Goldberg et al., 1975; Clare, 1978; Akiskal et al., 1978,).
With regard to the selection of a general practice clinic, it
was recognised at an early stage of this research that the role of
the general practitioner in the assessment and treatment of psychiatric
illness cannot be underestimated. The family doctor occupies a
strategic position between specialist psychiatric services and the
community. Many investigations have been carried out on the size
of the general practitioner's case load, and the concensus of such
enquiries has been that between one-tenth and one-fifth of the general
practice population are mentally ill or emotionally disturbed (Shepherd
et al., 1966).
Neuroses make up a considerably larger proportion of psychiatric
morbidity in family practice than hospital psychiatric practice (Clare,
1978). In Shepherd et al's (1966) investigation of 46 London general
practices, neuroses comprised 63 per cent and character disorder 4 per
cent of the psychiatric disorders seen. Corresponding statistics for
all out-patients at the Maudsley Hospital were 40 per cent and 37 per
cent and for in-patients 29 per cent and 26 per cent respectively.
Only a small proportion of neurotically disturbed patients are treated
by psychiatrists and even a smaller proportion by in-patient services.
On the other hand, psychotic illness constituted 4 per cent of the
total psychiatric morbidity in the survey by Shepherd et al. compared
with Mark's (1973) observation that psychoses formed 25 per cent of
the Maudsley Hospital outpatient cases and 72 per cent of first admissions
to mental hospitals in England and Wales in 1957.
While the majority of emotionally disturbed people are treated
solely in general practice, many are referred to specialists and
general practitioners form the largest single group of referring agents
to the psychiatric services (Robertson, 1979). For example, in North
East Scotland almost 78 per cent of new outpatients were referred by
their general practitioners (Hall and Hunter, 1970), a figure similar
to that provided in a study from the Maudsley Hospital (Hare, 1968)
which showed that of 8,000 new outpatients 72 per cent were referred
by general practitioners. Kaeser and Cooper (1971) have estimated
that in Great Britain at least 150,000 new adult cases are referred
to psychiatric services each year from general practice. Thus, there
is little doubt that one of the most appropriate places to identify
and treat ambulatory depressed patients is in the family practitioner's
surgery.
For these reasons and not least because depression is reported
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to be one of the most common psychiatric disturbances encountered in
general practice (Po.poff, 1969; Fry, 1954; Watts, 1956) it was
decided that a proportion of patients would be screened and treated
in a general practice setting. Moreover, it was hoped that by choosing
a practice which serves a predominantly working class area of the city,
the sample would include some individuals whom Brown and Harris (1978)
have described as being particularly 'at risk' to developing a depressive
disorder. This was, however, more a reflection of clinical interest
than a specific component of the design.
2. Criteria for selection of depressed patients
i. Definition of clinical depression
A psychiatrist or general practitioner referred patients who
appeared clinically depressed from their respective clinics. They
were screened by two clinical psychologists (the author and a senior
colleague) using a standard psychiatric interview (Present State
Examination (Wing et al. , 1974)) for elicitation of symptoms and
signs. On the basis of this interview clinically depressed patients
were defined operationally as people who had met a 'definite' primary
major depressive syndrome diagnosis according to the research diagnostic
criteria of Spitzer et al. (1978). In addition, case notes were
checked for history of illness.
The specific criteria, taken from the third edition of Spitzer's
Research Diagnostic Criteria Manual, are as follows:
Criteria for inclusion
1. One or more distinct periods with dysphoric mood or pervasive
loss of interest of more than two weeks' duration,
2. At least five of the following symptoms must have appeared
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as part of the episode: a) poor appetite or weight loss or
increased appetite or weight gain; b) sleep difficulty or
sleeping too much; c) loss of energy, fatigability, or tiredness;
d) psychomotor agitation or retardation (this as opposed to a
subjective feeling of restlessness or being slowed down); e)
loss of pleasure or interest in usual activities including social
contact or sex; f) feelings of self-reproach or excessive or
inappropriate guilt; g) complaints of a reduced capacity to
think or concentrate such as slowed thinking or indecisiveness;
and h) recurrent thoughts of death or suicide, or any suicidal
behaviour.
3. The patient was referred for help during the period of
disturbance, took medication, or experienced functional impairment
in various social spheres.
4. The first appearance of these symptoms was not preceded by
schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorders, panic attacks, phobias,
obsessive compulsive disorder, somatisation disorder, anti-social
personality, alcoholism, drug use disorder, preferential homo—
sexuality, a serious illness which caused major changes in living
conditions, or a physical illness known to be associated with
psychological symptoms (e.g. thyrotoxicosis).
Criteria for exclusion
In addition to the exclusion criteria of the RDC mentioned
above (section 4) patients were excluded from the study if, in
the judgement of the interviewer, they presented with symptoms
which suggested primary anxiety (i.e. a rating of 0 on item 26
of the Present State Examination) or if an organic brain syndromef
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was suspected.
Moreover, in keeping with the existing evidence for the
effectiveness of cognitive therapy, it was decided that patients
with a history of bipolar affective disorder would be excluded,
as well as those individuals who presented with hallucinations,
delusions or other clinical signs which indicated the advisability
of inpatient hospitalisation (e.g. extreme agitation or retardation).
Also excluded were people suspected of being mentally retarded
from clinical judgement.
With respect to medication, those individuals whose medical
history contraindicated the prescription of antidepressant
medication were screened out of the study. However, patients
already taking antidepressants at the point of referral were
considered for admission if (l) in the opinion of the referring
doctor they had failed to respond to the current drug regimen,
and (2) they accepted the possibility that they might be given
another type of antidepressant as the treatment of choice,
ii. Minimum level of self-reported depression
Another clinical criterion for admission into the study was
self-reported level of depression which had to be at least mild
according to the British norms of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDl),
i.e. a score > 14. Metcalfe and Goldman (1965) found that British
scores tend to be lower than their American counterparts, the respective
means being x 14.3 i 8.3 and x 18.7 - 10.2. The danger of adopting
a low criterion score on a self-report measure is that it might broaden
the range of scores so much that it proves difficult to obtain
statistically significant differences at the end of treatment, even
if patients demonstrate dramatic improvement on other criteria.
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However, a relatively low criterion score appeared justified in
light of the frequently reported clinical observation that many
depressed patients 'don't realise that they are ill' and, when
confronted with a 'paper and pencil' instrument, fail to recognise
that many of the symptoms on the checklist are relevant to their
current state. Previous research has suggested that some types of
depressives rated as depressed by psychiatric and ward nursing staff
may not endorse syndrome depression items on self-report inventories
(Donelly and Murphy, 1976). This argument anticipates the rationale
which underlies the use of appropriate observer rating scale in clinical
trials.
iii Age
The third criterion for inclusion in the study was age limit:
a range of 18 to 65 years inclusive was adopted because of the known
difficulties in distinguishing adult psychopathology from childhood
and adolescent disturbances (e.g. Forrest et al. , 1978).
and because of the increasing risk of organic brain syndromes after
age of 65 (UJelford, 1958 , 1967; Post, 1962). No attempt was made
to control for age apart from the range given in order not to bias
the sample which was meant to be reasonably representative of psychiatric
and general practice ambulatory depressed patients.
3. Description of patients
A total of 140 referrals were evaluated. Fifty-two (37%) of
the patients assessed were rejected from the study, the proportions for
the general practice and the hospital being 43 per cent and 31 per cent
respectively. The proportion of patients rejected from the study and
the reasons for rejection are summarised in Table SOt .
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Table 5D, Patients excluded from the study from the two clinics and
the reasons for exclusion
Reason for Hospital Patients General Practice Full Sample


















Other 8 8 16
Low self-reported depression accounted for 47 per cent of those
rejected in the general practice group compared to 16 per cent in the
hospital group. In Table 5D, the category 'other' includes a mixture
of patients who were excluded for the following reasons: suspected
organic impairment or subnormality, secondary depression following a
physical or psychiatric illness, bereavement reaction, spontaneous
recovery, schizophrenia and tricyclics being contraindicated.
Thus 88 patients constituted the sample at the start of the trial,
all of whom met all of the inclusion and none of the exclusion criteria.
There were 21 males and 67 females between the ages of 18 and 65.
Table 5D2 presents the demographic characteristics of the patients
from the two clinics. On the basis of their educational background,
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Table 5D2 Demographic characteristics of patients from the two clinics
Variable Hospital patients General Practice Full sample



































































the patients were classified into four groups: level of education
less than or equal to school leaving age (level I); at least two
'0' levels and/or must have completed secondary school (level II);
specialised training instead of or following *□* levels on completion
of secondary schooling, e.g. business training, technical college,
secretarial course (level III); attended University, though they
need not have obtained a degree (level IV). Social class was
determined according to the patient's occupational status as listed
in the 'Classification of Occupations' (1970) booklet published by
the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. In the case of
married women, the husband's job was used'as the criterion. Single,
separated, divorced, and widowed females were classified according to
their own occupations. If a patient was unemployed at the time of
the evaluation then the job which he/she held last was taken as the
criterion for social class.
As should be expected, the sample was strongly biased in the
proportion of females to males, women making up 15% of the final sample.
The hospital outpatients were slightly older on average, better educated,
and from a higher social class than the general practice patients. A
considerably higher proportion of general practice patients (46^) had
lost a spouse relative to patients referred from the hospital clinic
(16?S).
T
With regard to clinical features, the hospital patients had
experienced more depressive episodes on average and had been depressed
for a longer period than those from the general practice setting. Not
surprisingly, over three times as many hospital outpatients had been
admitted to a psychiatric hospital at some time in their lives. Sixty-
four per cent of the full sample had had previous tricyclic drug treatment.
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Table 5D3 Clinical features of patients from the two clinics
Hospital patients General Practice Full sample
N = 49 patients N = 39 N = 88
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"t the time of their evaluation for entry into the trial, Z8% of
the total population reported suicidal ideation and another 1Z% had
made a suicide attempt in the recent past (see Table 5D3 ).
Before the full evaluation was given each patient had to be at
least mildly depressed, defined by a minimum score of 14 on the
Beck Depression Inventory (see 'Measures used' below). Table 5D4
shows the means, standard deviations, and ranges for each of the patient
groups and for the two populations combined.
Table 5D4 Beck Depression Inventory Scores at initial evaluation for








Mean 26.4 25.7 26
S.D. 7.6 6.9 7.3
Range 15 - 41 14 -"43 14 - 43
The mean score on the BDI for the full sample at intake indicated
moderate depression (x = 26) which is consistent with the British norms
for the Beck Depression Inventory; the mean score for the hospital
patients was just slightly higher than that in the general practice
group.
The aim of admitting at least 30 patients into each treatment
group was fulfilled except for the drug treatment group. Only 28
patients were admitted to this group. This was due as much to the
randomisation procedure as it was to the purely practical problem of
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a time constraint relative to the resources available for the research.
□f the 30 patients admitted to the combined cognitive therapy and
pharmacotherapy group, eight patients dropped out of treatment, leaving
a total of 22 completers. These figures were identical for the
cognitive therapy group. In the pharmacotherapy group, eight out of 28
patients dropped out of therapy, leaving a total of 20 completers.
Attrition uas higher in the sample of general practice patients.
E. DESCRIPTION OF TREATMENTS
1. Cognitive therapy alone
Cognitive therapy alone consisted of at least one weekly 60
minute session with the treating clinical psychologist. No psycho¬
tropic drugs were allowed. The nature of the specific psychotherapy,
as described in an unpublished (Beck et al.. 1978) and published manual
(Beck etal., 1979), was short-term and focused on correcting the
patient's negative thinking. The treatment protocol did not specify
a maximum number of interviews though the longest time a patient could
remain in therapy (and still be included in the trial) was twenty weeks.
Clinically, therapy was stopped sooner or later according to individual
cases.
Cognitive therapy techniques are designed to identify, reality
test and correct maladaptive distorted conceptualisations and the
maladaptive schemas (beliefs) underlying these cognitions. The idea
behind the approach is that the patient learns to master problems and
situations which he previously considered insuperable by re-evaluating
and changing his thinking. The ultimate goal is to help the patient
to think more realistically and adaptively with a view to reducing
symptoms.
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Table 5E, shows a summary of the steps used (for a detailed
description see Beck etal. (1979)). These consist of a detailed
assessment phase and a certain amount of didactic, confrontation, and
behavioural methods - all however aimed at a main target, the cognitive
element. The purpose of therapy is cognitive restructuring, using
Kelly's (1955) notion of the patient and the therapist as scientists
who collaborate in investigating the patient's personal constructs.
Step 1 consists of an assessment phase and requires the application
of a behavioural, or problem-oriented conceptual framework to depressive
disorders. The patient's symptoms may be regarded as a set of target
problems which manifest at several levels of functioning - cognitive,
behavioural, or physiological. The target problem may be defined as
any of the components of the depressive disorder that involves suffering
or functional disability. Breaking down the depressive syndrome into
component problems facilitates goal directed activity for the patient
and therapist alike and is indispensable for structuring therapy within
individual sessions and throughout the course of treatment, e.g.
establishing agendas for each session and planning homework assignments.
Table 5E2 summarises the major components of the depressive
syndrome and how these may be subdivided into specific target problems.
According to Beck et al. , the therapist in collaboration with
the patient makes a determination as to which of the target problems
should be dealt with on the basis of many factors, e.g. which are most
distressing to the patient, which are most amenable to therapeutic
intervention.
For the sake of brevity it is not possible to discuss all of the
specific techniques for dealing with these problems. In general,
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Table 5E, Steps in cognitive therapy
1. Assessment phase
i.e. breaking down the depressive syndrome
into component problems
2. Socialisation for therapy
i.e. providing a rationale for the cognitive
approach
3. Monitoring of automatic thoughts
4. Distancing
5. Identification and discussion of stereotyped
themes (e.g. loss, failure, hopelessness)
6. Elicitation and challenging of depressogenic
beliefs
7. The use of behavioural techniques
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1.lossfpositive motivation 2.increased dependency
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1.passivity 2.avoidance 3.inertia 4.reductionin socialkills
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193.
the techniques may be classified as
A. predominantly cognitive in which the major focus is on the
patient's thinking, and
B. predominantly behavioural which consists of engaging the
patient in specific activities or projects which, in themselves,
help to relieve some of his suffering and will have a generalisation
effect onto the other problems.
Step 2, socialisation for therapy, is didactic and involves the
discussion of certain basic principles of epistemology. The attitudes
conveyed are that a perception of reality is not reality itself, but
only a rough approximation. The patient's sampling of reality is
restricted by the inherent limitations of his sensory function,and
secondly,his interpretations of his sensory input are dependent on
inherently fallible cognitive processes. Physiological processes
can substantially alter perception and comprehension of reality. Thus,
the patient has to accept the distinction between external reality and
psychological phenomena and that reliable knowledge depends ultimately
on having access to enough information. The influence of thinking
on mood is explained with examples (see Beck et al., 1978, 1979) -
in particular examples of 'maladaptive automatic thinking' which
precedes a feeling of dysphoria.
Beck emphasises the importance of this stage of treatment, in
particular helping the patient to recognise the connection between
thinking and feeling. Beck suggests that the therapist may explain
the cognitive approach to the sophisticated patient in the following
way: 'when depressed persons consider their experiences, they generally
pay most attention to the negative meanings which can be attributed to
V
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these events. When this occurs, the negative thinking feels
realistic to you. The more believable this negative thinking is the
more upset you will feel.' (Beck et al. . 197B, P. 98).
Throughout treatment, but especially during the initial phases,
the therapist repeatedly focuses on the connection between feeling
and thinking. For example, if the patient says 'i feel sad, empty*
the cognitive therapist will ask 'what are you thinking about?'
Although this step in therapy is mainly didactic, the therapist, by
his interviewing technique, employs modelling as an important component
in teaching the cognitive approach.
After the cognitive approach has been explained and discussed,
the third step, the monitoring of thoughts, or 'filling in the blank'
begins. A basic procedure for helping the patient identify his
'automatic thoughts is to train him to observe the sequence of external
events and his reactions to them. The patient may report a number
of circumstances in which he felt upset. The emotional upset becomes
understandable if he can recollect the thoughts that occurred during
that gap. Figure SEt illustrates the basic idea behind the technique.
Both examples have been taken from the casenotes of a patient who





Example 2 Recalls the decision
and act to abort
first child





'A killer can never
be a good mother'
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The next step (4) in treatment is called distancing. Some
patients who have learned to identify their automatic thoughts re¬
cognise their unreliable and maladaptive nature spontaneously.
Distancing refers to the process of regarding thoughts objectively,
that is, seeing them as psychological phenomena, not as identical
with reality. Recent experimental work indicates that this com¬
ponent of Beck's therapy has a measurable effect in reducing the
impact of negative thinking on mood and its psychophysiological
correlates (Blackburn and Bonham, 1980).
The monitoring of automatic thoughts and distancing from them
help to bring out the stereotyped themes that pervade the patient's
thinking; for example, themes of inferiority, inadequacy, guilt.
In step 5 the therapist points these out and challenges them by
indicating the lack of evidence, by offering contrary evidence and by
underlining the overgeneralisation or arbitrary nature of the conclusion.
The patient is encouraged to put forward alternative hypotheses and
draw alternative conclusions (cognitive reappraisal and alternative
therapy ).
A common theme in the thinking of depressed patients is hopeless¬
ness, a cognitive symptom which is reported to correlate highly with
suicidal intent (Minkoff et al., 1973).
The particular therapeutic strategy used in dealing with the
patient's hopelessness is based on the premise that he/she is locked
in by his arbitrary conclusions. It does not occur to him to question
these conclusions (automatic thoughts), e.g. 'there is no point in
living', 'i have nothing to look forward to,' or 'I am a burden to my
family and they will be better off without me'. As far as the patient
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is concerned these thoughts and their themes appear very reasonable,
even when they are questioned by the therapist. However, according
to Beck et al. (1978) the adoption of a problem solving approach (e.g.
exploring the validity of the patient's fixed ideas, or by asking the
patient to think rationally about the advantages and disadvantages
of suicide) facilitates the break up of the 'closed' cognitive net¬
work. As the patient reflects on the evidence bearing on his negative
thinking, he/she may recall information that contradicts the fixed
belief. Beck et al. (1978) give the example of a woman who originally
said that she had never been happy but, when confronted with evidence
that failed to support this, was able to recall a period in her life,
albeit during her adolescence, when she did experience contentment.
The next step (6), eliciting depressoqenic schemas, often takes
place in conjunction with the discussion of automatic thoughts and
their related themes. While talking about the themes, the 'list of
tyrannical shoulds' or rules that the patient uses to regulate his
life or appraise other people become apparent. These rules are often
unrealistic, or are used inappropriately or excessively. Typical
unrealistic rules are, for example, 'in order to be happy, I need to
be loved by everybody, therefore I should make everybody love me' or
'i should always be strong and never show weakness or get sick';
another example would be 'i should succeed at everything I do'. These
schemas (beliefs) can be pinpointed and challenged by the therapist
(confrontation). Beck et al. note that once several rules have been
identified one technique, which they call a variation of response-
prevention, may be used to modify the 'should'. The therapist guides
the patient to l) verbalise the 'should', e.g. 'i should never get
angry with people', 2) predict what would happen if he did not
follow this inner command, e.g. 'my colleagues will reject me
completely', 3) carry out an experiment to test the prediction,
e.g. verbalise a well-practised, but low level assertive response,
and 4) according to the results of the experiment revise the 'should',
e.g. record his colleague's reaction in a diary which might turn out
to be mild annoyance rather than outright rejection.
The emphasis here, as with all of the techniques of cognitive
therapy, is to get the patient to adopt an experimental approach to
his difficulties and to test the negative thinking (hypothesis) which
is causing him so much distress.
Finally, in keeping with the experimental approach is the
use of behavioural techniques which complement the intellectual
procedures in cognitive therapy. These may include a hierarchy of
graded tasks (or success therapy) used to challenge the patient's
cognition that he cannot succeed at anything, also to increase his
activity level and thus change his self-image and simultaneously
change other people's opinion of and attitude to him. Keeping an
hourly diary of waking activities (see Appendix I) which he marks for
mastery and pleasure can change the patient's poor self image and
focus his attention on the positive aspects of his life instead of
the negative, thus altering his negative abstractions. The patient
also usually keeps a log of automatic thoughts. The specific techniq
consists of writing down the situation that elicited the unpleasant
feeling in one column, writing down the negative cognition in another
column and the rational response in another (triple column technique,
see appendix II). Beck also uses modelling techniques such as role
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reversal: the therapist, for example, plays the role of the patient
as he sees himself: inadequate, inert, weak. The patient is coached
to assume the role of the therapist: understanding,yet directive and
more objective about the patient's difficulties.
Thus, in addition to a didactic approach and socratic dialogues
where the therapist puts forward an opposite viewpoint and by argument
he and the patient can work towards a realistic assessment of a
situation, the patient has a fair amount of homework to do. Graded
tasks, keeping a diary, monitoring automatic thoughts and, as seen in
the example of modifying the 'should', carrying out specific behavioural
assignments to improve interpersonal problems are all likely to be
included in the patient's therapy programme.
Tables 5E3 from Beck (1976), P. 275-278, list the target
approach to depression and recommended techniques to tackle them.
2. Pharmacotherapy alone
Consistent with clinical practice and to maximise the effect of
antidepressant medication, the treating physician selected an agent
most indicated for each patient at hand (Baldessariri, 1977). Medication
consisted of tricyclic or tetracyclic antidepressants (N = 57 completers
only), monoamine oxidase inhibitors ((MAOI) N = 2 completers only),
lithium (N = 1, completer only) and Anafranil (N = 4, completers only).
Tricyclic medication consisted of 100 - 200 mg/day of amitriptyline
or imipramine administered in a flexible dose which was raised to 125 mg
within ten days, stabilised over the next two weeks and maintained for
another 12 weeks. As with the cognitive therapy group, the maximum
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consisted of 60 - 90 mg/day and 100-20Q mg/day respectively.
Monoamine oxidase inhibitor treatment consisted of phenelzine 60 - 90
mg/day; lithium carbonate was used to obtain a serum level of 80 -
120 mmol/l. No other medications were prescribed for these subjects.
Patients treated in the general practice clinic received either
tricyclic or tetracyclic medication; MAOIs and lithium were not
prescribed in this group.
It was decided that a period of 12 weeks was well beyond the
time when a maximum effect to drug therapy could be expected. In fact,
considerably shorter time periods have been reported in many successful
drug trials (e.g. Morris and Beck, 1974).
In addition to taking antidepressant medication each patient
received supportive counselling from the attending physicians.
3. Combined cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy
Cognitive therapy plus drugs consisted of both treatments as
described above.
4. Therapists and therapists' training
Two therapists participated in the study: two qualified clinical
psychologists, one of whom is a principal psychologist attached to the
MRC Brain Metabolism Unit, Thomas Clouston Clinic, Royal Edinburgh
Hospital, the other being the author, who had a level of clinical
experience equivalent to that required for eligibility as a senior
psychologist in the National Health Service. Each had considerable
experience in the treatment of adult psychiatric populations.
Beck et al. (1979) have given a summary of the pre-requisites
needed to be a cognitive therapist. These are taken directly from the
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manual. The cognitive therapist should have:
a) 'a clear understanding of the cognitive model of depression'
b) 'a grasp of the conceptual framework of cognitive therapy (as
outlined in various texts) as well as its special application to
the treatment of depression'
c) 'formal training at a centre for cognitive therapy. This should
include supervision in the therapy of depressed patients'.
d) 'training at workshops, group precBptoring and institutes and
the utilisation of videotapes and annotated transcripts. Such
training also requires continual supervision by a qualified instructor
on a weekly basis until the competency criteria are met'.
(from Beck et al., 1979, 25-26)
The two psychologists involved in the present investigation had
familiarised themselves with the cognitive theory of depression as
described by Beck (1967, 1973, 1976), the special application of the
theory to the treatment of depression, as well as the procedures
outlined above. Both the theory and procedures of the cognitive
approach to depression were discussed thoroughly, with special emphasis
accorded to techniques for the prevention of suicide. Prior to treating
patients, the therapists experimented with the various methods, one
playing the role of a depressed patient while the other acted out the
role of a cognitive therapist.
In addition to using the manual 'Cognitive Therapy of Depression
(unpublished version, Beck et al., 1978) as a guide, videotapes of an
experienced cognitive therapist (A.T. Beck) were viewed and the de¬
monstrated techniques discussed in detail with the aid of explanatory
transcripts. Moreover, throughout the self-training process and prior
to the start of the actual study, each of the therapists had
treated at least two depressed inpatients and several outpatients,
some of whom had been prescribed antidepressant medication.
Neither of the therapists had received formal training from
the developers of the cognitive therapy techniques. This was due to
several practical difficulties.
Uhen the project was planned originally, no formal guidelines
for therapist training had been developed. Another problem was that,
while it was theoretically feasible to receive some degree of training
from the developers of cognitive therapy at the University of Pennsylvania,
the resources available to the present researchers precluded extensive
training for two therapists in an overseas academic centre. A third
difficulty was that at the time the project was being planned, there
were no facilities available in Great Britain which could have offered
suitable training in the form of seminars or workshops.
In an attempt to control somewhat for the quality of therapy
being administered, audiotaped recordings of selected therapy sessions
were reviewed regularly by the therapists. Some of these were subsequently
evaluated by experienced cognitive therapists at the Centre for Cognitive
Therapy (see appendix III). The evaluations provided by the Pennsylvania
staff indicate a reasonable degree of proficiency on the part of the
author in the administration of cognitive therapy.
Having said that, it is recognised that the therapeutic skills
of the therapists would have been enhanced by more formalised training.
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F. PROCEDURE
Table 5F1 shows the design of the study.
1. Patients referred from the two sources, prior to any evaluation,
agreed that if eligible for the study they would accept pharmacotherapy,
cognitive therapy or a combination of the two. They were advised
of the nature of the study and the available treatment modalities
and that acceptance into the study precluded the concurrent use of
psychotropic medications other than that prescribed by the doctor
for purposes of the research. The nature, potential risks, and
benefits of the research were discussed. Each patient was free
to leave the study at any time.
2. The first criterion for admission into the study was level of
depression which had to be at least mild according to the British
Norms of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI > 14).
3. Those patients who met the criterion score on the BDI were
then screened using a standard psychiatric interview, i.e. the
Present State Examination (Uing etal. , 1974), for elicitation of
symptoms and signs. Two clinical psychologists conducted the
interviews, both of whom had received training in the use of the
Present State Examination. On the basis of this interview,
Spitzer's research diagnostic criteria were checked (Spitzer etal. ,
1978). The patients had to present with a symptom profile which
satisfied the criteria for primary major depressive disorder as
outlined above. Those patients in whom anxiety was the primary
problem were excluded from the trial.
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were taken, i.e. several self-report scales, an observer rating, and
two behavioural tasks.
5. The patients were then randomly allocated to one of three treat¬
ment modes: cognitive therapy alone, pharmacotherapy/drug of choice,
or a combination of the two. Treatment assignment was made by opening
a sealed envelope which contained the actual treatment assignment.
Separate sets of envelopes were prepared for each location, i.e. a
total of 45 envelopes for each clinic, each with an equal distribution
of the three treatments. To ensure equal allocation of different
levels of depression, three levels of severity were controlled in the
random allocation, mild (BDI 14-20), moderate (BDI 20-26), and severe
(BDI 26+). All of the envelopes were prepared prior to any patient
selection. Uhen a patient became eligible for admission to the study,
the interviewer contacted the appropriate secretary at the clinic who
then selected an envelope at random, thereby allocating the patient
to the treatment mode. This procedure, in particular ensuring that
the treatment envelopes were in the possession of a staff member not
connected with the study, allowed for proper randomisation of treatment.
For the hospital patients, the consultants in charge reserved the right
to veto the admission into the study of any single patient if he had
been randomly allocated to a treatment mode which was undesirable from
the consultant's viewpoint. However, this eventuality never occurred.
6. Treatment was administered in the two clinics with both cognitive
therapy groups attending usually twice a week at the beginning and once
a week thereafter.
7. Re-assessment on all baseline measures except the Present State
Examination was done every two or three weeks if this was possible.
Patients who received pharmacotherapy alone had a therapist contact
only at the time of re-assessment. They were seen by the prescribing
psychiatrist or family doctor and by one of the two clinical psychologists
involved in the trial, their role being simply to distribute the self-
report scales and to administer the two objective behavioural measures.
8. If no response occurred after a maximum of 12 weeks of treatment
patients were dropped from the trial whatever type of treatment they
were on. Response was defined, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, as a
decrease of 50/6 or more on either or both of the two main depression
rating scales, i.e. the Beck Depression Inventory and the Hamilton
Rating Scale. It was felt that a 50% reduction in either observed
or self-reported depression would reflect a degree of 'real' clinical
improvement from the patient's viewpoint (see Klerman et al., 1974).
9. A maximum of 20 weeks of therapy was specified, though clinically
treatment was stopped sooner or later according to individual cases.
10. After treatment the protocol specified that patients be followed
up every six weeks for one year using the same measures. This part
of the study is still in progress, therefore follow-up data will not
be included in the reporting of results, this study being concerned
only with the outcome of treatment.
G. MEASURES AND RATING SCALES
Research studies in depression call for means to estimate reliably
and validly the severity of illness in the patients being examined.
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This need is second only to that for uniform diagnostic criteria and
is important for matching groups of subjects within a given unit as
well as for comparing the results of biological, pharmacological, and
psychological studies carried out in different centres (Carrol et al.,
1973).
The measures used in this study were chosen because they are,
on the whole, well documented measures of aspects of depression which
this study sets out to investigate.
Although the reliability and validity of some of the measures
is less than adequate, the instruments are widely used in psychiatric
research, thus making results relatively comparable and repeatable for
other investigators. The measures and rating scales will be described
under the subheadings of the functions they measure.
1. Diagnostic
According to Rush (1976), 'diagnosis (to know through) re¬
presents a hypothesis, the clinician's best hypothesis, about the
nature of an ailment. It designates both what the ailment is and
how it came about. Specifically it focuses on the nature of
pathological processes or the nature of the malfunctions presumed
to occur. It is a statement of both what is the phenomenon and
how one explains the phenomenon. Thus, diagnosis involves an under¬
standing based upon classification and explanation' (P.47).
Although many physicians would agree with Dr. Rush on the nature
of diagnosis, it is far more difficult for them to reach a concensus
on what exactly constitutes a depressive disorder.
The problem of diagnosing the depressions was referred to briefly
in the introductory chapter (chapter 1) in relation to the multiple
meanings of the term, both in verbal and written communications about
the phenomenon. It may be an affect, a symptom, a syndrome or an
illness (Mendels, 1975). Other factors contributing to difficulties
in diagnosis include: the failure to operationalise consistently the
criteria for making a diagnosis of depression; the inability to make
a distinction as to u/hen depression ends and another psychiatric
disorder begins ('boundary problem'); and most importantly, the problem
of poor interrater reliability (Rush, 1976; Z u<bin, 1967; Kendell,
1976).
In an effort to resolve these difficulties, in particular
low diagnostic reliability, Wing et al, (1974) developed the Present
State Examination, the main instrument used to screen referrals for
the present investigation.
(i) Present State Examination
The Present State Examination, or PSE, (Wing et al. , 1974) was
used for the purpose of eliciting symptoms, those psychological,
behavioural, and physical phenomena which have generally been thought
by psychiatrists to constitute mental illness. It is a structured
psychiatric interview the development of which as an aid to the
differential diagnosis of the mentally ill has been well-documented
(Wing et al., 1965; Wing, 1970, Wing, 1971; Wing et al., 1974).
In its brief version, it has been shown to be convenient and acceptable
for use in population surveys (Wing et al., 1976; Wing et al., 1977;
Duncan-Oones and Henderson, 1978; Henderson et al., 1980).
The manual of the ninth edition of the Present State Examination
(Wing et al., 1974) provides all the necessary information on the
rationale behind the development of the PSE, the derivation of items,
the administration of the interview, and the use of the scoring key.
Essentially, the interview is a checklist of 140 items which
systematically covers all of the phenomena likely to be considered
during a psychiatric examination (see Appendix IV). The interview
is completed by rating the presence or absence of each symptom.
Most of the symptoms are scored 0, 1, 2, 8 or 9. A rating of 0
means that the symptom was absent during the past month, (8) that
the interviewer was uncertain even after proper enquiry, whether
the symptom has been present during the past month and (9) that no
decision can be made because the question was not asked as the
patient did not answer or replied incomprehensibly. Ratings of
1 or 2 indicate whether the symptom was present in moderate or
severe form.
A major advantage of the ninth edition is that each symptom
is described in great detail in a glossary of definitions. Wing
et al.emphasise that training with this glossary is essential if
the ratings of symptoms are to be made in a uniform or reliable way.
Both of the clinical psychologists who conducted the interviews in
this study were trained in its administration, not by the developers
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of the PSE, but by one of their delegates, a consultant psychiatrist
at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital.
The present State Examination can be used in a number of ways
for scientific research. According to Wing et al. (1974), 'the
first and most obvious use of the system is to describe, in terms
of symptoms, syndromes or classes, the psychopathological character¬
istics of groups of people at a defined point in time' (P.32).
Individual or group syndrome profiles using their Catego classification
system allows for the delineation of differences between classical
diagnostic groupings (e.g. schizophrenia, psychotic depression)
and comparability across different selected psychiatric populations
and cultures (Cooper et al. , 1972; WHO, 1973, in Wing et al., 1974).
The instrument has also been used to measure change in symptoms.
For instance, the ninth edition of the PSE was used in two trials
of preventive medication in schizophrenia (reported in Wing et al.)
while an earlier version (eighth edition) was used monthly to assess
change in an investigation of two antidepressant drugs (Lipsedge et al.,
1971, in Wing et al., 1974).
Apart from classifying items into different psychiatric syndromes
and measuring change over time, the PSE can be used to standardise the
description of mental state of patients included in various research
projects. Many of the treatment studies reviewed in the previous
chapter, including drug trials, suffer from the fact that their results
are not comparable with those undertaken at different sites, particularly
in terms of the populations studied. The main reason for choosing
the PSE in this investigation is that it is a useful aid to the
standardisation of selection of depressed patients.
Data are available from two studies in which the PSE was used
on a large scale, the US-UK Diagnostic Project and the WHO International
Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS). The inter-observer reliability
ratings of individual items has been examined extensively in these
projects and, with only a few exceptions, high levels of reliability
have been reported (Wing et al. , 1974). For example, in the IPSS
tests of item reliability were carried out between nine research centres.
The analysis included data obtained from simple investigation of inter-
observer reliability on both live and videotaped interviews. The
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The range of values of the intraclass correlation between centres
was from 0.97 to 0.43 with a median of 0.77. Other investigators
have employed different statistical methods and obtained similar
results (Sartorius et al. , 1970; WHO, 1973, in Wing et al., 1974).
Wing et al. (1974) note that, on the whole, items covering
depressive symptoms have proved to be consistently very reliable
while items on anxiety are less so with other symptoms variable
and intermediate.
While this study has not used the PSE as a diagnostic instrument
on its own, it is worthwhile considering briefly another point in
its favour, that is, the reliability of the section and syndrome
scores.
Section scores, which are the sum of the scores for the items
within each section (e.g. anxiety or depression items), also have
a high inter-observer reliability expressed as a product-moment
coefficient. For instance, a range of 0.80 and 0.95 was achieved
in two studies (Kendell et al., 1968; IPSS), with the section relating
to situational anxiety having the lowest correlation coefficient at
0.58. Wing et al. (1974) point out the flaw and the usefulness of
this data: 'This high reliability might perhaps be expected, since
two observers might arrive at the same section scores, even though
the ratings of the constituent items in that section were not the
same. In spite of this, however, it is a very important level of
reliability to study since the section scores, representing a summary
of judgements over a homogeneous group of items, is probably a close
approximation to the usual unstandardised judgements about severity
of anxiety, depression, tension, etc. that are made in everyday work'
(P. 61).
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Syndrome scores can also be obtained by taking the sums of
the scores for symptoms of a similar kind. For example, syndrome I
(nuclear syndrome) is composed of symptoms regarded by Schneider
(1959, 1971, in Wing et al., 1974) as 'first rank', in the sense that
they are likely to be diagnostic of schizophrenia in the absence
of organic features. These symptoms are differentiated from those
in syndrome 13 (auditory hallucinations) because in this case the
hallucinations are meant to be voices talking to the patient rather
than about him. According to Wing et al. , 'if this symptom is well
enough defined (so that affectively or sub-culturally based hallucin¬
ations can be excluded), it is probably as indicative of schizophrenia
as any in syndrome I (nuclear syndrome), but it is kept separate
until the demonstration is made that it can be specifically rated'
(P. 41).
The IPSS material was used to test the reliability of the syndrome
scores of the PSE. Two psychiatrists (one interviewer and one
observer) rated 190 interviews and another 51 subjects were inter¬
viewed twice. On the basis of the first 35 syndrome scores (there
are 38 altogether), the product-moment correlation coefficients of
reliability fell within the same range as those of the studies
mentioned earlier (though the median value is reported to have been
higher (Wing et al.,1974).
In addition to having high reliability with respect to item,
section, and syndrome scores, it is possible to obtain a high degree
of agreement between psychiatrists on a number of diagnostic categories
using PSE information alone. Moreover, studies have shown that when
the PSE is repeated by another interviewer within a day or so of the
first interview, the reliability stays reasonably high, though the
values are somewhat lower (Kendell et al. , 1968; Wing et al. ,
1967; IPSS). For example, Kendell et al. (1968, in Wing et al.
1974) found that, for items, the statistic KAPPA decreased from a
mean of 0.71 for inter-observer reliability to 0.41 for repeatability.
Similarly for section scores, the values dropped from a mean of
0.84 to a mean of 0.64.
These results indicate that even when there are changes in the
patient's symptoms over time and in the person conducting the
interview, the PSE, if used properly, is a sound instrument for
assessing the current psychiatric status of an individual.
The developers of the PSE have pointed to some difficulties
with their data: 'Most of the results refer to the situation in
which two psychiatrists (often two who knew each other quite well)
are rating one interview. The observer can pick up clues as to how
the examiner proposes to rate and the reliability can thus be
spuriously high* (Wing et al. , 1974, P. 130). Indeed, most of the
psychiatrists who participated in the studies had been educated in
the same clinical school. Thus, in spite of the fact that the PSE
was used with high reliability within research centres, there is
the possibility, again acknowledged by the developers, of differences
in the way symptoms were understood and rated across the research
sites. Wing et al. report instances where'key symptoms had been
rated present although the examples written down at the time did not
seem to warrant a positive rating. It is not known how often this
occurred without being noted or how often a symptom was present but
not rated positively' (P. 130).
The reasons for such differences include: l) the lack of prolonged
formal training in the original group of psychiatrists who conducted
and took part in the early studies; 2) because there was no detailed
glossary of definitions of items in the earlier editions of the
PSE, training in the differential definition of symptoms was less
than adequate; and 3) it is likely that over a period of time
psychiatrists with different initial training and ideas gradually
deviated from one another.
It is clear from the reasons outlined above that to ensure
comparability of results across investigations raters should be
trained before using the Present State Examination if this is possible.
But what happens when a group of untrained researchers select the
PSE as their instrument of choice? Can they expect a reasonably
high level of consistency? Recent evidence from Canberra,
Australia, indicate that this is possible. Duncan-Bones et al.
(1980) found that in a population survey a group of psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists can achieve consistency on a number of
PSE measures after lengthy self-training and 'regular recalibration'
sessions throughout the period of the study. A finding particularly
relevant to the present study is that the two psychologists,as a pair,
rated at the same level as the psychiatrists. This contrasts
sharply with an earlier report (Wing et al. , 1977) which suggested
that clinical psychologists tend to rate twice as much morbidity as
psychiatrists when using the PSE in a population survey.
The main problem with the study is that the Canberra raters might
be able to obtain high reliability between themselves but would not get
the same consistency against a rater trained by the developers of
the PSE or one of their delegates. Even so, the findings should
serve to encourage researchers without formal training to use the
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PSE in investigations where a systematic description of psychiatric
symptoms is desirable.
In summary, the PSE is a very reliable instrument for describing
patients who present with psychiatric problems. Although the
PSE has many uses it was used in this study primarily to elicit
symptoms in a systematic manner to fulfill Spitzer's Diagnostic
Criteria for Primary Major Depression. In addition, a total severity
score based on PSE items was taken as a measure of general psychiatric
disturbance.
(ii) The Research Diagnostic Criteria
The previous section described the Present State Examination,
a uniform and reliable procedure for collecting the information used
to make diagnoses and to describe the characteristics of patients
who participate in psychiatric research. In devising the PSE,
Wing and his associates have made a significant contribution to
resolving one problem that has plagued investigators in the study
of affective disorders.
Another and equally important problem has been tackled by
another group of researchers over the past decade, namely, the develop¬
ment of agreed upon sets of criteria for diagnosis which enable re¬
searchers to compare the results of studies which use different ways
of classifying patients (Feighner et al., 1972; Spitzer et al. , 1978).
The absence of a uniform set of diagnostic criteria makes it virtually
impossible to know if one researcher's patients who are characterised,
for example, as havingJsevere endogenous depression* correspond to
another researcher's patients described as having 'psychotic depression'.
Although Wing and his colleagues have also been concerned with this
problem, most of the work on the development of diagnostic criteria
for the affective disorders has come out of the United States.
Before talking about the Research Diagnostic Criteria, it would
be helpful to shift the focus of the discussion to some important
issues related to the contemporary approach to the diagnosis of
depression.
A recurrent theme throughout this thesis has been that the de¬
pressions represent heterogeneous disorders (Nendels, 1975; Klerman,
1974). However, clinically relevant and commonly agreed upon distinctions
between the sub-groups of depressions is still far from adequate. To
date, no generally accepted scheme for subdividing the depressions has
been found, though numerous investigators have tried to distinguish
between the various subgroups (e.g. Garside et al. , 1971; Robins et
al. , 1972; Paykel, 1971; Klerman, 1971).
The modern day approach to the diagnosis of depression stems
from the emergence of scientific medicine in the late 18th and early
19th centuries. According to Rush (1976) 'The approach of Sydenham^
in the 18th century led to the classification of diseases by symptoms
and clinical course. The development of clinical pathology with
clinical-pathological correlates . . . and the development of bacteriology
. . . accordingly led to an acceptance of the aetiological principle
as the basis for nosology. Thus, the principle that, ideally,
classification should be based on knowledge of aetiological processes
was accepted' (P. 51).
Kraepelin applied these basic concepts in psychiatry. On the
basis of prognosis, he differentiated the depressions (then manic-
depressive illness) from the schizophrenias. The concept of 'affective
disorders' was developed by Bleuler to incorporate not only manic-
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depressive illness but also psychoneurotic depressive reactions,
involutional melancholia, etc. Thus, he widened the concept of
the depressions, but did not specify the boundaries of the 'affective
disorders' - a problem which persists today (Rush, ibid).
Meanwhile, in America the philosophical and scientific bases of
psychiatric nosology was being criticised by such eminent figures as
Meyer and Menninger. The disciples of Meyer regarded depression
as part of the range of human experience, a total reaction to the
stresses of life. These and other 'unifiers' such as Aubrey Lewis
underscored the importance of social factors and personal experience
in the origins of depression and opposed proposals that the depressions
should be subdivided. The Meyerians paid less attention to the
influence of organic, constitutional and genetic factors in the
development of depression. UJhile they accepted the concept of a
gradualist or continuum model of depression from minor to major
disturbance, they doubted the validity of the distinction between
neurotic and psychotic or endogenous and reactive depressions (Klerman,
1974, in Rush, 1976).
Gillespie (1929) was the first to propose the distinction of
endogenous and reactive types of depression. This dualistic approach
was meant to differentiate depressions which arose in response to
environmental stress (reactive) and those without a clear precipitant
(endogenous). Such a heterogeneous or pluralistic approach has been
embraced by many continental Europeans and some British authors (Klerman,
1974, in Rush, 1976).
Another diagnostic dichotomy is that of 'neurotic' and 'psychotic'
depressions. In the United Kingdom this dualism refers to the evidence
for a discontinuity with reality as manifested by hallucinations,
delusions, ideas of reference, etc. In contrast, psychiatrists in
America see psychotic depression in terms of the severity of symptoms,
extent of functional impairment, and even the degree of ego regression,
a viewpoint grounded in the work of Fenichel (see Chapter 3). With
regard to this distinction, Rush comments: 'To some, there is an
implicit assumption in the neurotic-psychotic dichotomy that psychotic
disorders are biological, whereas neurotic disorders are due to stress
or personality dynamics. Unfortunately, neurotic-psychotic is some¬
times confused with the endogenous-reactive dichotomy, although
psychosis is not one of the necessary criteria for the endogenous
depressive type' (Rush, 1976, P.52).
The problem of differentiating the various subgroups of depressions
is complicated by the existence of other dichotomies such as unipolar-
bipolar, retarded-agitated, and primary-secondary depressions, all
of which have been discussed in depth by various authors (a.g.
Akiskal and McKinney, 1975 ; Kendell, 1976; Becker, 1974, 1977).
A recent distinction and the one most relevant to the selection
of patients for this investigation is the primary-secondary dichotomy
which has been put forward by the St. Louis group (Robins and Guze,
1972; Feighner et al., 1972). Primary affective disorder refers to
a disorder in a patient who has previously been well or whose only
previous episodes of psychiatric illness consisted of mania or
depression. Thus, secondary affective disorders occur in a mentally
ill patient who had previously had another psychiatric illness. The
distinction is logically superordinate to the unipolar bipolar category
(for detailed discussion see Rush, 1976). The main advantage of the
primary-secondary distinction is that it avoids two diagnostic dilemmas:
(l) the question of whether a patient is 'neurotic' or'psychotic'
and (2) whether the depression was precipitated by an environmental
stress, i.e. the reactive-endogenous controversy. As suggested
earlier, while the term neurotic depression is used frequently in
clinical practice to denote a supposedly homogeneous group of de¬
pressed patients, there is little, if any, evidence to support this
contention. Rather, it seems that 'neurotic depression' is an
umbrella label for diagnostically and prognistically heterogeneous
groups of depressed patients (Akiskal et al., 1978).
This brief overview of the problem of diagnosis in depression
indicates that, in spite of general agreement over the presence of a
common core of depression, there is wide disagreement over the precise
nature of depression and exactly how to classify it. At the risk of
putting too fine a point on the issue, a reference to Kendell's (1975)
paper may give an idea of the state of confusion in the area. He
points out that the 9th edition of the International Classification
of Diseases lists depression in 13 categories, not, in his opinion,
because there are in reality so many types of depression, but because
different countries see depression and its constituents in markedly
varying ways. Until the recent attempt to develop uniform diagnostic
criteria,along with reliable procedures for describing symptoms, the
field of psychiatry was left with the problem of different authors having
varying concepts of depression and a situation where numerous categories
were needed to accommodate the different ideas of clinicians in over
50 countries.
The Research Diagnostic Criteria (Spitzer et al. , 1975, 1978)
were developed to help researchers in psychiatry to overcome the
'contemporary confusion', as Kendell puts it, in the diagnostic system.
A major purpose of the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) is to enable
investigators to select relatively homogeneous groups of patients
who meet specified diagnostic criteria. The RDC were developed as
part of a collaborative project on the psychobiology of the depressive
disorders sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health.
Although the RDC includes criteria for non-affective disorders, its
primary focus is on affective illness.
For each functional psychiatric disorder within the RDC there
are both inclusion and exclusion criteria. The criteria for Primary
Major Depression were outlined in a previous section. Since one aim
of this research was to select patients on the basis of symptoms and
previous psychiatric history, subjects were chosen according to the
Primary-Secondary distinction, thereby avoiding the difficulties posed
by the reactive-endogenous and neurotic-psychotic dichotomies. The
RDC also provides for subdividing patients into subtypes of depression
(e.g. simple maj or and situational major depression) but this was not
considered relevant to the research.
In general, the RDC criteria refer to symptoms, signs, duration
or cause of illness as levels of severity of impairment. For some
of the diagnoses certain symptoms or symptom patterns are of diagnostic
importance only if they persist beyond a certain stated duration.
Diagnostic terms are frequently defined in the criteria themselves
so as to avoid ambiguity as to essential clinical characteristics.
Spitzer et al. discuss the rationale for selecting the specific
criteria: 'an attempt was made to operationally define the category
in a manner that would achieve maximal acceptance among clinicians
and researchers who use that particular concept. In many cases the
criteria are based on good research evidence indicating that the
criteria chosen have considerable usefulness for such diagnostic
purposes as predicting outcome, response to treatment and familial
association. On the other hand, many of the criteria represent an
attempt to operationalise concepts whose importance for diagnosis
is based primarily on clinical experience rather than the results of
formal research studies' (1978, P. 774).
This comment by the developers of the RDC points to one problem
in using any diagnostic criteria no matter how well-conceived it is,
namely, that of validity.
For example, Nelson et al. (1978) have commented on their experience
with the RDC for the diagnosis of primary major depressive disorder.
They draw attention to the problem of false positive diagnoses which
they attribute to their use of the criteria exactly as written. If
the RDC are used in a 'simple checklist manner' a clearly heterogeneous
group of patients is obtained. Nelson et al. note that the reason
for this could be because earlier versions of the RDC combined criteria
for endogenous and neurotic depressions (Woodruff et al., 1974), a
point acknowledged by the St. Louis group (Feighner et al. , 1972).
Recent evidence suggests that this warning on the validity of
the RDC is well-founded. Feinberg et al. (1979) concur with Nelson
et al. , emphasising that the RDC may be similarly flawed for the
endogenous subtype of depression. They compared the RDC for endogenous
major depressive disorder with their own clinical diagnoses in 48 con¬
secutive outpatients who presented to their clinic complaining of de¬
pressed mood. All of the patients were screened by a psychiatrist in
an open clinical interview and by a social worker who administered
the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS), a
structured interview specially designed for the RDC. The clinical
diagnoses were revised using follow-up information gathered six months
to two years later. In the words of the authors, 'follow up diagnoses
were based on response to treatment, other aspects of clinical course
and information from the patient's current therapist' (P. 267).
Feinberg et al. report that the RDC resulted in both false-
positive and false-negative errors, with ZQ% of the patients
classified incorrectly. There was poor agreement overall between
the clinical diagnoses and RDC, the Kappa coefficient being .41.
Particularly interesting was the finding that of the six patients
incorrectly classified as not endoqenously depressed by the RDC, three
were bipolar, 'with unequivocal episodes of hypomania meeting RDC
criteria'. With regard to the false-positives, eight patients had
'atypical dysphoric presentations' whose symptom pictures were rather
different from those commonly recognised as endogenous depression.
Like Nelson et al. (1978), the authors concluded that refinements
are needed in the RDC if homogeneous groups of patients can be expected
to be selected for research in the affective disorders. Even with
improvements they stress the importance of tempering the RDC with
clinical judgement.
As seen, information for the RDC is collected by means of direct
examination of the patient, i.e. conducting a structured interview
(SADS). If the researcher is interested in obtaining a lifetime
prevalence of diagnoses, then a lifetime version of the SADS may be
used. The SADS interview can be used for diagnosing current episodes
224.
of illness as well as previous episodes and for making multiple
diagnoses of functional psychiatric illnesses. Built into the SADS
and RDC is a system which gives the researcher an option of examining
the data by choosing patients on the basis of degrees of certainty of
diagnosis. For instance, there are specific criteria for probable
vs definite, such as 'probable' requiring only three items endorsed
in an index and 'definite' requiring four or more (for a detailed account
see Spitzer et al.'s third edition of the RDC, 1978). Patients selected
for this study had to meet a 'definite' diagnosis of primary major
depression.
Since the SADS interview was not employed in this present study
to elicit symptoms, there is little point in discussing the instrument
in detail. It is worth noting, in passing, that the reliability of
the RDC categories based on the SADS scale has been tested in three
studies, all of which were conducted in the United States. The
reliability figures as expressed in Kappa coefficients of agreement ^
were high, ranging from .88 to .90 for Major Depressive Disorder, and
.78 to .86 for Primary Major Depressive Disorder (Spitzer et al. , 1978).
On the surface it would appear that these figures are comparable to
those reported for the PSE section and syndrome scores. This, in it¬
self, suggests that the SADS interview might be a better instrument
to use for eliciting symptoms if an investigator elects to use the RDC.
However, compared to the PSE, the SADS scale is problematic from
the standpoint of cross-cultural testing. The PSE achieves high
reliability through extensive use at multiple centres in the United
Kingdom and the United States, not to mention nine centres in Eastern
Europe. For this reason the PSE was chosen as the standard measure
for eliciting symptoms in the present study, rather than the culturally
restricted SADS scale.
However, there is a problem in using the Present State Examination
as a screening measure to fulfill the RDC. Although it is comprehensive
and reliable, the PSE does not provide all of the information required
to meet some of the inclusion criteria for Primary Major Depression.
For instance, according to Spitzer et al. (1978), appetitive disturbance
may involve overeating and weight gain as well as eating too little,
with accompanying weight loss. Similarly, a patient may have sleep
disturbance if he reports sleeping too much, even though the conventional
view is that sleep disturbance should be regarded as a symptom of
depression only when the patient complains of sleep loss, especially
in the early hours of the morning. In short, there are no items in
the PSE which allow for ratings on symptoms of excessive eating (and
)
weight gain). Excessive sleeping is rated as a dissociative symptom
(item 100), this item not being a compulsory one for the interviewer to
ask. Unless the PSE is modified specifically to include items which
cover these criteria, it is unlikely that the patient will report the
symptom during the course of the interview.
Since an unmodified version of the PSE was used in the present
study, it is recognised that some patients who might have been admitted
to the study on the basis of strict adherence to the criteria for
Primary Major Depression were, in fact, excluded because of the limit¬
ations mentioned above. On the other hand, the fact that the interviewers
were aware of the limitations in the PSE prompted them to make the necessary
enquiries, albeit in a clinical and less structured fashion. It was de¬
cided that using the RDC in this way would not present any more of a
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threat to the validity of the diagnostic criteria than already
appears to exist. Moreover, it was felt that even if some patients
were incorrectly excluded from the trial because of the limitations
in the interview method, such an error would bias the selection in
a manner consistent with diagnostic practices in Britain. In effect,
the end result would be to minimise the number of patients admitted
to the trial who presented with 'atypical symptom profiles', thereby
reducing false-positive diagnoses.
Despite these difficulties, Spitzer's Research Diagnostic
Criteria provide a much needed partial answer to the problems of
the unreliability of clinical diagnostic practices. The use of the
RDC makes the results of this research relatively comparable and
repeatable for other investigators.
2. Self-report measures of mood
(i) Beck Depression Inventory
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDl) is a self-rating scale which
is derived from Beck's cognitive theory of depression (see Appendix V).
It was constructed by selecting items that discriminated between
depressed and non depressed psychiatric patients (Beck, 1967). It
consists of a list of 31 descriptive symptoms referring to characteristic
t
aspects of depression, e.g. pessimism, social withdrawal, suicidal
wishes, a sense of failure and physical symptoms. For each symptom
there are four or five statements in the first person ranging from a
mild or neutral statement to one indicating a severe form of that
particular symptom. Each statement is assigned a score of 0, 1, 2 or
3 to indicate the degree of severity of the symptom. The maximum'
score on the BDI is 62.
There is evidence for the construct and concurrent validity of the
BDI. A central aspect of Beck's theory is that depressed people regard
themselves, their world, and their future in a negative way. The model
receives support from findings that this 'negative cognitive set' is mani¬
fested in the dreams of depressed patients, in their response in certain
projective tests and in their self concept. A significant relationship
has been found between self-reported depression on the BDI and masochistic
dreams (Beck and Ward, 1961, in Beck, 1967), scores on a self-concept
test, with high scores indicating a negative concept (Beck and Stein,
1960), the tendency for patients to see themselves as failures in
response to pictorial stimuli (Beck, 1961), childhood bereavement
(Beck et al., 1963, in Beck, 1967), the tendency to make extremely
pessimistic predictions about future performance following inefficient
task performance (Loeb et al., 1964) and the tendency to underestimate
successful performance (Loeb et al. , 1966, in Beck, 1967).
Its concurrent validity, as assessed by the degree of concordance
with physicians' ratings has been found to be 0.65 to 0.67 with an
American population (Beck, 1961) and 0.61 with a British population
(l*!etcalfe and Goldman, 1965). In addition, the BDI correlates highly
with other self-rating scales (Little and McPhail, 1973).
Beck (1961) reports that the reliability of the scale has been
found to range from 0.86 to 0.93. With regard to concordance rates
between the BDI and observer rating scales such as the Hamilton Rating
Scale (HRS), correlations of 0.75 (Schwab et al. , 1967) and 0.82 (Williams
et al. . 1972) have been reported. However, other investigators have
noted that these correlations were highest near recovery and lowest
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at the acute stage of the depressive episode (e.g. Carrol et al., 1973;
Paykel et al., 1973).
Possible explanations for this finding are: the distorting
effects of illness on self-perception, lack of insight, and response
sets. It appears that the BDI may not be so reliable in quantifying
depression as a physicians's rating when the patient is ill (Prusoff,
1972) and this feature may be positively related to the extent of
psychopathology present in the patient (Donovan and O'Leary, 1976).
Thus, observer rating scores (e.g. HRS) may be better predictors of
BDI scores in the future (when the patient is nearer recovery) than
at the same time and they may also be a better predictor of future
BDI scores than BDI scores are of future observer rating scores.
For the reasons outlined above, and because of the availability
of normative data from a British population, the BDI was chosen as the
main instrument for assessing self-reported depression in this treatment
study.
(ii) Irritability, depression and anxiety scale
The irritability, depression and anxiety (IDA) scale is a self-
report questionnaire for the measurement of irritability for use in a
clinical context (Snaith et al., 1978). Interest in the association
between irritability and psychiatric disorder (e.g. Gottechalk et al. ,
1963; Buss and Durkee , 1957; Caine et al., 1967), together with
the growing awareness of the possible effect of psychotropic medication
in modifying the degree of irritability, indicates that a valid measure
of this state is relevant to an outcome study such as this.
The IDA consists of a list of 18 descriptive items which refer
to three aspects of mood - irritability, depression and anxiety, e.g.
intolerance, poorly controlled anger, lev/el of interest in the
environment, autonomic symptoms, etc. Within the IDA there are four
subscales. There are five items for the depression scale (rangeof
scores 0 - 15), five for anxiety (range 0 - 15), four items for outward
directed irritability (range 0 - 12) and four for the inward directed
irritability scale (range D - 12). A fifth score can be obtained for
total irritability by adding the outward and inward irritability scores.
Each item is followed by four possible responses. The wording of
some items expresses a healthy state, e.g. 'i feel cheerful' while
others convey a morbid state, e.g. 'i lose my temper and snap at others'.
The wording of the response format varies from one item to another.
On the questionnaire a depression item, an anxiety item and an
irritability item appear in sequence. The subject is asked to underline
the response which applies most to him/her at the time. While the
scoring values do not appear on the questionnaire, scores of 0, 1, 2 or
3 are given depending on the severity of the symptom (see Appendix VI).
All of the items on the scale refer to the patient's present mental
state, the time period being how the patient feels at the moment or
has felt in the previous day or two.
It was decided that a scale which combined measures of irritability
with anxiety and depression ratings would be useful because it might
help to disentangle the complex relationships between these moods.
Another reason, pointed out by the authors of this scale, is that by
interspersing irritability items among other items relating to mood
disorder, the scale is less likely to put respondents 'on the defensive',
thereby increasing the likelihood that statements would be truthfully
endorsed.
The scale is relatively new and has not received much empirical
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support except for that provided by the developers of the questionnaire.
The correlations of the self-assessment scales with modified
versiors of the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety and Depression are
as follows; depression = .75, anxiety = .70, outward irritability -
.79, and inward irritability a .84. These are all highly significant
and satisfy the requirements for concurrent validity.
In terms of the sensitivity and specificity of each of the sub-
scales, Snaith etal. compared the responses of 78 patients with those
of a non-patient control group (N =100) and found that the depression,
anxiety and irritability scales provided satisfactory discrimination
between the two groups. For the depression scale of controls-and
14% of patients were misclassified according to a psychiatrist's rating
of severity of disorder; for anxiety the figures were similar while
the most sensitive scale was inward irritability, where only 4% of
controls~and Q% of patients were misclassified. The least sensitive
scale appears to be outward irritability as the percentages bf mis-
classification were considerably higher, i.e. 16% for controls and
24^ for patients.
Snaith et al. checked the reliability of the IDA by internal
consistency, dividing the subscales into two halves. While there are
difficulties in using this method on scales with few items, the authors
found the reliability coefficients (Spearman-Brown method) to be high.
Because the scales involved as few as four items, the authors split
each scale three ways and obtained the following correlations;
depression = .74, .80, .87; outward irritability = #yy? ^ gg ? ^gg. ancj
inward irritability = .70, .92, .93.
This scale was chosen mainly because it is one of the few self-
report measures available for assessing a subject's present state of
irritability. Although the scale is new and in need of further in¬
vestigation, its construction was purposefully based on both inpatients
and outpatients which makes it valid for use with either population.
Moreover, it is a short and convenient way to obtain more information
about the complex relationships between several dysthymic states which
a patient may experience during the course of a depressive illness.
Self-report measures of cognitive content
(i) Semantic differential
This is an instrument for measuring a person's cognitive
structuring or the meaning which he/she gives to various aspects of
the world. The technique described by Osgood et al. (1957) was
modified to provide an assessment of the patient's cognitive world by
means of twelve seven-point scales applied to five constructs considered
important in depression (see Appendix VII). The bipolar adjectives
which occupied each end of the 12 scales represent a selection from
those recommended by Osgood et al. (op. cit.) and were chosen for
their relevance to depressed mood which had been established in a study
in the Metabolic Unit, Thomas Clouston Clinic (Ludgate, 1976). The
constructs included Beck's (1967, 1976) negative cognitive triad, i.e.
the self, the world and the future. The five constructs were: Me
as I am now, Me as I was before this illness, Me as I would like to be,
My environment as it is now, and The future as I see it for me. These
concepts were rated on the following bipolar descriptors, most of which
were derived from Osgood's evaluative factor: successful-unsuccessful,
good-bad, worthwhile-worthless, hopeful-hopeless, active-passive,
interesting-dull, fast-slow, pleasant-unpleasant, positive-negative,
in control-helpless, adequate-inadequate and happy-sad. Depending on
where the patient placed his mark on the line, he was assigned a
score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7, the lower the score the more negative
the rating, the higher the score the more positive the rating. The
lowest score a patient could get for a given concept was 12 while the
maximum score was 84.
The estimation of reliability for 'state* scales by the test-re-
test method is, on the whole, unsatisfactory. If the scale is given
again to the patient too soon, scores may be affected by recollection
of the previous completion. If the time interval is longer the patient's
clinical state may have changed.
Bearing in mind these limits, data on the reliability of the
semantic differential as derived from test-retest analyses may be
considered. In the two studies reported below reliability was assessed
in terms of the error of measurement between tests, the finer or smaller
the average magnitude of this error the more reliable the instrument.
Luria (1953, in Osgood et al. , 1957) used the semantic differential
in a psychotherapy investigation. The reliabilities of 150 items (15
concepts and 10 scales) were measured over test-retest intervals of a
few minutes, i.e. immediate test-retest, 6-8 weeks, and 12-15 weeks
for non therapy controls, and over only the few minute interval for
therapy patients. Error was assessed in terms of the 'average absolute
deviations in response from test-retest*. (P.131), for all scales, and
the three categories of scales. The categories consisted of the three
factors - evaluation, potency and activity (EPA) - which emerged from
Osgood et al's factor analysis of over 50 bipolar adjective scales across
20 different concepts (see Osgood et al., 1957 for a detailed account).
Looking at the immediate test-retest data for the non-therapy controls
and therapy patients, evaluative scales (e.g. worthwhile-worthless)
produced the smallest average errors, these being .53 for the controls
and .58 for the therapy group. This contrasts sharply with the activity
scale (e.g. active-passive) which yielded the largest error measurements:
.85 for the non-therapy controls and .81 for the therapy patients.
There was no difference in reliability between normal controls and
'neurotic* patients but, as expected, the magnitude of the average error
increases considerably with longer time intervals between tests.
Test-retest reliability of the somantic differential has also
been examined in a study by Botpp (1955, in Osgood et al., 1957) in which
groups of normal controls and schizophrenic patients were compared in
immediate and delayed (two weeks) testing conditions. Again, the
evaluative scales showed consistently smaller deviations for both test-
retest intervals and for both groups than the potency and activity
scales. However, the schizophrenic patients, in contrast to Luria's
patients undergoing psychotherapy, showed significantly poorer reliability
than the controls (P = 0.001 by Mann-Whitney test). It may be that
this finding points to the limitations of the semantic differential
when applied to schizophrenics, or perhaps less stability in their meanings
of concepts (i.e. change in what is being measured).
As a measure of general attitudes, the semantic differential
achieves high test-retest reliability. For example, Tannenbaum (1953,
in Osgood et al. , 1957) looked at each of six concepts judged against
six evaluative scales. One hundred and thirty-five subjects were seen
on two occasions separated by five weeks. The test-retest coefficients
ranged from .87 to .93 with a mean r (Z transformation) of .91.
Unfortunately, studies of the validity of the semantic differential
are almost exclusively concerned with the evaluative factor. For
instance, Suci (1952, in Osgood et al., 1957) was able to discriminate
between high and low ethnocentrics , as determined separately from the
E scale of the Authoritarian Personality studies, on the basis of
their ratings of different ethnic constructs on the evaluative
scales of the semantic differential. Similarly, it was found that
the evaluative scale ratings discriminated in their predicted ways
between subtleties in political preferences (Luci et al. , 1952) and
pictorial political symbolism (Tannenbaum and Kessick, in Osgood et al.,
1957).
Its concurrent validity as assessed by the degree of concordance
with attitudes rated on a Guttman scale is reported to be high (.78,
P < 0.01, being the rank order correlation between the two instruments
by test-retest method).
Welges et al. (1971) used the semantic differential to determine
the relationship between self esteem and perception of personal future.
By correlating semantic differential scores for self esteem and future
outlook from normals and psychiatric patients and by correlating
changes in self-esteem with changes in future outlook within acutely
ill patients over time, they found that the degree of a person's self-
esteem is significantly related to how hopeful he is about his own future.
The authors speculated that therapies (e.g. cognitive therapy) which
offer a specific approach to modifying future outlook should be helpful
in treating patients with low self-esteem.
Self-concept has been demonstrated to improve after treatment
in depression (Laxer » 1964). Depressives often initially show high
self-blame and low self-ratings which is probably a function of mood
level. There is a change towards lower self-blame and higher self-
ratings after treatment (Laxer, ibid). In addition to the enhancement
of the self-concept it would be expected that constructs like 'the
environment' (world) and 'the future' should also change positively
as depression lifts. More importantly, if Beck's cognitive model of
depression is to be empirically supported, then these cognitive changes
should precede mood changes in the course of recovery.
In summary, the semantic differential can be applied to a variety
of research problems. It has been shown to be sufficiently reliable
and valid for many research purposes. It is also flexible and relatively
easy to adapt to varying research demands, quick and economical to
administer and to score. And, as Heise points out, 'there is probably
no social psychological principle that has received such resounding cross-group
and cross-cultural verification as the EPA structure of the SD ratings'
(1965, P.421). The main problems are to select appropriate and relevant
concepts and descriptive scales as well as appropriate and relevant analysis.
In this study the concepts were relevant to Beck's cognitive model and'the
descriptive scales and the instrument was used as an outcome measure to
assess changes in cognitive aspects of depression.
(ii) General expectancy scale (hopelessness scale)
In recent years considerable work has been directed at the
importance of hopelessness in a variety of psychopathological conditions.
Thus, hopelessness has been named as one of the central features of
depression (Beck, 1963, 1967, 1973; Nelgis and Bowlby, 1969) and has
been implicated in a number of other conditions such as suicide (Beck,
1963), schizophrenia (Laing and Esterson, 1965), alcoholism (Smart,
1968), psychopathy (flelges and Bowlby, 1969) and physical illness
(Schmale, 1958).
The hopelessness scale (HS) can be seen as a self-rating scale
designed to measure pessimism, or an individual's negative expectations
about his personal future (see Appendix VIII). It consists of 20
items which are rated true or false, 9 of which are keyed 'false' and
11 keyed 'true'. For every statement, each response is assigned a
score of 0 or 1 and the total hopelessness score is the sum of the
scores on the individual items. Thus, the possible range of scores
is from 0 to 20.
Published data on the psychometric properties of the hopelessness
scale are scarce. However, Beck etal. (1974) have reported on the
reliability and validity of the scale. They checked the reliability
of the HS by looking at its internal consistency in a sample of 294
patients who had been hospitalised for attempting suicide. The
analysis produced a reliability coefficient of .93 (ALPHA coefficient).
In terms of scale intercorrelations, the item total coefficients were
reported to range from .39 to .76.
The degree of concordance with doctors' ratings of hopelessness
has been found to be .74 in a general medical practice population (N = 23)
and .62 with a hospitalised attempted suicide sample (l\l = 62). Comparing
the HS with other measures of hopelessness, Beck etal. (1974) found
correlations of .60 with the Stuart Future Test (Stuart, 1962) and
.63 with the pessimism item of the Beck Depression Inventory, this
being the highest item correlation on the BDI.
The construct validity of the HS, as assessed through factor
analysis (N = 294) is open to question. Although the scale is meant
to tap a person's 'negative expectations of the future', factor 1,
which revolved around affective associations (e.g. happiness, enthusiasm),
accounted for the largest amount of variance (42^). On the other hand,
only 6% of the total variance was accounted for by factor 3 ('future
expetations' ) which dealt with the individual's anticipations about
what life would be like, the likelihood of things working out, etc.
This would help to explain the significantly high correlation (Beck
et al., 1974) between the HS and the BDI (.63, P < .001), a self-report
measure of depression heavily loaded with affective content, e.g. self-
debasement (Pichot and Lemperiere, 1964, in Beck, 1967).
Despite these difficulties, the measurement of pessimism has
been useful in exploring possible motives for suicidal behaviour.
For instance, Minkoff et al. (1973) reported that the HS correlated
markedly higher with suicide intent in suicide attempters (r = .47,
P = < .001) than did severity of depression as measured by the BDI
(r = .26, P = < .05). Further analyses showed that the partial
correlation of suicide intent with HS (holding BDI constant) was .41
(P = < .001) while partial correlation of intent with BDI (holding
HS constant) was -.09 (nonsignificant). These results suggest that
hopelessness may be a better predictor of suicide intent than depth
of depression.
The relationship between hopelessness, depression, and suicide
intent has also been investigated by Wetzel (1976). He examined a
sample 154 suicide attempters, suicide ideators (threateners) and
psychiatric controls, i.e. psychiatric patients who denied any suicide
attempt or ideation within one year of testing. Subjects were rated
on suicide intent scales and given the HS, Zung depression scale, and
a self-rated measure of suicide risk. Ninety-four out of the initial
sample were administered these scales again one month later. Suicidal
subjects mere found to be more depressed than the psychiatric controls.
Moreover, severity of suicide intent in threateners and attempters
was significantly (P = < .05) associated with depression.
With regard to hopelessness, HS scores discriminated between
suicidal patients. In all cases hopelessness was more highly
correlated with suicide intent or behaviour than depression. Like
the previous study, when the effects of hopelessness were controlled
statistically in ideators, depression no longer correlated with suicide
intent. However, when depression was controlled, hopelessness
and suicide intent were still significantly correlated (r = .41, P =
< .01).
Although there are problems with the validity data for the HS,
it seemed justifiable to use it in this study because of the documented
relationship between hopelessness and level of depression. As the
HS has not been used in a British sample of depressed patients, it
was decided that the validity of the scale should be checked by
comparing patient responses on the HS with the other measure of personal
future used in the present study, i.e. 'the future as I see it for me'
(one of the concepts on the semantic differential).
Clearly, more extensive validity evidence pertaining to psychiatric
and nonpsychiatric patients, the base rate, and its sensitivity through
repeated clinical use is required for the HS.
4. Observer rating
One of the first rating scales primarily designed for depressive
disorder was described in 1960 and revised in 1967 (Hamilton, 1967).
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRS-D) was designed to be
used by those who have adequate clinical experience and have been
trained in the use of rating scales (Hamilton, 1974). It has become
the standard instrument for psychiatrists' ratings and has been said
to have no serious rival as an observer scale (Carrol et al., 1973).
It is meant to be completed after a clinical interview and to take
account of information from all available sources concerning the
patient's behaviour during the previous week. Thus, the HRS-D cannot
be used too often in the course of a treatment trial.
The scale consists of 17 items which are added to give a score
measuring severity of illness. One common symptom 'diurnal variation'
is excluded because it is not a symptom which adds to the severity of
the illness but records the form of the illness (Hamilton, 1974).
Other relatively rare symptoms not included in the total score are
depersonalisation , obsessional symptoms and paranoid symptoms. Each
of the 17 items is scored on a three (0 to 2) or five (0 to 4) point
scale for its intensity and/or frequency (see Appendix IX).
The reliability has been found to range from 0.81 (Prusoff et al.,
1972) to 0.90 (Hamilton, 1979) between raters at the same interview.
The validity of the scale as assessed by its correlation with other
instruments for measuring depression ranges from 0.79 (Brown and Zung,
1972) to 0.82 (Williams et al., 1972). Zealley and Aitken (1969, in
Hamilton, 1979) reported that for patients just admitted to hospital
the correlation with global judgements was .90 while for patients who
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were discharged it was 0.55. This decrease in reliability, according
to Hamilton, may be due to the decreased range in scores.
The HRS-D has been criticised on the grounds that there is too much
emphasis on somatic or biological changes (Hamilton, 1979). Apart
from this, the main disadvantage with the scale is that it must be
administered by trained and experienced raters. The use of skilled
interviewers is time consuming and costly.
Given the experience of the raters, the strongest point about the
Hamilton Scale is that it is a reliable and valid observer rating
instrument. A skilled observer, by reason of his training and clinical
expertise, has developed standards against which he can evaluate any
one symptom, whereas a patient does not have the clinical background
required for a valid assessment. Patients occasionally have their
reasons for minimising or over-emphasising their symptoms and a skilled
observer may be able to offset these difficulties through a good inter¬
view, thereby obtaining a more accurate account of the patient's state
(Hamilton, 1979). Additional advantages of the scale are that it is
short enough to allow easy completion yet thorough, it permits flexibility
in interviewing and is not restricted to the here and now assessment
(Hamilton, 1974).
5. Behavioural measures
Slowness of responding is generally considered to be a major
symptom of depression and seems to be reversible with improvement in
clinical status (Miller, 1975; Blackburn, 1975). For example,
Fisher (1949) reported a significant increase in speed on the Digit
Symbol Test of the Wais for a group of depressives who had been
successfully treated with ECT. Other studies (e.g. Hall and Stride,
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(1954) found significant decreases in reaction times for both schizo¬
phrenic and endogenous depressed patients. Miller (1975), in his re¬
view of the area, notes that more severely disturbed patients (e.g.
'endogenous' or psychotic depressives) perform very slowly on motor
tasks while the less severely disturbed patients (e.g. 'neurotics')
are, in fact, slow to respond but more like normals. Thus, a useful
index of severity of illness appears to be psychomotor retardation.
In the present study behavioural tasks were used to assess base¬
line retardation and improvement with treatment in an attempt to back
up the other verbal report measures with more indirect behaviour measures
which, it can be argued, are less sensitive to demand characteristics.
(i) Speech rate
One of the behavioural tasks used in this investigation was
based on a technique described by Szabadi et al. (1976). They
found that a sample of 'automatic speech', i.e. counting from one
to ten, taperecorded and measured for elongation of pauses between
phonation differentiated groups of normals from moderately depressed
inpatients. Although the pause time of the volunteers remained
constant over a two month period, the patients showed a marked decrease
in pause time as they recovered from depressive illness. This
appeared to represent a real change in their state and was not due
to practice effect because no change in pause time had been observed
in the healthy volunteers over a similar period of study. Moreover,
this simple behavioural measure seemed more sensitive and produced
more consistent results than other tests for retardation (Hamilton
Retardation Scores, motility scores from nurses' ratings and tapping
time ).
As the authors recommended that the test could be further simplified
(without losing its sensitivity) by measuring total counting time
(i.e. phonation plus pauses), it was decided that this modified version
of 'automatic speech' would be used in the present study.
Thus, at each assessment subjects were asked to count from 1 to
10 'taking their own time' and this sample of automatic speech was
recorded using a Sony portable tape recorder equipped with a hand
microphone. The recording was later played back through a Grass
Polygraph and the signals magnified by a control voice box. Once
the auditory output had been magnified and printed onto paper (speed =
50 mm/sec.) the total length of the voice trace was measured in
hundreths of a second (an example of a 'voice trace' appears in Appendix
X).
The results of the periodic speech tests were evaluated by an
independent staff member, a psychophysiological technician in the Brain
Metabolism Unit, and thus neither the experimenters nor the patients
received any feedback about the performance on the test.
The automatic speech test was chosen because of its simplicity,
shortness, ease of administration, sensitivity to slowness of response
and the fact that it is unlikely to be contaminated by I.Q.
(ii) Writing speed
The other behavioural task used in this study was writing speed.
Patients were asked to count backwards to themselves starting from
100 and to write these numbers on a sheet of paper, e.g. 100, 99, 98,
97, 96, etc. The patient was given a time-limit of 90 seconds, though
this was never made explicit. The reason for not telling the subject
about the time limit was that the examiner wanted to obtain as much
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of a 'spontaneous performance' as was feasible within the
limitations of the assessment situation. The more numbers
written correctly in sequence the higher the score on writing
speed. The range of scores was 1 to 100 or more, as some
subjects had time to start again from 0 within the 90 seconds.
Speed of performance has been measured using similar psycho¬
motor tasks (Babcock and Levy, 1940; Rapaport, 1945; Fisher,
1949; Foulds, 1952; Shapiro and Nelson, 1955; Payne and
Hewlett, 1960; Blackburn, 1975). It was thought that an
alternative behavioural task would be useful, especially one
that is simple, yet more demanding of attentional processes
and motor skills.
H. SUMMARY OF MEASURES USED IN THE STUDY
Table 5H-, shows a list of the measures used in the present
study. There were two diagnostic instruments, seven mood, nine
cognitive and two behavioural measures, making a total of 20 measures.
Of these IB were outcome measures.
Under the column labelled 'cognitive measures' numbers 7, 8 and
9 represent aspects of cognition that were derived from the five concepts
used in the semantic differential. In view of the literature relating
depression to premorbid personality, and excessively high standards,
it made psychological sense to measure what might be termed (l) the
patient's perceived deviation from previously 'well' self (no. 7),
(2) the perceived degree of discrepancy between ideal self and current
self (no. B), (3) and the perceived difference between ideal self and
previously 'well' self (no. 9).
With regard to these 'composite measures', the maximum numerical
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difference between any two concepts is 72, or the difference between
the highest possible score for a concept (84) and the lowest possible
score (12). Thus, the greater the difference score the greater the




1. Patients from the two referral sources will differ in level of depression
pattern of depressive symptoms and severity of psychiatric symptoms at
presentation for admission into the trial.
The reason for putting forward this hypothesis was to test the
supposition held by some hospital-based staff that hospital patients are
more likely to report symptoms indicative of depressive illness (syndrome
depression) and greater intensity of depressed mood than general practice
patients. There is evidence that patients referred for psychiatric
treatment are a selected group (e.g. Rawnsley and Loudon, 1962), in that
they have chronic disorders, often with attendent social and behavioural
problems (Shepherd et al., 1966). Moreover, patients in community-
based samples are reported to present with lower levels of general
psychiatric disturbance (UJinq et al. , 1978).
2. The combined cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy treatment modality
will have fewer drop-outs than either of the cognitive therapy and
pharmacotherapy groups.
Herceg-Baron et al. (1979), using interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT)
in combination with drugs,found such an effect (P. 41). Rush et al.
(1977) also found this effect in their study of cognitive therapy alone.
3. Patients assigned to each treatment modality will show a reduction
in depressive symptoms by the end of the specified period.
This hypothesis is derived from the findings of numerous drug
studies (e.g. Morris and Beck, 1974). A few investigations on the
efficacy of cognitive therapy (e.g. Rush et al. , 1977; Shaw, 1977)
and the recent study by Ueissman et al. (1974) concerning the
effectiveness of interpersonal psychotherapy in conjunction with
drugs which have shown these forms of treatment to be effective in
relieving the acute symptoms of depression.
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4. Patients who receive cognitive therapy will show a greater
reduction in severity of depression than those given pharmacotherapy
(P. 140).
5. Patients assigned to the combination of pharmacotherapy plus
cognigiue therapy will show a greater reduction in acute symptomatology
t
than either of the cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy groups (P. 40).
6. Patients who respond to the combination treatment will show a
quicker reduction in depressive symptoms than responders in either
of the cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy groups.
This hypothesis is related to hypothesis 5 and refers to the
presumed positive interactive effect of the two efficacious treatment
modes.
3. SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES
Specifically, this research focuses on the following hypotheses:
1. Hospital outpatients will have higher levels of self-reported
(BDI) and observed (HRS) depression than general practice patients.
2. Hospital outpatients will report more diagnostically relevant
depressive symptoms as measured by the PSE than general practice patients.
3. Hospital outpatients will be more severely disturbed in terms of
overall psychiatric symptoms than general practice patients as
documented by total score on the PSE.
4. Cognitive therapy will be superior to pharmacotherapy in reducing
the number of drop-outs from treatment.
5. Combination treatment will be superior to cognitive therapy and
pharmacotherapy in reducing the number of drop-outs from treatment.
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6. Patients in all three treatment groups will have lower scores
at the end of treatment than they did at the start of treatment on
all mood measures, i.e. BDI, the depression subscale of the IDA,
anxiety, inward irritability, outward irritability, total irritability
(IN + OUT) and the HRS.
7. Patients in all these treatment groups will have lower scores
on hopelessness (HS) at the end of treatment than they did initially.
Since the semantic differential is meant to measure the degree of
negative thinking about the self, the world and the future, patients
in the three treatment groups will have higher scores on these con¬
cepts at the end of treatment than they did at the beginning. Thus,
it is predicted that as patients recover from depression they will view
themselves, their environment and their future in a more positive
light.
8. Patients in the three treatment groups will perform better at the
end of therapy than they did at the beginning on both behavioural tasks,
i.e. they will count from 1 to 10 faster (speech rate) and write more
numbers in the allotted time at the end of treatment relative to the
beginning.
9. Patients assigned to the cognitive therapy group will show greater
reductions in mood disturbance on all mood measures at the end of treat¬
ment compared to those assigned to pharmacotherapy.
10. Patients receiving cognitive therapy will show a greater reduction
in hopelessness and higher scores on views of self, world, and future
than patients who receive pharmacotherapy.
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11. Those who receive cognitive therapy will also perform better
on the two behavioural tasks at the end of treatment compared to the
pharmacotherapy group.
12. Patients assigned to the combination of pharmacotherapy and
%
cognitive therapy will show the greatest reduction in acute affective
symptoms at the end of treatment on all mood measures.
13. Patients assigned to combination treatment will show the
greatest reduction in hopelessness and the greatest increase in
scores on views of self, world and future compared to the other
treatment groups.
14. Combination therapy will result in the best performance on the
two behavioural measures at the end of treatment compared to the
other two treatments on their own.
15. Patients who respond to combination treatment will show a more
rapid reduction in self-reported depression (BDl) than those who
respond to cognitive therapy alone and pharmacotherapy alone.
16. Patients who respond to cognitive therapy and the combination of
drugs and cognitive therapy, because of the specific focus of cognitive
therapy on hopelessness ,• will show a more rapid reduction in degree of
hopelessness as measured on the hopelessness scale (HS) than those
who respond to pharmacotherapy.
K. STATISTICAL ANALYSES
The statistical technigues used in this investigation were all standard
procedures. Most of the data for group comparisons were analysed using
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, second edition, 1975)
on the EMAS 2980 computer system.
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1. Categorical (i.e. nominal scale) comparisons, except for three
variables (i.e. referral source, education and social class) were
made by means of the chi-square test, or where more appropriate, the
Fisher Exact Probability Test (Siegal, 1956).
2. Group comparisons at baseline and for outcome were analysed
by two way analysis of variance or covariance for unequal cell sizes
(see Winer, 1970; Snedecor and Cochran, 1967; SPSS second edition,
1975) for treatment and location (i.e. hospital and general practice
settings).
3. In the analyses of outcome, significant differences as determined
by F ratios were followed up by applying Snedecor and Cochran's
(6th edition, 1967) revised least significant differences method in
order to locate significant differences between means.
4. Other two-group comparisons were calculated by Student's t test
for related or independent samples (Guilford, 1965). Even where
directional predictions could be made, significance levels reported
will be for two-tailed tests, unless otherwise stated.
5. Correlations were calculated using Pearson product moment
coefficient (Guilford, 1965; SPSS second edition, 1975).
6. The differential response of endogenous and non-endogenous
patients to each treatment mode was examined by X2 analysis, as were
the number of endogenous responders and non-responders, and non-
endogenous responders and non-responders in each treatment.
7. Graphs were plotted for self-reported depression (BDI) and
hopelessness (HS) to see whether the treatments produced different
response patterns.
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8. In an attempt to predict which variables best predicted response
to each treatment, three multiple regression analyses were computed,
one for combination, CBT and pharmacotherapy (see Darlington, 1968;
Kerlinguer and Pedhazen, 1973, for a detailed account of multiple
regression).
9. In a rather hypothetical extension to the multiple regression
techniques, patients from the treatment groups were re-assigned to
three 'predicted treatment groups' on the basis of individual
characteristics which had been identified as important predictors of
response to combination treatment, CBT and drugs.
A discriminant function analysis was then computed to elicit
further psychological factors which might predict response to treatment.
This, however, was a highly abstract exercise, and was intended
largely to raise some questions for future research.
A complete description of the rationale and results of the
analysis appears in appendix XIX (for a detailed description of
discriminant function analyses see Tatsauka, 1970, 1971; Rao, 1978;
and the Manual for the Statistical Package of the Social Sciences,
2nd edition, 1975).
It is not proposed to specify here the statistical techniques
used to investigate each particular area of interest in this research.
The different stages of the data analysis went in sequence and the
details of the method of analysis at each stage were determined
to some extent by the results at preceding stages. Therefore, it
was decided that it would be more meaningful to describe the
relevant statistical methods briefly at the beginning of each section




A. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE
The Present State Examination is a valuable aid for describing the
psychopathological characteristics of groups of people at a specific
point in time. Since patients were referred from two sources, a
hospital and a community-based clinic, and because the PSE could be
expected to reveal any relevant differences between these groups,
it was considered desirable to compare these groups in terms of
symptoms obtained from the PSE. As the PSE was used to fulfill the
RDC for Primary Major Depression, X2 analyses (2x2 tables) were
computed only on diagnostically relevant items. The decision to use
the X2 test in these and other comparisons was based strictly on Siegel's
(1956) recommendations for X2. Two tailed tests of significance
were used in all instances.
A complete symptomatic description of the total sample from each
referral source appears in Appendix XI.
It was anticipated that these groups would also differ on several
clinical, demographic, and severity measures. Therefore, a 2-lday
Analysis of Variance was computed which compared the two populations
for each of the three treatments. This analysis permitted inspection
of possible differences across treatments and took account of any inter¬
action effects between the separate populations and treatment modalities.
Few problems create greater difficulties in a treatment study
than differential attrition. Attrition, by definition, is not under
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experimental control. When subjects discontinue treatment for
different reasons in the different treatment conditions, the adequacy
of random assignment to treatments is undermined. Observed differences
between groups cannot be clearly attributed to the experimental
manipulation.
No direct attempt was made in this study to elicit reasons for
dropping out of treatment. However, it was decided that it would be
helpful to find out in what ways completers could be differentiated
from noncompleters in terms of clinical, demographic, and outcome
measures. This strategy provided some means of evaluating the
extent of bias related to differential attrition. Thus another two-
way analysis of variance was computed which compared patients who
completed treatment with those who did not (irrespective of referral
source) in the three different treatment groups.
The last comparison which was made involved only those patients
who completed the trial. A two-way analysis of variance was calculated
which compared the final sample from each population within and across
the three treatments (i.e. the same analysis that was computed for the
entire sample).
Finally, a correlational analysis was computed for the entire
sample which was intended to establish the extent to which there was
an interrelationship between demographic, clinical and dependent
variables. Again, two-tailed tests of significance were employed in
the analysis.
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1. Comparison of the hospital and general practice patients
on symptoms
From table 6A1 , the different patient samples were significantly
related to only two symptoms as elicited by the PSE, loss of libido
and subjective anergia, with the hospital outpatient sample reporting
these symptoms more frequently than general practice patients. The
Research Diagnostic Criteria for Primary Major Depression as derived
from the PSE symptoms, including rating criteria, appears in Appendix
XI,as does a complete description of PSE symptoms obtained from the
patients in each clinic.
Table 6A, Presence or absence of symptoms used to meet the diagnostic
criteria in the hospital and general practice sample
Frequency Frequency
present present X2, df = 1Hospital G.P.
N = 49 N = 38
23. depressed mood 49 38 Not applicable
19. inefficient thinking 37 23 1.59
20. poor concentration 36 28 .07
22. loss of interest 40 24 2.87
38. loss of libido 23 9 4.03 *
28. avoidance of social 36 24 .64
contact
35. delayed sleep 22 22 .97
37. early wakening 19 21 1.73
34. loss of weight 18 12 .08
29. self-depreciation 34 20 1.89
33. self blame 28 18 .48
25. suicidal ideas/plans 27 17 .55
6. loss of energy 43 34 .008
36. subjective anergia 42 24 4.79 *
26a anxiety and depression 11 8 .17
26b depression primary 38 30 .01
110. slowness/underactivity 4 2 .01
111. agitation 5 1 .91
*
P = < 0.05
N.B. in the general practice group N = 38 for PSE data only (l PSE
missing)
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2. Comparison of the initial sample of hospital and general practice
patients on clinical, demographic and baseline measures of severity
Before investigating the effectiveness of each treatment separately
and relative to one another, clinical, demographic, and severity measures
of depression in the two populations at the time of admission into the
trial were examined. The reasons for this were: (l) to provide basic
information on the population which could be compared with other studies,
and (2) to find out whether the differences, if any, were sufficiently
large to require more sophisticated analysis and further consideration
when discussing the outcome data.
The statistical design employed was that of a 2 x 3 analysis of
variance with unequal group sizes. This design and the analysis
are described by Winer (1970). Anticipating that any significant
differences between groups of completers would be controlled statistically
in the analysis of change scores, it was considered unnecessary at this
stage to do a-posteriori tests of significance or to distinguish inter¬
actional effects from simple main effects.
In the summaries of the analyses of variance presented throughout
this chapter, the notation for all variables, the two samples, and
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b) level II
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6. Duration of current illness
(in weeks) ~~~~~~~~——————
7. Present State Examination
(total severity score)




12. Inward Irritability (i.D.A.)
13. Outward Irritability (i.D.A.)
14. Total Irritability (IN + OUT)
15. Hamilton Rating Scale -
16. Me as I am now
17. Me as I was before this illness
18. Me as I would like to be




























20. The future as I see it for me FUT
21. Perceived deviation from WA5E (WAS minus AM)
previous self
22. Perceived discrepancy between IDS (WD minus AM)
ideal and current self
23. Perceived discrepancy betueen IDW (WD minus WAS)
ideal self and premorbid self
24. Speech rate (Counting Speed) CS
25. Writing Speed WS
Table 6A2 summarises the results of the analysis of variance
computed for all of the patients admitted into the trial (for F ratios
and further information see Appendix XII).
There were five location differences that were statistically
significant, indicating that the hospital patients were better
educated, from a higher social class, were depressed for a longer
period, were more severely disturbed in terms of reported severity of
symptoms on the PSE, and had lower self-esteem than the patients seen
in general practice. Statistically significant differences between
treatment groups were found for three variables. Patients assigned
to cognitive therapy and combination treatment were ill for a longer
period on average than those assigned to drug treatment. The
combination treatment group also had a higher mean HRS score than
either the cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy group. The drug
treatment group performed less well on one psychomotor task, as evidenced
by a relatively lower mean WS score, than either of the cognitive therapy
groups.
There was only one interaction effect. Inspection of the results
for duration of illness shows that hospital patients assigned to either
of the cognitive therapy treatments had been depressed for a longer
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time on average than hospital patients assigned to pharmacotherapy
or the three general practice treatment groups. In the general
practice sample, the patients allocated to cognitive therapy had
experienced the most chronic depression on average, while the least
chronic patients were those allocated to the combined cognitive therapy
plus pharmacotherapy group.
Thus, on the whole there were only few differences between the
samples from the two sources of referral.
Table 6A2 Results of analysis of variance on all patients admitted
into the trial (LOC xTR)
Number of cases within and across cells for table A2.
in HP GP Across group N
COMB N = 16 N - 14 N = 30
CBT N = 17 N = 13 N = 30
D N - 16 N = 12 N = 28





GP Across group i
(x, SD) (x, SD)
Analysis of variance
Significance levels
COMB 47.4 + 9.7 38.9
+
8.2 43.4 + 9.8
CBT 40.5 + 10.4 37.6 ± 12.5 39.2 + 11.2 L0C NS
AGE
D 43.6 + 12.9 42.9 ± 7.4 43.3 ± 10.7 TR NS
L0C x TR NS'
Within
group
43.7 + 11.2 39.7
+



















2.3 ± 1.1 1.4 + 0.7 1.9
+
1.1




CBT 2.4 + 1.1 3.5 + 0.9 2.7 + 1.1 L0C p - < .001
soc
0 2.6 + 0.9 3.8 + 0.93 3.1 + 1.1 TR NS
L0C x TR NS
Within
group













HP _GP Across group Analysis of variance
(x, SD) (x, SD) (x, SD) Significance levels
COMB 127.7 ± 117.2 22.3 ± 22.1 78.5 - 100.9
CBT 112.9 ± 113.9 48.2 ± 47.84 84.7 ± 95.8 LOC p < .001
DILL D 32.4 ± 40.9 41.8 ± 37.2 36.4 ± 38.9 TR p < .04
LOC x TR p < .02Within
group
91.4 ± 104.9 36.9 ± 37.7 67.3 ± 85.9
COMB 34.1 + 7.4 28.4 ± CJ1 • CD 31.5 ± 7.2
CBT 36.3 + 8.0 28.0 + 5.7 32.9 ± 8.2 LOC P < • 002





35.1 + 9.1 29.3 + 5.8 32.5 + 8.2




7.5 22.9 + 4.9 26.3
+ 7.1
CBT 23.6 + 7.1 25.7 + 7.1 24.6
+
7.2 LOC NS
D 26.7 + 7.7 28.6
+ 7.3 27.5 + 7.7 TR NS
Within
group
26.4 + 7.6 25.7 + 6.9 26.1 ± 7.8
LOC x TR NS
COMB 14.2 + 5.2 10.6 + 5.4 12.6 ± 5.5
CBT 13.6 ± 5.5 12.4 + 5.4 13.1 ± 5.4 LOC NS
D 13.5 ± 4.3 12.4 + 4.1 13.1 ± 4.2 TR NS
Within
group
13.8 + 4.9 11.8 ± 4.9 12.9 ± 5.0
LOC x TR NS
COMB 9.2 + 2.8 9.6 + 3.1 9.3 ± 2.9
CBT 8.2 ± 2.9 9.6 + 2.5 8.8 ± 2.8 LOC NS
D 9.2 + 3.0 8.9 ± 2.4 9.1 ± 2.7 TR NS
Within
group
8.6 + 2.9 9.4 ± 2.6 9.1 ± 2.8
LOC x TR NS
COMB 10.4 + 2.3 9.5 + 2.5 10.0 + 2.4
CBT 9.5 ± 2.7 9.8 + 3.0 9.6 ± 2.8 LOC NS
D 10.0 ± 2.9 9.9 + 1.5 10.0 ± 2.9 TR NS
Within 10.0 ± 2.9 9.7 ± 2.4 9.9 ± 2.7
LOC x TR NS
group
Hr - ■
COMB 7.2 ± 3.4 6.5 ± 3.5 6.9
+ 3.3
CBT 7.4 ± 3.5 7.0 ± 2.2 7.2
+ 3.0 LOC NS
D 7.1 ± 2.9 7.3 ± 2.8 7.1 ± 2.9 TR NS
Within
group
7.2 ± 3.2 6.9 ± 2.8 7.2 + 3.0
LOC x TR NS
COMB 6.2 ± 3.9 6.0 ± 2.9 6.1 ± 3.5
CBT 6.3 ± 3.2 6.7 ± 2.5 6.5 ± 2.9 LOC NS
D 5.8 ± 3.4 9.6 ± 2.5 7.4 ± 3.6 TR NS
Within
group
6.1 ± 3.5 7.4 ± 3.0 6.6 ± 3.3
LOC x TR NS
COMB 13.3 ± 6 12.5 ± 5 12.9 ± 5.5
CBT 13.6
+
6 13.7 ± 3.6 13.7 ± 5 LOC NS
D 12.9 ± 5.9 16.9 ± 3.5 14.5 ± 5.4 TR NS
Within
group
13.3 ± 5.8 14.3 ± 4.4 13.7 ± 5.3
LOC x TR NS
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Variable _HP(x, SD)
GP Across group Analysis of variance









CBT 34.2 ± ll.~7 39.8 + 10.9 36.7




+ 13.3 TR NS





+ 11.3 34.5 + 12.7
group







+ 10.6 LOC NS
D 62.4 + 17.3 66.9
+
11.0 64.3

















3.6 78.6 ± 4.9 LOC
4.3 77.6 + 11.2 TR
LOC
79.0 ± 7.5








+ 14.5 34.7 + 16
CBT 42.1 + 17.9 38.9
+ 14.8-: 40.9 + 16.4 LOC NS
D 40.1 + 18.5 34.0
+ 20.9 37.8
+ 19.4 TR NS




























































14.1 ± 10.9 12.7 ± 10.8
11.2 ± 11.9 12.4 ± 9.6
13.4 ± 10.5 14.4 ± 13.0




25.7 £ 16.6 34.9 ± 17.2
28.8 - 17.6 29.2 ± 14.0
31.6 ± 12.1 31.5 ± 14.1
34.1 - 14.7 28.6 £ 15.5 32.0 - 15.1
LOC NS
TR NS
LOC x TR NS
LOC NS
TR NS
LOC x TR NS
LOC NS
TR NS
LOC x TR NS
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. , _R _HP _GP Across group Analysis of variance3ria 8







4.5 21.2 + 4.0 20.5
+
4.3
CBT 16.8 + 4.7 17.7 + 4.0 17.2 + 4.3 L0C NS
D 17.3
+







4.1 18.5 + 4.5




2.0 6.1 + 1.9
CBT 5.9 + 3.6 6.2
+ 1.8 6.1 + 2.9 L0C NS
D 5.4 + 2.3 6.9 + 2.3 6.0 + 2.3 TR NS
Uithin
group





L0C x TR NS
COMB 45.1 + 14.0 51.1 + 18.7 47.6
+
16.2
CBT 56.7 + 13.8 47.6
+
14.6 52.8 + 14.7 L0C NS
D 40.2 + 18.1 41.7
+
12.5 40.8 ± 15.9 TR P < .03
Uithin
47.5 + 16.7 46.8 + 15.6 47.3 + 16.2
L0C x TR NS
group
Variables which significantly differentiated the groups at p < .05
or less
3. Comparison of completers and noncompleters
The next stage of the analysis was concerned with the investigation
of possible differences between subgroups of patients who completed
the trial and those who for various reasons dropped out of treatment.
This was accomplished in two ways. A 2 x 2 x2 analysis (two-
tailed test) was calculated for total number of drop-outs from treat¬
ment in each location, the point being to examine the possible re¬
lationship between attrition and the different clinics. Next, a
two-way anslysis of variance was computed for all clinical, demographic,
and baseline measures of severity of depression. ~
Table 6A3 shows that, while attrition was considerably higher
in the general practice sample, the relationship between location and
attrition was not statistically significant.
The nine hospital and 15 general practice drop-outs were equally
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distributed among the three treatments, i.e. 3, 3 and 3, and 5, 5 and
5. Thus, no one treatment can be said to have been more liable to
attrition.
Table 6A3 X2 analysis for completers and noncompleters
Completers Noncompleters Totals
H.P. 40 9 49
G.P. 24 15 39
Totals 64 24 88
x2 = 3.47, df = 1, NS
The results of the analysis of variance for the subgroups of
completers and noncompleters are presented in Table 6A4 (for additional
information see Appendix XIII).
There were 22 completers in each of the cognitive therapy groups
and 20 completers in the pharmacotherapy group, making a total of 64
completers in the trial.
Six variables significantly differentiated the patients who
completed treatment from those who did not. Of these, five variables
were measures of severity of illness. Noncompleters had higher
mean scores on both self-reported (BDI) and observer-rated (HRS)
depression, were more inwardly irritable on average, had higher mean
total irritability scores, and were more negative in terms of their
mean score on self-reported view of the environment. Those who did
not complete treatment were also less educated than patients who had
a full course of treatment.
Since this analysis was computed on the same population as before,
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the treatment differences (DILL, HRS, US) are identical to those
reported in the previous section.
The results also indicate that there were no status (i.e.
completers, noncompleters) by treatment interactions.
Table 6A4 Results of analysis of variance on completers and non-
completers (Status x TR )




















Total N - 88
Variable TR Completers Noncompleters Across group Analysis of variance







COMB 45.4 + 9.8 38.0 + 8.3 43.4 + 9.8
CBT 39.7 + 11.1 37.8 ± 12.2 39.2 + 11.2 Status NS
D 44.9 ± 10.8 39.4 + 10.1 43.3 + 10.7 TR NS
Uithin
group
43.3 + 10.7 38.4 + 9.9 42 + 10.7
Status x TR NS
COMB 1.9 + 1.1 2.0 + 1.1 1.9
+
1.1
CBT 2.3 + 1.2 1.4 + 0.74 2.0 + 1.2 Status p <.05
D 2.0
+
0.9 1.3 + 0.5 1.8
+ 0.9 TR NS
Uithin
group
2.0 + 1.1 1.5 + 0.83 1.9
+ 1.1



























D 3.0 + 0.9 3.5 + 1.3 3.1 + 1.1
Uithin 2.8 + 1.1 3.2 + 1.0 3.0 ± 1.1
group
COMB 75.5 + 75.5 86.9 + 158.1 78.5 + 100.9
CBT 89.5 + 105.3 72.0 + 66.9 84.7 + 95.8 Status NS
D 38.5 + 41. 3 31.5 + 34.3 36.4 + 38.9 TR p < .04
Uithin
Status x TR
68.7 + 81.1 63.5 + 99.5 67.3 ± 85.9
group
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COMB 12.0 + 5.6
CBT 12.4 + 5.5
D 12.8 + 4.4
Within 12.4 + 5.2
group








COMB 10.0 + 2.6
CBT 9.2 + 2.8







CBT 6.5 + 2.9







CBT 5.9 + 2.5






COMB 13 + 5.4
CBT 12.5 + 4.7















X CO o Significance
31.5 - 7.2
32.7 ± 8.2 Status NS




+ 6.6 26.3 + 7.1
+ 8.2 24.6 + 7.2 Status
+ 4.0 27.5 + 7.4 TR NS
Status
+ 6.8 26.1 + 7.3
+ 5.3 12.6 + 5.5
+ 5.0 13.1 + 5.4 Status





+ 3.2 9.3 + 2.9
+
2.3 8.8 + 2.8 Status
+ 1.7 9.1 + 2.7 TR NS
Status
+ 'st•CM 9.1 + 2.8
+ 1.8 10.0 + 2.4
+ 2.7 9.6 + 2.8 Status
± 1.8 10.0 + 2.9 TR NS
Status
+ 2.1 9.9 + C^-•CM
+ 3.1 6.9 + 3.3
+ 2.1 7.2 ± 3.0 Status






± 4.1 6.1 + 3.5
± 3.5 6.5 ± 2.9 Status






6.3 12;2 + 5.5
+ 4.7 13.7 + 5.0 Status
+ 5.1 14.5 + 5.4 TR NS
Status





Variable TR Completers Noncompleters Across group Analysis of variance
x, SD x, SD x, SD Significance levels
COMB 34.2 + 13.3 29.3 + 14.6 33.1
+
13.5
CBT 38.6 + 10.4 31.3 + 13.4 36.9 + 11.5 Status NS




36.0 + 12.5 30.2 + 12.8 34.5 + 12.7
COMB 68.6
+ 13.1 66.0 + 16.7 68.1 + 13.7
CBT 66 + 9.7 65.5 + 13.4 65.9 + 10.6 Status NS
WAS - D 64.1 + 15 64.9 + 16.1 64.3 + 15 TR NS







8.6 80.8 + 5.1
CBT 77.9 +
. 5.1 80.8 + 3.5 78.6 + 4.9 Status NS
WD D 78.5 + 6.0 75.1 + 20.4 77.6 + 11.2 TR NS
Within
group
79.2 + 5.2 78.5 + 12.4 79.0 + 7.5
Status x TR
COMB 36.2 + 17.5 29.3 + 7.6 34.7
+
16
* CBT 44.2 + 15.7 31.3 + 15.4 40.7 + 16.4 Status P <




40.3 ± 16.5 30.1 - 17.6 37.S - 17.3
Status x TR I\IS
COMB 37.9 + 21.2 38.5
+
23.6 38 + 21.3
CBT 46.3 + 20.5 30.9 + 20.3 42.2 + 21.2
FUT D 46.1 + 19.2 40 + 25.2 44.5 + 20.6
Within
43.3 + 20.4 36.1 + 22.2 41.5 + 21.0
Status NS
TR NS
Status x TR NS
IDS
COMB 46.7 + 14.2 50.2 + 15.9 47.4 + 14.3
CBT 38.7 + 10.9 49 + 14.1 41.4 + 12.5
D 43.6 + 14.7 45.4 + 16.7 44.1 + 15
Within







Status x TR NS
COMB 12.5
+
11.4 13.5 + 9.5 12.7 + 10.8
CBT 11.8 + 9.0 14.0 + 11.5 12.4 + 9.6
IDW D 14.4
+
13.3 14.6 + 13.2 14.4 + 13.0
Within
group
12.9 ± 11.2 14.0 ± 11.0 13.2 ± 11.1
Status NS
TR NS
Status x TR NS
WASE
COMB 34.5 + 17.5 36.7 + 17.9 34.9 ± 17.2
CBT 27.4
+
13.5 34.3 + 15.2 29.2 + 14
D 30.2
+
14.8 35.1 + 12 31.5 + 14.1
Within
group
30.7 - 15.4 35.2 ± 14.3 32 ± 15.1
Status NS
TR NS




IMoncompleters Across group Analysis of variance
x, SD x, SD Significance levels
* COMB 20.5 + 4.6 20.4 + 3.7 20.5 + 4.3
HRS CBT 15.9 + 3.5 20.8 + 4.5 17.2 + 4.3 Status p < .005
D 17.4 + 4.6 19.1
+
3.9 17.9 ± 4.7 TR p < .02
Within
group
18 ± 4.5 20.1 + 3.9 18.5 + 4.5
Status x TR NS
COMB 6.0 + 1.9 6.9 + 2.0 6.1 + 1.9 I
CS CBT 6.2 ± 3.2 5.8 + 1.9 6.1 + 2.9 Status NS
D 5.9 + 2.3 6.3 + 2.7 6.0 + 2.3 TR NS
Within
group
6.0 + 2.5 6.3 + 2.1 6.1
+
2.4
Status x TR NS
* COMB 45.4
+ 15.1 56 + 18.6 47.6
+
16.2
US CBT 53.9 ± 15 49.6 + 14 52.8 + 14.7 Status NS
D 40.9 ± 16.6 41 + 14.5 40.8 + 15.9 TR p < .03
Within
46.9 + 16.3 48.4 + 16 47.3
+
16.2
Status x TR NS
group
Variables which significantly differentiated the groups at p < .05
or less
4. Comparison of completers only in the hospital and general practice
samples
Having examined the characteristics of the entire sample in a
number of ways and the ways in which completers and drop-outs differed,
the characteristics of those patients who completed the trial were
analysed. The reasons for this were: 1) to make the characteristics
of this final sample more easily comparable with the characteristics
of the entire population admitted to the trial, and 2) to ascertain
whether any of these factors were of sufficient importance to demand
further consideration when analysing outcome.
The section opens with a summary of the population studied and
a baseline description of completers only which includes only selected
variables. Next, the results of two-way analysis of variance
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(location x treatment) for all variables are reported. This is
followed by a breakdown of the populations in terms of length of
time in therapy and number of therapy sessions.
Table 6A5 summarises the population studied. To recapitulate,
140 patients were assessed, of whom 52 were rejected. There was a
somewhat higher rate of rejection in the general practice but this
was not significant. Also, attrition was higher in the general practice
group. A total of 40 hospital patients completed the trial compared
to 24 completers in general practice.
Table 6A5 Population studied
Hospital O.P. General Practice
Nas. assessed 71 69 140
*
Nos. rejected 22 (31*) 30 (43*) 52
Drop-outs 9 (18*) 15 (38*) 24
Completers 40 24 64
* 2
X II M • 00 w • CD • "—1IIC|-□
A baseline description for completers only is presented in
table 6A6. The table includes some data from the results of the
analysis of variance. There was no difference in age distribution,
but socio-economic level and education differed at a high significance
level, the hospital patients being of a higher socio-economic level
(Registrar General Classification) and of a higher educational level
(coded as 1 = left school at minimal age; 2 = at least 2 0 levels or
completed secondary education; 3 = special training such as technical
education; 4 = at least some university education). The hospital patients
had suffered more depressive episodes and their current episode was of longer
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duration.
There were no significant differences in basal BDI and HRS-D
ratings, but the hospital patients had a significantly higher total
severity of symptoms on the PSE.
Table 6A6 Baseline description for completers only
H.P. (N = 40) G.P. (N = 24)
M ± S.D. (Range) 1*1 ± S.D. (range)
Age 44.5 ± 11.4 (21-63) 41.3 ± 9.5 (24-57)
y y y .
Socio-economic 2.4 - 0.9 (l-4) 3.7 * 1 (1—5)
level
Education *** 2.5 ± 1.1 (1-4) 1.3 ± 0.6 (1-3)
Previous dep. ** 3.1 ± 4.43 (0-25) 0.8 ± 0.96 (0-3)
episodes
Duration of illness * 86.8 ± 93.7 (4-416) 38.7 ± 39.9 (3-156)
(weeks)
BDI 24.6 ± 7 (15-40) 23.3 ± 5.3 (14-34)
HRS-D 17.3 ± 4.6 (11-33) 19.0 ± 4.5 (11-26)
PSE total * 34.1 ± 8.9 (18-51) 29.5 ± 6.6 (20-46)
y y y y y y
p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.001
Table 6A7 shows the results of the analysis of variance (L0C x TR)
for baseline differences for all variables, some of which were presented
in the previous table (for further details see Appendix XIV). Apart
from the differences discussed earlier, it was found that hospital
patients were, on the whole, more hopeless, less outwardly irritable
and had lower self esteem than general practice patients. There was
only one treatment difference: the combination group had a higher
mean HRS-D score than the drug group who in turn were higher than
the CBT group.
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The hospital patients therefore are a sicker population than the
general practice patients. They are more chronically ill, suffer
more recurrent episodes, have more severe symptoms, are more hopeless
and self-critical. They are, however, less outwardly irritable than
the general practice patients.
Table 6A7 Results of analysis of variance on completers only fLQC x TR)






Across group Analysis of Variance
x, SD Significance Levels
TR HP GP
001*18 N - 13 N = 9
CBT N = 14 N = 8
D N = 13 N = 7





COMB 49.2 8.8 39.9 ± 8.7
CBT 39.3 + 10.5 40.4 - 12.8
AGE D 45.4





11.4 41.3 ± 9.5
COMB 2.3
+
1.3 1.2 ± 0.44
* CBT - 2.9 + 1.1 1.3 ± 0.70





1.1 1.3 ± 0.62
COMB 2.5
+ 0.87 3.7 ± 1.2
A
soc
CBT 2.1 + 1.0 3.6 ± 1.1





0.90 3.7 - 1.0
COMB 110.4
+
79.8 25 - 23.3
* CBT 111 + 122.5 51.9 ± 53.7
DILL - D 37 + 44.2 41.4 ± 38.6
Within
group
















1.2 L0C p < .001
0.97 TR NS






L0C p < .001
TR NS
L0C x TR NS
68.7 - 89
TR NS







COMB 34.5 - 7.9
CBT 34.5 - 6.2




GP Across group Analysis of variance
X , SD x, SD Significance
0 — 6.6 32.3 - 7.9
6 ± 6.0 32.0 ± 6.9 LOC p < .05
4 ± 7.2 32.9 - 10.6 TR NS
LOC x TR NS
8.9 29.5 - 6.6 32.4 ± 8.3
BDI COMB 28.0 + 7.9
CBT 21.3 + 4.9
























5.5 10.1 + 5.4 12.0 +
* CBT 13.5 + 5.5 10.6 + 5.4 12.4 +
HS D 13.4 + 4.6 11.6 + 4.2 12.7
+





4.3 12.4 ± 5.2
LOC p < .05
TR NS










2.7 9.0 + 2.2 8.0 + 2.6 LOC NS
DEP D 9.0 + 3.2 8.7 + 2.9 8.9 + 3.0 TR NS



























+ 2.8 LOC NS
+ 3.2 TR NS
LOC x TR NS
2.8
- COMB 6.9 + 3.7 6.7 ± 3.4 6.8 + 3.5
CBT 6.6 + 3.4 6.4 + 2.3 6.5 ± 2.9 LOC NS
IN D 6.5 + 2.9 6.9 + 2.5 6.6 + 2.7 TR NS
Within
LOC x TR
6.7 + 3.3 6.6
+





































COMB 12.5 ± 6.1 13.5 + 4.6 12.9
+
5.5
CBT 12 ± 5.3 13.1 + 3.4 12.5
+ 4.7 LOC
0 12 ± 5.6 16.4 + 3.0 13.5 + 5.2 TR
LOC
Within











COMB 30.2 + 13.8 39.8
+
* CBT 35.5 ± 10.8 44.1
+







+ 12.9 66.3 ±
CBT 64.1 + 7.3 69.4 ±































































79.1 - 5.7 79.3 £ 4.4





41.78 ± 17.4 37.9 ± 15
31.9 + 21.9 46.5
+
42.9 ± 18.1 52.3 +
45.5 + 19.7 47 +
40.2 + 20.3 49 +
51.5 + 13.8 39.8 +
40.8 + 11.5 35 +




11.8 ± 11.7 13.3 +
13.1 ± 7.8 9.7 +
16.3 ± 15.9 10.9 +
13.7 ± 12 11.4 +







32.3 i 14.8 28
34.2 + 13.3
38.6 + 10.4 LOC P < .05
34.9 + 13.7 TR NS




66 + 9.7 LOC NS
64.1 + 15 TR NS
LOC x TR NS
66.3 + 12.7
87.1 + .4
77.9 ± 5.1 LOC NS
78.5 + 6 TR NS














46.3 ± 20.5 LOC NS






38.7 ± 10.9 LOC NS
43.6 + 14.8 TR NS






11.9 + 9.0 LOC NS
14.4 + 13.3 TR NS





27.4 + 13.5 LOC NS
30.2 + 14.8 TR NS




HP GP Across group Analysis of Variance




+ 4.0 20.5 + 4.6
* CBT 15.7 + 3.5 16.3 + 3.8 15.9
+ 3.5 L0C NS




+ 4.6 19 + 4.5 17.9 + 4.6
L0C X TR NS







. 6.1 + 3.8 6.2 + 1.9 6.0
+ 3.1





5.9 + 2.8 6.2 + 1.9 6.1
+
2.5
































47.5 + 17.2 46
+ 19.9 46.9 + 16.3
LOC X TR NS
■£■ __
Variables which significantly differentiated the group at p = .05
or less
From table 6A8 , 22 patients had combination treatment (13 HP and
9 GP), 22 had CBT (14 HP and 8 GP), 20 had drugs (13 HP and 7 GP).
Table 6AS Breakdown of populations according to treatment
HP GP
N (N = 40) Sessions N (N = 24) Sessions N
weeks in trial weeks in trial
COMB 13 15.2 - 4.3 16.6 ± 5.1 9 11.6 - 4.1 11.6 ± 4.1 22
CBT 14 12.4 ± 4.8 16.9 - 7.3 8 12.4 ± 4.6 12.5 ±5 22
D 13 12.3 ±4.0 - 7 12.7 - 2.6 - 20
Weeks: HP/COMB > GP/C0MB, t = 1.91, Df 20, NS
Sessions: HP/COMB > GP/C0MB, t = 2.54, Df 20, p < .05
HP/CBT > GP/CBT, t = 1.67, Df 20, NS
The HP combination group was in treatment for slightly longer
but the difference in weeks from-the other groups is not significant.
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They, however, had significantly more treatment sessions than the
GP combinative group. The HP/CBT group also had more treatment
sessions than the GP/CBT group, but the difference is not statistically
significant. Thus, the hospital patients were given more treatment
sessions than the general practice patients.
5. Correlation of baseline measures
This section is directed towards examining the interrelationships
between demographic, clinical and severity measures of depression
which have been selected for the present study. The main interest,
however, was to show that the dependent measures have concurrent
validity. Concurrent validity is the demonstration that independent
techniques of assessment measure the same phenomena.
Pearson product moment correlations were computed to assess the
degree of association between the various measures of mood, cognition
and psychomotor inefficiency. Only significant baseline correlations
are reported and these are based on data obtained from all patients
admitted into the trial, i.e. completers and noncompleters from the
two clinics.
Table 6Ag shows the significant correlations computed on baseline
data between age, education, social class, total severity score on the
PSE and the various measures of severity of depression. All of these
significant correlations were low. The highest correlation was
between level of education and social class (-.64). The negative
sign reflects the rating system used in the study, i.e. the higher
the numerical rating for education, the more educated a patient was,
whereas the higher the rating for social class, the 'lower down' the
patient was in terms of social standing.
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Table 6Ag Significant baseline correlations between demographic
factors, total score on the PSE and dependent measures
for all patients admitted into the trial
N = 88















































< .05, P = < .01,
**-*










Correlations between mood scales are presented in table 6A10.
Table 6A,Q significant baseline correlations between mood measures
for all patients admitted into the trial
N = 88
BDI HRS DEP ANX IN OUT
V V Y y Y y \/ \e \s \s \s \/ \/ \/ \y V__V_
A a A AAA AAA AAA AAA A A
HRS .50 _ DEP .43 _ ANX .37 _ IN . 40 _ OUT .38 IRR .84
A A A A A A A A AAA
D^P .30 ANX .27 IN .29 _ OUT .27 IRR .81














p = < .05 *
**
P = < .01,Df _ 86 . , "" p P = < .001
Again, nearly all of the correlations were low. However, they were
significant and, with respect to the main measures (i.e. BDI and HRS),
the correlation (.50) was of the order expected from, for example,
the information reported by Carroll et al. (1973) and Prusoff et al.
(1972) for studies with comparable self-report and observer scales.
These suggest that the degree of concordance between such measures
is lower during the acute episode than at recovery. It is
interesting that the depression subscale (DEP) of the IDA which consists
of biological and affective items, correlates almost as highly with
the HRS as the BDI and at the same high level of significance.
From table 6&i1 showing the intercorrelations of the cognitive
measures, hopelessness (HS) was correlated negatively at a high
significance lBvel with the semantic differential measures of
each component in Beck's cognitive triad (AN, ENV, FUT). That
is, the more hopeless a patient was according to his responses on
the HS (high score), the more negatively he viewed himself, his
environment and his personal future in terms of the concepts used
in the semantic differential (low scores). While a stronger degree
of association would have been desirable, the relatively high
negative correlation between the two measures of hopelessness (HS
and FUT, -.77) provides tentative support for the concurrent
validity of the HS. This is important because the original version
of Beck's HS has not been validated in a British population. In
addition, there is a highly significant, positive interrelationship
between the different components in the negative cognitive triad
(AN and ENV, .60; AN and FUT .58; ENV and FUT .51).
The association between mood and cognitive measures for all
patients admitted into the trial is presented in table 6A-| 2 • The
BDI was consistently correlated at a high significance level with
those cognitive measures which might be expected to reflect depressed
thinking, including the degree of discrepancy between perceived current
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self and ideal self (IDS) and perceived deviation from previously
'well* self (UiASE). However, the correlations were moderate, the
highest being between BDI and AM (--.55) and the lowest between BDI
and FUT (-.40). The association between depth of depression as
assessed by BDI and hopelessness (HS) was not as strong (.47), for
example, as that reported by Minkoff et al. (.68 (1973)). The lower
correlation obtained in the present study might be attributed to the
fact that none of the patients were psychotic or schizophrenic, and
all were outpatients. In the Minkoff et al. study, the sample con¬
sisted of inpatients, a considerable proportion of whom had been
severely disturbed.
With regard to the other self-report measures of mood, while
the correlations were moderate to low, both anxiety (ANX) and inward
directed irritability (IN) were correlated positively with hopeless¬
ness (HS) and negatively with low self esteem (AM). Moreover, total
irritability score (IRR) was significantly correlated with cognitive
aspects of depression.
The observer rating of depression (HRS) was associated with only
two cognitive measures, self-esteem (AM) and perceived deviation from
previous self (WASE). There were no significant relationships between
HRS score and the other cognitive aspects of depression. This may
reflect the fact that the HRS is loaded rather heavily with biological
items and contains hardly any items which relate directly to the
specific cognitive phenomena of interest here.
Finally, table 6l\^z shows the significant basal correlations between
the different behavioural measures and the rest of the variables.
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Speech rate (CS) correlated significantly with the depression subscale
of the IDA, but otherwise this measure, when compared across subjects,
was not associated with the other aspects of depression measured in
the study. On the other hand, writing speed (WS) was correlated
negatively with four measures of mood (BDI, ANX, OUT, IRR) and two
measures of cognition (AM, FUT). There was a highly significant,
positive correlation between performance on the writing speed task
and level of education (.48). The two behavioural measures, however,
were not significantly correlated.
Table 6A-, 3 Significant baseline correlations between behavioural,
demographic and other dependent measures for all patients




















y ^ ^ y y
Df = 86 p = < .05 p = < .01 P = < .001
These results indicate that, of the two behavioural measures,
speech rate (CS) as assessed in this investigation, is the least
sensitive measure of psychomotor inefficiency. While writing speed
would appear to be slightly better, performance on this task is almost
certainly related to how well educated a person is to begin with.
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B. ANALYSIS OF OUTCOME
In keeping with the objectives of the research, it was decided
to examine (l) whether each treatment group in each clinic actually
improved from their initial mean scores in terms of the dependent
variables (mood, cognitive and behavioural measures), and (2) to see
how effective the different treatment modalities were relative to one
another.
The main analysis used was analysis of variance (liJiner, 1970).
Specifically, a two-way analysis of covariance for change scores was
computed, using as covariates the four descriptive variables which
differentiated the two populations: i.e. duration of illness, education,
socio-economic level and PSE total severity score. Change scores
were obtained by simply subtracting the last score from the initial
score.
Outcome was investigated in another way. End-point scores from
the main self-report depression scale (BDI) were used to classify
people into subgroups of responders and nonresponders, i.e. 'responders'
obtained a BDI score < 8 and/or a 50^ reduction from initial score
by the end of treatment. Then, Fisher's Exact Probability Test was
employed to check the relationship between these categories and the
two populations for each treatment modality.
Another major analysis was needed. In order to control for
differences in scores at the time of admission into the trial, a
two-way analysis of covariance for percentage change scores was
computed, controlling for the same descriptive differences as in the
analysis of change scores. Percentage change scores were computed
by subtracting the last score from the initial score, then dividing
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the difference by the initial score and multiplying by one-hundred.
It was hoped that these analyses would take into account any real
differences between the samples from each clinic and among the three
treatments.
Assessment of the significance of improvement in each treatment
group in each clinic was computed by testing the significance of mean
change and percentage change scores using a t test (t = mean change
* SD
scores - (rr~) . Thus, for each of the dependent variables (18)
a t value was obtained for each treatment group and the significance
level checked to determine whether each treatment group had improved
on average from their initial level of depression.
With regard to the relative effectiveness of the three treatments,
a-posteriori tests of significance between means were done by applying
Snedecor and Cochran's (6th edition, 1967) revised least significant
differences method, i.e. tps or t0, x MS ( i. + i ), Df ofsrror im -j n 2
MS . Where interaction effects were found in the two-way analysis
error
of covariance, the data were reanalysed in one-way analyses of variance.
This section also considers the differential response of endogenous
and non endogenous patients to the three treatment modes. People
were classified as endogenous or non-endogenous according to Spitzer's
RDC (1978) on the basis of their baseline Hamilton Rating (see Appendix
XV for a list of symptoms). X2 analysis was used to check whether
these categories for the two populations combined had a differential
response to the three treatments. Fisher's Exact Probability Test
was used to compare the frequencies of endogenous responders and
non responders and non-endogenous responders and non-responders within
each treatment.
1. Analysis of change scores (pre - post treatment)
Table 6B! shows the mean change scores, standard deviations and
t values for each treatment in the two populations. Looking at the
significance of change scores on all these variables (18) for each
SD
treatment (t = mean — ), the hospital patients improved significantly
on nearly all variables in each treatment group. Speech rate (CS)
did not change significantly. In addition, for the CBT group there
was no significant improvement in outward irritability (OUT) and for
drugs the difference between ideal and current self (IDS) did not change
significantly. Variables where change would not be expected did not
change, i.e. pre-morbid self-esteem (WAS), ideal self (WD), and
discrepancy between ideal self and previously well self (IDW). The
same pattern applied for general practice combination and CBT groups,
i.e. no significant changes for WAS, WD, IDW and CS. However, changes
in the general practice drug group were rarely significant. Significant
improvement occurred for seven variables only, i.e. depression subscale
of the IDA (DEP), and subscales outward irritability (OUT) and total
irritability (IRR) as well as view of the self (An), view of the
environment (EIMV), ideal self discrepancy (IDS) and discrepancy between
pre-morbid self and current self (WASE).
Thus, it can be seen that the three treatment modes were effective
for the hospital patients whereas for the general practice patients
combination treatment and CBT had an effect on all variables which
would be expected to change while drug treatment was, on the whole,
not effective.
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Table 6B-| Mean change scores, standard deviations and t values for
each treatment in the two populations
(x, SD's from analysis of covariance)































D 15.4 ± 9.6
COMB 6.5 ± 7.3
HS CBT 7.3 ± 7.5
D 5.8 ± 4.0
COMB 4.5 ± 4.4
DEP CBT 3.6 ± 55.0
D 4.2
+ 3.1
COMB 4.8 + 4.4
ANX CBT 3.9 + 4.6
D 3.1 ± 2.8








OUT CBT 1.2 + 2.9
D 0.8 + 1.7
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4.6 + 3.4 4.07
4.7 + 3.0 4.43
2.0 + 2.1 2.53
4.8 + 2.6 5.52
4.4 + -1.5 8.30




4.5 + 2.7 4.74


























































N.S. 9.7 + 13.4 2.17 NS
NS 2.1 + 19.3 0.31 NS
NS 7.6 + 17.9 1.13 NS
Variable
COMB 2.0 + 3.7 1.96 NS -.1 + 3.5 .09 NS
WD CBT 2.1 + 5.5 1.43 NS 1.8 + 6.8 .99 NS
D 0.9 + 9.7 0.33 NS 7.0 + 13.5 1.38 NS
COMB 25.5 ± 25.4 3.62 ** 30.2 + 16 5.67 Y Y VAAA
ENV CBT 17.7 + 18.5 3.58 ** 31.4 ± 20.7 4.3 **
D 15.3 + 15.1 3.66 ** 18.1 + 19.1 2.5 *
COMB 33.4 + 29.4 4.1 *-* 26.8 + 12.8 6.28 Y Y Y7V7WV
FUT CBT 21 + 25.4 3.09 ** 20.8
+
24.9 2.36 *
D IB.4 + 21.5 3.09 •** 8.4 ± 27.6 0.81 NS
COMB 32 ± 20 5.7 Y Y YAAA 24.2 + 11.8 6.16 Y Y VAAA
IDS CBT -2.4 ± 84.8 .11 NS 29.8 ± 10.9 7.74 \y \/AAA
D 19.2 ± 9.1 7.62 *** 20 + 17.3 3.16 *
COMB 0.7 ± 18.6 0.14 NS -9.8 + 15.1 1.95 NS
IDW CBT -4.2 ± 19.2 0.82 NS -0.4 ± 21.3 .05 NS
D -4.2 ± 18.2 0.83 NS -0.6 + 11.5 0.14 NS
COMB 31.8 ± 33.6 3.42 ** 34 + 15.4 6.63 V V VAAA
WASE CBT 26.2 ± 35.4 2.77 * 28.4 + 28 2.88 *
D 24.9 ± 22.8 3.94 ** 22 ± 16 3.64 *
COMB 13.5 + 7.5 6.49 AAA 15.7 ± 5.7 8.26 \y \yAAA
CBT 9.9
+
9.2 4.02 ** 12.8 ± 3.2 11.33 \/ \J \/AAA
D 9.3 ± 5.1 6.60 Y V YAAA 3.3 + 4.8 1.82 NS
COMB 4.4 ± 24.8 0.64 NS 6.9 ± 14.0 1.48 NS
CBT 18.2 ± 35.9 1.90 NS 11.3 ± 17.3 1.85 NS
D -0.5 ± 18.9 0.10 NS 9.3 ± 10.4 2.37 NS
COMB 6.4 + 10.5 2.2 * 9.0 ± 5.0 5.39 Y Y YAAA
CBT 12.9 + 13.6 3.5 ** 8.6 ± 10.1 2.41 *




P = < **rHCD•
V V V
AAA
P = < .001
The data from this table were computed in an analysis of covariance
for change scores and these are presented in table 6B2. There were
four co-variates, namely those variables which had discriminated
between the two populations at baseline: education level, socio¬
economic status, duration of illness and total score on the PSE. The
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covariates and significance levels for each are shown in Appendix
XV1.
Eight variables showed differential effects for treatment, these
being BDI, ANX, IIM, IRR, AM, ENU, FUT and HRS. There were no
location differences and there was only one interaction effect and
this was on BDI change scores. Only one of these differences could
have occurred by chance at the 5% level and all of these differences
were significant at a higher level than the 5% level, except for view
of the future (FUT).
Table 6B2 Results of analysis of covariance for change scores in the
two populations fLOC x TR)
(across group N's: COMB - 22, CBT - 22, D - 20)
Means, standard deviations, Analysis of covariance
across groups for each TR significance levels
* COMB 17.9 ± 10.8 LOC NS
BDI CBT 13.7 ± 12.4 TR P < .02
D 11.9 ± 10.2 LOC X TR P < .02
COMB 6.5 - 6.5 LOC NS
HS CBT 7.3 ± 6.4 TR NS
D 5.1 ± 5.7 LOC X TR NS
COMB 4.5 - 3.9 LOC NS
DEP CBT 4.0 ± 4.3 TR NS
D 3.4 ± 2.9 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 4.8 ± 3.7 LOC NS
ANX CBT 4.1 ± 3.8 TR P < .01
D 2.4 - 2.6 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 4.0 - 3.9 LOC 1 NS
IN CBT 3.6 - 4.2 TR P < .02
D 1.8 ± 2.3 LOC X TR NS
COMB 2.1 ± 3.1 LOC NS
OUT CBT 1.8 ± 2.6 TR NS
D 3.2 - 2.9 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 6.1 - 5.5 LOC NS
IRR CBT 5.4 - 6.1 TR P < .05
D 3.2 - 2.9 LOC X TR NS
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Variable TR Means, standard deviations,
across groups for each TR
Analysis of covariance
significance levels
* COMB 27.9 - 17.1 LOC NS
AM CBT 22.9 ± 19.9 TR P '
D 18.2 ± 11.3 LOC X TR NS
COMB 4.8 - 16.5 LOC NS
WAS CBT 4.8 ± 19.3 TR NS
D 6.1 ± 16.0 LOC X TR NS
COMB 1.1 - 3.6 LOC NS
WD CBT 1.9 ± 5.9 TR NS
D 3.0 - 11.2 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 27.5 - 21.7 LOC NS
ENV CBT 22.7 ± 2.0 TR P '
D 16.3 ± 16.2 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 30.7 ± 23.8 LOC NS
FUT CBT 20.9 ± 24.6 TR P
D 14.9 - 23.6 LOC X TR NS
COMB 28.8 ± 16.5 LOC NS
IDS CBT 9.3 - 68.9 TR NS
D 19.5 ± 12.2 LOC X TR NS
COMB -3.6 ± 17.7 LOC NS
IDW CBT -2.8 ± 19.6 TR NS
D -2.9 ± 15.9 LOC X TR NS
COMB 32.7 ± 27.1 LOC NS
WASE CBT 27.0 ± 32.2 TR NS
D 23.9 - 20.3 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 14.4 ± 6.7 LOC NS
HRS CBT 10.9 ± 7.6 TR p
D 7.2 - 5.7 LOC X TR NS
COMB 5.4 - 20.7 LOC NS
CS CBT 15.8 - 30.3 TR NS
D 3.3 ± 16.6 LOC X TR NS
COMB 7.5 - 8.6 LOC NS
WS CBT 11.3 ± 12.4 TR NS





Variables which significantly differentiated the groups
at p < .05 or less
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Figure 6B2 shows a histogram of these eight variables for
the hospital group. It can be seen that in the hospital group the
combination treatment always does best and that there is not much
difference between the CBT alone and drug groups. The drug group is
usually slightly lower, except for BDI.
Turning to the general practice patients, a histogram of the
same variabilis shown in figure 6B3 . In this case, the drug group
is always lower in terms of change with only minimal differences
between the combination and CBT groups.
Since there was an interaction effect for change scores
on the BDI, additional tests for simple main effects were necessary.
The results of these are shown in Table 6B3.
Table 6B3 BDI change scores; results of testing for simple main





































F = 29 . 45





Tests between means for the HP
COMB > CBT LSD = 61.7, NS, Df = 36
COMB > D LSD = 65.8, NS, Df = 36
D > CBT LSD = 61.7, NS, Df = 36
Fig.6B2
SelfWorldfuture
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Five one-way analyses of variance were computed for BDI change
scores, covarying for duration of illness, this being the only
covariate which was significant for this variable. There were no
significant differences between locations except for the combination
treatment with the hospital combination group doing significantly
better than those who received combination treatment in general
practice. In treatment effects within locations, the only
significant difference was within the hospital group where combination
was superior to either treatment on its own. However, no significant
differences emerged when a-posteriori tests between means were








Significant results of a-posteriori tests for differences
between means in the GP group using the revised LSD method
COMB N = 9 CBT N - 8 Drug N = 7
GP
TR — Comparisons and LSD values
Df = 53
COMB 4.8 + 2.6 COMB > CBT, LSD : 4.2, NS
CBT 4.4 ± 1.5 COMB > D, LSD = 4.3, *
D 1.1 ± 1.5 CBT > D, LSD : 4.5, *
Df = 53
COMB 3.8 ± 2.4 CBT > COMB , LSD — 3.4, NS
CBT 4.5 ± 2.7 COMB > D, LSD T 3.5, NS
0 0.9 ± 2.2 CBT > D, LSD = 3.6, *
Df = 54
COMB 24.3 ± 12.2 CBT > COMB , LSD ss 13.8, NS
CBT 28 ± 13.9 COMB > D, LSD 14.4, NS
0 13 ± 9.8 CBT > D, LSD = 14.8, *
Df = 50
COMB 15.7 ± 5.7 COMB > CBT, LSD = 6.D4, NS
CBT 12.8 ± 3.2 COMB > D, LSD 8.4 **
D 3.3 + 4.8 CBT > D, LSD — 8.6 **
p = < .05
**
p = < .01
N.B. Cases with missing data have been dropped from the analysis
which accounts for varying Df's.
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Table 6B4 shows the other variables which showed significant
differences between means when a-posteriori tests were done (LSD
method). The only significant differences which emerged were in
the general practice on four variables, i.e. anxiety (ANX), inward
irritability (IN), view of the self (AM), and the Hamilton Scale (HRS).
The differences were between combination therapy and drugs and CBT
and drugs but there were no significant differences between combination
treatment and CBT.
2. Analysis of patients classified as responders and non-responders
Klerman et al. (1974) defined 'significant clinical improvement'
in their pharmacotherapy sample as a 50/2 decrease in initial depression
score (Raskin Scale). This formula was applied in the present study
to identify categories of responders and non-responders to the three
treatments. Thus, responders were defined as patients who reported
at least a 50% reduction from their initial BDI rating and/or a score
< 8 on the same measure.
Table 6B5 shows the number of responders and non-responders in
each treatment for each population. Data from this table were used
for six comparisons.
Table 6B5 Number of responders/non-responders in each treatment for





Resp Non-resp Resp Non-Resp
COMB 10 3 13 a 1 9 p = 0.35 NS
CBT a 6 14 a 0 8 p = 0.08 NS
D 10 3 13 1 6 7 p = 0.01
28 12 40 17 7 24
Results of X2 for differences between responders and non-responders
1. Combined populations, X2 = 3„73, Df = 2, IMS All two-tailed
2. Hospital population, X2 = 1.70, Df = 2, NS tests of
3. General Practice X2 =15.81, Df = 2, p < .01 significance
29?.
The frequencies of combined responders and non-responders in each
treatment for both populations combined was not significant (X2 - 3.73,
Df s 2). Looking at the number of responders and non-responders
for each treatment for the hospital population (column 1) X2 = 1.70,
Df = 2, indicating that the frequency of responders and non-responders
in each treatment for the hospital patients did not differ significantly.
However, for the general practice patients (column 2), X2 = 15.81, Df = 2,
p = < .01 which indicated that the number of non-responders in the
drug group in this population was disproportionately large.
Looking along the rows at the number of responders and non-
responders for each treatment in the hospital and general practice
groups, Fisher's exact probability test for combination treatment
was p — 0.35 indicating no difference in the frequency of responders
and non-responders for this treatment in the two populations. Similarly,
there was no difference in cognitive treatment (p = .08), but there was
a significant difference in the drug group (p = .01) indicating that
in the general practice there were significantly more non-responders
to drug than in the hospital group.
3. Analysis of percentage change scores fpre - post treatment)
Table 6B6 shows the mean percentage change scores, standard
deviations and t values for each treatment in the two populations.
Looking at the significance levels of percentage change scores on
SD
the 18 variables for each treatment (t = mean - — ), the hospital
patients in the combination group improved significantly on 11 variables
(BDI, DEP, ANX, OUT, IRR, AM, ENV, FUT, IDS, UASE and HRS). The CBT
group improved significantly on 10 variables (BDI, HS, ANX, AM, ENV,
FUT, UASE, HRS, OS and US). For the pharmacotherapy patients
significant improvement occurred on as many variables, these being
BDI, HS, DEP, IN, IRR, AM, ENV, IDS, WASE and HRS.
Variables where percentage change would not be expected did
not change, i.e. pre-morbid functioning (WAS), ideal self (WD),
and discrepancy between ideal self and pre-morbid functioning (IDW).
In the combination group hopelessness (HS), inward irritability )IN),
speech rate (CS) and writing speed (WS) did not change significantly.
For the CBT group there was no significant improvement in the
depression subscale of the IDA (DEP), inward irritability (IN),
outward irritability (BUT), total irritability (IRR) and ideal-self
discrepancy (IDS). In the hospital pharmacotherapy group, anxiety
(ANX), outward irritability (OUT), personal future as assessed by
semantic differential (FUT), speech rate (CS) and writing speed (WS)
did not change significantly from initial level of severity.
These results indicate that, on the whole, all three treatment
modalities were effective in reducing depressive symptoms in the
hospital outpatient group. However, when initial differences are
taken into account by using percentage change scores, there are fewer
significant changes from basal level of depression relative to those
found for absolute change scores. For instance, in the present analysis
the hospital patients improved significantly in all treatment groups
on five variables (BDI, AM, ENV, WASE and HRS). This contrasts markedly
with the results of the absolute change analysis where all treatments
produced significant improvement on 12 variables in the hospital group.
With respect to the general practice, the same pattern found for
absolute change scores applied for percentage change. That is, for
the combination and CBT groups there was significant improvement in
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all variables, except for personal future (FUT) where there was no
significant improvement for the CBT group. Taking initial scores
into account, there were even fewer changes in the general practice
drug group than in the previous analysis. Significant improvement
occurred in only five variables (i.e. DEP, OUT, ENV, IDS and U7ASE)
compared with the seven significantly different variables found in
the absolute change score analysis.
Thus, once again, the pharmacotherapy treatment in general
practice appears to have had a weak effect in terms of reducing
depressive symptoms.
Table 6B6 Mean percentage change scores, standard deviations and
t values for each treatment in the two populations
(x, SD's from analysis of covariance)
Number of cases and Df's for each treatment cell in table 6Bfi
HP GP
COMB N - 13 Df = 12 N = 9 Df = 8
CBT N = 14 Df - 13 N = 8 Df - 7


































































































D 44.6 + 24.1 6.68










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data from this table were used to compute an analysis of co-
variance for percentage change scores. These are presented in
table 6B7. The F ratios, covariates, and significance levels for
each are summarised in Appendix XVI,J.
Table 6B7 Results of analysis of covariance for percentage change
scores in the two populations (*L0C x TR )
(across group IM*s COMB = 22, CBT = 22, D = 20)
Means, standard deviations, Analysis of covariance
across groups for each TR significance levels
* COMB 70.3 ± 34.5 LOC NS
BDI CBT 56.7 ± 57.4 TR p < .04
D 49.8 ± 42.2 LOC X TR p < .01
COMB 40 - 77 LOC NS
HS CBT 56.3 ± 37.1 ' TR NS
D 36.1 ±39.8 LOC X TR NS
COMB 44.1 ± 36 LOC NS
DEP CBT 39.3 ±69.2 TR NS
"
D 36.8 ± 24.8 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 46.5 ± 33.7 LOC NS
ANX CBT 41.4 ± 45.5 TR p < .01
•
D 15.9 ± 56.5 LOC X TR NS
COMB 30 ± 14.5 LOC NS
IN
_
CBT 43.3 ± 61.9 TR NS
D 29.1 ± 34.5 LOC X TR NS
COMB 35.5 ±49.2 LOC NS
OUT CBT 21.2 ± 53.5 TR NS
D 10.3 ± 36.6 LOC X TR NS
COMB 42.2 ±49.5 LOC NS
IRR CBT 36.4 ± 50.3 TR NS
D 23.7 ± 22.4 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 110.4 ±126.2 LOC NS
AM CBT 70 ± 70.1 TR p < .04
D 63.8 ±48.2 LOC X TR NS
COMB 5.6 ± 25.9 LOC NS
WAS CBT 5.8 ± 27 TR NS
D 6.1 ± 33.9 LOC X TR NS
COMB 1.4 ± 4.7 LOC NS
WD CBT 2.6 ± 7.7 TR NS
D 3.3 ± 15 LOC X TR NS
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Variable TR Means, standard deviations,






ENV CBT 78.7 + 111.2 TR NS
D 56.7 + 60.9 L0C X TR NS
COMB 145.8 + 169 L0C NS
FUT CBT 86
+ 129.4 TR NS
D 66
+ 121.7 LOC X TR NS
COMB 62.5 + 26.9 LOC NS
IDS CBT 28.1 + 151.6 TR NS
D 48.4 + 28.3 LOC X TR NS
COMB -46.5 + 170.1 LOC NS
I Did CBT 17.6 + 147.6 TR NS
D -47.1 + 129.4 LOC X TR NS




D 88.7 ± 103.5 LOC X TR NS
* COMB 70
+ 28.1 LOC NS
HRS CBT 66 ± 44.3 TR p < .01
D 44.2 + 33, 6 LOC X TR NS
COMB 2.9 + 45.4 LOC NS
CS CBT 19.8 + 28.5 TR NS
D -2.3 + 45.5 LOC X TR NS
COMB 19.4 ± 29.8 LOC NS
IdS CBT 24 .1 + 26.8 TR NS
D 154.1 + 56.5 LOC X TR NS
Variables u/hich significantly differentiated the
groups at p s < .05 or less
Controlling for baseline levels of severity resulted in four differential
effects for treatment, i.e. self-reported depression (BDI), anxiety
(ANX), view of current self (AM) and observed depression (HRS). One of
these could have occurred by chance at the 5% level.
In contrast, analyses of change scores irrespective of initial level
of severity produced eight significant treatment effects on variables
where change would have been expected. As in the change score analysis,
there was an interaction effect for BDI percentage change.
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Figure 6B7 shows a histogram of the four variables which showed
differential effects for treatment in both populations. It can be
seen that in the hospital group the combination treatment continues
to do best and that there is not much difference between the CBT
and drug groups. The drug group is slightly lower for observed
depression (HRS) and anxiety (ANX) but slightly higher than CBT on
the cognitive measure of current self esteem (An). For the BDI, the
drug group responds better than the CBT group and almost to the same
level as the combination therapy group.
For the general practice patients, figure 6B7 shows that once
again the drug group is lowest with minimal differences between the
combination and CBT groups.
The results of the additional tests for simple main effects for
the BDI are presented in table 6Bg.
Table 6Be BDI percentage change scores: results of testing for
simple main effects using analyses of covariance
p.pfs F ratios and
significance levels
1, 19 F = 13.65
p = < .01
1, 19 F = .16
NS
1, 17 F = .31
NS
Five one-way analyses of variance were computed for BDI percentage change
scores covarying for duration of illness. Although the mean
percentage changes were nearly identical, there was a highly sig¬
nificant difference between locations for the combination treatment.
(l covariate)
_HP _GP
x, SD x, SD
COMB 70.3 ± 38.5 70.4 ± 29.8
(N = 13) (N - 9)
CBT 38.8 ± 65.2 87.9 ± 15
(N - 14) (N = 8)
D 66.1 ± 38.6 19.6 ± 31.8
(N = 13) (N - 7)
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It will be remembered that the hospital patients were significantly
more chronic than the general practice patients. When the effects
of duration of illness are controlled, it appears that the hospital
combination group does significantly better than the general practice
combination group. Similarly, when the effects of chronic depression
are partialled out in the other comparisons, no significant differences
emerge either between or within locations.
Table 6Bg shows the results of the tests of significance for
differences between means for the HRS. The only significant differences
which emerged were in the general practice group. These were between
combination and drugs and CBT and drugs and there was no difference
between combination and CBT. Thus, cognitive therapy with or without
drugs did better than drugs alone in the general practice. This was
true for observed depression but not the self-reported aspects of
depression which did, in fact, show differential treatment effects
in the two-way analysis of covariance.
Table 6Bg HRS percentage change score: a-posteriori tests for
differences between means in the GP group using the
revised LSD method
COMB N = 9 CBT N - 8 Drug N = 7
Variable TR GP Comparisons and LSD values
Df - 50
COMB 73.3 - 19.2 CBT > COMB, LSD - 32.8, NS
HRS CBT 79.6 - 15.8 COMB > D, LSD = 34, p <.01
D 20.3 ± 28.2 CBT > D, LSD = 34.8 p <.01
4. The differential response of endogenous and non-endogenous patients
to the three treatments
Since many clinicians assume that endogenous depressed patients
respond to drug therapy and non-endogenous patients are perhaps best
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suited for psychological interventions, it was thought desirable
to investigate the differential response of these subgroups to the
three treatment modes. Thus, patients were classified as definite
endogenous or non-endogenous according to Spitzer's RDC (for a list
of symptoms and the criteria for inclusion, see Appendix X.V), This
was done in a post hoc fashion on the basis of baseline Hamilton
Ratings. The hospital and general practice patients were combined
for this analysis.
From table 6B}Q it can be seen that the proportion of endogenous
and non-endogenous patients were equally distributed across the three
treatments.
Table 6B-] 0 Frequencies of endogenous and non-endogenous patients
in each treatment across populations
TR Endogenous Non-endogenous Total
COMB 11 11 22
CBT 7 15 22
D 9 11 20
Total 27 37 64
x2 - 1.07, Df = 2, NS
(Two tailed test)
The frequencies of endogenous responders and nonresponders and
non-endogenous responders and non-responders within each treatment
are presented in table SB 1 -j . Along the rows, comparing these
categories by Fisher's Exact Probability Test, there were no significant
/ \ **
differences (2x2 tables).
Comparing the first two columns, i.e. the frequencies of responders
and non-responders to the three treatments within the endogenous group,
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there was no significant difference according to x2 analysis (3x2
table). Similarly, comparing the last two columns, there was no
difference in the response of the non—endogenous group.
Table 6B, 1 Response of endogenous and non-endogenous subgroups in
the two populations combined
TR Endogenous (IM = 27) Non-endogenous (N = 37) Fisher Tests
Responders Nonresponders Responders Non-responders
COMB 9 2 9 2 1.42, NS
CBT 5 2 11 4 1.44, NS
D 5 4 6 5 1.30, NS
x2 = .70, NS x2 = .89, NS
(Two-tailed tests)
Thus, in this group, endogenous patients respond as well to CBT
as they do to drugs or combination treatment and non-endogenous
patients respond as well to drugs as they do to CBT with or without
drugs.
5. Pattern of response in the subgroup of responders
In theory the three treatment modes could be said to exert their
effects at different or multiple levels of functioning, i.e. drugs
at the biological level, CBT at the cognitive or psychological level,
and combination therapy at both levels simultaneously. The end result
for patients in each group seems to be at least partial recovery from
depression in terms of mean change or percentage change scores. But
what about the degree of response to the different treatments at various
stages of therapy? If these treatments do exert effects at different
or multiple levels of functioning then they might be expected to
produce different patterns of response over time. Moreover, differential
patterns of response might be most apparent in subgroups of patients
who respond well to each treatment. By looking at the pattern of
response for each treatment in groups of responders, it may be possible
to identify the point in time at which patients may be expected to show
significant improvement in the different treatments.
The next section, while essentially descriptive, attempts to
consider these questions. Nonresponders were excluded from the
analysis because the main interest here was to delineate the 'typical'
sort of response which might be expected from patients who respond to'
combination therapy, CBT, or drugs.
The only analysis used was a series of post hoc tests (t tests)
to compare 1) the degree of response at consecutive points in time
for each treatment on its own, and 2) the degree of response at con¬
secutive points in time across the three treatments. This analysis,
it was thought, might give some idea as to when improvement might be
expected for each treatment and which treatment produced the quickest
response. The analysis was computed for self-rated depression (BDl)
and hopelessness (HS) only.
Ordinarily, when examining data over time, particularly change
scores, a repeated measures analysis of variance would be the
statistical method of choice (see Winer, 1970). However, the
population studied was, by definition, a highly selected subgroup
known to have shown improvement, i.e. BDI final score < 8 or 50%
reduction from initial score. Therefore, it was considered unnecessary
to do an analysis of variance for repeated measures and quite valid to
make the various comparisons using post hoc tests.
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Figure 6Ba shows the pattern of response in groups of responders
to each treatment (two samples combined) on self-rated depression (BDI).
Inspection of the graph shows no differences at initial assessment and
no difference at outcome but the pattern of response appears different
for the three treatments. Pharmaco-therapy seems to provide a very
stable response over time. In contrast, cognitive therapy gives a
dramatic response initially but is, on the whole, more variable. Com¬
bination treatment appears to combine stability with quickness of
response.
The results of paired t-tests of mean differences in BDI change
scores between consecutive occasions of testing within treatments are
presented in table 6B-) 2 . For the drug group, there are no significant
changes between any two consecutive points in time, except for T5-T6 ,
which suggests a very steady, gradual reduction of depression throughout
the course of treatment (approximately two weeks between assessments,
14 weeks altogether). The first significant improvement from baseline
assessment occurs at T3, or approximately six weeks into therapy. On
the other hand, cognitive therapy gives a highly significant rate of
improvement at approximately two weeks into treatment and, following
a more erratic course, shows less significant changes between times
3 and 5, or 6 to 10 weeks into treatment. In fact, the pattern shewn
at the early stages for cognitive therapy appears similar to the
placebo effect discussed by Frankel (1978). For combination treatment,
there is also an immediate reduction in level of depression from
baseline to time 2 and another significant change in the subsequent
two weeks, though there is no significant change between any two points
in time afterwards.
Fig.6Ba
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Table 6B! 3 shows the results of t-tests of mean differences
in BDI change scores between occasions of testing across the three
treatments. There were no differences at initial assessment, though
there are significant differences at the 3rd and 4th assessments, i.e.
at 6 and 8 weeks approximately. The differences on each of these
occasions are between pharmacotherapy and combination treatment, with
the latter providing the quicker response. There were no significant
differences between cognitive therapy and combination treatment.
Table 6B!3 Results of t-tests of mean differences in BDI change
scores between consecutive occasions of testing;
across treatments
Drug N = 11 CBT N = 16 COMB N = 18
Treatment .. s -p **-
Comparisons 23 4567
^ ' ** *
D v COMB t = .85 t . .88 t - 2.77 t = 2.38 t = 1.36 t = .11 t = .67
Df = 27 NS NS NS NS NS
D v CBT t - .49 t =1.90 t = .79 t = 1.56 t - 1.95 t = . 63 t = .88
Df = 25 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
COMB v CBT t = .78 t =1.30 t - 1.97 t = . 60 t = .71 t a .46 t =1.2
Df = 32 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
* *-*
p = < .05 P = < .01
The differential response rate of the three treatments is shown more
dramatically on hopelessness (Figure 6Bg ). Though there seem to be no
differences at baseline, from the 3rd assessment there appears to be large
differences between the drug responders and the responders from the other
treatments and these are evident even at the end of treatment.
Table 6B-, 4 shows the results of paired t-tests of mean differences
on hopelessness change scores between consecutive occasions of testing
within each treatment. bJith regard to the drug group, there were no
Fig.6B9
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significant changes between any two consecutive points in time.
The rate of change for drugs is slow. Significant improvement does
occur in this group of responders but not until approximately 10 weeks
into treatment (T5). In contrast, cognitive therapy gives a
significant rate of improvement at approximately two weeks into
therapy. Moreover, there are no significant changes between the
remaining occasions of testing which suggests a steady, gradual
reduction of hopelessness over time. This stable pattern contrasts
sharply with the more erratic response pattern seen for cognitive
therapy on self-rated level of depression. For combination treatment,
there is an immediate and significant improvement in the first two weeks
(T2 ) followed by another and more highly significant reduction in
hopelessness between weeks two and six (T2 - T3). Overall, the
pattern for combination appears similar to that for cognitive therapy
and both of these are markedly different from the drug therapy response
pattern.
The results of t-tests of mean differences in hopelessness across
the three treatments at the different points in time are shown in Table
6B!5. There are no significant differences at baseline. There are,
however, highly significant differences between the drug and combination
treatments from T3 onwards until the end of treatment. Also, there
are significant differences across the same points in time between
drugs and cognitive therapy. In both sets of comparisons, cognitive
therapy with or without drugs produced the quickest reduction in
hopelessness. However, when cognitive therapy and combination
treatment are compared over the different occasions of testing, there
are -no significant differences, indicating an equivalent effect for
the two treatments on hopelessness.
































































C. PREDICTION OF RESPONSE TO THERAPY: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
An important but secondary aim of this investigation was to elicit
predictive therapy and patient factors. To accomplish this, different
statistical techniques were used, namely multiple regression and
discriminant function analyses respectively. This part of the results is
concerned with multiple regression, the method used to arrive at the
optimum combination of predictor variables for each treatment group. The
criterion measure selected was percentage change on the main self-report
scale for level of depression (BDI).
Multiple regression represents the maximum correlation between a
criterion or dependent variable and a weighted combination of independent
variables and is said to give an inflated value because it capitalises
upon chance deviations that favour high multiple correlations (e.g.
Draper-Smith, 1966). Some have argued that it is a biased estimate of
multiple correlation in the population and that this is especially true
when the sample sizes are small as they are in this study (for detailed
discussion see Kerlinguer, 1973; Draper-Smith, 1966). The statistical
technique used to make this computation computes an adjusted R2 which
takes account of both the number of variables in the equation and the
number of cases and is designed to adjust the significance of R2 when
sample sizes are small. The procedure used was a stepwise regression
which is described fully in the Manual of the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS, 2nd edition, 1975).
Using percentage changes on the BDI as the criterion measure, most
of the other variables were included as predictor variables in three
multiple regression analyses, one for each treatment (both populations
combined). Six variables were excluded from the analyses in order to
minimise the amount of redundant information in the regression equations
and to enhance clinical credibility. These were DEP, IN, OUT, CS, US
and SOC. The subscales of the IDA (DEP, IN, DUT) were excluded because it was
felt that these measures would be unlikely to contribute any more valid
information than, for example, the Hamilton Scale for Depression (HRS) and
the measure of total irritability (IRR) which, in fact, is simply a
composite of the other irritability subscales. The behavioural measures
(CS, US) were also excluded partly because they proved to be among the
least sensitive measures of severity of depression (see section A, para. 5)
and partly because relative to other measures (e.g. mood and cognitive),
they appeared to be less meaningful from a clinical standpoint. Since
social class (SOC) was found to be highly correlated with education, it was
considered unnecessary to include both variables in the same analyses.
Level of education was thought to be more relevant in view of the possible
relationship between response to psychotherapy and verbal skills (Uhitehead,
1979).
Thus, a total of 19 variables were used in the regression equations
for the three treatments. These were: location (LOC), age, sex,
education (EDUC), duration of illness (DILL), PSE total severity score
(PSE), Beck Depression Inventory (BDl), Anxiety (ANX), total irritability
(IRR), Hamilton Rating Scale (HRS), hopelessness (HS), fie as I am now (AM),
fie as I was before this illness (UAS), Me as I would like to be (UD), My
environment as it is now (ENV), the Future as I see it for me (FUT),
discrepancy between ideal and current self(lDS), discrepancy between ideal and
premorbid self (IDU) and discrepancy between previous and current self (UASE).
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This section presents the results of the stepwise multiple
regression. Although all of the variables were included in the
analyses, only the 'best' predictor variables for each treatment are
reported here, i.e. the fewest number of variables which, in combination,
accounted for the greatest proportion of variation in percentage change
on self-rated depression. The maximum proportion of variance explained
in the various regression analyses using all 19 variables was 70 per cent.
Once the optimum combination of predictor variables had been
obtained, those variables with significant regression coefficients were
used to devise three equations which were subsequently employed to arrive
at 'predicted groups' for combination, C8T and drugs respectively.
Table 6C-i shows the best predictors of percentage change in self-
rated depression for combination treatment. Looking at the R2 column,
six variables account for 59% of the variation in the criterion measure.
Table 6C-| Stepwise multiple regression analyses: combination therapy




. Simple R nultiple R R2 R2 change
DILL -0.48 0.47 0.23 0.23
EDUC 0.12 0.67 0.46 0.23
IRR -0.24 0.69 0.49 0.03
ANX 0.16 0.72 0.52 0.03
WASE -0.07 0.73 0.53 0.01
An 0.27 0.76 0.59 0.06
Of these duration of illness (DILL) and level of education (EDUC) explain
46% of the variance when combined in the regression analysis. The
direction and strength of the relationship between these two predictors
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and change in self-reported depression can be seen in table 6C2 ,
which shows the unstandardised (B) and standardised (Beta) regression
coefficients for duration of illness and educational level. For
combination treatment long duration of illness is a negative predictor
(B = -0.37, Beta m -0.B10) and high level of education is a positive
predictor (B s + 17.8, Beta + 0.580) of percentage change in self-
rated depression. The F tests for each regression coefficient (B's)
are significant, indicating that there is a direct linkage between these
two variables and outcome as assessed by percentage change in the BDI.
Table 6C2 also shows the two variable regression equations for the
combination group.
Table 6C2 Stepwise multiple regression analysis
Two variable equation for the combination group with % change in
BDI as the criterion (R = +0.67, adjusted R2 = +0.40)
Variable B Beta Df F ratio
DILL - duration of illness -0.37 -0.810 1, 19 15.26
EDUC - eduational level 17.8 +0.580 1, 19 7.85 *
(Constant 65)
Regression equation for the combination group
Combination = 65 - 0.37 (DILL) + 17.8 (EDUC)
■¥rtfr -X-
p - < .01 P = < .05
A summary of the best predictors of percentage change in BDI for
CBT is presented in table 6C3. The column R2 indicates that four
variables account for 53^ of the variation in the criterion measure,
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Table 6C3 Stepwise multiple regression analysis: CBT
Summary of the best predictors of percentage change in self-rated
depression (BDl)
Variables
added Simple R Multiple R R change
DILL 1 o • CJ1 en 0.55 0.30 0.30
ENV -0.37 0.67 0.45 0.15
BDI 0.45 0.70 0.50 0.05
LOC 0.39 0.73 0.53 0.03
with duration of illness (DILL) and view of the environment (ENV)
contributing as much as 45% of the variance. The unstandardised (B)
and standardised (Beta) regression coefficients for these two
predictors are shown in Table 6C4 , giving an idea as to the direction
and strength of the association between duration of illness, view of the
environment and percentage change in BDI. For cognitive therapy,
again long duration of illness is a negative predictor (B = -0.29,
Beta -.558) as is a relatively positive view of the environment (B = -1.36,
Beta = -0.389), i.e. patients with a negative view of the environment (low
scores) tend to do better on cognitive therapy. There is a direct
association between these two variables and outcome on self-rated
depression as evidenced by the significant F ratios for each regression
coefficient (B*s) computed in the analysis. Table 6C4 also shows the
two variable equation for the CBT group.
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Table 6C4 Stepwise multiple regression analysis: two variable equation
for the CBT group with % change in BDI as the criterion
(R = +0.67, adjusted R2 - +0.39) N = 22
Variable B Beta Df F ratio
DILL - duration of illness -0.29 -0.558 1, 19 10.21
EI\IV - view of the environment -1.36 -0.389 1, 19 4.97
Regression equation for the CBT group
cognitive therapy alone = 147.66 - 0.29 (DILL) - 1.36 (ENV)
** *
p = < .01 p = < .05
Table 6C5 shows the best predictors of percentage change in self-
rated depression for drug therapy. Inspection of column R2 indicates
that four variables account for 56^ of the variance. Of these referral
source (L0C) and perceived discrepancy between ideal and current self
(IDS) combined explain A7% of the variation in the criterion measure.
Table 6C5 Stepwise multiple regression analysis: drug treatment
Summary of the best predictors of percentage change in self-
rated depression (BDI)
Variables
added Simple R Multiple R R2 R2 change
L0C in•o1 0.54 0.29 0.29
IDS -0.45 0.69 0.47 0.18
ANX -0.39 0.72 0.52 0.05
HS 0.06 0.95 0.56 0.04
The direction and strength of the relationship between these two predictors
and change in self-rated depression can be seen in table 6C6, which shows the
318.
unstandardised (B) and standardised (Beta) regression coefficients for
referral source and perceived discrepancy between ideal and current self.
For drug therapy, being a patient attending a general practice in a pre¬
dominantly working class area is a negative predictor (B = -.45, Beta ■
-0.527) and having a large discrepancy between current self-image and ideal
self is also a negative predictor. The F tests for each regression co¬
efficient (B's) are significant, suggesting a direct relationship between
these two variables and outcome as measured by percentage change in BDI.
The two variable equation for the drug therapy group is also shown in
table 6C6.
Table 6C6 Stepwise multiple regression analysis
Two variable equation for the drug groups with % change in BDI
as the criterion (R = +0.69, adjusted Rz = +0.42) N = 20
B Beta Df F ratio
LOC - source of referral -.45 -0.527 1, 17 9.06 **
IDS - perceived discrepancy -1.2 -0.43 1, 17 6.07 *
between ideal and current self
(Constant = 165.0)
Regression equation for the drug group
Drugs - 165 - 45 (LOC) - 1.2 (ideal-self discrepancy)
** *
p = < .01 p = < .05
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
1. Patients from both sources of referral reported substantial
psychopathology as indicated by pattern of symptoms, total severity
score on the PSE, self-reported depth of depression and observer
rated depression. Although the two samples were similar in terms of
pattern of affective disturbance as assessed on the PSE, the hospital
group were more severely disturbed than the general practice patients.
Moreover, the hospital sample reported longer duration of current
depressive episode than the community based sample of patients.
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2. Attrition was considerably higher in the general practice
group but the difference was not significant. There were no
differences in the attrition rate across treatments in each
population.
Patients who dropped out of treatment were more depressed
on self-rated and observer rated depression, more inwardly irritable
and generally irritable, and more negative in their perception of
the environment compared to those who remained in treatment.
3. Hospital patients were better educated and from higher social
class than general practice patients.
4. In the analysis of simple change scores within treatments,
all treatment groups in the hospital sample improved on most of the
dependent measures, as did patients in both cognitive therapy
groups in the general practice sample. In contrast, changes in the
general practice drug group were relatively rare.
5. Analysis of covariance for change scores indicated differential
effects for treatment on five mood measures and the three cognitive
measures pertinent to Beck's theory. For the hospital group,
combination treatment produced the greatest improvement, followed by
CBT and drugs. After disentangling the interaction effects for
self-reported depression (BDl), the pattern was: combination, then
pharmacotherapy and CBT. For the general practice group, the drug
treatment always showed the least improvement compared to changes
in both of the cognitive therapy groups.
6. liJith regard to percentage change scores, all three treatments
were effective in reducing depressive symptoms in the hospital group,
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though there were fewer significant changes compared to the number
of changes found in the analysis of absolute change scores. For
the general practice patients, combination and cognitive therapy
alone resulted in significant improvement in depressive symptoms.
In contrast, the drug group again showed the least number of
significant changes and even fewer changes than were found for
this group in the previous analysis.
7. Differential response rates for the three treatments in each
population for percentage change scores were similar to those
found in the analysis of absolute change scores. Again, controlling
for initial differences on basal measures resulted in fewer variables
which showed differential treatment effects, i.e. three mood measures
and one cognitive measure.
8. Correcting for duration of illness markedly influenced the
results obtained from the analyses.
9. Locating differences between means in both analyses through
the use of post hoc tests (LSD) proved, on the whole, unsuccessful except
for the G.P. group.
10. Endogenous patients responded as well to CBT as they did to
drugs or combination treatment.
11. The three treatments resulted in different patterns of response
for level of self-reported depression and hopelessness in subgroups
of responders.
12. Duration of illness was the most important predictor of response
to cognitive therapy, with or without drugs.
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E. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS RELATIVE TO THE SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES
TESTED
For the sake of simplicity and parsimony, the hypotheses associated
with outcome will be discussed in relation to change scores only.
Hypothesis 1: that the hospital outpatients will have higher levels
of depression than general practice patients is not supported: hospital
and general practice patients had similar levels of self-reported and
observed depression (p. 259).
Hypothesis 2: that the hospital outpatients will report more depressive
symptoms than general practice patients is only supported in part:
only two symptoms differentiated the hospital outpatients from the general
practice patients (p. 254).
Hypothesis 5: that hospital outpatients will be more severely disturbed
in terms of overall psychiatric symptoms than general practice patients
is fully supported: the hospital patients had significantly higher
total scores on the PSE (p.259).
Hypothesis 4: that cognitive therapy will be superior to pharmaco¬
therapy in terms of reducing the number of drop-outs from treatment
is not supported.
There were no significant differences in the number of drop-outs
between the two treatment groups in both populations . (pp 261-262).
Hypothesis 5: that combination treatment will be superior to cognitive
therapy and pharmacotherapy in reducing the number of drop-outs from
treatment is not supported.
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There were no significant differences in the number of drop-outs
between the combination group and each of the other treatments in both
populations (pp 261-262).
Hypothesis 6: that patients in all three treatment groups will have
lower scores at the end of treatment than they did at the start of
I
treatment on all mood measures is only supported in part for each
population.
In the hospital outpatient sample, patients in all three treatment
groups improved significantly on six out of seven mood measures (pp 283-284).
In the general practice sample, patients who received combination
treatment and cognitive therapy alone improved significantly on all of
the mood measures in the analysis of change scores (p. 283). However,
patients in the pharmacotherapy group improved significantly on only
three out of the seven mood measures (pp 283-284).
Hypothesis 7: that patients in all three treatment groups will have
lower scores on hopelessness and higher scores on views of self, world,
and future at the end of treatment than they did initially is fully
supported for the hospital sample; for the general practice sample,
the hypothesis receives only partial support.
In the hospital group all three treatments resulted in significantly
lower scores on hopelessness and significantly higher scores on views
of self, world and future (pp 283-284)..
For the general practice group, combination treatment and cognitive
therapy alone resulted in significantly lower scores on hopelessness and
significantly higher scores on views of self, world and future. However,
pharmacotherapy did not significantly reduce hopelessness. It did result
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in significantly higher scores on views of the self and the world,
but failed to produce significantly higher scores on view of the
future (pp 283-284).
Hypothesis 8: that patients in all three treatment groups will perform
better at the end.of therapy than they did at the start on both
behavioural tasks receives minimal support for each population.
In the hospital sample all three treatments failed to produce a
significant increase in speech rate (counting speed); the three treatments
did, however, produce significant increases in writing speed (p. 284).
For the general practice group, similar results were obtained except
that pharmacotherapy failed to produce a significant increase in writing
speed (p. 284).
Hypothesis 9: that patients assigned to the cognitive therapy group
will show greater reductions in mood disturbance on all affective measures
at the end of treatment compared to those assigned to pharmacotherapy is
not supported for the hospital sample, but receives partial support for
the general practice group.
In the hospital sample, cognitive therapy was only as effective as
pharmacotherapy in reducing affective symptoms on five of seven mood
measures. For the general practice group, however, cognitive therapy
was significantly more effective than pharmacotherapy in reducing affective
symptoms on three of seven mood measures (pp 288, 289, 290).
Hypothesis 10; that patients receiving cognitive therapy will show a
greater reduction in hopelessness and higher scores on views of the self,
the world, and the future than patients who received pharmacotherapy is
not supported in the hospital group and receives partial support in the
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general practice sample.
In the hospital group, cognitive therapy uas not more effective than
pharmacotherapy in decreasing hopelessness and in increasing scores on
views of the self, the world and the future. For the general practice
group, cognitive therapy was not more effective than drugs in reducing
hopelessness or in increasing scores on views of the world and the
future. However, cognitive therapy was significantly more effective
than pharmacotherapy in increasing scores on view of the self, i.e.
enhancing self-esteem (p. 290).
Hypothesis 11: that those who receive cognitive therapy will also
perform better on the two behavioural tasks at the end of treatment
compared to the pharmacotherapy group is not supported.
There were no significant differences between the two treatments
in terms of increasing speech rate or writing speed (p. 286).
Hypothesis 12: that patients assigned to the combination of pharmaco¬
therapy and cognitive therapy will show the greatest reduction in affective
symptoms at the end of treatment on all mood measures is supported in part
in the hospital population but is not supported in the general practice
group.
In the hospital group, combination treatment resulted in the greatest
overall reduction in affective symptoms compared to the other two treatment
groups on five of seven mood measures (p. 288). Although the overall
difference between combination treatment and the other treatments was
statistically significant for self-reported depression (BDl) (pp 287,
290), the differences between combination treatment and cognitive therapy
and combination therapy and drug therapy were not large enough to be
statistically significant at the 5% level (p. 287).
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For the general practice group, combination treatment was not more
effective than cognitive therapy alone but it was significantly more
effective than pharmacotherapy alone in reducing affective symptoms
on three of seven mood measures (p. 290).
Hypothesis 13: that patients assigned to combination treatment will
shou the greatest reduction in hopelessness and the greatest increase
in scores on views of the self, the world, and the future compared to
the other treatment groups is supported only in part in the hospital
population but not in the general practice group.
In the hospital sample, combination treatment was not more effective
than either cognitive therapy or drugs in decreasing hopelessness. How¬
ever, combination therapy resulted in the greatest increase in scores on
views of the self, the world, and the future relative to the other two
treatment groups (p. 288). When individual comparisons were made
between combination treatment and cognitive therapy and combination
treatment and drugs, no statistically significant differences emerged.
For the general practice group, combination treatment was not more
effective than cognitive therapy alone but it was significantly more
effective than pharmacotherapy alone in increasing scores on view of
the self, i.e. enhancing self-esteem (p. 290).
Hypothesis 14: that combination therapy will result in better performance
on the two behavioural measures at the end of treatment compared to each
of the treatments on their own is not supported.
In both populations no significant differences emerged between the
three treatments in terms of increasing speech rate or writing speed.
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Hypothesis 15; that patients who respond to combination treatment
will show a more rapid reduction in self-reported depression (BDI)
than those who respond to cognitive therapy alone and pharmacotherapy alone
is supported in part.
Responders to combination treatment showed a significantly more rapid
reduction in depressed mood than responders in the pharmacotherapy group
(p. 307 )• However, responders to combination treatment did not show a
significantly more rapid reduction in depressed mood than responders to
cognitive therapy alone (p. 307).
Hypothesis 16; that patients who respond to cognitive therapy and the
combination of drugs and cognitive therapy will show a more rapid reduction
in degree of hopelessness as measured on the hopelessness scale (HS)
than those who respond to pharmacotherapy is fully supported.
Responders to cognitive therapy and combination treatment showed
a significantly more rapid reduction in hopelessness than responders to




A. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO POPULATIONS SELECTED
FOR INCLUSION IN THE STUDY?
In view of the wide range of patients selected for the trial and the
increased interest in the treatment of psychiatric disturbances at the
primary care level (Clare, 1978), it is clearly important to establish
whether or not the psychiatric syndromes treated in community settings
resemble those encountered in hospitals, since any consideration of the
use of biochemical or psychological interventions in general practice
must acknowledge the possibility that identical terms may be used to
describe states that are in fact quite different.
Of the psychiatric syndromes encountered in general practice,
depression is said to be one of the most common (e.g. Popoff, 1969;
*
Goldberg and Kenel, 1975). It is, therefore, important to ask in what
ways, if any, the depressive symptoms presented by general practice
patients from the Leith surgery differ from those seen in patients who
were screened at the Royal Edinburgh outpatient department.
It was expected that differences would be found between settings in
that hospital patients would be more likely to present depressive symptoms
which constituted an 'endogenous* pattern and would also manifest a
significantly greater degree of depression than community-based patients
(Wing et al. , 1978; Shepherd et al. , 1966).
Response to the PSE items used to meet the RDC for primary major
depression indicated that depressed general practice patients and hospital
patients report similar patterns of affective disturbance (also see
appendix XI). Only two symptoms differentiated the samples, namely
loss of libido and subjective anergia, with hospital patients reporting
these significantly more often than general practice patients. Thus,
one 'endogenous' symptom (loss of libido) did, in fact, distinguish the
hospital patients from those seen in general practice.
Patients from the two clinics were also very similar in terms of
intensity of depressed mood. There were no significant differences
between the groups in self-reported (BDI) and observer-rated (HRS)
depression. Mean scores for self-reported depression for both populations
indicated a moderate degree of severity according to the British norms
for the Beck Depression Inventory (Metcalfe and Goldman, 1965).
While patients from each referral source were similar in terms of
symptom pattern and depth of depression, they were different from one
another in several important respects. With regard to severity of ill¬
ness, compared to general practice patients, the hospital patients were
rated significantly higher on general psychiatric disturbance as assessed
by total score on the PSE and had significantly lower self-esteem (AM,
semantic differential). Moreover, they were significantly more chronic
than the general practice patients who, in turn, were from significantly
lower social class and were less educated than the hospital group.
It is interesting to compare these results with those reported in
other studies (e.g. Blashki, 1972; Pilowsky et al., 1978). For instance,
Pilowsky et al. (1978) found that depressed patients from inpatient and
general practice settings reported the same degree of depressive severity
but showed different symptom patterns as measured by a depression
questionnaire. Twice as many hospital patients were classified as 'non-
endogenous' or 'endogenous' depressed compared to the general practice
patients, most of whom were assigned to a 'non-depressed' category.
Since no attempt was made to select patients according to specific
diagnostic criteria, it is likely that the findings reported by Pilowsky
et al. reflect the conceptual biases and diagnostic practices of the
physicians in the two settings. Moreover, different patterns of affective
disturbance might well be expected in comparisons of inpatient and community-
based patients in that inpatients represent a small and highly selected
subgroup of depressively ill people who tend to present with severe,
psychotic, suicidal, therapy resistant and chronic depressions (Copeland
et al. , 1975; Helmchen , 1979).
In light of the findings of the present investigation, it appears
possible that the measure used by Pilowsky et al. (1978) failed to discriminate
depression in general practice patients because of problems related to the
insensitivity of self-report scales (Hamilton, 1974, 1979, see chapter 5).
Had a comprehensive and structured observer-rated instrument been used
to gather the data, the difference in symptom pattern between patients
from the two settings may not have been so marked.
The implications of not distinguishing between depressive subtypes
can be readily appreciated, particularly as it has frequently been observed
that depressions of the 'endogenous' type are more likely to respond to
tricyclic antidepressants (Ball and Kiloh, 1959; Raskin et al., 1970;
Paykel, 1972; Deykin and Demascio , 1972). However, the findings reported
here challenge the assumption that these subtypes and intensity of depressed
mood may be predicted on the basis of treatment setting.
The hospital group are a sicker population than the general practice
patients in terms of overall level of psychiatric disturbance, though
both groups obtained mean PSE total scores (Table, p.259 ) consistent with
those reported by Wing et al. (1978) for inpatient and outpatient samples
combined (i.e. PSE total > 21). This aspect of severity is mirrored
by the finding that the hospital group had lower self-esteem and longer
duration of illness than the general practice group.
The difference found between the groups on the cognitive measure
suggests that low self-esteem (negative view of the self), a key component
in Beck's eognitive triad, becomes more salient with increasing symptom
severity. This would be predicted from the hierarchical nature of
psychiatric diagnosis (Foulds, 1976). Various investigators have asked
whether or not low self-esteem is preponderant at all levels and in all
types of depression (e.g. Akiskal and McKinney, 1975; Blaney, 1977;
Becker, 1977, 1979).
Another point may be raised concerning the two populations selected
for inclusion in the study. Wing et al. (1978) note that in patients
with depressed mood categorical differences in disorders may exist when
there is an appearance of specific depressive symptoms with increased PSE
total score, particularly psychotic ones (e.g. delusions, hallucinations).
Although none of the patients in the study had psychotic symptoms, the
hospital patients reported more specific symptoms (loss of libido,
subjective anergia) along with higher PSE scores. Moreover, they were
mora chronic, the mean duration of illness being 91.4 weeks, or nearly two
years. Therefore, it is possible that the hospital outpatient sample
represents a subgroup of depressives within the 'umbrella' diagnosis of
primary major depression. The differential response to treatment of this
population is a critical issue and will be taken up later in the chapter.
With regard to demographic factors, the hospital patients were
slightly older (43.7 - 11.2) than the general practice group (39.9 £ 9.6)
but the difference was not significant. Traditionally, depression has
been viewed as a disorder of middle and later life. The data from this
study, however, are consistent with recent reports of samples of treated
patients which show younger ages between 30 and 40 (Becker, 1977; Paykel
et al., 1979). One explanation for the relatively young age of patients
selected for the trial lies in the younger age of neurotic compared to
psychotic depressed patients, observed in investigations of depressive
classification. For example, a study by Grad de Alarcon et al. (1975,
in Paykel et al. , 1979) showed the peak age for psychotic depression was
in the 50*s and that for neurotic depression in the 30's. Over the years
milder illnesses have, in fact, featured more prominently in studies of
treated depression with a notable shift towards younger women presenting
with neurotic as opposed to psychotic depression (e.g. Rosenthal ,^1966).
This may reflect attenuation of illness by early treatment in the community
*
a change in referral patterns over time to include patients who previously
might not have been regarded as ill or have accepted psychiatric treatment.
Many studies (see Weissman and Klerman, 1977; Silverman, 196S;
Lehmann, 1971) show higher rates of depression in females in ratios from
2 : 1 to 3 : 1 and the results reported here are in line with these finding
In both populations women outnumbered men nearly 3 : 1 with a slightly
higher proportion of men appearing in the hospital outpatient sample
(36^) compared to general practice (25%).
Various explanations, biological and social, have been put forward
for the preponderance of women in studies of depression (Weissman and
Klerman, 1977). Biological theories centre around sex-linked genetic
transmission (Gershon et al., 1971), hormonal effects as reflected in
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premenstrual tension (Neu et al. , 1974; Shader et al. , 1970), post¬
partum depression (Paffenberger and flcCabe, 1966; Pugh et al., 1963),
the menopause (flcKinley and Jeffries, 1974) and the use of oral contraceptives
(Ueissman and Slaby, 1973).
Psychosocial interpretations suggest that women differ from men in
treatment-seeking behaviour (Weissman and Klerman, 1977) and in their
preparedness to talk about their emotions. In many cultures crying and
an appearance of helplessness are frequently viewed as feminine behaviours,
or at least are more tolerable in women. Paykel and Rown (1979) note
that other forms of deviance, most notably alcoholism, delinquency and adult
crime, are more common in males.
Alternative hypotheses have been proposed specifying the pathways
whereby women's disadvantaged status might contribute to clinical depression.
Attention has been given, for example, to differential rates of mental
illness among married and unmarried women. In a review of the area
Gove (1972) found that rates of mental disorder were higher in married
women than in married men, but for the single, divorced or widowed, findings
were equivocal, with a tendency to higher rates in men. He proposed that,
although marriage seems to have a protective effect for men, it may have a
detrimental effect on women in that women are more likely to have to cope
with stresses such as a low status role as housewife, several children,
and financial dependence on the spouse, among others. The work of Brown
and Harris (1978, see chapter 3) reflects the growing interest in this
field; they observed high rates of affective disorders among women with
young children.
The question of sex differences in the incidence of depression is
complex and a full explanation probably involves incorporating several of
the theories mentioned abov/e. It is particularly relevant to outcome
studies such as the one reported here in light of findings which suggest
a differential effect for treatment in women (e.g. Hordern et al., 1963;
Hordern et al. , 1965; MRC Trial, 1965).
The observed differences between the two populations in terms of
education and social class are due primarily to selection factors. Nearly
all of the hospital outpatients were referred by consultant psychiatrists
connected with the Brain Metabolism Unit, Thomas Clouston Clinic which
covers a large section of Southwest Edinburgh, a predominently middle
class district of the City. It was anticipated that people referred from
this catchment area would be 'typical' of patients who might be chosen
for psychotherapy and yet, markedly different from those referred in Leith,
most of whom were, in fact, less educated and fromlower social class.
Another and more important reason for choosing these referral sources was
to attract a broad range of patients for the trial. To date?investigations
of the effectiveness of CBT have been limited to highly selected samples.
For instance, Shaw (1977) and Taylor and Marshall (1977) both used
university students; and Rush et al. (1977) had patients attending a
university clinic and with an average of 14 years' education, as did Fuchs
and Rehm (1977) in their study of self-control therapy. All of these
subjects, therefore, tended to be of quite high verbal ability (Whitehead,
1979). These investigations do not allow conclusions as regards the
possible relationship between treatment success and education or socio¬
economic level.
The results of this study, however, (table, p. 185) show that 50/& of
all patients admitted to the trial had minimal education (i.e. until the
lowebt, possible school leaving age) and 27% came from lower social class.
Within the general practice group 48/S of the patients came from lower
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socioeconomic levels (social classes IV and V).
Thus, the papulation selected for this project makes it possible to
test the applicability of CBT to a wide variety of patients. It permits
comment on whether or not low education patients can use the cognitive
therapy style and whether or not the problems presented by patients of
lower socioeconomic class can be dealt with in this way (Whitehead, 1979).
It is worth emphasising, in summary, that symptom pattern and moderately
high total scores on the PSE indicated substantial psychopathology in both
groups of patients.
B. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATIENTS WHO DROPPED OUT OF
TREATMENT AND THOSE WHO COMPLETED THE TRIAL?
The attrition rate for both populations combined was 27 per cent,
a finding consistent with figures reported for drug conditions in many
controlled trials (Klerman et al., 1974; Weissman et al. , 1974; Lasky,
1962; Weissman et al., 1979; Herceg-Baron et al., 1979), but considerably
lower than those found in some psychotherapy studies (e.g. Daneman, 1961,
Covi et al., 1974, 47^). More general practice patients dropped
out of treatment (38^) compared to the hospital population (18^) but the
difference was not significant. Furthermore, there were no differences
in the attrition rates across treatments in each population.
Differential attrition poses a major threat to the internal validity
of a treatment study, i.e. it influences the correctness with which observed
effects can be attributed to the treatments being tested (Hollon and Beck,
1978; Lasky, 1962). However, since attrition was balanced across the
treatments in each sample in this study, it need not be given much weight
in the interpretation of outcome results. It is difficult to assess the
reasons for discontinuing treatment in the general practice but for
the hospital patients, as contact was not lost, it is known that two were
admitted to hospital, one woman's husband thought that she should be on
drugs, two in cognitive therapy said it made them feel worse, one (duration
of illness nine years) stopped coming after 10 weeks, two emigrated and
one refused more treatment.
Although the specific aims of the present study did not include
any plans to elicit directly the reasons why patients dropped out of
treatment (e.g. spontaneous remission, treatment failures, or excessive
side effects), an attempt was made to see how the rather large subgroup
of noncompleters (both samples combined) differed at baseline from those
who stayed in treatment.
The findings of the comparison of non-completers and completers for
all variables examined at screening indicated that patients who dropped
out of treatment reported greater intensity of depression (self-reported
and observed), higher levels of inward and general irritability, and a
more negative view of the environment. Moreover, noncompleters were
also less educated than those who completed treatment.
The data suggest that the exact nature of the sample completing
therapy might have been somewhat different from those accepted into the
study. This places some limitation on the populations and situations
to which the observed effects can legitimately be generalised. Even so,
the results.are interesting in that they raise questions concerning the
validity of the diagnostic criteria used in this study (Spitzer et al.,
1978) and more importantly perhaps, the problem of untreated depression
in the community (Brown and Harris, 1978).
Given that most of the drop outs came from the general practice
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setting, i.e. 15 of 24, or 63^, one explanation for the results might be
that, while drop outs scored high on several severity measures of depression,
they may have been suffering from some affective disturbance other than
clinical depression when admitted into the trial. To put it another way,
either the diagnostic criteria itself, or the way symptoms were elicited
by the interviewer, resulted in a high proportion of 'false positive'
diagnoses. In light of the findings cited earlier (chapter 5, p. 223)
as regards the overinclusiveness of the RDC, it is possible that patients
who experienced transient, yet acute, dysthymic states (e.g. anxiety,
irritability, or the 'blues') following interpersonal or situational
crises could have been incorrectly classified as depressed and admitted
into the trial. As their condition improved from day to day, these
patients might have decided that it was no longer necessary to consult
a physician or remain in treatment. On the other hand, great care was
taken to exclude patients reporting symptoms which suggested a diagnosis
of primary anxiety (chapter 5, p.181) and this is likely to have minimised
the admission of people presenting with general dysthymic discomfort or
transient situational disturbances.. Although some misclassification is
inevitable whether either clinical or standardised diagnostic criteria are
used to select patients, the findings reported here point to another
explanation for the high proportion of drop outs from the Leith practice.
Brown and Harris (1978) argue that depression may be a consequence
of aspects of social disadvantage. Whitehead (1979) takes up this argument,
suggesting that whereas a well-off individual might become depressed because
of his unrealistic appraisal of events, the poorer person might be quite
accurate in his perception of environmental disadvantage. Presuming that
the drop outs, many of whom came from lower social class, were 'real
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depressives' , it is conceivable that due to their significantly more
negative appraisal of the world, these individuals decided that medical
care on its own was unlikely to result in a meaningful change in their
social circumstances. For some patients who discontinued treatment,
depression may have developed, or at least may have been maintained by,
an all-too-realistic appraisal of a deprived environment. In this
context, it is notable that in addition to being more depressed than
completers, the dropouts were significantly more inwardly irritable which
suggests that those who have a negative, but possibly realistic, view of
their environment, may blame themselves for their disadvantaged status.
Abramson et al. (1978) have argued for the use of reattribution techniques
in conjunction with 'environmental engineering' (e.g. rehousing families)
as a means of reducing depression in such populations.
The fact that noncompleters were less educated than completers may
be due to the higher number of general practice patients in the subgroup
of dropouts. However, it is possible that less educated patients dropped
out of the study because of failure to grasp the reasons why they were being
treated or because of an inability to understand the principles and procedures
of cognitive therapy.
Whatever the reasons for patients dropping out of treatment, the results
of this study indicate that a considerable number of moderately depressed
outpatients did not accept the professional help made available to them.
While it is conceivable that some may not have been clinically depressed
to begin with, there is little doubt that others went back to their homes
having to cope with aibstantial psychopathology as well as routine 'problems
in living*. True, various social support systems could have been available
to help them deal with day to day stresses. However, if the patients
selected from the Leith area are in any way comprable to those found in
Brown and Harris's survey in Camberwell, then in all likelihood these
individuals returned to the community only to confront the social vacuum
and loneliness which, according to Brown and Harris, feature so conspicuously
in the lives of environmentally disadvantaged groups. The fact that over
twice as many general practice patients had experienced loss due to
separation, divorce and death relative to the hospital population lends
weight to this argument (chapter 5, p» 185).
In summary, any investigator who conducts a planned treatment evaluation
would like to be able to analyse data from all cases admitted to a trial.
Yet in practice this is extremely difficult to accomplish; subjects
drop out of a study during its course for many reasons. Unless an attempt
is made to understand and deal with the effects of sample attrition,
findings can be obscured, vitiated or biased.
This section considered differential attrition in the two clinical
populations and across treatments within each subgroup. Differences
between patients who completed treatment and those who did not were presented
and possible reasons for premature termination of treatment put forward.
C. THE FINAL SAMPLE: ARE THERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATIENTS FROM
THE TWO SOURCES OF REFERRAL?
The data from the comparison of completers only across the two clinical
papulations indicate that the differences between the hospital and general
practice samples were essentially similar to those found in the analysis
of all patients admitted into the trial. That is, compared to the Leith
sample, hospital outpatients were from higher social class, were better
educated , had experienced more depressive episodes, and longer duration
of illness, had significantly higher PSE total scores on average and lower
self-esteem. However, exclusion of the dropouts from both populations
resulted in two other differences between the groups. The hospital
completers were more hopeless and less outwardly irritable than the general
practice completers, indicating that the samples which eventually completed
therapy were, in fact, somewhat different from those screened into the
study, with the hospital group being especially pessimistic about the future*
One explanation for this finding is that less hopeless hospital
patients could have dropped out of therapy, which would have had the effect
of raising the mean hopelessness score of the hospital completers relative
to the general practice group. Bias on the part of the therapists who
administered the cognitive treatment might account for relatively more
hopeless people staying in the trial. The therapists' awareness of the
reported connection between hopelessness and suicidal intent (fflinkoff
et al., 1973; Wetzel, 1976), plus the fact that they had been particularly
concerned with mastering the techniques for identifying and reducing suicidal
risk (Beck et al., 1979) could have resulted in their selectively attending
to patients who initially verbalised strong feelings of hopelessness.
0n purely clinical grounds, this might be regarded as a trial success in
that people most at risk to committing suicide were motivated to maintain
contact with professional helpers.
With regard to the community-based sample, the mean hopelessness
score in the general practice group could have been reduced if a relatively
large minority of hopeless patients discontinued treatment. Presuming
that a similar therapist bias occurred for the Leith patients, those who
reported feelings of hopelessness would have received special attention
and would, therefore, have been more likely to stay in treatment. Why
is it, then, that a small number of hopeless patients from Leith may have
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decided not to continue therapy? This is a difficult question and one
which relates back to the problem of delineating the reasons for differential
attrition in treatment studies.
However, Brown (1979) and Brown and Harris (1978) speculate that
specific feelings of hopelessness are likely to occur as a consequence of
exposure to stressful life events in the context of social deprivation.
If this develops into a general feeling of hopelessness, it may form the
central feature of a depressive disorder. Moreover, the chances of
developing such a pessimistic attitude towards life may be increased con¬
siderably if, as Beck (1967, 1976) suggests, an individual has a learning
history which did not foster the development and maintenance of a positive
self concept. Given ongoing low self-esteem, a particular series of events
or difficulties and a deprived environment, it is questionable whether the
most competent therapist ('cognitive* or otherwise) would be able to help
some individuals to adopt an optimistic view about controlling their
circumstances. This clinical/social picture may apply to some Leith
patients who were hopeless and discontinued treatment. For these people
it is conceivable that therapist attention towards, and treatment of,
hopelessness may not have been sufficient to motivate them to remain in
treatment, let alone change their negative expectations about the future.
It is recognised that this is a speculative position and goes beyond
the results presented in this thesis. Nevertheless, the discussion is
relevant to sample attrition and again draws attention to the possible
need for a broader, partly preventative approach, that might be best
implemented outside the medical sphere (Brown and Harris, 1978; Brown,
1979; Abramson et al., 1978).
Patients' expectations about the nature of, and appropriate role
behaviours for, psychotherapy significantly influence the course of treat¬
ment along a number of dimensions including duration (Garfield and Wolpin,
1963; Lorr and McNair, 1964), outcome (Lennard and Bernstein, I960),
patient discomfort (Baum and Felzer, 1964), involvement in the therapeutic
process (Kamin and Caughlin, 1963; Levitt, 1966; White et al., 1964)
and attrition rates (Overall and Aronson, 1963). It is likely that the
differences between the two samples in terms of education and social
class influenced expectations about cognitive therapy. This might help
to explain not only the higher attrition in general practice, but why
more hopeless hospital patients decided to complete therapy. In addition,
the manner and level of enthusiasm with which the cognitive therapy project
was described to the patients by doctors from the respective clinics would
have affected treatment expectations significantly.
Before going on to discuss the outcome results, it is important to
consider whether or not the completers from the hospital and general practice
samples differed in terms of affective pattern, since some have argued that
this has implications for response to treatment (e.g. Ruskin et al., 1976;
Paykel, 1972). Using Spitzer's (Spitzer et al. , 1978) criteria for
endogenous depression, completers from the two clinics were classified as
endogenous or non-endogenous depressed patients on the basis of their basal
Hamilton Rating scores. There were no significant differences between
the number of endogenous and non-endogenous patients in the two clinics,
indicating that the hospital and general practice completers presented
with essentially similar symptom patterns (see appendix XVIII). These
data support the finding cited earlier (p. 328) with respect to the comparison
of the groups on PSE symptoms and underscore the importance of avoiding




The first three sections of the discussion have been concerned with
the sample of patients selected for the study. There is evidence that
both populations experienced substantial psychopathology, that the hospital
patients had more symptoms and were more severely disturbed than general
practice patients, though both groups were similar in terms of level of
depression, and that both populations had similar patterns of affective
disturbance. Considerable attention was given to attrition, in particular
houi dropouts differed from completers. In some respects (e.g. intensity
of depression, negative view of the environment) noncompleters were more
severely disturbed than completers, a finding which must be weighted
against conclusions concerning the applicability of the different treat¬
ments to depressed patients in general. Inferences were drawn from these
data and possible reasons for dropping out of treatment were presented.
OUTCOME
D. This part of the discussion will focus on two questions:
1. Do hospital outpatients respond to each treatment modality?
2. Which treatment is most effective in alleviating symptoms
in the hospital group?
In the hospital outpatient sample, pharmacotherapy (drug of choice),
cognitive therapy, and a combination of the two were found to be effective
in the treatment of outpatients diagnosed as having primary major depressive
disorder. All three treatments resulted in substantial and statistically
significant reducation in depressive symptomatology as documented by patient
self-reports and clinical evaluations. This was true, on the whole,
for both absolute change and percentage change scores. Furthermore,
all three treatmentswere associated with significant decreases in levels
of self-reported anxiety and irritability. Since there was no placebo
control group, it is possible that all patients could have improved
spontaneously through the passage of time. This issue, however, will be
taken up in more detail later.
Similarly, the three treatments produced significant changes in the
expected directions along the cognitive parameters investigated, in
particular those directly relevant to Beck's cognitive model of depression
(views of the self, the world, and the future). That is, by the end of
the treatment period, patients in each of the treatment groups reported
higher self-esteem, a more positive view of the environment, and were
more hopeful about the future. However, level of depression as measured
by the behavioural tasks, by and large, did not change significantly
over the course of treatment.
The efficacy of all three treatments was also supported by the finding
that the number of responders and non-responders, as defined by decreased
BDI score, did not differ significantly across the three treatments in the
hospital group.
While all three treatments were successful in reducing the severity
of affective symptoms and changing negative thoughts, analysis of covariance
for change scores indicated that the combination of cognitive therapy and
drugs produced the greatest improvement, followed by cognitive therapy and
pharmacotherapy. This pattern held for seven of the eight variables
which showed significant differential effects for treatment, i.e. anxiety
(ANX), inward irritability (IN), general irritability (IRR), views of self
(An), world (ENV) and future (FUT) and observed depression (HRS). Self-
reported depression (BDI) did not show this pattern due to an interaction
effect. Subsequent analysis of simple main effects for BDI change scores
(controlling for duration of illness) resulted in a somewhat different
pattern with combination treatment still showing the greatest significant
reduction in depression, followed by pharmacotherapy and cognitive therapy.
With regard to comparisons across the locations, hospital patients receiving
combination therapy did significantly better than general practice patients
who were assigned to the same treatment.
Significant differential effects for treatment in favour of combination
therapy were also found when initial differences in levels of severity were
taken into account in the analysis of covariance for percentage change
scores. Combination treatment was superior to the other two treatments
as documented by self-reported levels of anxiety' (ANX), and self-esteem (AM)
as well as clinical evaluations (HRS). There were minimal differences
between the cognitive and drug therapy response.rates. Again, an inter¬
action effect was found for self-reported depression (BDI). After disentangling
the interaction effects for BDI (covarying for duration of illness), a similar
pattern to that found for change scores emerged in the present analysis.
That is, the combination of cognitive therapy and drugs was more effective
than either treatment on its own, followed by pharmacotherapy and cognitive
therapy. In this instance, however, the difference among the treatments
within the hospital population was not statistically significant. Thus
the differential effects for treatment observed for BDI percentage change
were due primarily to variance in an across-population comparison. In
fact, one of the most striking results of this study was that, while both
groups had almost identical mean percentage change scores, the hospital
combination group did significantly better than the general practice
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combination group. In this comparison, partialling out the effects
of duration of illness had a particularly marked effect on outcome.
In the hospital group, post hoc tests to locate significant
differences between means failed to discriminate between the treatment
groups (except for the BDI change scores), a finding which could be
explained by the very large variances (within group mean square error)
observed in the different analyses.
When treatment adequacy is evaluated in terms of prevention of
premature treatment termination, all three treatments were effective in
keeping attrition very low, i.e. the number of dropouts was the same across
the three treatments (COMB and DRUG - 3/13, 23$; CBT = 3/l4, 21%). This
is important since the data show that premature termination of treatment
was associated with high levels of depressive symptomatology. Moreover,
these figures compare favourably with those reported by Weissman et al.
(1979) in their study of the efficacy of combined pharmacotherapy plus
interpersonal psychotherapy. The lowest attrition rate for their hospital
sample was 33% for combination treatment, compared with 52$ for the psycho¬
therapy alone group and 67$ for pharmacotherapy alone.
The results of this study for the hospital group indicate that cognitive
therapy works at least as well as pharmacotherapy and combining the two
treatments has a partly additive effect. With respect to response in
clinical research, a salient point is the difference between clinical
meaningfulness and statistical difference (see Weissman, 1979; Whitehead,
1979; Hollon and Beck, 1978; Rush and Beck, 1978). Thus, for the hospital
sample the clinical ranking of response is combination of cognitive therapy
and drug of choice, cognitive therapy, and pharmacotherapy - the differences
between each treatment being, on the whole, not statistically significant.
While the present study provides tentative support for the possible
additive effect of combination treatment, the work of Rush and Watkins
(in press) and Beck et al. (1979) indicates that pharmacotherapy may not
enhance the effect of cognitive therapy administered on an individual
basis. However, as seen in chapter four (p.148), methodological reasons
for the discrepancy between these findings were anticipated. As regards
the efficacy of cognitive therapy compared to other psychological treatments,
Shaw (1977) and Morris (1975), for example, have shown that cognitive
therapy is more effective than nondirective, behavioural, or insight
oriented psychotherapy in the treatment of depressed patients.
The results of this study contrast with those reported by Rush et al.
(1977) which showed the superiority of cognitive therapy over tricyclic
pharmacotherapy. In the present investigation similar response rates
were found for the two treatments. One reason for the discrepancy in
outcome could be that in this study patients assigned to pharmacotherapy
were given drugs suited to their individual needs (as judged by the
clinicians) whereas in the Rush et al. study, one drug (imipramine)
was prescribed for all patients. While imipramine is one of the most
effective antidepressants available (Morris and Beck, 1974), Baldessarini
(1977) has pointed out that from a clinical standpoint patients are likely
to derive the most benefit from pharmacotherapy when they are put on a
drug-of-choice regimen, since this provides the physician with maximum
flexibility in the management of depressive symptoms.
In terms of methodological differences, another comparison might be
made between the present study and that of Rush et al. Consistent with
the literature relevant to the potential prophylactic effect of anti¬
depressants (e.g. Klerman et al. , 1974; Weissman et al. . 1974), it was
decided that patients uiho showed a good response to drugs would be
encouraged to take maintenance doses of medication up to six months after
recovery. Thus, in the present study patients assigned to pharmacotherapy
were still taking medication at the time of their final evaluation.
However, in the Rush et al. study medication was tapered off during the
last two weeks of the trial and discontinued before the patients had their
last assessment. This could help to explain the observed superiority of
cognitive therapy over pharmacotherapy in the Rush et al. study, particularly
as it is likely that some patients in the cognitive therapy group were
still involved in therapy immediately before the final evaluation. Although
the results reported here show that cognitive therapy is, at best, only as
effective as pharmacotherapy for hospital outpatients, it could be argued
that the outcome is more striking insofar as it gives a realistic picture
of the efficacy of cognitive therapy compared to the clinical practice
of psychiatrists in a highly respected teaching hospital in Britain.
The question could also be raised as to whether the atmosphere and
reputation of the University of Pennsylvania clinic, in which cognitive
therapy was developed and refined, could account for cognitive therapy
'having the edge' over pharmacotherapy in the Rush et al. study. Treatment
setting is an important ingredient in successful psychotherapy (Frank et
al. , 1978). The setting, because of its inherent therapeutic stimulus
value, is a potent placebo variable. Direct comparisons of placebo response
in different settings indicate that setting can induce placebo effects and
affect treatment outcome in many ways (e.g. Rickels et al. , 1966).
Moreover, the reputation and milieu of a treatment research centre can
influence the availability of resources for research as well as the amount
of dedication which members of staff bring to a project. In short,
special research units such as the 'Center for Cognitive Therapy' cannot
be said to be representative of the settings in which most depressed patients
are likely to be treated.
In this context, in the Rush et al. study eighteen therapists
participated in the treatment of 41 depressed outpatients, 19 of whom
received cognitive therapy, making the therapist-to-patient ratio in the
cognitive therapy group nearly 1:1. In addition, each therapist was
systematically supervised every week by dedicated proponents of the treat¬
ment method (A.T. Beck, Dohn Rush), a factor quite likely to have influenced
the degree of motivation which the therapists brought into the treatment
situation. By comparison, two self-trained (see p. 201) cognitive therapists
administered treatment in the present investigation. They were supported
by three psychiatrists and two general practitioners, none of whom had
much investment in the theory and procedures of cognitive ■ therapy. On
the contrary, all were trained in and worked within a biological model of
depression seen to be upheld by numerous drug studies (e.g. Morris and
Beck, 1974). Bearing in mind that the 4-4 patients who received cognitive
therapy, either with or without drugs, were seen by two therapists, the
marked differences in resources and treatment settings and the potential
impact these could have in terms of outcome are apparent.
It can be argued that this study represents the first successful 'field
test' for cognitive therapy on the grounds that clinicians in a distant
and independent institution, carrying a sizable caseload of depressed out¬
patients, obtained a response rate similar to that of pharmacotherapy.
Moreover, the clinical psychologists involved in the study could hardly
be regarded as part of an elite corps of cognitive therapists ('UK Vienna
Circle') since the trial in Edinburgh was begun before the recent upsurge
of interest in Britain.
Finally, one other reason may be put forward to explain the less
dramatic effect observed for cognitive therapy in this study relative to
that reported by Rush et al. (1977). As duration of illness differentiated
the hospital and general practice groups at a highly significant level,
it was used as a covariate in the analyses of outcome for both change and
percentage change scores. Thus in the present investigation degree of
chronicity was statistically controlled. On the other hand, duration of
illness was not controlled in the analysis reported by Rush et al. , this
in spite of what appeared to be a rather large difference in the distribution
of chronic patients in the two treatment groups. To illustrate, 6 of 19
(31^) of their cognitive therapy group had been ill for over a year compared
to 10 of 22 (45/£) in the pharmacotherapy group. In light of findings which
indicate that chronic depression is often associated with poor response to
treatment (e.g. Rogers and Clay, 1975; Paykel, 1972, 1979; Freyhan, 1974),
it is possible that the response rate in the pharmacotherapy group was
somewhat inhibited due to the relatively high proportion of chronic
depressives in that group. This would help to explain the superior effect
observed for cognitive therapy over drugs in the Pennsylvania trial.
Had these researchers used more sophisticated analyses, i.e. mean change
scores corrected for degree of chronicity, they might have obtained results
closer to those reported here.
The results of this study also contrast with a number of other studies
which report the superiority of pharmacotherapy over various kinds of
psychotherapy (Covi et al. , 1974; Friedman, 1975). Potential methodological
reasons for this descrepancy will be discussed shortly. However, from a
clinical point of view, it has been suggested that the most parsimonious
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explanation may relate to the nature of the psychological treatments
used (Rush et al., 1977; Beck et al., 1979). It is conceivable that
cognitive therapy is more successful than marital therapy (Friedman,
1975), social work counselling (Klerman et al. , 1974), or traditional
group therapy (Covi et al.. 1974), since it was specifically developed
for the treatment of depression. Extensive clinical and empirical work
with depressed patients (see Beck, 1967, 1973, 1976) provide the framework
for cognitive therapy which is specifically aimed at the central psychol¬
ogical problems of depression (e.g. negative views of self, world and future).
Proponents of this treatment argue that the specificity and targeted
approach of cognitive therapy may account for its success rate compared
to those reported for other psychotherapies.
While this explanation for the effectiveness of cognitive therapy
may well apply in relation to some other forms of psychotherapy, the
results presented in this thesis suggest that pharmacotherapy alone can
also modify the core psychological problems of depressive illness, as
evidenced by the statistically significant changes observed along some
cognitive parameters of the semantic differential. In the hospital
group, pharmacotherapy resulted in patients adopting more positive attitudes
about themselves and their environment as well as a hopeful outlook about
personal future. Since pharmacotherapy and cognitive therapy showed
similar levels of response on these parameters, it can be argued that
both treatments have similar effects, i.e. changing negative cognitions,
but achieve them through different modes of action. Furthermore, the
combined approach with its partly additive effect and presumably multimodal
action, may provide the best means of alleviating the psychological symptoms
of depression.
351.
The results of this study are in line with those reported by
Weissman et al. (1979). They found that the combination of interpersonal
psychotherapy (IPT) and pharmacotherapy was superior to IPT alone and
pharmacotherapy alone and concluded that combination treatment has a
partly additive effect in reducing the severity of symptoms in acutely
depressed outpatients. However, in terms of the acceptability of psycho¬
therapy to patients as measured by number of dropouts (e.g. Herceg-Brown
et al., 1979), it seems that cognitive therapy, with or without drugs, is
superior to IPT alone or in combination with drugs (see above, p. 345).
Again, this may be due to the nature of the therapies employed. Cognitive
therapy is a performance oriented treatment whereas IPT appears to be a
verbally-based, self-explorative type of psychotherapy. In cognitive
therapy depressed patients are encouraged to become active both inside and
outside the treatment sessions and are taught to identify, control, and
change negative thoughts associated with their depression, and to focus
less on affective pain. It may be that non-behavioural forms of psycho¬
therapy such as IPT, in which the message 'talk more and do less' is at
least implied if not directly stated, sensitise the individual to affective
discomfort, thereby making him more rather than less preoccupied with his
symptoms. Not surprisingly in these circumstances, patients could be
expected to discontinue treatment, thinking that psychotherapy has been
ineffective.
The findings reported here indicate that cognitive therapy may hold
great promise as a short term treatment for depressed hospital outpatients.
It works as well as pharmacotherapy (drug of choice) and there is evidence
that it can be more effective than tricyclic pharmacotherapy (Rush et al.,
1977). However, combining cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy is more
effective than either treatment alone in terms of reducing depressive
symptoms and changing negative thoughts.
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E. This section of the discussion will address two questions:
1. Do general practice patients respond to each treatment modality?
2. Which treatment is most effective in alleviating symptoms in the
general practice group?
In the general practice group the combination of drug of choice and
short-term individual cognitive therapy and cognitive therapy alone were
found to be effective in the treatment of depressed outpatients. Both
treatments produced substantial and statistically significant reduction
in depressive symptoms as measured by patient self-reports and clinical
evaluations. This applied, in general, to absolute change and percentage
change scores. Moreover, cognitive therapy, with or without drugs, was
associated with significant decreases in levels of self-reported anxiety
and irritability. On the other hand, statistically significant changes
in the pharmacotherapy group were rare. This group, on the whole, de¬
monstrated an unexpectedly poor response to therapy.
With regard to the cognitive measures, combination treatment and
cognitive therapy alone resulted in significant changes in the expected
direction, especially on those pertinent to cognitive theory (views
of self, world and future). That is, patients who received these two
forms of therapy reported more positive perceptions of themselves and
their environment and were more hopeful about the future. However,
pharmacotherapy did not produce significant changes in negative thoughts
as measured by the semantic differential. Again, severity of depression
as assessed by the behavioural tasks, by and large, did not change signifi¬
cantly over the course of treatment.
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Cognitive therapy with or without drugs was successful in reducing
the severity of affective symptoms and in changing negative thoughts.
Analysis of covariance for change scores indicated that the combination
of cognitive therapy and drugs and cognitive therapy alone resulted in
similar levels of response on these parameters and that both treatments
were more effective than pharmacotherapy alone. This pattern held for
the eight variables which showed statistically significant differential
effects for treatment, i.e. self-reported depression (BDI), anxiety,
inward irritability, general irritability, views of self, world and future
and observed depression.
Following up the interaction effects on the BDI with one-way analyses
of covariance (covarying for chronicity) resulted in the sane pattern,
though the difference between treatments was not statistically significant.
As mentioned earlier, a significant difference was found for combination
treatment across locations with the hospital group showing greater improve¬
ment than the general practice group.
Statistically significant effects for treatment in favour of the
combination and cognitive therapy groups were also observed in the analysis
of covariance for percentage change scores. Combination treatment and
cognitive therapy alone were superior to pharmacotherapy as measured by
levels of self-reported depression, anxiety and self-esteem, as well as
by clinical evaluation. Analyses of simple main effects for BDI within
the general practice sample (covarying for chronicity) produced the same
pattern, but once again, no significant differences emerged among the
three treatments. As in the change score analyses, comparison across
locations indicated the superiority of hospital combination treatment
over combination treatment administered to general practice patients.
In the general practice group, post hoc tests for significant
differences between means did, in fact, discriminate the treatment groups.
For change scores, statistically significant differences emerged on three
mood measures (anxiety, inward irritability, observer rating of depression)
and one cognitive measure (view of self). The combination of cognitive
therapy and drugs and cognitive therapy alone were significantly more
effective than drugs but there were no significant differences between
combination and cognitive therapy alone. For percentage change the only
significant difference found was for observer rated depression where, again,
cognitive therapy with or without drugs showed significantly greater reduction
compared to the pharmacotherapy group. However, no significant differences
emerged between the two cognitive therapy groups.
In terms of preventing drop-outs, all three treatments in general
practice had high attrition rates, these being 38/S (5/13) for combination
treatment, 36/£ (5/14) for cognitive therapy and (5/12) for drugs.
Thus, no one treatment was much better than any other in minimising the
number of drop-outs from therapy,against the expectation that cognitive
therapy, particularly when used in conjunction with drugs (Herceg-Baron
et al., 1979), would be more effective than drugs in preventing attrition.
However, these findings could be attributed as much to the general problem
of high attrition in general practice (Johnson, 1973) as to the idea that
all of the treatments were relatively unacceptable to patients. High
attrition in general practice is a matter of concern, since the data from
this study shows that those who failed to complete treatment were more
depressed than patients who completed therapy.
The results of the present investigation for the general practice
group appear to indicate that cognitive therapy combined with drugs and
cognitive therapy alone are more effective than pharmacotherapy alone.
In view of the minimal differences between the two cognitive therapy
groups in terms of degree of response, there is no evidence to support
the hypothesis that pharmacotherapy (drug-of-choice) enhances the
effect of cognitive therapy administered on an individual basis to general
practice patients (see Beck et al., 1979; Rush and Watkins).
The dramatic response to cognitive therapy and combination treatment
and the poor response to drugs in general practice are by far the most
striking findings in this outcome study. However, before drawing any
conclusions about the efficacy of cognitive therapy compared to drug
therapy in general practice, it is important to consider possible
reasons for the extremely poor response in the pharmacotherapy group.
Several authors (e.g. Johnson, 1973; liiheatley, 1972) have commented
on factors effecting poor compliance to drug regimens in general practice.
Johnson (1973) implicated, in particular, the prescription of less than
therapeutic doses, failure of supervision of the drug regimen, and poor
contact with the doctor. For example, in Johnson's study, only 72^ of
the 73 patients investigated were given drugs in a dose that would be
regarded as therapeutic. The potential benefit of therapy was considerably
reduced by the patient's own actions, as 16% discontinued medication within
a week, 41% within a two-week period, 69% within 21 days and after one
month 6Q%o of the patients had stopped taking their drugs. With regard
to consultation rate, Johnson found that in the first six weeks of treat¬
ment just over a third (38%) of patients had had two consultations with
the doctor and as few as 8% kept fortnightly appointments. In light of
such findings, it is possible that the patients in the drug group in
general practice failed to respond because of poor compliance.
In this study, though plasma levels were not monitored, all patients
in the general practice were prescribed amitriptyline, or imipramine, at
at least 100 - 150 mg daily. Because of the regular assessments, these
patients had more supervision of drug regimen and more doctor contact than
they would normally, seeing a hospital psychiatrist (Hamilton Rater) and
a psychologist (who administered the self report questionnaires) every
two weeks, in addition to seeing their G.P. for prescriptions. It can
be argued, therefore, that the effect observed for pharmacotherapy is
indeed genuine, suggesting that the sort of depression generally seen in
a busy urban practice responds best to psychotherapy.
Putting aside the question of the specificity of pharmacotherapy in
reducing depressive symptoms, perhaps a greater degree of response could
have been expected from drugs on the basis of placebo effect alone.
After all, large placebo response rates have been obtained in both anxiety
neurosis and neurotic depression, this being in the order of 50% (e.g.
Wheatley, 1968, 1969, 197D, 1972). Many factors related to patient
and situational variables affect the degree of placebo response (see
Shapiro, 1978, for an excellent review). However, one inescapable fact
is that placebo effects are only as good as the attitudes the attending
physician conveys about treatment.
Negative staff attitudes can decrease the efficacy of active medication
(Sabshin and Ramot, 1956, in Shapiro, 1978). The effect of a placebo can
be greatly diminished, from 70 to 25 per cent, if a negative attitude
towards medication is communicated to a patient (Volgyesi, 1954). In
another investigation, for example, patients treated with placebos showed
greater improvement than those on tranquillisers or behaviour therapy, a
finding the researchers attributed to the bias of nurses against pharmaco-
therapy and habit-training (Baker and Thorpe, 1956, in Shapiro, 1978).
In terms of predicting response to drugs in general practice,
Wheatley (1972),Sheard (1963, 1964) point out that the more optimistic
the attitude of doctor and patient, the more likely is an effective
response to treatment. In this context, it should be noted that the
doctors from the Leith practice, while sympathetic to their patient's
problems and conscientious in the administration of pharmacotherapy,
often expressed concern about the adequacy of this form of treatment,
not so much because they doubted the potential efficacy of drugs in
reducing depressive symptoms, but because in their eyes it offered little
in the way of helping patients to deal effectively with overwhelming
social problems (e.g. poor housing, family disharmony, financial difficulties).
Thus, it is conceivable that the G.P.s, as Beck (1976) suggests sometimes
happens to cognitive therapists, adopted the negative cognitive set
expressed by their patients and inadvertently conveyed a negative attitude
about the effectiveness of the drug treatment. This would have had all
the more impact if, as is likely, the doctors believed implicitly that
these depressions were reality-based and, as such, perhaps refractory to
purely physical treatments. This would help to account for the very
poor response in the general practice drug group.
Another explanation for the low level of response in the drug group
could be that a disproportionately high number of treatment resistant
patients had been assigned to the pharmacotherapy group. Wheatley
(1972), in discussing predictors of response in general practice, has
noted that response is better when there is no previous therapy, or when
it has been previously successful. While degree of chronicity was con¬
trolled in the statistical analyses, history of previous treatments was
not. Even if this had been planned initially it would have been
extremely difficult to identify 'treatment resistant' patients in the
general practice, not only because of the difficulties mentioned above
(e.g. poor compliance, low doses of tricyclics), but because of the
imprecise manner in which patient records are sometimes kept in general
practice. For instance, in the Leith practice it was not unusual for
the hard-pressed G.P. to omit a note in the record indicating that a patient
was depressed and that he had, in fact, been given a prescription for
antidepressants.
Controlling for previous treatments is an important methodological
issue and should be considered in the planning of future outcome studies
in general practice.
With regard to combination therapy, the question could be raised as
to whether good compliance with drug regimen, stimulated by regular
contact with the cognitive therapist, could account for the dramatic
effect observed in that group. Indeed, it is likely that compliance
in the combination treatment was better than in the pharmacotherapy group,
since the therapist stressed the importance of taking antidepressants at
the start of treatment and, as needed,throughout the course of cognitive
therapy. In fact, patients were encouraged to take their medication
regularly as part of 'cognitive therapy homework'. That is, in conjunction
with, for example, monitoring negative thoughts or increasing activities
gradually, patients worked with the therapist in the implementation of the
drug regimen. So, if the patient had been prescribed amitriptyline 100 mg
to be taken each night, he would record this on his activity schedule as
a task to be completed daily. Thus, it is possible that patients in the
combination group improved as a result of pharmacotherapy alone, particularly
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as drug schedules were fitted to patients daily routines (Haynes,
1976). However, the positive findings for cognitive therapy obtained
by the present researchers and others (Rush et al., 1977; Rush and
Ulatkins; Taylor and Marshall, 1977; Shaw, 1977) greatly weakens this
argument.
An important aspect of this psychotherapy- investigation is that it
involved patients with minimal education, many of whom came from lower
social classes. The results indicate that patients with only a basic
education can, in fact, respond to cognitive therapy. It is worth noting
that, on the basis of decreased BDI score (50% or < 8), all eight
completers in the cognitive therapy group and eight of nine completers
in the combination group showed significant clinical improvement. In
short, it seems as though a patient need not be a 'Rhodes Scholar* in
order to benefit from cognitive therapy.
This contention, however, has to be expanded by considering the
cognitive therapy approach as it was used specifically in the general
practice setting. From the very beginning of this project it was
recognised that conducting psychotherapy with a relatively disadvantaged
population such as that found in Leith might present special problems.
For instance, many studies indicate that psychotherapists working with
lower social class patients are confronted with two major difficulties:
a consistently high rate of premature defection from treatment and a poor
response to conventional psychotherapies ( Lorion , 1975, 1978). It
was thought that both of these problems could reflect a single basic
problem, namely poor adherence, either to the appointment schedule and/or
to the procedures of treatment (Rush and Watkins, in press).
For lower social class people both pragmatic and attitudinal factors
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contribute to early termination and/or poor adherence to treatment
procedures. Occupational and child care problems as well as
transportation are the most frequently encountered (Lorion, 1978). The
lower class mother is often a single parent who has no reliable child care
resources to allow her to seek treatment, let alone attend psychotherapy
sessions regularly (Brown and Harris, 1978).
With regard to attitudinal problems, Lorion (1975, 1978) has pointed
out that lower class patients (*|) often do not regard psychotherapy as a
treatment of choice, (2) are unsure about the relevance or effectiveness
of psychotherapy, (3) are frightened by and ashamed of requiring therapy,
(4) are perturbed that their problems may have an emotional basis, (5)
may feel defensive and threatened by the prospect of self-evaluation and
(6) may come to the therapist seeking direct advice and guidance for problems,
rather than emotional support and specific treatment (Rush and Watkins,
in press).
Premature termination and poor adherence in lower social class patients
are also likely to be associated with therapist attitudes such as (l)
problems in developing an understanding approach (empathy), (2) frustration
at being unable to conduct therapy within a 'traditional therapeutic role'
and (3) negative feelings towards and perhaps disapproval of the patient's
behaviour (Lorion, 1975).
In light of this information, special attention was given to the
'socialisation stage' of treatment in which the therapist and patient dealt
with one another's expectations about therapy. Considerable time was spent
with general practice patients trying to align their feelings, attitudes
and expectations with what they were likely to experience over the course
of treatment. This preparatory approach finds support, for instance, in
an investigation by Heitler (1973). He found that patients from lower
social class who were systematically prepared for group psychotherapy
became more readily and adequately involved in the tasks of the treatment
situation.
In the present study, attention to the problem of discrepancy of
expectations sometimes involved as many as three sessions. From a
clinical stand point, this appeared to reduce the amount of effort re¬
quired to convey successfully the basic concepts and techniques of cognitive
therapy. With adequate preparation it seemed as though patients were
more prepared to become active in therapy, e.g. giving the therapist
examples from their own experience of the connection between thoughts and
emotions.
Another important aspect of administering cognitive therapy to the
general practice patients was that the therapist consistently tried to
avoid using 'psychological jargon'. Terms like 'automatic thoughts',
'operating from a false premise', 'agendas', etc. were promptly abandoned
in favour of what seemed like more reality-based words or phrases, such
as 'harsh, unfair criticisms of yourself', 'belief (thinking habits) which
might cause you more distress than need be', 'plans for today's session'
and so on. Throughout treatment the therapist used this common sense
framework to facilitate the collaborative approach which Beck et al. (1979)
regard as a hallmark feature of cognitive therapy.
It is notable that before discussing any of the technical aspects
of cognitive therapy in their manual, Beck et al. (1979) emphasise the
importance of using cognitive techniques within a psychotherapeutic
atmosphere characterised by trust, warmth, empathy, etc. To this end
the therapist regarded himself as a potential confidant to each patient
and as much as possible attempted to maximise the interaction of non¬
specific and specific factors in the therapy situation. Quite frequently
this necessitated putting aside the 'technology' of cognitive treatment
to listen to a patient and perhaps reflect with her about the pressures
of, for example, living in overcrowded conditions (e.g. high noise levels,
lack of privacy), or being employed as a domestic worker (some people held
two jobs) and still having to care for the children and household. This
is not to say, however, that 'empathic support' was used as a substitute
for the cognitive techniques. In accordance with the cognitive therapy
regimen, all of the sessions were highly structured, involving focused
discussions relevant to the cognitive model of depression and homework
assignments (e.g. monitoring negative thoughts, graded tasks).
In this context, patients in the general practice seemed to adhere
best to the behavioural performance-based procedures. For instance,
asking patients to do things systematically such as reading a book for 15
minutes a day, keeping a record of waking activities, gradually going out
to socialise, cooking meals, etc. resulted in good compliance. On the
other hand, while these patients were very capable of carrying on a cognitive
therapy style dialogue and 'catching negative thoughts' within the sessions,
it was very difficult to get them to record these thoughts and practise
cognitive strategies in their home environment. Thus, for the cognitively
oriented tasks, compliance was quite poor in the general practice group.
Cognitive therapy in the general practice setting also demanded
flexibility and a willingness on the part of the therapist to depart from
the routine employed with hospital patients. For example, child care
difficulties often prevented UDmen in Leith from attending twice a week
and it became necessary for the therapist to comply with a once-a-week
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format until such time as a twice weekly arrangement could be made.
Rather than rigidly adhering to a designated appointment schedule it was
necessary on occasions to employ 30 minute sessions in order to accommodate
a patient's domestic and family responsibilities (e.g. children coming
home from school early, having to get home to meet a husband who had
unexpectedly changed his work schedule from night to day shift, or other
domestic crises).
The foregoing section of the discussion has been concerned with the
way that cognitive therapy was conducted in the Leith practice. It is
recognised that most of the information discussed was anecdotal in nature
and based primarily on observations made in the clinic over the course of
the research project. However, in view of the unexpected finding that
lower social class depressed patients respond well to cognitive therapy,
a clinically—based elaboration of the results seemed entirely appropriate.
The positive findings in the Leith surgery have implications for the
implementation of cognitive-behavioural techniques in general practice.
The use of traditional methods of psychotherapy within the general practice
setting are likely to be impractical. Even for the psychologically-oriented
and highly motivated G.P., psychodynamic interpretations made in the
hurried climate of a busy urban practice would probably be invalid,
deterimental or too painful for the depressed patient to tolerate.
A number of adaptations to psychotherapy have been suggested as being
appropriate for the general practice situation seen in Western Europe.
For example, Balint (1957), Balint and Norell (1976, in Clare, 1978) have
argued for a shift away from the conventional role of the doctor as a
diagnostician and 'towards that of a listener able to 'tune in , follow
the patient's lead, and allow the patient to make use of him' (Clare, 1978
p. 172). According to Clare, the notion of 'a flash' used to describe
the point when physician and patient simultaneously understand each
other is an essential component of this approach. However, in light of
the complex nature of clinical depression and the inherent risk of the
patient committing suicide, not everyone would agree that this form of
psychotherapy is likely to be helpful.
Other suggestions include the application to family practice of the
theories of transectional analysis (Browne and Freeling, 1967) and the
use of behavioural interventions (e.g. Marks, 1974, 1975).
However, there is little evidence as yet that such techniques are permeat¬
ing the main body of family practice (Clare, 1978).
The results of the present investigation indicate that cognitive
therapy may be a promising technique for the short term treatment of
depressed patients in family practice. Compared to traditional methods
of psychotherapy, it is specifically designed to deal with the core psycho¬
logical aspects of depression (e.g. hopelessness), is relatively quick in
reducing depressive symptoms, taking up to 3 months on average, and can
be applied to a wide range of patients, including those with a basic
education. Furthermore, it may have the added advantage of giving the
patient a set of coping strategies which he can use to prevent the onset
of subsequent depressive episodes.
Whether cognitive therapy should be reserved for clinical psychologists
and psychiatrists or should be extended to family doctors, social workers,
community nurses and health visitors is an intriguing question which remains
to be answered.
To conclude, combining drugs and psychotherapy in the general practice
setting did not have a negative interaction but neither was there the
partly additive effect seen in the hospital outpatient group. The inter-
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action appears to have been reciprocal (Klerman, 1975; Hollon and Beck,
1978), i.e. the effect being similar to the better of the two individual
treatments.
Outcome
F. This section will address the question: Do the three treatments
show different effects in terms of the degree of response at various
stages of therapy?
The results indicate that combination treatment, cognitive therapy,
and pharmacotherapy result in different response patterns over the course
of therapy. These vere evident on the two measures examined, i.e. self-
reported depression (BDl) and hopelessness (HS), in subgroups of responders
to each treatment mode (hospital and general practice samples combined).
With regard to depth of depression (BDl), pharmacotherapy showed a
stable, gradual effect in reducing depressed mood with the first significant
improvement occurring at approximately six weeks into treatment. While
cognitive therapy was quicker in significantly decreasing depressed mood
(two weeks), it produced a rather unstable, erratic response pattern.
However, combination treatment resulted in both a quick (i.e. statistically
significant reductions at two weeks and again between two and four weeks)
and stable reduction in depressed mood.
When the different levels of response of the three treatments were
compared at consecutive occasions of testing, there were no significant
differences between pharmacotherapy and cognitive therapy. However,
t
combination therapy resulted in significantly greater improvement at six
and eight weeks approximately, indicating that combining cognitive
therapy and drugs produces the quickest reduction in intensity of depression.
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The differential response rates of the three treatments were
demonstrated more dramatically on the measurement of hopelessness.
Pharmacotherapy showed a very delayed effect in decreasing hopelessness,
i.e. significant improvement in the group of responders did not occur until
approximately 10 weeks into treatment. In contrast, cognitive therapy
produced a significant reduction in hopelessness at approximately two weeks
into therapy. This rate of improvement was surpassed by combination
treatment which not only resulted in significant improvement at two weeks
but was followed by another significant reduction in hopelessness between
weeks two and six approximately.
Comparing the three treatment groups with each other at consecutive
occasions of testing showed that cognitive therapy, with or without drugs,
was significantly quicker than drugs alone in decreasing hopelessness.
It is notable that when cognitive therapy and combination treatment were
compared at the different assessment times, no statistically significant
differences emerged which suggests that there is an equivalent effect
for the two treatments in reducing hopelessness.
These findings support the argument that cognitive therapy in combination
with drugs may be one of the best ways to treat depressed outpatients.
Looking at progress at various stages of therapy, it appears that combination
treatment in particular, but cognitive therapy as well, have a sharper'and
quicker effect, especially on a core psychological symptom of depression,
namely hopelessness. As level of hopelessness has been found to be a
better predictor of suicide than depth of depression (Plinkoff et al. ,
1973), this finding may indicate that cognitive therapy alone or in
combination with drugs may be more effective than drugs alone in diminish¬
ing the risk of suicide in depressed patients.
These data take on added significance in view of the concern expressed
by numerous researchers (e.g. Silverstone et al., 1974; Morris and Beck, 19 ?4)
that pharmacotherapy, in spite of the not inconsiderable success of the
approach, often fails to bring quick relief to the patient. It takes
time for drugs to work and even with the finest of drug regimens, the risk
of depressed outpatients committing suicide remains high, particularly in
the short term. By adding cognitive therapy to drugs, not only could it
be possible to lower the risk of suicide, but perhaps through some inter¬
active process (cognitive x neurochemical change), it could be possible
to speed up the onset of drug effects.
Summary
The last three sections of the chapter (D, E, F) were directed
towards a discussion of the relative effectiveness of combination treatment,
cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy (drug-of-choice) in the treatment
of depressed hospital and general practice patients. For the hospital
sample, there is evidence that cognitive therapy is at least as effective
as drugs and that combining cognitive therapy and drugs has a partly additive
effect. In general practice, both combination treatment and cognitive
therapy alone were superior to drugs in reducing depressive symptoms. It
was argued that this superior efficacy might have been due to poor compliance
to drug regimen in the drug alone group. Whether this is so or the superiority
of cognitive therapy is due to a specific effect, the advantage of giving
cognitive therapy to people who choose not to take drugs is apparent.
Considerable attention was given to describing how cognitive therapy
was adapted clinically to suit the special problems faced with general
practice patients, most of whom were from lower social classes than the
hospital patients or patients treated with cognitive therapy in
previous studies.
Finally, it was argued that combination treatment and cognitive
therapy may give the patient quick relief in terms of reducing depressed
mood and pessimism.
G. WHICH VARIABLES BEST PREDICT RESPONSE TO EACH TREATMENT
MODALITY?
Using percentage changes on the BDI as the criterion variable,
most of the outcome variables were employed as predictor variables in
three multiple regression analyses, one for each treatment, to try
and establish which variables would best predict response.
The data indicated that for cognitive therapy and drugs combined,
long duration of illness was a negative predictor and high level of
education a positive predictor. For cognitive therapy alone, again long
duration of illness was a negative predictor as was a relatively positive
view of the world; in other words, patients with a relatively high
negative view of the world did better on cognitive therapy. With respect
to drugs, being a patient attending a general practice such as the Leith
surgery and having a large discrepancy between current self-image and
concept of ideal self {low self-esteem) were negative predictors. To
state these in positive terms: (l) the shorter the length of illness
and the higher the level of education, the greater the improvement with
combination treatment, (2) the shorter the length of illness and the more
negative the expressed view of the world, the greater the improvement with
cognitive therapy alone, and (3) being treated in a psychiatric outpatient
department" and reporting relatively high self-esteem will result in
greater improvement with drugs.
Thus, the prognosis for people receiving the different treatments-
was largely determined by factors dependent on the natural history of
the depressive disorder, treatment setting, educational level and
cognitive parameters.
The greater improvement predicted for patients who present with short
duration of illness was an expected finding. Prior chronicity, as
reflected by longer current depressive episode has been implicated as a
poor predictor of response to pharmacotherapy (Kerr et al., 1972; Paykel
et al., 1974). Poor outcome has also been associated with a history of
more previous illnesses (Paykel et al. , 1973; Uiittenborn et al., 1973),
this being perhaps another dimension of prior chronicity (Paykel, 1979).
Kiloh et al. (1962) reported that insidious onset without precipitants
but with duration less than one year indicated favourable response to
chemotherapy; and in a recent study of outcome of antidepressant drug treat¬
ment in psychiatric outpatients and general practice, Tyrer et al. (1980)
found that absence of chronic illness was significantly related to a good
outcome.
That treatment setting predicted outcome in the pharmacotherapy group
in this particular investigation is hardly surprising. The poor response
to drugs in the general practice group, as seen in the analyses of covariance,
was simply confirmed in the multiple regression analysis.
A number of empirical studies indicate a positive relationship between
improvement and educational attainment, this being true, on the whole,
for both pharmacotherapy (Raskin et al., 1974; Rickels et al., 1964;
Downing and Rickels, 1972; Bielski and Friedel, 1976) and psychotherapy
(Garfield, 1978; Luborsky et al., 1971). However, as Garfield points
out, and as is so common in psychotherapy research in particular, the main
criterion of outcome in most of these investigations has been therapist
ratings. These ratings could well have suffered from a lack of objectivity
because of therapists' possible preference for middle-class patients.
Meltzoff and Kornreich (1970), in their review of the area, reached the
conclusion that the evidence was not entirely convincing and that educational
level is not a potent factor in prognosis. It is to be noted that in
this investigation educational level was not a predictor of response to
cognitive therapy alone, the treatment which, in practice, was most obviously
linked to the patient's ability to use the terms and concepts of the
therapist.
As discussed above, recent work on preparing the patient for psycho¬
therapy suggests that educational level, and perhaps intelligence, may be
less significant than originally thought. It may be more important to
provide the patient with specific information about the process of psycho¬
therapy and his required participation than to attempt to establish the
basic levels of education and intelligence needed (Bloch, 1979). This
possibility is supported by the finding that the general practice patients
were able to use the cognitive approach after detailed discussion of what
they were likely to experience in the course of treatment.
The relationship between specific cognitive aspects of depression
(e.g. components of the negative cognitive triad) and outcome has not
received much attention in the literature. However, the findings
reported here suggest that this could be a fruitful area of research.
It may be that patients who are preoccupied with certain kinds of psycho¬
logical difficulties (e.g. negative bias against the world and themselves)
may benefit most from time-limited psychotherapies designed specifically
to alleviate these problems and which could be given alone or in conjunction
with drugs.
That cognitive factors were related to outcome as opposed to other
symptoms (e.g. anxiety, depressed mood) point to the importance of
attitudes (Beck, 1976) as potential predictors of outcome.
With regard to premorbid personality, a history of 'neurotic* traits
has been reported to predict a poor response to tricyclic drugs (Kiloh
et al. , 19 62; Deykin et al. , 1972). By way of comparison, Kupfer et al„
(1975), studying unipolar depressed outpatients, found premorbid traits
of chronic anxiety and obsessiveness to be related with a positive
response to tricyclics in patients with recurrent endogenous depression,
who are said to have premorbid traits of excessive orderliness,
conscientiousness and dependency (\/on Zersson, 1977), it is clear that a
history of at least certain 'neurotic' traits does not militate against re¬
sponse to drugs. Some of the confusion in this area may result from
differing views about the nature of the term 'neurotic traits' (Stern
et al.. 1980).
These studies notwithstanding, relatively little attention has been
paid in the research literature to the role of personality as a predictor
of clinical course and long term outcome (Weissman et al. , 1978). The
research that has been done has involved the use of very broad personality
factors such as neuroticism and extraversion (Eysenck et al. , 1964).
However, the measures used (e.g. the Maudsley Personality Inventory) do
not assess dimensions of personality such as regulation of hostility,
dependency and obsessional features that have been identified in the
clinical literature as related to predisposition to depression. Further¬
more, none of the measures are geared to assess specific schemas which
Beck (1976) sees as crucial aetiological features of depression. In
theory, it is schemas, or cognitive templates, that selectively filter
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experience in specific ways which result in the affective temperaments
mentioned above, and which make the individual prone to being highly self-
critical, seeing the world as overwhelmingly demanding, and regarding his
future in a pessimistic light.
Follow-up studies of depressed subjects should be conducted which
include, in addition to broad personality measures, some of the newer
measures developed specifically for depressed patients, e.g. Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale (Weissman, 1978, personal communication) and being tested
by members of the University of Pennsylvania staff.
The study of the relationship between aspects of personality and
long term outcome is an important area as evidenced by a recent article
by UJeissman et al. (1978). In a follow-up investigation of female depressed
patients who had been treated on an outpatient basis, they found that the
most important predictor of long-term outcome (i.e. eight months, two
and four years after the acute episode) was personality as assessed by the
neuroticism scale of the Maudsley Personality Inventory. Only the
neuroticism scale differentiated chronic and non-chronic patients, with
chronic patients being more neurotic than non-chronic patients. It may
be that highly neurotic individuals have a repertoire of dysfunctional
cognitive schemas which put them at greater risk for developing chronicity.
Future longitudinal studies of depression should consider the possible
relationship between dysfunctional schemas (attitudes), neuroticism and
outcome.
In this study, multiple regression analysis was used to determine
predictors of response to the combination of cognitive therapy and drugs,
cognitive therapy alone and pharmacotherapy. It should be remembered
however, that some criticisms of regression techniques have been put
forward which undermine the confidence that can be placed in the findings
reported here. For example, Klein et al. (1969, in Paykel, 1979) have
noted that psychiatric rating variables frequently do not meet the
assumptions for regression. Paykel (1979) has summarised the problem as
follows: 'Distributions are often skewed, and may be 3-shaped or U-shaped
Relationships between variables may be heteroscedastic, curvilinear rather
than linear, and interactive rather than additive. Findings based on
multiple regression are often hard to replicate. In maximising the variance
in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictor variables, the
multivariate technique may capitalise heavily on relationships which
are chance findings or are specific to the sample and cannot be replicated
in new samples' (P. 195).
In spite of these difficulties, the results from the multiple regression
provide some useful information in that they confirm the negative relationship
between long duration of illness and short-term outcome reported by many
researchers (see above, also Rogers and Clay, 1975, chapter 2, p. 16 )
and raise questions for future research. As an extension to the regression
method, an attempt was made further to identify variables which could
predict response to each treatment by computing a discriminant function
analysis using hypothetical categories, i.e. predicted treatment groups
comprising 'cases' assigned to each group on the basis of the regression
equations obtained from the multiple regression analysis. In view of
the highly abstract nature of this last analysis, the data based on it need
not be included as a central feature of the discussion. However, a
complete description of the rationale and the analysis itself appears in
Appendix XIX.
A final point may be raised as regards prediction of response to each
of the three treatments investigated in this thesis. The results
indicated that pattern of symptoms as defined by the categories 'endogenous*
and 'non-endogenous' did not predict response to combination treatment,
cognitive therapy alone, or pharmacotherapy alone. That is, endogenous
patients responded as well to cognitive therapy as they did to drugs and
combination treatment. To the extent that it is valid to speak in terms
of 'non-psychotic endogenous depression', the data are consistent with
earlier studies (e.g. Abraham et al. , 1963; Spear et al. , 1964) which
failed to find a relationship between endogenous symptom pattern and specific
response to chemotherapy. On the other hand, the results contrast sharply
with studies which have shown a strong association between symptom pattern
and response to pharmacotherapy (Ball and Kiloh, 1959; Kiloh et al. , 1962).
The disagreement among researchers in this area is due perhaps to the
differing conceptions of what constitutes 'endogenous' depression. In
fact, the criteria used to define 'endogenous' depression in this thesis,
i.e. Spitzer's RDC (Spitzer et al. , 1978), have been criticised for
being overinclusive (see chapter 5, p. 222).
H. LIMITATIONS IN THE METHODOLOGY
Previous sections of the discussion have touched upon various inter¬
pretations of the findings. The next section will consider possible
methodological flaws or other factors that could account for the results.
One flaw in the design of the present study is that no provisions
were made to control for previous treatment response and spontaneous
remission. It is possible that the good outcome seen for cognitive
therapy alone in both populations could have been obtained because the
patients would have got better no matter what kind of treatment they
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received. This criticism may be addressed in two ways. First,
the hospital group had a long history of depression and many had been
treated without success before their admission into the study. More¬
over, both groups reported moderate levels of depression at intake
and considerable levels of psycopathology as documented by PSE ratings.
Thus, for the hospital group at least, the psychiatric histories high¬
light a group more likely to be treatment resistant than responsive to
therapy. Secondly, as in the Rush et al. (1977) study, the drug treat¬
ment group in the hospital sample showed a good response rate (17%) as
defined by at least 50/£ decrease in self-reported depression (BDI).
The degree of response exceeds the median rate for spontaneous.remission
(43/£, range 13-67/^)- discussed by Bergin et al. (1978) in their review,
as do the response rates for the other treatment groups, except for the
general practice drug group, i.e. HOSPITAL SAMPLE: combination = 11%,
cognitive therapy =s 57%; GENERAL PRACTICE: combination = 99%, cognitive
therapy = 100^, drugs = 14^. By way of comparison, only 50^ of the
patients in the pharmacotherapy group in the Rush et al. study met this
criterion of significant clinical improvement (50^ of pre-treatment
BDI scores). The very fact that the general practice drug group showed
such a poor response also argues against the idea that the patients would
have responded to virtually any intervention.
Another criticism that can be made is that the doctors in both clinics
initially selected patients for referral to the trial on the basis of
individual implicit clinical criteria. For example, a hospital psychiatrist
could have referred mainly therapy resistant cases, thinking that cognitive
therapy was 'worth a try', whereas the general practitioner could have
selected socially disadvantaged people who, he reckoned, might benefit
from regular talks with 'a good listener' who could offer advice about the
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best ujay to deal with social problems. Such differential selection
is a serious problem which threatens the extent to which results can be
generalised to a wider population.
While pre-selection may well have occurred in both clinics and was
outwith the control of the experimenters, treatment assignment was random.
No attempt was made to match the treatment groups for age, sex, history
of illness, social class, educational level or severity of psychiatric
symptoms (PSE). However, the dimensions which differentiated the two
populations, i.e. duration of illness, PSE total scores, educational level
and social class, were controlled in the statistical analyses, making the
treatment groups relatively comparable.
A potentially serious flaw in the design is that there could have
been considerable variation in the way that the clinical assessors rated
patients on the Hamilton scale. Obtaining reliability data proved to be
very difficult as a number of consultant psychiatrists and senior registrars
conducted the assessments on a rotational basis. An attempt was made
initially to have both an observer and an interviewer at each assessment
which would have provided the necessary information to do a proper re¬
liability check. However, time constraints and limited resources prohibited
adequate implementation of this plan.
In this context, it could be argued that, since the assessors were
not always blind as to treatment allocation, bias in favour of combination
treatment, or cognitive therapy alone may have affected their evaluations.
However, one reassuring point may be raised concerning the objectivity of
the assessors. Since this study was carried out by the Brain Metabolism
Unit, it is fair to say that the bias of the staff is strongly pharmacological,
yet the ratings of the progress of patients on drugs do not reflect this
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bias. Furthermore, it is doubtful that blindness can be maintained
reliably in treatment studies comparing drugs with a psychotherapy
technique.
Another problem with the design of this study is that duration of
therapist contact was far longer in the combination and cognitive
therapy groups than in the pharmacotherapy groups. It is thus not clear
whether the effects observed for combination treatment and cognitive therapy
were due to the specific components of the cognitive treatment (working
through an interaction with drugs or on its own), or to the substantial
directive therapist contact given to the 'cognitive' patients.
It is true that greater therapist-patient contact could help to
explain the good response seen for combination treatment and cognitive
therapy alone. However, in designing psychotherapy outcome studies which
employ a drug control group, it may not always be essential to balance the
groups in terms of frequency of contact and therapy time, for, as Rush
et al. (1977) note, 'the studies that established the efficacy of pharmaco¬
therapy for depressed outpatients used a once-a-week minimal contact
design' (p. 34).
This criticism may be countered also by findings which show the super¬
iority of drugs over various forms of psychotherapy (e.g. Covi et al.,
1974; Friedman, 1975). If the total amount of time spent with therapists
were the only factor relevant to outcome, then the psychotherapies in¬
vestigated in these studies should have been more effective than drugs in
reducing depressive symptoms.
Marks (1978) makes the point that psychological treatments for
depression which involve a great deal of therapist time can only be
justified if the results are 'outstandingly and lastingly' (p.533) better
than conventional treatment with drugs since the latter are more cost-
effective. The data reported here do not indicate that cognitive therapy,
with or without drugs, is necessarily 'outstandingly' better than chemo¬
therapy, but they do support the contention that both are effective ways
of treating depression, with combination treatment offering the greatest
hope in relieving symptoms. The question of whether cognitive therapy
provides a more lasting effect than drugs remains to be determined. It
is hoped that the follow-up part of this study will shed light on this
important dimension of psychotherapy research.
The importance of interpersonal and psychological factors in the
treatment of depression should not be underestimated. The issue of
therapist-patient contact simply underscores the need to determine to
what extent this variable influences outcome, whether the treatments
being investigated are physical, psychological, or a combination of the
two.
Some factors related to the expectational sets of the therapists and
patients, particularly in general practice, and features of the treatment
setting were discussed earlier. On this point, the question could be
raised as to whether the therapists' motivation to administer cognitive
therapy and the amount of enthusiasm conveyed in the therapy sessions may
have had a strong nonspecific treatment effect. This criticism cannot
be dealt with by trying to minimise the role of therapist motivation.
Obviously, both psychologists were highly motivated to become 'cognitive
therapists' as evidenced by the amount of effort put into learning the
techniques, not to mention the fact that they were prepared to take on a
caseload of depressed outpatients, many of whom were suicidal (see appendix
XI) and treat a considerable number with psychotherapy only, which proved
to be a demanding experience to say the least. On the other hand, as
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in studies which reported the superiority of cognitive therapy over other
kinds of psychological treatment (e.g. Shaw, 1977), the therapists, being
based on a pharmacological unit, had no a priori commitment to cognitive
therapy. It is important to remember, too, that there is no reason
to believe that a consultant psychiatrist (or his team of highly motivated
and pharmacologically-oriented registrars) would be any less enthusiastic
about the potentially dramatic effect of drug therapy combined with
supportive psychotherapy.
Although enthusiasm and dedication to cognitive therapy may have
contributed to the effects observed for cognitive therapy alone and
combination treatment, this variable further supports the argument
for more research into the relationship between therapist qualities,
interactional processes in psychotherapy, and outcome (Parloff et al. ,
1978).
Turning to general problems related to measurement, this treatment
study fulfilled an important requirement of any therapeutic trial by
including independent assessments of patients in the different treatment
groups. However, as in many studies of this kind, the results rest
heavily on self-ratings. These measures are problematic in that they
might be especially prone to change with cognitive behavioural treatments
which might be effective in training the patient in new cognitive styles,
that are simply reproduced in self-ratings but which are not generated by
less verbally-directive control conditions, such as pharmacotherapy and
non-specific, supportive psychotherapy. It is thus not clear, for
example, whether the quicker response rates seen for combination treatment
and cognitive therapy (BDI, HS) were due to the actions of each treatment,
or to the fact that patients in these groups by virtue of their exposure
to the 'cognitive therapy style', had been verbally conditioned to respond
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in a way that favoured psychotherapy. It is difficult to refute this
argument as cognitive therapy is geared in part to focusing on and re¬
ducing verbalised affective pain (and its associated cognitions) and
hopelessness in particular.
Differential response set and the effect it has on self-ratings is
an important factor which must be considered in the interpretation of the
results of this study. To control for this variable, future studies
should employ, in addition to self-rating scales, behavioural measures of
depression such as that used by Dunn (1979, see p. ) which would be
perhaps less sensitive to contaminating effects of response set. An
alternative way to analyse the behavioural measures used in this study,
i.e. intra-individual correlations with Z score transgfrmations for group
comparisons, might also yield more convincing results and provide data
that might Q.ff§B:t the problem of response set in self report scales.
Another difficulty with the present investigation and this is true
for many treatment studies (Kazdin and Wilson, 1978), is that'the outcome
criteria used may not be totally adequate for assessing the effects of
the different treatments. Group differences, in terms of magnitude
of mean change in reducing depressive symptoms, provide an extremely limited
criterion for comparing treatments or for evaluating a given treatment.
While an additional criterion was used in this study (i.e. the proportion
of patients who improved markedly), several other related criteria need to
be considered in future short-term studies. These should include, for
example, the clinical significance or overall importance of the improvement
effected in the individual patient (i.e. does improvement enhance the
patient's everyday functioning in such areas as employment and social and
married life?). Another criterion suggested by Kazdin and Wilson (1978)
would be breadth of change, or range of therapy effects (e.g. does
'improvement' mean that the patient is better able to cope with problems
outside of the direct therapeutic focus on the defined problem?).
One way to assess this might be to have the patient monitor life events
on a regular basis over the course of treatment, identify these as
desirable or undesirable, and then rate how effectively he thinks he has been
able to deal with the undesirable events. This might also help the
clinician to determine to what extent changes in symptoms, for example, were
due to the treatments given or factors outwith the treatment setting.
The concurrent validity of the measures, while far from what was hoped for
was satisfactory except for the behavioural measures. Of special interest
were the findings on the semantic differential. The highly significant
correlations between the concepts relevant to Beck's theory (views of self
and world = .60; self and future = .58; and world and future = .51, all at
p = < .001) provide further indirect support for a major component of the
cognitive model of depression.
Criticisms which have been leveled against the semantic differential,
e.g.. lack of internal consistency of scales alleged to be measuring a
single factor, and a high degree of concept-scale interaction (Idarr and
Knappen, 1965; Presley, 1969), do not apply to the use of the semantic
differential made in this study as no attempt was made at this point to
work out factorial dimensions of the scale. The bipolar adjectives used
were, on the whole, those clinically used to elicit the three factors of
semantic differential analysis, i.e. evaluation, potency and activity.
These bipolar scales were scored only for their positive and negative
prime facie characteristics. Future studies are planned which set out
to examine the factorial dimensions of the scales.
Finally, an obvious flaw in the present research is the small size
of the sample, particularly in the general practice setting where there
were less than ID patients in each group. It is possible that the
outcome of this study would have been quite different had larger numbers
of subjects been involved. A large sample might further detect between-
group differences in post-treatment scores.
In spite of the shortcomings of the current investigation, the
results have numerous practical applications and highlight areas for
future research. Given further cross validation of the present findings
with larger samples, combined cognitive therapy plus drugs and cognitive
therapy alone may become recognised as effective ways of treating moderately
depressed hospital and general practice patients.
I. SOME INTERPRETATIONS AS TO WHY COGNITIVE THERAPY WORKS
One major finding of this study is that each treatment was effective
in alleviating depression, yet why this was so is not clear.
Most of the current theoretically derived psychological therapies
assume that depressed patients show specific competence deficits and treat¬
ment addresses the problem thought to be most critical. Beck (1976)
sees depressed patients as manifesting cognitive deficits (e.g. negative
cognitive triad): treatment is aimed at changing negative thoughts (Rush
et al. , 1977). Fuchs and Rehm (1977) see self-control as a critical problem
and aim therapy at restoring self-control. Grof (1977) has demonstrated
that increasing mood-related pleasant activities is more effective than self-
monitoring mood related activities or increasing non-mood related activities.
These different approaches to enhancing a specific competency have
been effective in reducing depression. The assumption behind all of these
studies is that therapeutic results were obtained because the treatment
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was effective in selectively influencing the specific target behaviour.
Zeiss et al. (1979) point out that with few exceptions these investigations
did not show that the target behaviours (e.g. negative thoughts, or low
rates of self-reinforcement) were selectively affected. Rather, they
showed only that level of depression was reduced as predicted. The
present study demonstrated that cognitive variables were affected by the
cognitive treatments but this occurred for pharmacotherapy as well. How
can these data be explained?
With regard to cognitive therapy, one explanation could be that treat¬
ment did, in fact, change depression-inducing cognitions. This contention
receives support from a recent study by Rush et al. (1979). They found
that, while both cognitive therapy and drug therapy significantly reduced
hopelessness and improved self-concept, cognitive therapy resulted in more
marked improvements in self-concept. Moreover, cognitive therapy was
associated with an earlier and greater impact on hopelessness than pharmaco¬
therapy, a finding borne out by the present study. These data suggest
that cognitive therapy may have had a specific effect on the target for
change, i.e. negative thoughts.
An equally plausible explanation has been put forward by Bandura
(1977). He argues that whether a psychological therapy aims for specific
or more global changes (e.g. Kelly, 1955; Rogers, 1970), it must change
the patient's sense of personal efficacy, i.e. the expectation that he can
perform the behaviours necessary to achieve desired outcomes. This,
according to Bandura, is often best accomplished through performance-
based procedures with a relatively specific focus. By learning to cope
effectively with a problem, the patient becomes more confident in his
ability to handle life's problems.
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Bandura's self-efficacy model has received indirect support in an
interesting study concerned with nonspecific improvement effects in the
treatment of depression. Zeiss et al. (1979) treated depressed out¬
patients with therapies which focused on either interpersonal skills,
negative cognitions or pleasant events. The results indicated that all
treatments were successful in alleviating depression but none had treatment-
specific effects on a single class of behaviour. The authors concluded,
'the treatments affected depression because all treatments provided train¬
ing in self-help skills, thus increasing the patient's expectations of
mastery and encouraging the perception of greater positive reinforcement
as a function of the patient's greater skillfulness. This effect was
independent of the specific training offered in any treatment module'
(p. 438).
Other explanations concerning the efficacy of psychotherapy are grounded
in research related to the study of nonspecific treatment variables thought
to characterise all therapies - patient-therapist roles, expectations of
improvement, therapy 'rituals' (Bergin and Suinn, 1975; Gomez-Schwartz,
et al., 1978).
Pharmacotherapy may influence cognitive factors in a less direct way
than specific psychotherapies. It may be that drugs, through intervention
at the biochemical level (Akiskal and McKinney, 1975), restores the homeo-
static balance thought to be disrupted by depressive illness, with cognitive
changes occurring secondarily as the organism achieves a greater degree of
physiological equilibrium.
Combined cognitive therapy and drugs would operate presumably at both
the biological and psychological levels simultaneously. This multi-level
action might account for the somewhat superior effect observed for combinatioi
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treatment in the hospital group. Against this theoretical framework,
the equivalent effect seen for combination treatment and cognitive
therapy in general practice is hard to explain. Factors related to
compliance and the expectations of both the therapists and patients in
the general practice setting and sample size could account for the lack
of a superior effect for combination treatment.
It is worth emphasising, in summary, that this research, being an
outcome study, has no pretensions of delineating therapeutic processes.
The ideas discussed in this section are largely speculative, although they
are based on some observations.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. The present study has concentrated upon examining the scope and
limitations of cognitive therapy alone and in combination with pharmaco¬
therapy in the treatment of depressed outpatients. The attempt to utilise
cognitive therapy to treat moderately depressed hospital and general
practice patients has largely substantiated the expectations arising from
previous research in which this form of psychotherapy has been found to
be effective. Thus, cognitive therapy appears to be a strong contender
as one of the most effective interventions for the treatment of clinical
depression. For hospital outpatients it is at least as effective as
pharmacotherapy and,for responders as a group, it appears to provide more
rapid improvement than pharmacotherapy in reducing both affective and cog¬
nitive symptoms of depression. Cognitive therapy seems to be a particularly
powerful technique for decreasing hopelessness, a cognitive feature of
depression which has been shown to predict suicide.
B. The findings from the sample of patients treated in Leith indicate
that cognitive therapy may be more effective than pharmacotherapy in
the treatment of the sort of depression seen in an urban family practice.
Moreover, it appears as though cognitive therapy has the potential to
attain parity with traditional methods of behaviour therapy in terms
of its applicability to a broad range of patients. This study has
demonstrated that patients from lower social class, having only a basic
level of education, can learn the cognitive therapy style. This
suggests, therefore, that some of the difficulties presented by socially
disadvantaged people can be handled in this way.
C. The results discussed in this thesis extend the limited findings
of previous research concerned with the use of psychological treatments
in conjunction with pharmacotherapy. From a clinical viewpoint, combined
cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy appearsto be more effective than
either treatment alone in reducing overall symptoms in hospital out¬
patients suffering from chronic, nonpsychotic depression. The effect
for combination treatment appears to be additive in this population in
the same way as Weissman et al. (1979) found interpersonal psychotherapy
and pharmacotherapy to be superior to either on its own. For those who
respond to therapy, combination treatment gives the added advantage of a
much quicker and sharper effect, in particular on hopelessness.
D. The finding that cognitive therapy with or without drugs is associated
with an earlier and greater impact on hopelessness than pharmacotherapy
in responders may have substantial clinical meaning for the initial
focus (i.e. hopelessness) of psychotherapy with depressed patients.
Moreover, it may help to explain why patients who show an initial
response to drug therapy are at some increased risk of committing suicide
(e.g. Silverstone, 1974). That is, hopelsssness and suicide intent may
remain high while motivation, through the onset of drug effects, is
increased. In these circumstances patients may be more inclined to act
on their intentions to harm themselves during this stage of pharmaco¬
therapy. Thus, cognitive therapy may be particularly better than the
supportive psychotherapy given with medication because of its specific
early impact on hopelessness.
E. For the less chronic general practice group, the equivalent effect
observed for combination treatment and cognitive therapy alone suggests
that drugs do nothing to enhance the effect of cognitive therapy administered
on an individual basis to patients in the doctor's surgery. It would
appear that if patients are to be treated for clinical depression in
general practice then cognitive therapy stands out as a viable alternative
to chemotherapy. The fact that cognitive therapy is less time consuming
than traditional psychotherapies and is feasible for a wide range of
patients make it very suitable for use in the general practice setting.
F. If the criterion of ease of dissemination of therapeutic technique
is invoked, then cognitive therapy fares particularly well compared to
traditional forms of psychotherapy which require extensive training,
supervision and experience. Using the teaching materials supplied by
Beck and his associates, the therapists involved in this study were able
to learn and practice cognitive therapy with a fair degree of success.
Thus, cognitive therapy appears to be a very teachable and easily disseminated
type of psychological treatment.
G. The results discussed in this thesis, as well as the author's day-
to-day experience in the clinic, argue strongly for a close collaboration
between the descriptive diagnostician, the biologically oriented psychiatrist
(or G.P.) and the behaviourally oriented psychotherapist. In short,
it appears that pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy cannot be regarded
as 'competitors' in the management of moderately depressed outpatients.
Rather, it would be more constructive to think of these treatments as
'allies', since this research provides tentative evidence that different
kinds of patients will respond to either drugs or cognitive therapy or a
combination of the two. The findings also provide further indirect support
for a multifactorial hypothesis in depression - hence for the management
of this disorder.
H. Whether short-term cognitive therapy with or without drugs offers
any special advantages over drugs alone in the prophylaxis of depression
is an important question. This hypothesis, however, can be tested only
through lengthy follow-up investigations which compare the relative
relapse rates of patients who received combination treatment, cognitive
therapy, or pharmacotherapy. The follow-up stage of this project
may help to address this crucial issue.
I. Some implications of the obtained findings for future research have
already been discussed. This study does not provide enough data to
say definitely that any one treatment modality in the hospital group
is statistically superior to any other, a problem which may be due to
the large variances in each treatment group. Similar studies that include
389.
larger and more homogenous samples might contribute more in the way of
statistical evidence that could support the significant clinical findings
obtained for the hospital outpatients in this study.
The multiple regression analysis used in this study allows for the
testing of specific hypotheses as regards the kind of people who are likely
to respond to combination treatment, cognitive therapy and drugs (p. 314
and appendix XIX ). Future research could be directed towards examining
whether the predictor variables obtained in this study are, in fact,
valid predictors of outcome.
No definite statement can be made about the efficacy of combination
treatment or cognitive therapy alone unless there is knowledge of out¬
comes o-f similar patients receiving alternative psychological treatments
(e.g. self-control therapy, interpersonal psychotherapy). This would
help to establish which of the psychological therapies were most beneficial
and, given the use of multiple outcome criteria, could shed light on the
specific effects, of the different treatments.
,Future clinical trials of cognitive therapy should also include
'inert treatment' groups (e.g. attention-by-assessment) to control
for the nonspecific effects of attention, as well as other ethically
feasible conditions (e.g. low contact, the nonscheduled treatment
method proposed by Weissman et al. 1979) which could be used to determine
whether the natural history of the depressive disorder can be influenced
by even minimal intervention, let alone the treatments under investigation.
Since cognitive therapy is an amalgam of behavioural and cognitive
techniques (e.g. graded tasks, assertion training, cognitive restructur¬
ing) much work needs to be done in teasing out the critical components
of the cognitive therapy package.
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Another concern for future research is to establish whether cognit¬
ive therapy, particularly when used in conjunction with drugs, has any¬
thing to offer severely ill depressed patients, such as psychotic,
hospitalised or bipolar patients.
There is a need to decide whether cognitive therapy has any beneficial
effect on general social adjustment and whether personality factors,
especially enduring attitudes, may be influenced by this form of treat¬
ment.
Finally, more research is needed to try and incorporate the various
approaches subsumed under the label 'cognitive therapy* into one con¬
sistent theoretical and treatment model.
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Describe: 1.Actualeventleading tounpleasantemotion, or 2.Streamofth ughts, daydream,orrecollection leadingtounpleasant emotion
1.Specifysad/ anxious/angry,etc. 2.Ratedegreeof emotion,1-100
1.Writeautomatic thoughtsapre¬ cededemotion(s) 0-100$
1.Writerational responseto automaticthought(s) 2.RatBbeliefin rationalresponse 0-100$
1.Re-rate beliefin automatic thoughts), 0-100$ 2.Specifyand ratesubsequent emotions,0-100
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APPENDIX III
Cognitive therapist competency checklist
Steve Bishop
General Comments:
Interpersonal factors and basic clinical skills appeared excellent.
Interest, warmth, sincerity, and especially enthusiasm were strong points.
Session was clearly within cognitive ball park (specific qualifications will
follow). There was some deficit in structural elements. An overt, stated
agenda was absent (although it was clear one was held in mind). The session
seemed to generally go with the flow of conversation, rather than follow a speci¬
fic structure. Balance between collaboration and didactically supplying cogni¬
tions or responses was a bit too weighted toward latter. Overall, session
was quite good.
Specific Comments: (loosely follows content and sequence of tape)
- Checking on events of past week good (although better in context of a complete
agenda. The implicit agenda appeared to be:
1) events of past week
2) jobs
3) guilt: a) abortion
b) separation
A) social relations: a) men
b) women
It would have helped had this been made explicit at start of session.
- Good positive reinforcement regarding patient's going through union channels
with her complaint. Empathetic comments good—acknowledging her feelings and the
difficulties of her position. Self-disclosure—good.
- Portion concerning drunk women at bar at patient's second job—"How'd you
handle it"—good, but primarily a behavioral question. Should have been coupled
with cognitive question—". . . and what thoughts did that bring to mind?"
Steve Bishop 2
- When patient said, "I was lazy," important not to let this slip by. Define as
symptom rather than personality trait.
"Bad feelings of husband having chosen someone else"—good in getting out
associated cognitions and assumptions. Might have defined in more concrete way—
listing reasons related to her for husband going elsewhere and reasons unrelated
to her—thereby dealing with self-attribution.
Having patient ''convince" you her good points as a wife—a good technique.
Re-attribution effectively accomplished by listing his bad qualities, or at least
referring to them.
"I can't stand swearing . . . gets me edgy." What are the specific cognitions
related. What intervenes to make this a noxious stimulus. Couple behavioral
approach, e.g., distraction (getting behind bar and turning attention to some¬
thing else) with cognitive approach.
Eliciting specific cognitions about abortion well done—especially in de¬
fining "cruel" and pointing out difference between cruel person and doing a cruel
act. Using idea of cruel-kind continuum good. Might have introduced concept
of percentage to counter all-or-nothing aspects.
"If were coming to you with this problem . . ."—good decentering technique.
Be aware of dangers of confronting a conviction (religious, moral, political,
etc.) directly. Taking a pragmatic approach (as eventually done) via looking
at consequence is more effective. Good in accepting her difficulties in this
area (i.e., abortion) and allow her to express some bad feelings.
Feedback on assigned homework—very good as was progress review of session
and course of therapy and review and writing down current homework.
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Competency Checklist for Cognitive Therapists
irapist Patient Date of Session
:er / / One-way mirror / / Videotape / V^udiotape
:e of Rating
Collaboration and Mutual Understanding
a. Therapist worked with patient even when using primarily an educative role.
b. Therapist asked for feedback.
'"c. Patient gave feedback.
1 d. Therapist asked for suggestions (or offered choices).
' e. Patient offered suggestions (or made choices).
f. Therapist responded to patient's feedback and/or suggestions; did not ignore
or negate them.
g. Therapist checked periodically for understanding of key points made by patient,
^h. Therapist spoke freely and seemed comfortable with the patient.
The patient spoke freely and seemed comfortable with the therapist.x.
Questioning
<^a. Therapist asked questions frequently.
"^b. Some questions were "open-ended."
^c. Some questions were inductive; they helped the patient arrive at a particular
conclusion or test a particular hypothesis.
"'"d. Some questions were asked to gather data.
■""e. Therapist did not "cross-examine" the patient; "trap" the patient, or make
the patient try to guess what the therapist has in mind.
Established Agenda (not applicable for first session)
a. Therapist established agenda for session.
b. Agenda items were specific and problem-oriented, rather than vague or general
topic areas.
■^c. At some point, therapist discussed events during the week since the last session.
d. Priorities for agenda items were established.
e. Agenda was appropriate for time allotment (neither too ambitious nor too limited)
Elicits Feedback





5. Structures Therapy Time Efficiently
t? a. Therapist covered most items on agenda and rescheduled unfinished business.
b. Therapist was flexible enough to include important issues that arose during
session but were not on the agenda.
—
c. Therapist stopped or limited time spent on peripheral or tangential topics.
^d. Therapist stopped or limited unproductive discussion on relevant topics.
6. Focuses on Appropriate Problem
v/1 a. Therapist identified specific problem(s) to focus on.
b. Identified problems were central to patient's distress rather than periphera
i^Tc. Identified problems were appropriate for treatment at this time.
j/" d. Identified problems were the key ones to focus on; the major problem was not
overlooked.
_^"e. Therapist concentrated on one or two problems instead of skipping around.
7. Elicits Automatic Thoughts
^3l. Specific automatic thoughts were identified.
^/b. Therapist helped patient identify thoughts rather than repeatedly point out
automatic thoughts to patient in a didactic fashion.
c. Therapist used appropriate techniques to elicit automatic thoughts
(circle techniques used);
"inductive questioning .^nood^shifts during session
imagery ^cJysfunctional thought record
role-playing
Therapist helped patient recognize connection between affect and specific
cognitions.
8. Tests Automatic Thoughts
a. Therapist tested or questioned automatic thoughts in some manner.
J/b. Therapist did not rely solely on didactic approaches (i.e., pointing out
irrationality).
W"
c. Therapist helped patient set up specific, testable hypotheses.
d. Therapist helped patient collect valid evidence systematically concerning
hypotheses.
///^e. Therapist helped patient evaluate evidence and draw conclusions from evidenc
ompetency Checklist
9. Identifies and Tests Underlying Assumptions
a. Specific underlying ("silent") assumptions were identified.
b. Therapist helped patient discover relevant assumptions from a joint analysis
of automatic thoughts.
Therapist did not rely solely on didactic counterarguments to evaluate
assumptions.
d. Therapist helped patient analyze validity of assumptions (e.g., by inductive
questioning or by listing advantages and disadvantages).
.0. Selects Appropriate Techniques
a. Techniques used were generally apprppriate for identified problems.
b. Techniques used were the most appropriate for identified problems
(e.g., preferable techniques were not overlooked).
c. Therapist executed techniques successfully.
d. Specific materials, instruments, and devices:
activity schedule: summary
activity schedule:planning
mastery and pleasure ratings
list of main points for patient
reading assignment








videotape of session for patient
audiotape of session for patient
"waIkie-1alkie"
questionnaires to elicit new material





1. Provides Progress Summaries
/fa. Therapist periodically recapitulated or reformulated problems being worked on
session.
^b. Therapist explained rationale for techniques or approaches used during session.
<^c. Therapist summarized progress made on identified problems during the session
(problem closure).
■ d. Therapist assessed (for patient's benefit) progress thus far in therapy and
future plan.
e. Therapist and patient achieved consensus regarding therapy progress.
ompc-tency Checklist
2. Assigns Homework
a. Therapist carefully reviewed previous week's homework.
y
b. Therapist summarized conclusions derived, or progress made, from previous
homework.
c. Therapist assigned new homework,
v/ cd. Homework assignment was appropriate for identified problems.
e. Therapist explained rationale for homework assignment.
f. Homework was specific and details were clearly explained.
7 g. Therapist asked patient if he/she anticipated problems in carrying out homework
h. Therapist integrated patient's suggestions, if any, into the assignment.
3. Genuineness
a. Therapist seemed to be saying what he sincerely felt.. Seemed honest
and "real."
b. Therapist seemed open rather than defensive.
c. Therapist did not seem to be holding back impressions or information, or
evading patient's questions.
d. Therapist did not seem patronizing or condescending. Treated the patient as
an "ecrual."
Therapist did not seem to be playing the role of a therapist. Did not sound
contrived or rehearsed.
4. Warmth
""a. Therapist's tone of voice and non-verbal behavior conveyed warmth and interest.
X"b. The content of what the therapist said communicated concern and caring.
^'** The therapist did not criticize, disapprove, or ridicule the patient's behavior.7
d̂. The therapist did not seem cold, distant, or indifferent.
7"e The therapist did not seem effusive, possessive, or over-involved.
f. The therapist responded to or displayed humor when appropriate.
5. Accurate Empathy
a. The therapist accurately summarized what the patient explicitly said.
b. The therapist accurately summarized the patient's most obvious emotions
(e.g., sadness, anger).
The therapist accurately summarized more subtle nuances of feeling or implicit
✓ belief.
d. The therapist communicated through his/her voice that he/she sensed the patient'
feelings and was responding to them.
jmpetency Check 11:
. The therapist did not inaccurately project his/her own problems,
conventional "wisdom" or attitudes derived from a particular theoretical
system onto the patient.
5. Professional Manner
Therapist's tone of voice and non-verbal behavior (e.g., posture) conveyed
confidence.
Therapist made clear statements without frequent hesitations or rephrasings.
c. Therapist took sufficient control of the session; did not seem too passive
by allowing patient to dominate session.
d. Therapist's appearance was "professional."












(Ninth edition of interview schedule, May 1973)
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Type of service or setting:




Live V/T A/T Film
Episode no.






The instruction manual contains a detailed description of the origins, development
and underlying principles of the PSE and a glossary of definitions of symptoms. The
examiner must be thoroughly familiar with the manual and glossary and should have
had some prior training in the use of the PSE.
Four kinds of question are written into the schedule:
(a) Obligatory (starred) questions
These must be asked if the interview is conducted at all. Only 54 questions are
involved. Thus subjects with no symptoms, who ask clarifying questions of their
own and who answer clearly and decisively, can be screened very quickly indeed.
Whenever there is any doubt, however, and certainly whenever a symptom needs
clarification, the second kind of question should be asked.
(b) Bracketed questions above cut-off points
These help to define the nature and extent of a symptom and should always be
asked if there is any doubt about replies to obligatory questions.
(c) Unbracketed questions below cut-off points
Once the examiner has proceeded below a cut-off point, he must ask all the un¬
bracketed questions in that part of the section.
(id) Bracketed questions below cut-off points
These serve the same function as similar questions above cut-off points, i.e. they
help to define the nature and extent of a symptom. They are used only if there is
some other evidence that the symptom is present.
In addition, the examiner himself will usually wish to ask other questions which
are not written into the schedule, either general probes or more specific questions,
depending on the nature of the patient's replies.
Each symptom is defined to some extent within the schedule itself but the
examiner must be completely familiar with the fuller definitions in the glossary.
A full discussion of scoring is also included in the glossary, particularly as to how to
differentiate (0) from (1), and (1) from (2).
(0) = Examiner satisfied that symptom not present to clinically significant degree
during past month.
(8) = Examiner not sure whether symptom present during past month, even
though the appropriate questions have been asked, and answered without incoher¬
ence or evasion. The symptom cannot be excluded.
(9) = No rating can be made because question not asked or subject does not
answer or answer is incomprehensible.
It should be emphasised that using the PSE schedule will not in itself guarantee
useful results. The quality of the output of any system depends on the quality of
the input.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The interviewer should introduce himself briefly, describe the purpose of the inter¬
view and explain about any recording equipment. The purpose of the introductory
section is to obtain an overall picture of the symptomatology, in the subject's own
words.
** To begin with, I should like to get an idea of the sort of problems that have
been troubling you during the past month. What have been the main
difficulties?
Record the main symptoms spontaneously mentioned.
Means of exploration, if subject gives inadequate information:
If subject's statement too brief Can you tell me more about that?
If subject has no more to add What else has been troubling you?
If statements are difficult to understand Can you explain what you mean by ..
If subject is vague Could you give an example of ... ?
If no other response forthcoming Why did you come to the (hospital)?
RATE PATIENT'S ACCOUNT OF SYMPTOMS.
0 = Subject responds adequately.
1 = Account somewhat inadequate but interview can proceed.
2 = Account seriously inadequate but interview proceeds in an
attempt to rate some subjective responses, as well as behaviour,
affect and speech. (see 140)
3 = Impossible to continue with interview. Only behaviour, affect and speech
sections rated.
REASONS FOR INADEQUACY (TICK AS MANY AS APPROPRIATE).
Denial or guardedness Inattention
Incoherence Refusal
Irrelevance Patient mute, stuporous, etc.
Replies too brief Other, specify
Poverty of content of speech
IF (1) OR (2) CARRY ON WITH SECTION 2, UNLESS SUBJECT MENTIONS OR
HINTS AT DELUSIONS OR HALLUCINATIONS -> SECTION 18.
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Current treatment, if subject not seen in hospital or clinic
Rate the following if sufficient information has already emerged.
If not, use the suggested question:
May I ask if you are seeing any doctor for your nerves?
Or specify if psychosomatic complaints.
What kind of doctor is he?
Your own GP? A private doctor? Psychiatrist?
0 = No doctor
1 = GP
2 = Private doctor other than GP
3 = Psychiatrist
4 = Hospital out-patient (other than psychiatric)
5 = Other paramedical specialist, or osteopath
6 = Other specify
Are you attending for treatment any person who is not medically qualified, e.g. lay
therapist, herbalist, acupuncture, faith healer, Christian Science, church which
forbids medical advice?
What were you complaining of at the time?
Specify type of treatment
Complaint
2. HEALTH, WORRYING, TENSION
** Is your physical health good?
(Does your body function normally?)
** Do you feel you are physically ill in any way?
(What is that like? How serious is it?)
RATE SUBJECT'S OWN SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF
PRESENT PHYSICAL HEALTH (irrespective of whether physical
disease is present).
0 = Feels physically very fit.
1 = Feels particular physical complaint but does not say positively feels fit.
2 = Feels unwell but not seriously incapacitated.
3 = Feels seriously incapacitated by physical illness.
□
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What does your doctor say is wrong?
(Have you had a physical illness recently; colds, influenza, etc.?)
RATE PRESENCE OF PHYSICAL ILLNESS OR HANDICAP,
taking results of recent investigations and physical state exami¬
nations into account.
0 = No physical illness or handicap present.
1 = Mild but significant physical illness or handicap (e.g. influenza or limp).
2 = More serious physical illness or handicap present but not incapacitating
or threatening to life (e.g. deafness or duodenal ulcer).
3 = Physical illness or handicap present which is incapacitating or threatening
to life (e.g. blindness or carcinoma).
Specify illness, disabilities and duration:
RATE PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS.
Special projects only
Have you worried a lot during the past month?
(What do you worry about?)
PROBE: (Money, housing, children, health, work, marriage, relatives, friends,
neighbours, other).
(How much do you worry? Are you a worrier?)
If any indication of worry, use further probes:
What is it like when you worry?
(What sort of state of mind do you get into?)
(Do unpleasant thoughts constantly go round and round in your mind?)
(Can you stop them by turning your attention to something else?)
RATE WORRYING: A round of painful thought which cannot
be stopped and is out of proportion to the subject worried about.
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate clinical
intensity or intense less than 50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of the month.
Have you had headaches, or other aches or pains, during the past month?
(What kind?)
RATE ONLY TENSION PAINS, e.g. 'band round head
'pressure ', 'tightness in scalp ', 'ache in back of neck etc., not [
migraine. I
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate clinical
intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of past month.
Have you been getting exhausted and worn out during the day or evening, even
when you haven't been working very hard?
RATE TIREDNESS OR EXHAUSTION: Do not include
tiredness due to 'flu, etc. = 9.
1 = Only moderate form of symptom (tiredness) present; or intense form
(exhaustion) less than 50% of the time.







Have you had difficulty in relaxing during the past month?
(Do your muscles feel tensed up?)
RATE MUSCULAR TENSION: Do not include a subjective
feeling of nervous tension, which is rated later.
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate clinical
intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of past month.
□ <7>
Have you been so fidgety and restless that you couldn't sit still?-
RATE RESTLESSNESS.
(Do you have to keep pacing up and down?)
1 = Only moderate form of symptom (fidgety, restless) present; or intense
form (pacing, can't sit down) less than 50% of the time.
2 = Intense form of symptom (pacing, etc.) present more than 50% of past
month.
□ <8>
Do you tend to worry over your physical health?
RATE HYPOCHONDRIASIS: Overconcern with possibility of
death, disease or malfunction. Re-rate at end of interview if
subject constantly reverts to hypochondriacal preoccupation.
Consider ratings of symptoms (1) and (3).
1 = Symptom present during past month, but not (2).
2 = Subject constantly reverts to hypochondriacal preoccupations during
interview.
I Iw
Do you often feel on edge or keyed up or mentally tense or strained?
(Do you generally suffer with your nerves?)
(Do you suffer from nervous exhaustion?)
RATE SUBJECTIVE FEELING OF 'NERVOUS TENSION':
There is no need for autonomic accompaniments for this
symptom to be rated present.
1 = Symptom definitely present during past month, but of moderate intensity,
or intense less than 50% of the time.
2 = Intense form of symptom present more than 50% of the past month.
I !<"»
Do you find that a lot of noise upsets you?
(Do noises sometimes seem to penetrate, or go through
your head?)
RATE HYPERSENSITIVITY TO NOISE.
1 = Moderate degree during month.
2 = Severe degree during month.
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3. AUTONOMIC ANXIETY
In this section, rate only subjective anxiety with autonomic accompaniments, either
free-floating or situational. Do not include worrying or nervous tension. Do not
include anxiety due to, e.g., persecutory delusions, except in the special item
(no. 13).




Difficulty getting breath Sweating
Dizziness Trembling)
** Have there been times lately when you have been very anxious or frightened?
(What was this like?)
(Did your heart beat fast?) Ask for other autonomic symptoms.
(How often in the past month?)
RATE FREE-FLOATING AUTONOMIC ANXIETY: Exclude
if due to delusions. Exclude if purely situational.
1 = Symptom definitely present, with autonomic accompaniment, during
past month, but of moderate clinical intensity, or intense less than 50%
of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of the time.
□ <">
** Have you had the feeling that something terrible might happen?
(That some disaster might occur but you are not sure what? Like illness or
death or ruination?)
(Have you been anxious about getting up in the morning because you are afraid
to face the day?)
(What did it feel like?)
RATE ANXIOUS FOREBODING WITH AUTONOMIC
ACCOMPANIMENTS.
1 = Symptom definitely present, with autonomic accompaniment, during
past month, but of moderate clinical intensity, or intense less than 50%
of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of the time.
RATE AUTONOMIC ANXIETY DUE TO DELUSIONS, etc.
and if necessary defer to end of interview.
0 = No anxiety due to delusions or hallucinations.
1 = Subject complains of anxiety but no evidence of anxiety on examination.
2 = Clearly anxious or frightened because of delusions or hallucinations.
□ (12)
□ (13)
CUT OFF IF NO EVIDENCE OF ANXIETY OR IF ANXIETY DUE ONLY
TO DELUSIONS -> SECTION 4.
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Have you had times when you felt shaky, or your heart pounded, or you felt
sweaty, and you simply had to do something about it?
(What was it like?)
(What was happening at the time?)
(How often during the past month?)
RATE PANIC ATTACKS WITH AUTONOMIC SYMPTOMS:
A panic attack is intolerable anxiety leading to some action to end it,
e.g. leaving a bus, phoning husband at work, going in to see a
neighbour, etc.
1 = One to four panic attacks during month
2 = Panic attacks five times or more.
Do you tend to get anxious in certain situations, such as travelling, or being alone,
or being in a lift or tube train?
(What situations? How often during the past month?)
(CHECK LIST: Can be presented on separate card and each item rated separately,
if needed.
Crowds (shop, street, theatre, cinema, church).
Going out alone; being at home alone.
Enclosed spaces (hairdresser, phone booth, tunnel).
Open spaces, bridges.
Travelling (buses, cars, trains).)
RATE SITUATIONAL AUTONOMIC ANXIETY.
1 = Has not been in such situations during the past month but aware that anxiety
would have been present if the situation had occurred.
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel anxious
because of it.
What about meeting people, e.g. going into a crowded room, making conversation?
(CHECK LIST: Present card if necessary:
Speaking to an audience.
Eating, drinking or writing in front of other people.
Parties.)
RATE AUTONOMIC ANXIETY ON MEETING PEOPLE.
1 = Has not been in such situations during the past month but aware that anxiety
would have been present if the situation had occurred.
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel anxious
because of it.
Do you have any special fears, like some people are scared of feathers or cats or
spiders or birds?
(CHECK LIST: Present card if necessary:
Heights, thunderstorms, darkness.
Animals or insects of any kind.





RATE ONLY SPECIFIC PHOBIAS, NOT GENERAL
SITUATIONAL ANXIETY.
1 = Has not been in such situations during the past month but aware that anxiety
would have been present if the situation had occurred.
2 = Situation has occurred during the past month and patient did feel anxious
because of it.
Do you avoid any of these situations (specify as appropriate) because you know you
will get anxious?
(How much does it affect your life?)
RATE AVOIDANCE OF ANXIETY-PROVOKING SITUATIONS.
1 = Subject tends to avoid such situations whenever possible.
2 = Marked generalisation of avoidance has occurred during past month, e.g.
subject has not dared to leave the house or has gone out only if accompanied.
Describe anxiety symptoms and list phobias.
□ <I7)
□ <18>
4. THINKING, CONCENTRATION, ETC.
** Can you think clearly or is there any interference with your thoughts?
** Do your thoughts tend to be muddled or slow?
(Can you make up your mind about simple things quite easily?) (Make decisions
about everyday matters?)
RATE SUBJECTIVELY INEFFICIENT THINKING (if due to
intrusion of alien thoughts, rate 9).
1 = Symptom definitely present during the past month, but of moderate
clinical intensity, or intense less than 50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense more than 50% of the past month.
** What has your concentration been like recently?
(Can you read an article in the paper or watch a TV programme right through?)
(Do your thoughts drift off so that you don't take things in?)
RATE POOR CONCENTRATION. I I
1 = Only moderate form of symptom present during the past month (e.g. can
read a short article, can concentrate if tries hard); or intense less than
50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically intense (cannot attempt to read or concentrate)
more than 50% of the past month.
** Do you tend to brood on things?
(So much that you even neglect your work?)
RATE NEGLECT DUE TO BROODING.
1 = Symptom has caused moderate impairment to work or social
relationships.




** What about your interests, have they changed at all?
(Have you lost interest in work, or hobbies, or recreations?)
(Have you let your appearance go?) f~
RATE LOSS OF INTEREST continuing during the past month. L
1 = Symptom definitely present during the past month, but of moderate
clinical severity or severe loss less than 50% of the time.
2 = Symptom clinically severe more than 50% of the past month.
** Have you become interested in new things at all?
IF EVIDENCE OF EXPANSIVE MOOD OR IDEAS -* SECTION 9.
IF ODD IDEAS, EXPLORE FURTHER. PROCEED TO SECTION 15
IF APPROPRIATE.
** Have you suffered any lapses of memory recently? (PROBE ONLY)
IF EVIDENCE OF DISSOCIATION OR ORGANIC MEMORY LOSS ^
SECTION 16.
ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS MAY SUGGEST THAT OTHER TYPES
OF THOUGHT DISORDER ARE PRESENT, IF NOT, CUT OFF ->
SECTION 5.
Cut off
IF ANY EVIDENCE OF THOUGHT DISORDER:
Are you in full control of your thoughts?
Can people read your mind?
Is anything like hypnotism or telepathy going on?
IF NECESSARY, PROCEED TO SECTION 13.
5. DEPRESSED MOOD
** Do you keep reasonably cheerful or have you been very depressed or low-
spirited recently?
Have you cried at all?
(When did you last really enjoy doing anything?)
RATE DEPRESSED MOOD. N.B. When rating clinical severity
of depression remember that deeply depressed people may not
necessarily cry. See definition in glossary.
1 = Only moderately depressed during past month, or deep depression for
less than 50% of the time and tending to vary in intensity.
2 = Deeply depressed for more than 50% of the past month, and tending to
be unvarying in intensity.
I I'23'
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** How do you see the future?
(Has life seemed quite hopeless?)
(Can you see any future?)
(Have you given up or does there still seem some reason for
trying?)
RATE HOPELESSNESS on subject's own view at present.
1 = Hopelessness of moderate intensity but still has some degree of hope for
the future (irrespective of time during month).
2 = Intense form of symptom (patient has given up hope altogether).
USE JUDGEMENT ABOUT WORDING.
** Have you felt that life wasn't worth living?
(Did you ever feel like ending it all?)
(What did you think you might do?)
(Did you actually try?)
RATE SUICIDAL PLANS OR ACTS.
1 = Deliberately considered suicide (not just a fleeting thought) but made no
attempt.
2 = Suicidal attempt but subject's life never likely to be in serious danger,
except unintentionally.
3 = Suicidal attempt apparently designed to end in death (i.e. accidental
discovery or inefficient means).
N.B. Examiner should judge clinically whether there was intent to end life or
not. If in doubt, assume not.
Cut off
IF EVIDENCE OF BOTH DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY RATE
ANXIETY OR DEPRESSION PRIMARY.
If subject suffers from both anxiety and depression, and both have been rated as
present, try to decide which is primary.
Which seems worse, the depression or the anxiety ? (Use patient's own terms).
0. Anxiety is primary. Depression appears to be entirely explicable
in terms of the limitations placed on the subject by the symp¬
toms of anxiety, e.g. being unable to leave the house, travel,
meet people, etc., or being afraid of heart disease because of
palpitations.
1. Anxiety and depression both present but seem independent of each other or
it is not possible to decide whether one of them is primary.
2. Depression is primary. Anxiety is either a result of the depression (e.g. subject
is frightened because of morbid or suicidal ideas) or it takes the form of fears
of catastrophe, forebodings about illness or death, dread of having to face the
day when first waking in the morning, preoccupation that something awful is






Is the depression worse at any particular time of day?
RATE MORNING DEPRESSION (particularly on waking)
0 = No depression.
1 = Not specially marked in mornings.
2 = Specially marked in mornings.
6. SELF AND OTHERS
** Have you wanted to stay away from other people?
(Why?)
(Have you been suspicious of their intentions? Of actual harm?)
RATE SOCIAL WITHDRAWAL.
1 = Only passive form of symptom, i.e. subject does not seek company but
does not refuse it if offered; or, if active withdrawal, less than 50% of
the month.
2 = Actively avoids company (refuses it if offered). Actively withdraws in
this way for more than 50% of the month.
** What is your opinion of yourself compared to other people?
(Do you feel better, or not as good, or about the same as most?)
(Do you feel inferior or even worthless?)
RATE SELF-DEPRECIATION.
1 = Some inferiority, not amounting to feeling of worthlessness. If subject
considers self to be worthless, this intense form of the symptom is
present less than 50% of the time.
2 = Subject considers self to be completely worthless. Symptom present
more than 50% of the month.
** How confident do you feel in yourself:
(For example, in talking to others, or in managing your relations with other
people?)
RATE LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE WITH OTHER
PEOPLE. Consider only competence in social relationships, not
competence at mechanical work, etc.
1 = Moderate lack of self-confidence, or intense lack less than 50% of the
month.
2 = Intense lack of self-confidence more than 50% of the month.
** Are you self-conscious in public?
(Do you get the feeling that other people are taking notice of you in the street
or a bus or a restaurant?)
(Do they ever seem to laugh at you or talk about you critically?)
(Do you consider people really are looking at you, or is it
perhaps the way you feel about it?)
RATE SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFERENCE (NOT DELUSIONS).
1 = Marked self-consciousness only (irrespective of time during month).







IF NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT, CUT OFF -»■ SECTION 7.
(IF EVIDENCE OF MISINTERPRETATIONS, DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE
OR PERSECUTION-> SECTIONS 15B, 15C.)
Cut off
IF EVIDENCE OF GUILT:
Do you have the feeling that you are being blamed for something, or even accused?
What about?
RATE GUILTY IDEAS OF REFERENCE. Do not include justifiable
blame or accusation. Exclude delusions ofguilt.
1 = Subject feels blamed but not accused (irrespective of time during month).
2 = Subject feels accused of some sin or misdemeanour. Not delusional
IF DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE MAY BE PRESENT -> SECTION 15B.
Do you tend to blame yourself at all?
(If people are critical, do you think you deserve it?)
RATE PATHOLOGICAL GUILT ONLY.
1 = Subject feels over-guilty about some peccadillo (irrespective of time during
month).
2 = Subject feels to blame for everything that has gone wrong even when not
his fault, but not delusional.
IF DELUSIONS OF GUILT MAY BE PRESENT -»■ SECTION 15G.
Do you blame anyone else for your troubles?
IF DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION SECTION 15C.
7. APPETITE, SLEEP, RETARDATION, LIBIDO
** What has your appetite been like recently?
(Have you lost any weight during the past three months?)
RATE LOSS OF WEIGHT DUE TO POOR APPETITE.
Do not include changes due to physical illness.
1 = Less than 7 lb (15 kg).
2 = 7 lb (1 5 kg) or more.
** Have you had any trouble getting off to sleep during the past month?
(How long do you lie awake?)
(What happens if you take sleeping tablets?)





RATE DELAYED SLEEP. I 1
^
1 = One hour or more delay (irrespective of sleeping tablets). I 1
2 = Two hours or more delay (irrespective of sleeping tablets).
(In either case, ten or more nights during month.)
** Do you seem to be slowed down in your movements, or to have too little
energy recently? How much has it affected you?
(Do things seem to be moving too fast for you?)
RATE SUBJECTIVE ANERGIA AND RETARDATION.
1 = Marked subjective listlessness and lack of energy.
2 = Marked retardation and underactivity (Irrespective of time during month).
IF NO APPETITE OR SLEEP DISTURBANCE, AND NO DEPRESSION,
CUT OFF -+ SECTION 8.
| |(36)
Cut off
IF SLEEP DISTURBANCE OR DEPRESSION:
Do you wake early in the morning?
RATE EARLY WAKING (one hour before usual).
1 = One hour or more before ordinary time.
2 = Two hours or more before ordinary time.
(In either case, ten or more nights during month.)
Has there been any change in your interest in sex?
RATE LOSS OF LIBIDO WITHIN PRESENT EPISODE OF
ILLNESS AND PERSISTING DURING PAST MONTH.
1 = Marked loss of interest and performance.
2 = Almost total loss of libido.
Does the depression or tension get worst just before the start of the monthly
period?
RATE PREMENSTRUAL EXACERBATION
0 = No definite exacerbation.





** Have you been very much more irritable than usual recently?
(How do you show it?)
(Do you keep it to yourself, or shout, or even hit people?)
RATE IRRITABILITY.
1 = Keeps irritation to himself.
2 = Shows anger by shouting or quarrelling.
3 = Shows anger by hitting people, throwing or breaking things.
(40)
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9. EXPANSIVE MOOD AND IDEATION
** Have you sometimes felt particularly cheerful and on top of the world, without
any reason?
(Too cheerful to be healthy?)
(How long does it last?)
RATE EXPANSIVE MOOD: not ordinary high spirits.
1 = Moderately expansive mood (euphoria with marked element of inappro-
priateness or excitement, whether recognised by subject or not), present
during past month, and persistent for hours at a time.* Do not include
transient high spirits. Not necessarily described by subject.
2 = Intense form of symptom (elation or exaltation) definitely present
during past month and persistent for hours at a time. Described by
subject.
** Have you felt particularly full of energy lately, or full of exciting ideas?
(Do things seem to go too slowly for you?)
(Do you need less sleep than usual?)
(Do you find yourself extremely active but not getting tired?)
(Have you developed new interests recently?)
RATE SUBJECTIVE IDEOMOTOR PRESSURE.
1 = Subjective equivalent of flight of ideas. Images and ideas flash through
the mind, each suggesting others, at a faster rate than usual. State persists
for hours at a time.* Definitely occurred during past month.
2 = As (1) but accompanied by very high energy output and activity which
does not seem to make subject tired at the time. Definitely occurred
during past month and persisted for hours at a time.*
IF NO EVIDENCE OF EXPANSIVE MOOD AND IDEATION, CUT OFF ->
SECTION 10.
Cut off
IF EVIDENCE OF EXPANSIVE MOOD AND IDEATION:
Have you seemed super-efficient at work, or as though you had special powers or
talents quite out of the ordinary?
Have you felt specially healthy?
Have you been buying any interesting things recently?
RATE GRANDIOSE IDEAS AND ACTIONS.
1 = Subjective feeling of superb health, exceptionally high intelligence, extra¬
ordinary abilities, etc. Persistent for hours at a time.* Symptom occurred at
some time during the month.
2 = Grandiose ideas have been translated into action during the month, e.g.
overspending, gambling, etc., under the influence of grandiose ideas and
expansive affect. Do,not include compulsive gambling unless clearly of this
type.
(^GRANDIOSE DELUSIONS, SECTION 15 D IF NECESSARY.)






These symptoms are usually experienced as occurring against conscious resistance
(see definition in glossary).
** Do you find that you have to keep on checking things that you know you have
already done?
(Like gas taps, doors, switches, etc.)
(Do you have to touch or count things many times or repeat the same action
over and over again?)
(What happens when you try to stop?)
RATE OBSESSIONAL CHECKING AND REPEATING.
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time.
2 = Symptom present in severe degree, more than 50% of the past month.
| | (44)
** Do you spend a lot of time on personal cleanliness, like washing over and over
even though you know you are clean? What about tidiness?
(Do you get worried by contamination with germs?)
(Do you have other rituals?)
(What happens when you try to stop?)
RATE OBSESSIONAL CLEANLINESS AND SIMILAR
RITUALS.
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time.
2 = Symptom present in severe degree, more than 50% of the past month.
□ (45)
** Do you find it difficult to make decisions even about trivial things?
(Do you constantly have to question the meaning of the universe?)
(Do you get awful thoughts coming into your mind even when you try to keep
them out?)
(What happens when you try to stop?) I
RATE OBSESSIONAL IDEAS AND RUMINATION. 1
1 = Symptom of moderate intensity or, if severe, present less than 50% of
the time.
2 = Symptom present in severe degree, more than 50% of the past month.
11. DEREALISATION AND DEPERSONALISATION
** Have you had the feeling recently that things around you were unreal?
(As though everything was an imitation of reality, like a stage set, with people
acting instead of being themselves?)
(What is it like? How do you explain it?)
RATE DEREALISATION.
1 = Moderately intense form of symptom definitely occurred during the past
month, and persisted for hours at a time. Things appear colourless and




2 = Intense form of symptom occurred during the past month and persisted
for hours at a time, e.g. whole world appears like a gigantic stage set, with
imitation instead of real objects and puppets instead of people. (If
delusional, do not rate here but symptom 90.)
** Have you yourself felt unreal, that you were not a person, not in the living
world?
(Or that you were outside yourself, looking at yourself from outside?)
(Or that you look unreal in the mirror?)
(Or that some part of your body did not belong to you?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE DEPERSONALISATION
1 = Moderately intense form of the symptom definitely occurred during the
past month and persisted for hours at a time. Subject feels himself unreal,
a sham, a shadow.
2 = Intense form of symptom definitely occurred during the past month and
persisted for hours at a time. Subject feels he is dead, not a person, living
in a parallel existence, a hollow shell, even that he does not exist. (If
delusional, do not rate here but symptom 90.)
12. OTHER PERCEPTUAL DISORDERS (NOT HALLUCINATIONS)
** Do you ever get the feeling that something odd is going on which you can't
explain?
(Or that familiar surroundings seem strange? How do you explain it?)
RATE DELUSIONAL MOOD: The subject feels that his familiar
environment has changed in a way which puzzles him and which
he may not be able to describe clearly. The feeling often accom¬
panies delusion formation.
1 = Symptom definitely present. No delusions have actually been formu¬
lated, though patient may feel that various delusional explanations are
possible.
2 = Full delusional elaboration has occurred.
** Does your imagination sometimes play tricks on you?
** Is there anything unusual about the way things look or sound, or smell, or
taste?
(Does your body function normally?)
(Is your own appearance normal?)
CONTINUE BELOW CUT-OFF IF NECESSARY, EVEN IF (49) NOT
PRESENT.




IF THERE IS ANY HINT OF PERCEPTUAL ABNORMALITY, CONTINUE
BEYOND CUT-OFF POINT AND ALSO CONSIDER LATER SECTIONS.
RATE ONLY BASIC EXPERIENCE, NOT DELUSIONAL ELABORATION.
In what way? Do sounds seem unnaturally clear or loud, or things look vividly
coloured or detailed?
(How do you explain this?)
RATE HEIGHTENED PERCEPTION: e.g. subject intensely aware
of cracks in a wall, details of a wallpaper pattern, colours in a picture.
Sounds heard with exceptional clarity, music appears particularly f
beautiful. I
1 = Subject unable to describe the symptom precisely, but examiner thinks it is
likely to have been present at some time during the past month.
2 = Subject describes symptom. Definitely present at some time (even if only
briefly) during the past month.
Do things seem dark or grey or colourless?
(How do you explain it?)
RATE DULLED PERCEPTION: The reverse of symptom (50).
Things look, sound and taste dull, flat, colourless and uninteresting.
1 = Subject unable to describe the symptom precisely, but examiner thinks it is
likely to have been present at some time during the past month.
2 = Subject describes symptom. Definitely present at some time (even if only
briefly) during the past month.
□ (51)
Does the appearance of things or people change in a puzzling way: e.g. distorted
shapes or size or colour?
(How do you explain it?)
RATE CHANGED PERCEPTION.
1 = Subject unable to describe the symptom precisely, but examiner thinks it is
likely to have been present at some time during the past month.
2 = Subject describes symptom. Definitely present at some time (even if only
briefly) during the past month.
Do you think your own appearance is normal?
(Conviction that nose is too large, teeth misshapen, body crooked, etc. Ask
questions here if convenient but rate symptom (89).)
rj<52>
Does your experience of time seem to have changed?
(Does it go too fast or too slowly, or do you seem to live through experiences
exactly as you have had them before?)
RATE CHANGED PERCEPTION OF TIME, INCLUDING j
DEJA VU. I
1 = Subject unable to describe the symptom precisely, but examiner thinks it is
likely to have been present at some time during the past month.
2 = Subject describes symptom. Definitely present at some time (even if only
briefly) during the past month.
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Do you feel you have lost your emotions in some way?
(That you are empty of all feeling, incapable of reacting emotionally?)
(Is this a definite change, or have you always been like that?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE LOST EMOTIONS: Rate only subjective loss of affect,
i.e. subject can remember being able to react emotionally, though
this might have been months or even years ago.
1 = Symptom definitely present during the past month but less than 50% of
the time.
2 = Symptom present more than 50% during the past month.
13. THOUGHT READING, INSERTION, ECHO, BROADCAST
IF QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN COVERED IN SECTION 4 ASK:
** Can you think quite clearly or is there any interference with your thoughts?
(Are you in full control of your thoughts?)
(Can people read your mind?)
(Is anything like hypnotism or telepathy going on?)
IF NO EVIDENCE OF THOUGHT READING, etc., CUT OFF -»
SECTION 14.
Cut off
IF ANY EVIDENCE, ASK QUESTIONS BELOW:
(These symptoms are often recorded as false positives. The examiner must be satis¬
fied that the subject is not simply assenting to a question he does not understand,
but genuinely recognises the experience and can describe it so that the examiner
recognises it.) It is particularly important to know the relevant sections of the
Instruction Manual well before rating these symptoms.
Are thoughts put into your head which you know are not your own?
(How do you know they are not your own?)
(Where do they come from?)
RATE THOUGHT INSERTION: Include only thoughts recognised
as alien. Do not include delusional elaboration, only basic experience.
(Exclude hallucinations,)
1 = Symptom described clearly, but subject thinks it may be due to 'own
unconscious thoughts' etc., i.e. not certainly alien.
2 = Symptom described clearly and thoughts described as alien, i.e. inserted into
mind from elsewhere (even if subject does not know from where). Not
hallucinations.
Do you ever seem to hear your own thoughts spoken aloud in your head, so that
someone standing near might be able to hear them?
(Are your thoughts broadcast, so that other people know what you are thinking?)




RATE THOUGHT BROADCAST. I 1
1 = Hears own thoughts 'spoken' aloud but not broadcast. Subject must really
hear them aloud in his head. If in doubt rate (8) or (0).
2 = Thoughts transferred or broadcast so that others can share subject's thoughts
even when they are not in the same room. (Do not include 'thoughts being
read' unless this is an explanation of thought broadcast. The subject must
actually experience his thoughts being available to others.)
Do you ever seem to hear your own thoughts repeated or echoed?
(What is that like? How do you explain it?)
(Where does it come from?)
RATE THOUGHT ECHO OR COMMENTARY.
1 = Thought echo. If any doubt, rate (8) or (0).-
2 = Subject experiences alien thoughts related to his own thoughts, i.e.
associations or comments on his own thoughts. Not hallucinations.
(57)
Do you ever experience your thoughts stopping quite unexpectedly so that there
are none left in your mind, even when your thoughts were flowing freely before?
(What is that like?)
(How often does it occur? What is it due to?)
Do your thoughts ever seem to be taken out of your head, as though some external
person or force were removing them?
(Can you give an example?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE THOUGHT BLOCK OR WITHDRAWAL.
1 = Thought block. Do not include if due to anxiety or lack of concentration;
only if it occurs totally unexpectedly when thoughts are flowing freely.
One single occasion is not sufficient for rating. Be very critical in rating this
symptom.
2 = Delusional explanation that thoughts are withdrawn.
| | (58)
Can anyone read your thoughts?
(How do you know? How do you explain it?)
RATE DELUSION OF THOUGHTS BEING READ: Only if subject
does not mean that people can infer his thoughts from his actions. j
(Do not include subject reading thoughts of other people -»• 76.) I
1 = 'Partial' delusion. Subject entertains the possibility that thoughts might be
read but is not certain about it. Exclude if subcultural explanation.
2 = Full delusion. Exclude if subcultural explanation. The term 'thought
reading' is commonly used to mean the ability to tell what someone is
thinking from the way they behave - this use should be excluded.
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14. HALLUCINATIONS
USE JUDGEMENT ABOUT WORDING.
** I should like to ask you a routine question which we ask of everybody. Do you
ever seem to hear noises or voices when there is no one about, and nothing else
to explain it?
(Do you ever seem to hear your name being called?)
** Is that true of visions or other unusual experiences, which some people have?
(Touch, taste, smell, temperature, pain, etc.)
IF NO EVIDENCE FOR HALLUCINATIONS OF ANY SENSE, CUT OFF-*
SECTION 15.
Cut off
IF EVIDENCE FOR NON-AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS ONLY
SUBSECTIONS 14B and 14C
14A. AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS
IF ANY EVIDENCE THAT AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS MIGHT BE
PRESENT:
Do you hear noises like tapping, or music? (What is it like?)
Does it sound like muttering or whispering?
Can you make out the words?
RATE NON-VERBAL AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS.
1 = Music, tapping, car engines, etc. Do not include tinnitus.
2 = Muttering, whispering but subject cannot make out any words at all.
What does the voice say?
(Write down examples of typical verbal hallucinations.)
(If accusatory: Do you think that it is justified? Do you deserve it?)
Do you hear your name being called?
RATE VERBAL HALLUCINATIONS BASED ON DEPRESSION
OR ELATION OR VOICE CALLING SUBJECT.
Content is congruent with mood; e.g. 'He's dirty', in context of depression, or
'Go to Westminster', in elated subject who thinks he is Prime Minister. Include
voice calling subject (e.g. calling name) or saying single words only. Be careful to
distinguish from delusions of reference in which people whom the subject can see
are thought to be talking about him.
RECORD EXAMPLES.
1 = Voice calling name, or single words only.
2 = Other verbal hallucinations; congruent with depressed mood.




Do you hear several voices talking about you?
Do they refer to you as 'he' (she)?
(What do they say?)
(Do they seem to comment on what you are thinking, or reading, or doing?)
RATE VOICE(S) DISCUSSING SUBJECT IN THIRD PERSON
OR COMMENTING ON THOUGHTS OR ACTIONS (NOT
BASED ON DEPRESSION OR ELATION).
Do not include muttering or whispering if subject cannot make out words. Exclude
'dissociative 'hallucinations (symptom 64). Do not include voice calling name or
affectively based verbal hallucinations (symptom 61). There may be one voice
commenting on subject's thoughts or actions, or several voices discussing the sub¬
ject in the third person.
RECORD EXAMPLES.
1 = Hears a voice or voices commenting on thoughts or actions in third person
(e.g. 'Now he's going to go to bed' or 'Why would he think a thing like
that?'). (2) not present.
2 = Hears voices talking about him/her in third person (e.g. 'I think he's a homo¬
sexual, don't you?' 'Yes, he wears a pink pullover, that's a sign of it.').
(1) may also be present.
Do they speak directly to you?
(Are they threatening or unpleasant?)
(Do they call you names?)
Do they give orders? (Do you obey?)
RATE VOICE(S) SPEAKING TO SUBJECT (NOT BASED ON
DEPRESSION OR ELATION).
Include voice(s) speaking directly to subject, whether accusing, threatening, giving
orders or giving information. Exclude voice(s) calling name or based on depression
or elation (symptom 61), or commenting on subject's thoughts or actions
(symptom 62). Exclude 'dissociative' hallucinations (symptom 63).
RECORD EXAMPLES.
1 = Pleasant, supportive or neutral voice(s), not based on affect. No hostile
voices.
2 = Hostile, threatening or accusing voice(s), thought to be undeserved and not
based on affect.
N.B. If single isolated words, even with neutral affect, include under 61 (1).
Can you carry on a two-way conversation with —?
(You can reply, and then — replies to you, and you reply again, just as in an
ordinary conversation?)
(Do you see anything, or smell anything at the same time as you hear the voice?)
(Who is it you are talking to?)
(What is the explanation?)
(Do you know anyone else who has this kind of experience?)
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The subject can hold a two-way conversation with a presence (variously described
as a person, ghost, spirit, god, etc.) which may also be sensed in other ways, e.g.
visually or by touch or smell. Often connected with people with whom the subject
has had strong affective ties. Visual hallucinations can occur alone. There is usually
a strong subcultural colouring, e.g. the subject belongs to a religious sect or to a
subcultural group which sanctions hallucinatory experiences, or the subject has been
under the influence of someone who is involved with such practices. Exclude
hypnogogic hallucinations.
RECORD EXAMPLES.
1 = 'Dissociative' hallucinations present. Subject belongs to subcultural group
or sect in which such experiences are sanctioned.
2 = 'Dissociative' hallucinations present. Subject does not belong to subcultural
group as in (1). If not known, rate (1).
Are these voices in your mind or can you hear them through your
1 = Subject hears both pseudo-hallucinations (within mind) and true hallucina¬
tions (through ears).
2 = Subject hears pseudo-hallucinations only.
3 = Subject hears true hallucinations only.
How do you explain the voice?
RECORD EXPLANATION.
14B. VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS
IF QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN COVERED IN SECTION 12 OR 14A, ASK:
** Have you had visions, or seen things other people couldn't see?
IF NO EVIDENCE, HERE OR ELSEWHERE, FOR VISUAL
HALLUCINATIONS CUT OFF-> SECTION 15.
IF ANY EVIDENCE OF VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS:
With your eyes or in your mind?
What did you see?
Were you half asleep at the time?
Has it occurred when you were fully awake?
Did you realise you were 'seeing things'?
Did the vision seem to arise out of a pattern on the wallpaper or a shadow?





RATE VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS: in clear consciousness
including pseudo-hallucinations. Exclude 'dissociative' visual
hallucinations (symptom 64).
1 = Formless visual hallucinations - flashes of light, shadows, etc.
2 = Formed visual hallucinations - people, objects like a 'fiery cross', faces, etc.
RATE DELIRIOUS VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS. I
14C. OTHER HALLUCINATIONS
IF QUESTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED IN PREVIOUS SECTIONS:
** Is there anything unusual about the way things feel, or taste, or smell?
** Does your body function normally?




IF ANY EVIDENCE FOR OTHER HALLUCINATIONS:
Do you sometimes notice strange smells that other people don't notice?
(What sort of thing?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE OLFACTORY HALLUCINATIONS: Exclude delusion that j
patient himself smells. I
1 = Simple olfactory hallucination. Not delusionally elaborated. Subject smells
oranges, death, a burnt smell, scent, etc., which other people cannot smell.
Can offer no explanation.
2 = Delusional elaboration in addition, e.g. gas being put into room.
Do you seem to think that you yourself give off a smell which is noticed?
(What is the explanation?)
RATE DELUSION THAT SUBJECT SMELLS: Do not include
simple preoccupation with body odour, e.g. in anxious subject who
sweats a lot.
1 = Subject irrationally thinks he gives off a smell but is not certain. Not sure
that others have noticed it but thinks it possible.
2 = Subject sure that he gives off a smell and that others have noticed it and
react accordingly.
Do you ever feel that someone is touching you, but when you look there is
nobody there?)
(Have you noticed that food or drink seems to have an unusual taste recently?)
| | (69)
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RATE OTHER HALLUCINATIONS AND DELUSIONAL
ELABORATION: Exclude hypochondriacal and nihilistic delusions
rated in (90) and (91).
1 = Sensation of touch, food tastes burnt, etc., but subject puzzled by the
experience. No delusional elaboration.












Delusions may be of two kinds, primary and secondary. Both kinds are rated
together in the following symptoms except where specified. For example, primary
delusions are specifically rated in symptom (82). They are defined here for
convenience.
Primary delusions are based upon experiences in which a subject suddenly be¬
comes convinced that a particular set of events has a special meaning (e.g. a subject
undergoing a liver biopsy suddenly felt he had been chosen by God). The delusion
cannot be explained and it is not shared by other members of the subject's cultural
or social group.
Secondary delusions are delusional elaborations of primary delusions or other
basic phenomena such as derealisation, depersonalisation, perceptual distortions,
hallucinations, thought echo, mood changes, etc.
Above cut-off questions, likely to elicit delusions if present, are included in many
of the preceding sections. There may also be evidence in the case-record or in the
subject's spontaneous account.
IF NO EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT DELUSIONS ARE PRESENT, CUT OFF -+
SECTION 16.
RECORD IF ANY PSYCHOTIC PHENOMENA PRESENT, OTHER THAN
DELUSIONS, USE JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER TO PROCEED BEYOND
CUT-OFF.
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IF ANY EVIDENCE FOR DELUSIONS, ASK ALL QUESTIONS NOT IN
BRACKETS, AND ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS WHICH SEEM INDICATED.
RATING OF PARTIAL AND FULL DELUSIONS.
In general, all delusions are rated as follows:
1 = Partial delusions, which are expressed with doubt, or as possibilities which
the subject entertains but is not certain about. This rating should not be used
if it is clear that full delusions have been present during the month, or if the
subject has acted as if fully deluded.
2 = Full delusions have been present at some time during the month. Fully
convinced. No insight.
A useful question to elucidate the difference between partial and full delusions is
as follows:
Even when you seem to be most convinced, do you really feel in the back of your
mind that it might well not be true, that it might be imagination?
15A. DELUSIONS OF CONTROL
Definition
The subject's will is replaced by that of some external agency. A simple statement
that the radio is controlling the subject is not sufficient. (This statement, alone,
should be rated 8.) The subject must describe a replacement of will by some other
force.
Do not include feeling that life is planned and directed by fate, or that the future
is present already in embryo, or that subject is not very strong-willed, or that voices
give subject orders. Do not include simple identification with God or being under
God's direction. Do not include subcultural or hysterical possession states or
multiple personality (->100).
Do you feel under the control of some force or power other than yourself?
(As though you were a robot or a zombie without a will of your own?)
(As though you were possessed by someone or something else?)
(What is that like?)
(Does this force make your movements for you without your willing it, or use
your voice, or your handwriting? Does it replace your personality? What is
the explanation?) i 1
RATE DELUSIONS OF CONTROL. I I
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
15B. MISINTERPRETATIONS, MISIDENTIFICATION AND
DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE
Definition
Delusions of reference: Do not include simple self-consciousness or feeling that
subject attracts comment, even if critical. These are rated under symptom 31.
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There must be elaboration: e.g. someone crosses his knees in order to indicate that
the subject is homosexual; or the whole neighbourhood is gossiping.
Delusional misinterpretations, etc. This is an extension of the delusion of refer¬
ence, so that not only do people seem to refer to subject, but situations appear to
be deliberately created to test him (exclude situations of medical treatment), or
objects appear to have special meanings.
Do people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double meaning, or do
things in a special way so as to convey a meaning?
Does everyone seem to gossip about you?
(Do people follow you about or check up on you or record your movements?)
(How do they do it? Why?)
(Are there people about who are not what they seem to be?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions.
Do things seem to be specially arranged?
(Is an experiment going on, to test you out?)
(Do you see any reference to yourself on TV or in the papers?)
(Do you ever seem to see special meanings in advertisements, or shop windows, or
in the way things are arranged?)
(How do you explain this?)
RATE DELUSIONAL MISINTERPRETATION AND
MISIDENTIFICATION.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
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15C. DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION
Is anyone deliberately trying to harm you, e.g. trying to poison you or kill you?
(How? Is there an organisation like the Mafia behind it?)
(Is there any other kind of persecution? How do you explain this?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
15 D. EXPANSIVE DELUSIONS
Do you think that people are organising things specially to help you?
RATE DELUSIONS OF ASSISTANCE.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
□ <74)
Is there anything special about you? Do you have special abilities or powers?
(Can you read people's thoughts?)
(Is there a special purpose or mission to your life?)
(Are you especially clever or inventive? How do you explain this?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF GRANDIOSE ABILITIES.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
(76)
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(Are you a very prominent person or related to someone prominent, like
Royalty?)
(Are you very rich or famous?)
(How do you explain this?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF GRANDIOSE IDENTITY: (Exclude
religious identification.)
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
15E. DELUSIONS CONCERNING VARIOUS TYPES OF
INFLUENCE AND PRIMARY DELUSIONS
Are you a very religious person?
(Specially close to Christ or God?)
(Can God communicate with you? How?)
(Are you yourself a saint?)
(How do you explain this?)
RATE RELIGIOUS DELUSIONS: Including delusional religious
explanations of other experiences. Exclude intense religious belief or
purely subcultural beliefs.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
How do you explain the things that have been happening? (SPECIFY)
Is there anything like hypnotism, telepathy, or the occult going on?
What is the explanation?
INCLUDE DELUSIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN TERMS OF
PARANORMAL PHENOMENA: e.g. hypnotism, telepathy, magic,
witchcraft, etc. Exclude purely subcultural beliefs, -*■ 83.
• 1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
Is anything like electricity, or X-rays, or radio-waves affecting you?
(In what way? What is the explanation?)
INCLUDE DELUSIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN TERMS OF
PHYSICAL FORCES: e.g. radio, television, X-rays, electricity,
transmitters, microphones, machines of various kinds.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
DELUSIONS OF ALIEN FORCES PENETRATING OR
CONTROLLING MIND (OR BODY).
Include any delusion, whether rated elsewhere or not, which involves an external
force penetrating the subject's mind or body, e.g. rays turn liver to gold, alien
thoughts pierce skull or are inserted into mind, hypnotism makes patient levitate,
a spirit speaks with subject's voice, a radio transmitter has been implanted into
brain and broadcasts thoughts or controls actions, etc.







Choose a likely delusion, and ask:
How did it come into your mind that this was the explanation?
(Did it happen suddenly? How did it begin?)
RATE PRIMARY DELUSIONS: Based upon experiences in which
subject suddenly becomes convinced that a particular set of events
has a special meaning. (See definition on page 214.) Not based on
mood or explanation of other abnormal experiences.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
(82)
15F. OTHER DEEUSIONS
(Examiner should question as appropriate.)
RATE SUBCULTURALLY INFLUENCED DELUSIONS: Include
only subjects who belong to small groups with definitely idiosyncratic
beliefs; small sects, tribes, 'secret societies', etc.
0 = No significant subcultural influence. For example, an English subject
believing he is influenced by TV would be rated (0) since, although the
delusion depends on TV being available in England, it is not in any way
specific to a small subcultural group.
1 = One or more of the 'delusions' rated earlier could easily be no more than a
belief shared by other members of the subject's subcultural group, e.g. the
Pentecostal church with the gift of tongues. Voodoo, witchcraft, communi¬
cating with God, are other examples of beliefs which may be taken quite
literally by groups of people who are not clinically deluded. Rate (1) if
subject holds such beliefs without elaborating them further.
2 = As (1), but because of excitement, expansiveness, depression, confusion,
intellectual retardation, etc., the subject holds the beliefs with exceptional
fervour and conviction, or elaborates them further. Such a subject might
well be regarded as abnormal by other members of his own sect or group.
3 = More specific delusional states, e.g. Koro, Witigo, etc.
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(Do you have any reason to be jealous of anybody?)
MORBID JEALOUSY.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
DELUSION OF PREGNANCY.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
SEXUAL DELUSIONS: Any delusion with sexual content, e.g. fantasy
lover, sex changing, etc. Do not include an untrue claim that a
subject is married or has children.
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Have you had any unusual experience or adventures recently?
RATE FANTASTIC DELUSIONS, DELUSIONAL MEMORIES,
DELUSIONAL CONFABULATIONS, FANTASTIC DELUSIONS:
Confabulation: Subject makes up delusions on the spot. Very rare.
Delusional memories: Subject seems to be describing actual memories.
Describes the same delusions time and again. Not confabulations.
Rare, e.g. 'I came down to earth on a silver star.' Fantastic delusions:
The commonest of the three, e.g. England's coast melting.
1 = Partial delusions 2 = Full delusions
15G. SIMPLE DELUSIONS BASED ON GUILT,
DEPERSONALISATION, HYPOCHONDRIASIS, ETC.
Definition
These symptoms often appear to be based on a depressed mood and are relatively
consistent and unelaborated. Do not include more bizarre elaborations of any of
them, e.g. having a metal nose = symptom 87, not 89. Having been turned into
another specified person = possibly symptom 71, not 90. Liver turned to lead by
X-rays = symptoms 80 and 81, not 91. England's coast melting = symptom 87,
not 92.
Do you feel you have committed a crime, or sinned greatly, or deserve punishment?
(Have you felt that your presence might contaminate or ruin other
people?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF GUILT.
1 = Subject has brought ruin to family by being in present condition, or thinks
that symptoms are a punishment for not doing better, etc. Does not
elaborate as in (2).
2 = Subject says has sinned greatly or committed some terrible crime or brought
ruin upon the world. May feel deserving of punishment, even of death or
hell-fire, because of it.
(Do you think your appearance is normal?)
RATE SIMPLE DELUSIONS CONCERNING APPEARANCE:
(Nose too large, teeth misshapen, body crooked, etc.)
1 = Strong feeling that there is something wrong with appearance; subject looks
old or ugly or dead, skin cracked, teeth misshapen, nose too large, body
crooked, etc. Can be reassured temporarily. There may be only one limited
preoccupation.
2 = Subject acts accordingly (plastic operations, etc.)
(Is anything the matter with your brain?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF DEPERSONALISATION: Subject has no
head, does not exist, hollow instead of a brain, etc.
1 = Unable to think, no thoughts in head, feels as though he has no brain or as
though it does not function at all.






(Is anything the matter with your body?)
RATE HYPOCHONDRIACAL DELUSIONS: Subject has incurable
cancer, bowels are stopped up, insides are rotting, etc.
1 = Subject feels body is unhealthy, rotten, diseased, but without the force of
(2).
2 = Subject has incurable cancer, bowels are stopped up or rotting away, etc.
(Do you have the feeling that something terrible is going to happen? What?)
RATE DELUSIONS OF CATASTROPHE: World is about to end,
some catastrophe has happened or will occur, everything is evil and \
will be destroyed. I
1 = Subject feels sense of impending doom; something awful will happen.
Non-specific but out of proportion to circumstances.
2 = Delusional conviction that world is about to end or some other enormous
catastrophe is about to occur or has occurred. World is dirty, decayed,
rotten: i.e. further delusional elaboration of (1).
□ <91)
15 H. GENERAL RATINGS OF DELUSIONS AND
HALLUCINATIONS
(Include both partial and full delusions.)
CONSIDER BOTH DELUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS IN FOLLOWING
RATINGS.
RATE SYSTEMATISATION OF DELUSIONS.
Scoring:
0 = No delusions or hallucinations.
1 = Delusions and hallucinations not elaborated into a general system affecting
much of the subject's experience. Include encapsulated delusions or isolated
hallucinations.
2 = Some systematic elaboration, but substantial areas of the subject's experi¬
ences are not affected.




0 = No attempt at concealment suspected.
1 = Examiner suspects that there may be (either) delusions or hallucinations in
the background, but the subject is not concealing much of the
psychopathology.
2 = Examiner suspects that there is a considerable preoccupation with delusions
(even a delusional system) or hallucinations, but the subject tries to conceal
them.
3 = No concealment but other delusions or hallucinations probably present. Not
elicited because of poor intelligence and education or incoherence or
muteness, etc.
| | (94)
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OVERALL RATING OF PREOCCUPATION WITH DELUSIONS
AND HALLUCINATIONS.
Scoring:
0 = No delusions or hallucinations.
1 = No delusions or hallucinations definitely rated but examiner suspects that
they may be present.
2 = Preoccupied with past delusions or hallucinations only. Not actively deluded
or hallucinated at present.
3 = Delusions or hallucinations definitely present but subject is not preoccupied
with them for much of the time. Can turn attention to other things without
difficulty.
4 = Delusions or hallucinations present and take up most of the subject's
attention. Preoccupied to the exclusion of many other matters.
5 = Patient can hardly discuss anything but delusions.
RATE ACTING OUT DELUSIONS
(Rate from case-record, etc.)
Scoring:
0 = No delusions or hallucinations.
1 = Subject able to keep delusions or hallucinations to himself, or to confide
them only to a few trusted people (sympathetic relatives, friends, doctors,
etc.). He does not express them in public nor act upon them. Does not talk
out loud to voices.
2 = Subject has acted upon delusions or hallucinations during past month, or
expressed them in public (i.e. outside the small circle of people who would
be expected to be sympathetic). This has not, however, resulted in severe
social disturbance or a social crisis.
3 = As (2) but acting out, or public expression, has resulted in severe social
disturbance or a social crisis.
16. SENSORIUM AND FACTORS AFFECTING
** Have you had any lapses of memory recently?
(Have there been any periods in which you completely forgot what happened?)
(What was it like?)
(How do you explain it?)
RATE FUGUES, BLACKOUTS, AMNESIA LASTING MORE
THAN ONE HOUR: irrespective of aetiology.
1 = less than 12 hours.
2 = 12-24 hours.
3 = more than 24 hours.
** What medicines or drugs do you take?
(Do you take anything for your nerves or your mood?)






| | (98)RATE DRUG ABUSE DURING MONTH. One category only.
1 = Cannabis.
2 = Amytal, etc.
3 = LSD, amphetamine, etc.
4 = Cocaine, heroin, etc.
** May I ask about your drinking habits? How much do you usually drink each
day?
(Is alcohol in any way a problem for you? In what way?)
(CHECK LIST: Present on card if needed. During the past month have you:
had family problems because of drinking?
missed work because of drinking?
had morning shakes or other withdrawal symptoms?
had blackouts for several hours?
heard voices or seen visions?)
RATE ALCOHOL ABUSE DURING PAST MONTH. 1 I (99)
1 = Agrees alcohol has been a problem but not 2.
2 = Any check-list item applies.
RATE DISSOCIATIVE STATES DURING PAST MONTH:
'Narrowing of consciousness which serves an unconscious purpose and
is commonly accompanied or followed by a selective amnesia',
e.g. trance, possession state, fugue, hypersomnia, stupor, etc.
Do not include if caused by drugs, alcohol, epilepsy, etc.
1 = Present during the past month, but not at examination.
2 = Present at examination.
(100)
RATE CONVERSION SYMPTOMS, e.g. paralysis, anaesthesia,
blindness, tremor, seizures, etc. if mentioned during interview.
1 = Present during month, not at examination.
2 = Present at examination.
(101)
RATE CLOUDING OR STUPOR AT
EXAMINATION
1 = Clouding: Inadequate comprehension of external impressions, with per¬
plexity, and impairment of attention and orientation.
2 = Stupor: Subject appears comatose but there is no clouding or impairment
of consciousness.
| | (102)
IF ANY SUSPICION OF POOR MEMORY OR DISORIENTATION:
May I ask one or two standard questions we ask of everybody?
How old are you?
Can you tell me the year and the month?
What is the name of the Prime Minister?
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** Do you think there is anything the matter with you?
(What do you think it is?)
(Could it be a nervous condition?)
(What do you think the cause is?)
(Why did you need to come to hospital?)
(Do you think (specify delusions or hallucinations) were part of a nervous
condition?)
IF PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS (i.e. SYMPTOMS FROM
SECTIONS 12-15):
0 = Full insight (in intelligent subject, able to appreciate the issues involved).
1 = As much insight into the nature of the condition as social background
and intelligence allow.
2 = Agrees to a nervous condition but examiner feels that subject does not
really accept the explanation in terms of a nervous illness (e.g. gives
delusional explanation, the result of persecution, or rays, etc.).
3 = Denies nervous condition entirely.
9 = Psychotic illness not present.
IF NEUROTIC SYMPTOMS (i.e. SYMPTOMS FROM
SECTIONS 1-11 ONLY):
0 = Full insight (in intelligent subject, able to appreciate the issues involved).
1 = As much insight into the nature of the condition as social background
and intelligence allow.
2 = Gives physical explanation for neurotic symptoms.
3 = Denies neurotic symptoms entirely.
9 = Neurotic illness not present.
** Of all the problems you have told me about, which one affects you most?
How much does it interfere with your work or your relationships with other
people?
(Have you actually been out of work, or been unable to do the housework, or
go shopping, travelling, etc., during the past month?)
(Have the symptoms impaired your efficiency in any other way?)
RATE SOCIAL IMPAIRMENT DUE TO NEUROTIC
CONDITION.
0 = No neurotic or psychotic symptoms present.
1 = Neurotic symptoms present but little diminution of subject's efficiency





2 = Neurotic symptoms interfere with subject's efficiency to a moderate
extent but are not incapacitating, e.g. subject neglects housework or
can't enjoy leisure activities or social relationships, or finds work-
efficiency reduced because of worry, tension, irritability, depression,
anxiety, etc. Subject does not, however, stop work altogether or com¬
pletely neglect household.
3 = Subject severely incapacitated by neurotic symptoms: had to have at
least a week off work during past month; was housebound for a week or
more; was actively withdrawn from all social relationships, etc. The
subject does not have to be totally incapacitated for the whole month
for this rating to be made, but impairment has to be very severe.
8 = Examiner unsure.
9 = Psychotic condition present.
(If both psychotic and neurotic condition, rate whichever shows more
impairment.)
CONDITION
0 = No neurotic or psychotic symptoms present.
1 = Psychotic symptoms present but little diminution of subject's efficiency
or interference with everyday activities.
2 = Psychotic symptoms interfere with subject's efficiency to a moderate
extent but are not incapacitating, e.g. subject neglects housework or
can't enjoy leisure activities or social relationships, or finds work-
efficiency reduced. Subject does not, however, stop work altogether or
completely neglect household.
3 = Subject severely incapacitated by psychotic symptoms: had to have at
least a week off work during past month; was housebound for a week or
more; was actively withdrawn from all social relationships, etc. The
subject does not have to be totally incapacitated for the whole month
for this rating to be made, but impairment has to be very severe.
8 = Examiner unsure.
9 = Neurotic condition, and no psychotic condition, present.
FINAL QUESTION
** Have there been any other things lately that I haven't covered?
Note here any points that seem to be important or unusual about the subject
or the interview which are not covered in the schedule.
Reconsider schedule to make sure that all obligatory questions have been asked.
Also consider whether behaviour, affect and speech ratings can be made or
whether further observation or examination is necessary. IF NOT, THIS IS
THE END OF THE INTERVIEW.
RATE SOCIAL IMPAIRMENT DUE TO PSYCHOTIC
Specify;
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18-20. BEHAVIOUR, AFFECT AND SPEECH
RATINGS
0 = Symptom absent.
1 = Present in fairly severe degree, or very severe but intermittent during
interview.
2 = Present in very severe degree and almost continuous during interview.
8 = Examiner not sure.
9 = Subject not examined, or examination not appropriate.
N.B. If in doubt, rate (0). A rating of (1) means there is no doubt about the symp¬
tom being present in fairly severe form.
Behaviour during interview
Self-neglect (cleanliness, shaven, make-up, state of hair and
clothes).
Bizarre appearance (secret documents openly displayed, special
clothes or ornaments with symbolic significance, etc. Do not
include mannerisms or posturing = symptom 116).
Slowness and underactivity (sits abnormally still, walks abnormally
slowly, delay in performing movements).
Agitation (fidgety, restlessness, pacing, frequent unnecessary
movements).
Gross excitement and violence (throws things, runs or jumps about,
waves arms wildly, shouts or screams).
Irreverent behaviour (sings, facetious, silly jokes, flippant remarks,
unduly familiar).
Distractibility (stops talking or changes subject due to distraction by
trivial noises or events outside the room or turns attention to
furniture, etc.).
Embarrassing behaviour (making sexual suggestions or advances to
interviewer; loss of social restraint - scratches genitals, passes loud
flatus, etc.).
Mannerisms and posturing (odd, stylised movements or acts, usually
idiosyncratic to the patient, often suggestive of special meaning or
purpose: assuming and maintaining uncomfortable or inappropriate
postures).
Stereotypies, etc.(constant repetition of movements or postures
such as rocking, rubbing, nodding, grimacing: no special significance).
Behaves as if hallucinated (non-verbal: as though hears voices or
visions: lips move soundlessly, looks round, giggles to self - not just














(Negativism: does the opposite of what he is asked.
Ambitendence: begins to take proffered hand, then withdraws; etc.
Echopraxia: imitates examiner's movement.
Flexibilitas cerea: arm remains where it is put, for at least 1 5 seconds.
Mitgehen: excessive co-operation in passive movement.
Echolalia: imitates words and phrases with same intonation and inflection of voice.)
(These items can be separately rated in special projects.)
Affect during interview
Observed anxiety (tense worried look or posture, fearful appre¬
hensive look, frightened tone of voice, tremor).
Observed depression (sad, mournful look, tears, gloomy tone of
voice, deep sighing, voice chokes on distressing topic).
Histrionic (feelings expressed in exaggerated, dramatic, histrionic
manner).
Hypomanic affect (unduly cheerful, smiling, euphoric,
elated).




Lability of mood (whether lability of one mood, or changing from
one mood to another).
Blunted affect (expressionless face and voice, uniform blunting
whatever the topic of conversation, indifference to distressing
topics, whether delusional or normal).
1 = Blunting not uniform, e.g. at times responds affectively but
at other times is markedly flat; or responds with some
evidence of affect, but definitely less than expected.
2 = Severe and uniform blunting.
Incongruity ofaffect (emotion is shown, but not congruent
with topic).
Speech during interview
Slow speech (long pauses before answering, long pauses between
words).
Pressure of speech (more copious speech than normal, too rapid
speech, very loud voice, too circumstantial speech).
Non-social speech (talks, mutters, whispers out loud, out of

















1 = Almost mute, fewer than twenty words in all.
2 = Totally mute.
Restricted quantity of speech (subject frequently fails to answer,
questions have to be repeated, restricted to minimum necessary,
no extra sentences, no additional comments).
Neologisms and idosyncratic use of words or phrases, e.g. 'One is
called "Per-God" and the other is called "Per-the-Devil"',
'. .. miracle-willed through God's "tarn-harn" ..'Well, there is a
frequenting of clairvoyance...'Per-God', 'Per-the-Devil' and
'tarn-harn' are neologisms; 'frequenting of clairvoyance' is an
example of ordinary words used idiosyncratically. DO NOT RATE





Disorder of content of speech
Three types of disordered content are specified: in each case, the effect is to make
it very difficult to grasp what the subject means. However, the symptoms are
defined in terms of specific components so that it should, in most cases, be possible
to say whether one, two, or all three symptoms are present. If in doubt, rate
hierarchically, i.e. rate incoherence in preference to flight of ideas and flight of
ideas in preference to poverty of speech.
If the patient does not talk enough to give a rateable sample of speech, rate all
three symptoms Y.
Incoherence of speech. The subject's meaning is obscured by dis¬
torted grammar, lack of logical connection between one part of a
sentence and another or between sentences, sudden irrelevances or
'Knight's move', grossly pedantic phrases, answering off the point,
etc. For example:
'We've seen the downfall of the radium crown by the Roman Catholics, whereas
when you come to see the drinking side of the business, God saw that Noah, if he
lost his reason, he got nobody there to look after them.'
'I did suggest to you, that intrinsic or congenital sentiment or refinement of
disposition would be so miracle-willed through God's "tarn-harn" as to assume
quite the opposite.'
'I believe we live in a world, in an age, where the elements are a force that elders
of professionalism hope, not to conquer, but to control.'
'What's your address?' 'It's supposed to be Salisbury near Birmingham.'
(Vorbeireden.)
DO NOT RATE THIS SYMPTOM PRESENT UNLESS EXAMPLES ARE
WRITTEN DOWN.
A rating of 2 means that very little normal speech is present.
N.B. A free flow of delusions is not necessarily incoherent. A subject may talk




Flight of ideas. Words are associated together inappropriately by
sound or rhyme (clang association). Although the original aim of the
sentence may quickly be lost, a path can be traced through asso¬
ciations of the white-black-coffin or ring-wrong variety, or through
associations with distracting stimuli, e.g.
'How is your appetite?' 'I feel as if I have lost my appetite. I have had an orange.
A real juicy orange.' (Sees patient walking past window.) 'She is going for E.C.T.
Etcetera treatment or teddy bear's picnic. I call it.'
DO NOT RATE THIS SYMPTOM PRESENT UNLESS EXAMPLES ARE
WRITTEN DOWN.
A rating of 2 means that very little normal speech is present.
Poverty of content of speech. The subject talks freely but so vaguely
that little information is given in spite of the number of words used:
rambles on without coming to a point; may wander far from
original theme. Exclude incoherence or flight of ideas. Rate only if
severe and always give written example.
Misleading answers. Subject's answers are misleading because answers
'yes' or 'no' to everything, or frequent self-contradictions, or
appears to be deliberately misleading. Do not include incoherence,
flight of ideas or poverty of speech here.
Re-rate adequacy of interview
0 = Ratings made adequately represent the symptoms present.
1 = Some problem but key symptoms have been rated.
2 = Serious question as to adequacy of interview for rating key
symptoms (other than sections 18-20).
3 = Only sections 18-20 could be rated.
Check that every box has an entry except those below ticked cut-off points.










AGE: ... MARITAL STATUS:
Here are some statements regarding the way people feel and think.
The statements are grouped in 21 sections from A to U. One
statement must be chosen from each section. You are requested to
put a circle round the number of the statement which fits you best at
the moment.
A 0 I do not feel sad
1 I feel blue or sad
2a I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap out of it
2b I am so sad or unhappy that it is very painful
3 I am so sad and unhappy that I can't stand it
B 0 I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged about the future
la I feel discouraged about the future
2a I feel I have nothing to look forward to
2b I feel that I won't ever get over my troubles
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve
C 0 I do not feel like a failure
1 I feel that I have failed more than average
2a I feel I have accomplished very little that is worthwhile or that
means anything
2b As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures

























am not particularly dissatisfied
feel bored most of the time
don't enjoy things the way I used to
don't get satisfaction out of anything any more
am dissatisfied with everything
don't feel particularly guilty
feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time
feel quite guilty
feel bad or unworthy practically all the time now
feel as though I am very bad or worthless
don't feel I am being punished
have a feeling that something bad may happen to me
feel I am being punished or will be punished
feel I deserve to be punished
want to be punished
don't feel disappointed in myself
am disappointed in myself
don't like myself
am disgusted with myself
hate myself
don't feel I am worse than anyone else
am very critical of myself for my weaknesses, or mistakes
blame myself for everything that goes wrong























don't have any thoughts of harming myself
! have thoughts of harming myself but I would not carry them out
! feel I would be better off dead
: have definite plans about committing suicide
feel my family would be better off if I were dead
would kill myself if I could
don't cry any more than usual
cry more now than I used to
cry all the time now. I can't stop it
! used to be able to cry but now I can't cry at all even though I
ant to
! am no more irritated now than I ever am
get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to
! feel irritated all the time
! don't get irritated at all at the things that used to irritate me
have not lost interest in other people
! am less interested in other people now than I used to be
! have lost most of my interest in other people and have little
'eelings for them
have lost all my interest in other people and don't care about
hem at all
make decisions about as well as ever
am less sure of myself now and try to put off making decisions
! can't make decisions any more without help
I can't make any decisions at all any more
I\l 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance and
they make me look unattractive
3 I feel that I am ugly or repulsive to look at
□ 0 I can work about as well as before
la It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something
lb I don't work as well as I used to
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything
3 I can't do any work at all
P 0 I can sleep as well as usual
1 I wake up more tired in the morning than I used to
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back
to sleep
3 I wake up early every day and can't get more than 5 hours' sleep
Q 0 I don't get any more tired than usual
1 I get tired more easily than I used to
2 I get tired from doing anything
3 I get too tired to do anything
R 0 My appetite is no worse than usual
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be
2 My appetite is much worse now
3 I have no appetite at all any more
SOI haven't lost much weight, if any, lately
1 I have lost more than 5 lbs
2 I have lost more than 10 lbs
3 I have lost more than 15 lbs
I am no more concerned about my health than usual
I am concerned about aches and pains or_ upset stomach or_
constipation or other unpleasant feelings in my body
I am so concerned with how I feel or what I feel that it's
hard to think of much else
I am completely absorbed in what I feel
I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex
I am less interested in sex than I used to be
I am much less interested in sex now
I have lost interest in sex completely
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APPENDIX VI
Irritability, depression, anxiety scale
This questionnaire is to help the doctor to know how you are feeling
at present. Read each item carefully and underline the response which
best shows how you are feeling now, or have been feeling in the last
day or two.
ft clinical scale for the self-assessment of irritability




No, not at all




No, not at all









No, not at all
5. I feel tense or wound up
Yes, definitely
Yes, sometimes
No , not much
No, not at all




No, not at all
7. I have kept up my old interests
Yes, most of them
Yes, some of them
No, not many of them
No, none of them
8. I am patient with other people
All of the time
Most of the time
Some of the time
Hardly ever









No, not at all




No, not at all















15. I'm awake before I need to get up
For two hours or more
For about one hour
For less than one hour
Not at all, I sleep until it is time to get up -r/V/'l
/i









No, I never can









The purpose of this exercise is to measure the meaning of certain things
to various people by having them judge them against a series of descriptive
scales. In doing this please make your judgement on the basis of what
these mean to you. On each page of this pamphlet you will find a different
concept to be judged and beneath it a set of scales. You are to rate the
concept on each of these scales in order.
Here is houi you are to use these scales:
If you feel that the concept at the top of the page is very closely related
to_ one end of the scale, you should place your check-mark as follows:
fair X : : : : : : : unfair
fair : : : : : : X : unfair
If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to one or the other
end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your check-mark
as follows:
strong : X : : : : : : weak
strong : : : : : X : : weak
If the concept seems only slightly related to one side as opposed to the
other side (but is not really neutral), then you should check as follows:
active : : X : : : : : passive
active : : : : X : : : passive
The direction towards which you check, of course, depends upon which of
the two ends of the scale seems most characteristic of the things you are
judging.
If you consider the concept to be neutral on the scale, both sides of the
scale equally associated with the concept, or if the scale is completely
irrelevant, unrelated to the concept, then you should place your check¬
mark in the middle space.
safe : : : X : : : : dangerous
Never put more than one check-mark on a single scale.
Sometimes you may feel as though you have had the same item before on
the test. This will not be the case, so do not look back and forth
through the items. Do not try to remember how you checked similar items
earlier in the test. Make each item a separate and independent judgement.
Work at a steady pace and don t worry or puzzle much over individual
items. It is your first impressions, the immediate 'feelings' about the
items that we want. On the other hand, please avoid carelessness, because
we want your true impressions.











































































My environment as it is now
1. successful : : : : : : : unsuccessful
2. bad : : : : : : : good
3. worthless : : : : : : : worthwhile
4. hopeful : : : : : : : hopeless
5. active : : : : : : : passive
6. interesting : : : : : : : dull
7. slow : : : : : : : fast
8. unpleasant : : : : : : : pleasant
9. negative : : : : : : : positive
10. in control : : : : : : : helpless
11. inadequate : : : : : : : adequate
12. happy : : : : : : : sad





























Here are some statements about the way you see the future. Read each
statement carefully. If the statement describes how you think about the
future, circle the word true at the side of the questionnaire. If it does
not describe how you think about the future, circle the word false at the
side of the questionnaire.
1. I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm
2. I might as well give up because I can't make things
better for myself
3. When things are going badly I am helped by knowing
that they can't stay that way for ever
4. I can't imagine what my life would be like in 10 years
























In the future I expect to succeed in what concerns me
most True
Fly future seems dark to me True
I expect to get more of the good things in life than
the average person
I just don't get the breaks, and there's no reason to
believe I will in the future True
Fly past experiences have prepared me well for my future True
All I can see ahead of me is unpleasantness rather than
pleasantness True
I don't expect to get what I really want True
Whan I look ahead to the future I expect that I will
be happier than I am now True
Things just don't work out the way I want them to True
I have great faith in the future True
I never get what I want so it is foolish to want anything True
It is very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction
in the future True
The future seems vague and uncertain to me
T can look forward to more good times than bad times
There's no use in really trying to get something I


























1 0-4 Depressed mood
2 0-4 Guilt
3 0-4 Suicide
4 0-2 Insomnia, initial
5 0-2 Insomnia, middle
6 0-2 Insomnia, delayed
7 0-4 Work and interests
8 0-4 Retardation
9 0-4 Agitation
10 0-4 Anxiety, psychic
11 0-4 Anxiety, somatic
12 0-2 Somatic symptoms, gastro-intestinal
»
13 0-2 Somatic symptoms, general
14 0-2 Somatic symptoms, genital
15 0-4 Hypochondriasis
16 0-2 Loss of insight




19 0-4 Depersonalisation, etc.
20 0-2 Obsessional symptoms
Gradinq
0 Absent




















List of PSE items used to meet the research diagnostic criteria
for primary major depression
Presence of reported symptoms















































25 suicidal plans or acts 1 ,2 or 3
110 slowness and underactivity 1 only
111 agitation 1 only
6
36











Present State Examination fPSE)
Presence or absence of reported symptoms in the hospital population
(INI ■ 49) and general practice population (N ■ 38, 1 PSE missing)
Hospital G.P.






1 physical health rating: (I1) 22 45 18 47
2) 9 18 6 16
3) 3 • 07 0 0
2 doctor's opinion rating: (J1) 10 21 2 • 05
2) 2 4 0 0
U) 0 0 1 • 02
3 psychosomatic 1 • 02 1 • 02
4 worrying 42 86 30 79
5 tension pains 25 51 23 61
6 loss of energy, exhaustion 43 88 34 89
7 muscular tension 33 67 22 58
8 agitation 24 49 18 47
9 hypochondriasis 8 16 6 16
10 psychic tension 44 90 33 87
11 autonomic tension 34 69 24 63
12 anxious foreboding 8 16 11 29
13 anxiety due to delusions 2 • 04 0 0
14 panic attacks 10 20 1 • 02
15 situational anxiety 15 31 3 ' • 08
16 anxiety over meeting people 20 41 4 11
17 specific phobias 7 14 2 • 05
18 anxiety avoidance 5 10 4 11
19 inefficient thinking 37 76 23 61
20 poor concentration 36 73 28 74
21 neglect because of brooding 28 57 22 58
22 loss of interest in activities 40 82 24 63
23 depressed mood 49 100 38 100
24 hopelessness 43 88 33 87
25 suicidal ideas or acts 27 55 17 45
26 primary depression 38 78 30 79
anxiety and depression 12 24 7 18
27 diurnal variation 22 45 12 32
rated 2)
28 avoidance of social contact 36 73 24 63
29 self-depreciation 34 69 20 53
30 lack of self confidence 41 84 24 63
31 simple ideas of reference 15 31 10 26
32 guilty ideas of reference 8 16 8 21
33 self-blame 28 57 18 47
34 weight loss 18 37 12 32
35 delayed sleep 22 45 22 58
36 subjective anergia 42 86 24 63
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Hospital G.P.






37 early morning wakening 19 39 21 55
38 loss of libido 23 47 9 24
39 premenstrual exacerbation 12 24 10 26
40 irritability 43 87 33 87
41 expansive mood 2 .04 0 0
42 ideomotor pressure 1 .02 0 0
43 grandiose ideas 0 0 0 0
44 obsessional checking 10 20 4 11
45 obsessional cleanliness 4 .08 0 0
46 obsessional ideas 13 27 4 11
47 derealisation 5 10 0 0
48 depersonalisation 8 16 0 0
100 dissociative state 3 .06 0 0
101 conversion symptom 1 .02 0 0
110 slowness, underactivity 4 .08 2
111 agitation 5 10 1
120 observed anxiety 15 31 14 37
121 observed depression 42 86 27 71
122 hystrionic 3 .06 1






Two-way analysis of variance for the entire population




Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 3.262 1
TR 1.650 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 20.698 1
TR 0.498 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
LOC 24.955 1
TR 0.700 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 11.131 1
TR 3.478 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 10.277 1
TR 0.302 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.285 1
TR 0.830 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 3.165 1
TR 0.079 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.810 1
TR 0.263 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.300 1
TR 0.102' 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.177 1
TR 0.079 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 3.450 1
TR 1.252 2
LOC x TR 3.015 2
Explained 2.373 5




Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.769 1
TR 0.616 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 5.280 1
TR 0.664 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.176 1
TR 0.581 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.471 1
TR 1.280 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.181 1
TR 0.865 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.019 1
TR 0.691 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 2.759 1
TR 1.411 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.035 1
TR 0.256 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.485 1
TR 1.232 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.998 1
TR 4.162 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.071 1
TR 0.065 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.307 1
TR 3.487 2











TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF UARIANCE




Source of variation F ratio Of
STAT 3.867 - 1
TR 1.621 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 3.986 1
TR 0.375 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 1.398 1
TR 0.466 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
STAT 0.045 1
TR 2.700 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.281 1
TR 0.291 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 25.955 1
TR 1.378 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 2.527 1
TR 0.045 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
STAT 3.344 1
TR 0.347 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 2.203 1
TR 0.149 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 5.178 1
TR 0.043 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 2.153 1
TR 1.043 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 5.073 1
TR 0.527 2






Source of variation F ratio Of
STAT 3.371 1
TR 0.757 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.044 1
TR 0.555 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.066 1
TR 1.231 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 6.020 1
TR 1.085 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 2.037 1
TR 0.748 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 2.472 1
TR 1.492 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.165 1
TR 0.254 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 1.476 1
TR 1.394 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 8.575 1
TR 5.359 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.424 1
TR 0.081 2
STAT x TR 0.785 2




Source of variation F ratio Df
STAT 0.047 1
TR 3.455 2






Two-way analysis of variance
for completers only





Source of variation F ratio Df
LDC 1.554 1
TR 2.050 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
LOC 23.137 1
TR 0.834 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 24.103 1
TR 0.69 6 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 6.406 1
TR 2.68 6 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 4.102 1
TR 0.077 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.913 1
TR 1.947 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 4.040 1
TR 0.058 2





Source of variation- F ratio Df
LOC 0.576 1
TR 1.392 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LDC 0.038 1
TR 0.326 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.006 1
TR 0.047 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 7.423 1
TR 0.769 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 2.463 1
TR 0.259 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 4.146 1
TR 0.909 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
LOC 0.530 1
TR 0.641 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
LOC . 0.012 1
TR 2.466 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.729 1
TR 1.266 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 2.862 1
TR 1.339 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 3.013 1
TR 2.215 2





Source of v/ariation F ratio Df
LOC 0.581 1
TR 0.264 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.059 1
TR 1.397 2






Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 1.815 1
TR 6.179 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.294 1
TR 0.053 2





Source of variation F ratio Df
LOC 0.141 1
TR 2.560 2






List of symptoms used to meet the research diagnostic criteria
for endogenous major depression
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APPENDIX XV.
Research Diagnostic Criteria: Endogenous Major Depressive Disorder
A. 1. Distinct quality of depressed mood
2. Lack of reactivity to environmental changes
3. Wood is worse a.m.
4. Pervasive loss of interest or pleasure.
B. 1. Feelings of self-reproach or excessive or inappropriate guilt
2. Early morning awakening or middle insomnia
3. Psychomotor retardation or agitation (more than mere subjective
feeling)
4. Poor appetite
5. Weight loss (2 lbs a week over several weeks or 20 lbs a year,
not on a diet)
6. Loss of interest or pleasure (may or may not be pervasive) in
usual activities or decreased sexual drive.
(From groups A and B a total of at least four symptoms for probable,





















Source of Variation F ratio Df
Covariates 1.194 4
EDUC 1.069 1
































































Source ou variation F ratio Df

















PSE 10.978 ' 1
LOC 0.720 1
TR 4.929 2











































































































































Two-way analysis of covariance for percentage change scores
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APPENDIX XVII
Percentage change in BDI












Percentage change in HS












Percentage change in PEP













Percentage change in flIMX












Percentage change in IN












Percentage change in OUT













Percentage change in IRR
Source of variation F ratio Df











Percentage change in AM












Percentage change in WAS













Percentage change in UP












Percentage change in ENU












Percentage change in FUT













Percentage change in IDS












Percentage change in IDUJ












Percentage change in WflSE





. PSE 0.917 1
LOC 0.107 1
TR 0.436 2





Percentage change in HRS












Percentage change in C5












Percentage change in WS














Presence of endogenous symptoms in each population (
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APPENDIX XVIII
Presence of endogenous and non-endogenous symptom pattern
in the hospital and general practice samples fcompleters only)
Endogenous Non-endogenous Total
Hospital 16 24 40
G.P. 11 13 24
Total 27 37 64
X2 = .51 Df = 1 NS
488.
APPENDIX XIX





Having identified several variables which appear to predict
best response in each treatment group, it was considered desirable
to use this information to create three 'predicted treatment groups'
(combination, C8T and drugs) and assign patients to these groups on the
basis of individual characteristics. The reason for doing this was to
find out which treatments, in theory, were best suited to individual
patients. Moreover, it was felt that, if the different predicted
groups were, in fact, composed of different types of people, then it
should be feasible to discriminate these categories statistically using
variables other than those which defined the categories. By delineating
the boundaries between the predicted treatment groups, it might be
possible to learn more about which measurements are most effective in
distinguishing between the predicted groups, how best to combine the
measurements, and how successfully the distinction can be made. The
statistical method used to examine these questions was discriminant
function analysis.
Essentially, a discriminant function is a regression equation with
a dependent variable that represents group membership. The function
maximally discriminates the me/mbersof the group and indicates to which
group each member probably belongs (Kerlinguer, 1973). In brief, if
there are two or more independent variables and members of, for example,
two groups, the discriminant function gives the 'best' prediction of the
'correct' group membership of each member of the sample. Thus, the
discriminant funtion can be used to assign individuals to groups
according to their scores on a number of measures (Kerlinguer, ibid).
490.
For a detailed discussion of discriminant function analysis, the reader
is referred to Kerlinguer (1973), Tatsuoka (1970, 1971), Rao (1978) and
the Manual for the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (2nd
edition, 1975).
In the present study, three regression equations were produced
from the data from each treatment group (p. ) which gave a predicted
response to treatment (i.e. % change in BDI) for each subject who
received that treatment. Next, each of the regression equations was
applied to each subject in the other categories (e.g. the equation for
combination treatment was applied to each subject in CBT and the
equation for CBT to each subject in the drugs group). By examining
individual cases in this way it was passible to determine, at least
hypothetically, which was predicted to be the best treatment in terms
of % change on the BDI. For example, subject A who really got combination
therapy might have achieved a 50/2 reduction in BDI score, only a 20/2
change had he received drugs, or a 40/2 change if he had been assigned
to CBT alone. There was a predicted score also for the treatment he
actually received (i.e. combination therapy) which may or may not have
coincided with his actual score.
In this way three predicted groups were created, i.e. one for each
treatment, and a discriminant function analysis computed (SPSS, 2nd
edition, 1975) in order to (l) distinguish statistically between these
categories using variables other than those included in the regression
equations and (2) on the basis of weights given to each of the variables
which comprised the key function, identify the variables (psychological
characteristics) which contributed most towards discriminating the
predicted treatment groups.
491.
Of the twenty-five variables included initially in the research,
eighteen were used in the discriminant analysis. Two variables, total
irritability (IRR) and discrepancy between ideal and premorbid self
(IDU) had been analysed, in fact, but had to be dropped because they
caused signularity in the within groups covariance matrices. Duration
of illness (DILL), educational level (EDUC), view of the environment
(ENV), referral source (LOC), and ideal self discrepancy(IDS) were ex¬
cluded because they were variables which had been identified previously
as predictors of response to therapy. Since these variables were used
to create the categories being discriminated, it would have been artificial
to include them in the computation of the discriminant functions.
As suggested in the discussion (p. ), it is recognised that this
analysis is essentially a statistical manoeuvre in that the information
gained from it applies to abstract categories (predicted treatment groups)
rather than actual treatment groups. Nevertheless, it was hoped that
data from the discriminant analysis might be relevant to the clinician
interested in different ways of conceptualising the selection of patients
for specific treatments and raise questions for future research.
Table XIX Distribution of cases in the predicted groups based on
l the regression equations for combination, CBT and drugs














From table XIX^, of the 64 completers in the trial, 27 cases were
assigned to the predicted group for combination treatment, 26 cases
to the predicted group for CBT and only 11 cases to the predicted
group of pharmacotherapy. In other words, when the predictors for
each treatment were used as the standard for selection, over Q0% of the
patients admitted to the trial were assigned to CBT with or without
drugs as preferred treatment.
Table XIX^ Number and relative importance of functions derived in
the discriminant analysis of the three predicted treatment
groups
Discrim- Eigen- Relative Cononical Functions Wilk's X2 Signifi¬
cant value % correlation derived Lambda Df's cance
1 1.36 77.6 0.76 0 0.303 59.0 0.009
36
2 0.39 22.4 0.53 1 0.727 16.4, 0.49
17
Table XIX2 shows the number and relative importance of functions
derived in the discriminant analysis of the three predicted groups
(categories). Discriminant function 1, with its relatively high
eigenvalue and associated correlation, had considerable discriminative
power in terms of its capacity to separate the groups, whereas the
second function was relatively weak. Looking at the column 'Lambda'
(and its associated X2 tests of significance), before any functions were
removed Lambda was 0.303 which further indicated the discriminating
power of function 1. However, after some of the information had been
removed by the second function, Lambda increased to the point where X2
was no longer statistically significant (Lambda - 0.727). Function 2 did
not add significantly to discriminating the three groups and can, there¬
fore, be discounted.
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From tables XIX and XIX » the discriminant analysis for the3 4
eighteen variables separated the predicted groups (also labelled 'actual
categories') for combination, CBT and drugs at a highly significant
level. 80.3^ of known cases were correctly classified. All of
the members of the 'actual' drug group were correctly discriminated.
The most incorrectly classified group was the 'actual' combined
treatment and cases from this group were assigned predominently to the
CBT discriminant predicted group (2Q%), though a small proportion were
also placed in the discriminant predicted group for drugs (Q%). Some
CBT cases were, in fact, misclassified but all of these were assigned to
the discriminant predicted group for combined treatment.
lable XIX^ Standardised discriminant coefficients for the predicted
groups for the three treatments
Variables Function 1 Function 2
1. Sex -0.178 0.120
2. Age -0.025 0.022
3. SOC -0.290 -0.079
4. PSE 0.543 0.130
5. BDI -0.308 0.122
6. HS 0.079 -0.391
7. DEP 0.000 0.362
8. ANX -0.030 -0.482
9. IN -0.238 0.621
10. OUT -0.326 -0.181
11. API -0.332 -2.700
12. WAS 0.380 2.270
13. WD 0.142 -0.199
14. FUT 0.246 0.231
15. WASE -0.684 -2.957
16. HRS -0.252 -0.255
17. CS -0.135 0.011
18. WS 0.131 0.400
49 4.
Looking at function 1 (table ^IX^), the greatest negative
discriminants were: perceived negative change in self with illness
(WASE), level of self-esteem (API), outward directed irritability (OUT),
self-reported depression (BDI), social class (SOC), and observer rated
depression (HRS). Variables showing the greatest positive values were:
total severity score on the PSE, pre-morbid self-esteem (WAS) and
personal future (FUT).
Table XIX Predicted results based on the discriminant functions for
variables 1 to 18. Group 1 refers to Combination treatment

































N.B. Three cases could not be classified in the analysis
80.3* of known cases correctly classified
Chi square = 59.0, p — < .01















Table XIX shows the mean discriminant scores for each group
5
on the respective functions. These data and the distribution of
cases around each group centroid (mean) are presented graphically in
figure XIX
5
The results for function 1 indicate that the CBT predicted group,
with its negative score, has been most easily separated from the
predicted group for drugs which has a relatively high, positive dis¬
criminant score. However, the boundary between the combination treat¬
ment group and the other two treatments is less distinct and the over¬
lap, particularly between the combined therapy and CBT, is considerable.
Thus, relating the discriminant variables to the appropriate
predicted treatment groups may be done as follows: total severity score
on the PSE, level of pre-morbid functioning (WAS) and outlook about
personal future (FUT) identified the predicted drug therapy group. For
the CBT predicted group, perceived deviation from normal (WASE), current
self-esteem (API), outward directed irritability (OUT), self-reported
(BDI) and observer-rated depression (HRS), and social class (SOC) were
the most decisive discriminant variables.
Because of the overlap between the groups, it is difficult to
specify the best discriminants for the predicted combined group.
However, as the two pharmacotherapy treatments have positive centroid
loadings and are, therefore, more closely represented in reduced space
(fig.XIX,- ), it is likely that the combined group is better identified
by the positively weighted discriminant variables, rather than the
negative ones. Thus, both pharmacotherapy groups are most accurately
discriminated by ratings on psychiatric symptoms (PSE), pre-morbid function¬




























As to the best combination of measurements, the variables which
contributed most to function 1 overall were: perceived deviation from
normal (hJASE = -0.68), PSE total score (PSE = +0.54), pre-morbid
functioning (WAS = +0.38), current self-esteem (AM - -0.33), outward
irritability (OUT = -0.32), self-reported depression (BDI = -0.30),
social class (S0C = -0.29), observed depression (HRS = -0.25) and
personal future (FUT = +0.24).
As the mean discriminant scores were well-separated and the
overall distribution of scores tended towards distinct separation ,
these discriminants and their associated psychological meanings may now
be applied to the drug and CBT predicted groups.
Table XlXglists the psychological characteristics which further
identified the kinds of people-who might do best on drugs and CBT.
Table XlXg Variables which contributed most towards identifying patients
in the predicted groups for drugs and CBT
Drug predicted group CBT predicted group
1. high PSE total score 1. high perceived deviation from
normal
2. good pre-morbid functioning 2. relatively high self-esteem
3. higher social class 3. high outward irritability
4. positive view of personal 4. high self-reported and
future observer-rated depression
Thus, these variables, in conjunction with those which predicted
a good response to each treatment as gleaned from the multiple regression
analysis (see pages in discussion) allow for the development of
specific hypotheses concerning the type of people who might respond to
combination treatment, cognitive therapy alone, and drugs.
